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Abstract
The thesis identifies goals of proportionate dispute resolution (PDR). The 
operation of the decision-making and dispute resolution processes relating to 
the provision of remedial help for children with special educational needs 
(SEN) is examined to assess attainment of these goals.
A factual basis is established for the analysis by describing the relevant 
legislative provisions and what is known about their operation from existing 
empirical research. The exercise of discretion is examined. A theoretical 
framework is devised to enable consideration of the balance of trade-offs; 
collective goals and individual interests; and adequacy of redress. The SEN 
decision-making and appeals processes are analysed with reference to this 
framework. Parties to SEN disputes are parents and Local Education Authorities 
(LEAs). Attainment of PDR goals by the formal SEN dispute resolution 
mechanisms is assessed and the mechanisms compared.
In 2002, obligations were imposed upon LEAs to provide informal 
disagreement resolution services in the form of conciliation and mediation. The 
strengths and weaknesses of these dispute resolution models are considered 
with reference to theoretical and empirical works. The effect of their 
introduction is then assessed with reference to the framework and attainment of 
PDR goals. None of the formal or informal dispute resolution mechanisms 
assure attainment of all of the PDR goals. Neither does the operation of the 
system as a whole.
Analysis of the children’s services complaints model using the framework 
reveals that this model assures attainment of all PDR goals and affords adequate 
redress. The model appears to resolve problems identified in the SEN dispute 
resolution process, and to be a promising candidate both for reform of that 
process and for a unified system of education and children’s services 
complaints. The role of children in the process and possibilities for one-door 
access and a single system are considered.
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Chapter One
Introduction
Behind the most practical decision-making lie matters of theoretical 
interest. It is hoped that the discussion of those issues will not only be of 
interest in its own right, but that it may also be of practical interest in 
helping to identify some of the problems that are encountered in any 
area of discretionary authority. (Galligan 1986 p.3).
1.1. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter describes the structure of the thesis and its methodology; explains 
the theoretical framework of the analysis; describes the context of SEN 
decision-making and dispute resolution; sets out Mashaw’s bureaucratic justice 
models and discusses the relevant statutory provisions with reference to the 
models.
1.2. INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS
1.2.1. Central Question addressed by the Thesis
The term ‘Proportionate Dispute Resolution’ (PDR) is taken from the White 
Paper ‘Transforming Public Services: Complaints, Redress and Tribunals’ 
published in 2004 (‘Transforming Public Services’). This states that decision­
making systems must be designed to minimise errors and uncertainty, and that, 
where mistakes are made, the ‘system for putting things right’ must be 
proportionate. That is, it should reflect the following ‘standards’:
• there should be no disproportionate barriers to users in 
terms of cost, speed or complexity;
• misconceived or trivial complaints are identified and rooted 
out quickly;
• those with the power to correct a decision get things right 
and changes feed back into the decision-making system so 
that there is less error and uncertainty in the future; and
• disputes are dealt with cost-effectively. (Ibid. para 1.7)
The standards are aspirational, therefore they are referred to in the thesis as ‘the 
PDR goals’.
This thesis is an examination of the decision-making and dispute resolution 
processes relating to the provision of remedial help for children with special
10
educational needs (SEN). Decisions about the nature of children’s needs and the 
help they receive are made by schools and Local Education Authorities (LEAs). 
Formal dispute resolution mechanisms for resolving disputes between parents 
and LEAs are the Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal 
(SENDIST), the Local Commissioners for Administration (referred to as the 
Local Government Ombudsman (LGO))1, and the Administrative Court. The 
Special Educational Needs and Disability Act 2001 imposed an obligation upon 
LEAs to make arrangements for informal disagreement resolution services, and 
to make schools and parents aware of these services. The thesis assess firstly 
whether the formal mechanisms assure proportionate dispute resolution, and 
secondly what is added by the introduction of informal disagreement resolution 
services.
The SEN statutory framework is described alongside information about its 
operation drawn from empirical studies to establish a factual basis for the 
analysis. The first stage of the analysis comprises consideration of the operation 
of discretion. The second stage takes as its central reference point the work of 
Jerry L. Mashaw and Michael Adler. Their work was chosen because, in order 
to draw meaningful conclusions about the operation of decision-making and 
dispute resolution processes, it is necessary to examine the operational effects 
of the trade-offs employed, particularly the effect of the trade-off between 
collective goals and individual interests. These themes are the focus of two 
studies - Mashaw’s study of a disability benefit programme (Mashaw 1983) and 
Adler’s study of school admission appeals (Adler 1989). Observations drawn 
from Mashaw and Adler’s work are applied to the operation of SEN decision­
making and dispute resolution enabling conclusions to be drawn about the 
effects of adopting particular configurations of trade-offs and models for 
balancing individual interests and collective goals.
1 The thesis refers to the LGO as a formal mechanism in contrast to mediation and conciliation 
which are referred to as informal. Transforming Public Services’ refers to Ombudsmen as 
informal mechanisms in contrast with courts and tribunals.
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The basis of analysis in the thesis is different to that employed in recent studies 
of the SENDIST2. The PDR goals are not focused exclusively upon dispute 
resolution processes. They envisage improvement of initial decision-making, 
case management and outcomes of complaints informing future decisions. 
Justice, if it features at all, as about ‘getting things right’ in terms of correction. 
There is no reference to the Franks’ criteria of openness, fairness or impartiality 
(Franks 1957). This signals a policy leaning towards substantive justice, as 
opposed to procedural fairness, and towards Mashaw’s model of bureaucratic 
rationality3 which is driven by the objective of realisation of the legislative will 
at the lowest possible cost. The thesis makes no comment upon the merits of the 
definition of PDR, regarding its goals simply as the declared objective of 
administrative reform. It does consider procedural fairness.
The PDR goals provide a benchmark for the analysis. It is possible to identify 
which goals each SEN dispute resolution mechanism assures the attainment of. 
But it is necessary to go further. Mashaw suggests that evaluation with 
reference to false-absolutes, such as ‘accuracy’, ‘efficiency’ or ‘fairness’ is a 
substitute for critical analysis. In order to draw meaningful conclusions, it is 
necessary to evaluate trade-offs among goals. He also suggests that this is both 
problematic and unsatisfactory. Whilst, for example, a cost-benefit analysis of 
the provision of representation may be straightforward, weighting the 
importance of accuracy against delay, where one is traded-off in favour of the 
other, is problematic. Any conclusions would be open to argument.
For this reason, and because there is no indication in policy documentation that 
any of the PDR goals should have greater weight, the thesis does not attempt to 
weight goals. But it goes further than simply determining whether they are 
attained. Where a goal is not attained, the trade-offs leading to this are 
considered. This enables observations to be drawn about what needs to be
2 Harris’s assessment criteria were independence, impartiality, skill, speed and an enabling 
approach giving due weight to the views of parents and children (Harris 1997). Leggatt 
considered whether the tribunal offered an enabling approach which supported the parties in a 
way that would give them confidence in their own abilities to participate in the process (Leggatt 
2001). Genn used Leggatt’s benchmark in terms of access, fair hearings and outcomes (Genn 
2006).
3 The model is described on p. 31 and discussed in detail in Chapter Four.
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changed in order to attain goals, and for comparisons to be made between 
different mechanisms to determine which dispute resolution model provides the 
optimum assurance of PDR. The thesis does not simply substitute PDR goals 
for access to justice criteria as false-absolutes and determine whether each are 
met, it adds depth to existing analysis of SEN dispute resolution; reaches new 
conclusions, and makes cohesive and sustainable arguments for change.
‘Transforming Public Services’ suggests that different redress mechanisms have 
advantages and disadvantages, and recommends combining mechanisms to 
enable a responsive service based upon choice -  a ‘one-door approach’. It 
makes few practical suggestions, however, as to how this objective might be 
achieved. In light of this recommendation, it is necessary to consider how 
redress is provided for each of the different types of grievance that commonly 
arise in SEN disputes. Adler, adopting PDR as a reasonable conception of 
administrative justice and an appropriate starting point for legislative reform, 
has developed a composite typology of administrative grievances (Adler 
2006c). The typology is used in the thesis not as a tool for empirical research, as 
was envisaged by Adler, but as a tool to draw observations about various 
dispute resolution models in order to reach conclusions about:
• the ability of individual SEN dispute resolution mechanisms to deal with 
each of the grievances identified;
• the detrimental effects of having a plethora of dispute resolution 
mechanisms in operation;
• the advantages of mediation and conciliation in enabling all aspects of a 
dispute to be dealt with in one arena; and
• provision of a ‘one-door’ service for complaints about the provision of 
education and children’s services by local authorities and schools.
The analysis situates SEN decision-making and dispute resolution as part of an 
overall system of providing education and other services to children. There has 
been a tendency in previous work to focus upon SEN in isolation4. As the Audit 
Commission observe (Audit Commission 2002b), it is difficult to see how
4 Harris (2007) is an exception.
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teaching in mainstream classes of 30 children, including children with 
significant learning difficulties and physical disabilities, can operate effectively 
for all of those children unless decisions are made with reference to both the 
needs of individual children and the needs of the class. Holistic decision­
making necessitates crossing the boundaries of legislation that creates different 
parameters for decision-making and different dispute resolution processes. This 
thesis constitutes a first attempt to rationalise SEN dispute resolution against a 
background of inclusion and integration of education and children’s services 
with a view to suggesting how PDR may be assured within a genuinely 
responsive system.
It is unlikely that any dispute resolution system can be judged objectively 
perfect. All involve trade-offs: greater accuracy may lead to delay; participation 
may increase cost; flexibility in decision-making may lead to disparities; a 
proliferation of rules may lead to unfairness caused by lack of flexibility. The 
objective of the thesis is to suggest the good within the constraints of the 
possible. Mediation was introduced following recommendations made in a 
major review of the tribunal system5 as an ‘obvious’ solution to situations 
where conflict leads to a breakdown in communication. A wider question that 
appears not to have been considered is whether mediation is appropriate in 
citizen v state disputes in the absence of context-based adaptations to reduce the 
risk of unfairness arising from power-imbalance.
The thesis is not intended to be critical of the SENDIST. Various studies have 
concluded that the tribunal operates well, within the remit it has been given6. 
Tribunal members and staff endeavour to redress power-imbalance and to 
provide assistance. What the thesis questions is whether a system that places 
LEAs in a position of defending their decisions at a tribunal following 
adversarial pre-hearing procedures can be said to secure the optimum balance of 
trade-offs in the context of resolving disputes about whether children who have 
learning difficulties receive the help they need. Such a system appears likely to
5 Leggatt 2001.
6 These studies are referred to in Note 2.
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generate and exacerbate conflict in circumstances where it is important that 
children, parents and professionals have a co-operative relationship.
It is stated in a report by the House of Commons Education and Skills 
Committee that the number of appeals lodged represents less than 1 % of 
children with SEN (Education and Skills Committee 2006 p.52). There is no 
information about why the numbers are so low. The (then) Department for 
Education and Skills (DfES) suggested, in evidence given to the Committee, 
that it is an indication that the system is working well. The Committee did not 
accept this, concluding that there were significant problems with access for 
particular groups. The evidential basis for their conclusion is unclear from the 
report. They refer to a statement by a head teacher who said, ‘tribunals are a 
complicated process and it’s often only the dogged, middle-class parents that 
are prepared to take the process on.’ They also cite the high level of variation in 
the number of appeals across different local authorities as reasons for this 
conclusion.
The DfES suggested to the Committee that there is no clear link between 
numbers of appeals and areas of social deprivation. The Committee, therefore, 
acknowledged that the issue is not as straightforward as wealthier areas having 
more appeals, or there being higher levels of appeals in areas where more 
adverse decisions are made. The DfES response is misleading. Hackney, for 
example, is an area of high deprivation with a high number of appeals. The 
implication, therefore, is that there is no link between class and high numbers of 
appeals. But this is based upon an assumption without any information about 
the class of parents who have appealed. It is possible that every appeal was 
made by a middle-class parent. It cannot be assumed that there are no middle- 
class parents living in Hackney.
The link between class/educational background, and access in relation to 
SENDIST appeals can be made through other sources. Studies by Harris (1997), 
Riddell et al. (1994) and (2002), Knill and Humphries (1996), Evans (1998) and 
Hall (1999) identify a predominance of middle-class better educated parents. 
Even if the picture may be more complicated, as Evans says:
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It would be unusual, given all the evidence which suggests that middle- 
class families benefit more than others from the Welfare State in general 
(Wilkinson 1994), and from the education service in particular 
(Mortimore and Whitty, 1997; Smith and Noble 1995), if it were not the 
case that use of the Tribunal was skewed towards middle-class families. 
(Evans 1998 p.59).
Research by Genn on perceptions of tribunals (including SENDIST) by minority 
ethnic users (Genn 2006) identifies a reluctance on the part of appellants to 
become involved in legal proceedings because of anticipated expense and 
complexity. Dominance of the criminal justice system in the public imagination 
leads to misconceptions about what to expect and deters people from seeking 
redress. Findings in this study are consistent with Genn’s earlier research on 
what people do and think about going to law generally (Genn 1999a), which 
indicates that people find accessing formal dispute resolution mechanisms 
stressful. This research concluded that, faced with the choice of either invoking 
an impartial dispute resolution mechanism with all that involves, or simply 
abandoning their claim, more than half of the participants abandoned their 
claim. Possibly parents of children with SEN are making the same choice for 
similar reasons, indicating the hidden potential demand for justice Genn 
identifies.
If it continues to be the case that few parents of children with SEN appeal and 
that those who do make gains for their children in terms of provision, children 
whose parents do not appeal may be disadvantaged both in terms of not making 
a gain, and in terms of someone else’s gain depleting resources available for 
their child. If large numbers of parents are not accessing the SENDIST, for 
whatever reason, a solution might be to take steps to make it more accessible by 
educating parents so that they are competent and confident to enforce state 
obligations towards their children. The risk is that this may not resolve all of the 
problems this thesis identifies; that it would fail to assure PDR, and would 
result in a race perpetuating a fundamental unfairness. Those who appealed first 
would exhaust available resources. Another solution might be to strongly 
encourage settlement. But this would need to be considered against a 
background of power-imbalance. Arguably what is wanted is a system that is 
easily negotiated by parents and which facilitates choice between ‘safe’ options.
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1.2.2. Format
The structure of the thesis evolves in four stages:
> Process and context -  an outline of the statutory framework for SEN 
decision-making and dispute resolution and an evidence-based 
description of the processes, highlighting tensions;
> Framework and analysis -  examination of the operation of discretion; 
analysis of the SEN decision-making and formal dispute resolution 
processes with reference to the work of Mashaw and Adler and the goals 
of PDR;
> ADR -  analysis of changes to the system brought about by the 
introduction of mediation and conciliation and issues relevant to their 
use in the context of SEN;
> Reform - suggestions for change informed by the analysis and the wider 
context of disputes involving children, rights to education and children’s 
rights.
The detailed sequence of the thesis is to:
• describe the SEN decision-making process with reference to relevant 
studies and to describe Mashaw’s justice models (Chapter One);
• describe the formal dispute resolution mechanisms as above (Chapter 
Two);
• consider the exercise of discretion in SEN decision-making, the extent to 
which its exercise is limited or influenced, and the source of such 
limitations and influences (Chapter Three);
• analyse the SEN decision-making and dispute resolution processes with 
reference to the work of Mashaw and Adler and, using the information 
and observations in previous Chapters, assess whether PDR and 
adequate redress are assured (Chapter Four);
• describe the operation of mediation and conciliation in the SEN context;
• with reference to theoretical work and recent research studies, describe 
the advantages and disadvantages of mediation and conciliation and key 
issues such as power-imbalance, low take-up, oversight and monitoring, 
pressure to mediate, and cost-effectiveness; and
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• consider what the introduction of mediation and conciliation achieves in 
terms of the balance of trade-offs; collective goals and individual 
interests; assurance of PDR; and redress (Chapter Five);
• describe a possible alternative model and analyse it with reference to the 
above;
• identify the need for a ‘one-door’ approach and unified system of 
children’s complaints (Chapter Six);
• consider the role children should play in the decision-making and 
dispute resolution processes;
• draw observations and conclusions about possible reform of the SEN 
dispute resolution system (Chapter Seven).
• Appendix -  Bibliography and data sources for studies cited.
A considerable amount of stage-setting is needed before embarking upon the 
meat of the theoretical analysis which then evolves in stages. The format of 
having a formal literature review as the second chapter did not work well within 
this framework. As a result, critical analysis of relevant literature is conducted 
as each study is referred to in the text, and data sources are set out in an 
Appendix.
1.2.3. Methodology
The thesis analyses SEN decision-making and dispute resolution as 
administrative law processes in the light of recent theory on administrative 
justice, developments in administrative law jurisprudence and case law. The 
work of Mashaw and Adler is used to establish a framework for examination of 
the exercise of discretion and evaluation of the operation of the balance of 
trade-offs against the objectives of the substantive justice model known as PDR. 
Whilst there is some reference to statistical and empirical data, this thesis is not 
an empirical study. It is set in the mould of classical administrative law studies, 
drawing where necessary on empirical information to provide informed 
analysis.
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1.2.4. Terminology
The following terms are used:
Adversarial-style pre-hearing procedure - a procedure used typically in 
disputes in the civil courts. Each party is responsible for the preparation and 
presentation their own case. The procedure encourages each party to discredit 
their opponent’s case.
Inquisitorial procedure -  an adjudicator takes full control of the process, may 
inspect files, call witnesses and adjudicates on a dispute with, or without, a 
hearing.
Inquisitorial hearing -  an oral hearing at which an adjudicator takes control of 
the proceedings and determines the extent to which the parties participate. The 
adjudicator may call evidence.
Enabling hearing7 -  an oral hearing at which the parties are supported in ways 
that give them confidence to participate, and where the adjudicator compensates 
for appellants’ lack of skill or knowledge. In contrast to adversarial hearings 
where the adjudicator maintains a neutral position, intervention by the 
adjudicator to assist the weaker party is legitimate.
DFE, DFEE, DFES, DCSF -  the Government Department with oversight for 
SEN is the Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF). This was 
formerly the Department for Education and Skills (DFES); before that the 
Department for Education and Employment (DFEE); and before that the 
Department for Education (DFE). All of these abbreviations are used in the text. 
DCA, MoJ -  the Government Department with oversight of administrative 
justice is the Ministry of Justice (MoJ). This was formerly the Department of 
Constitutional Affairs (DCA). Both abbreviations are used.
LEA -  Local Education Authority. Section 162 of the Education and Inspections 
Act 2006 (c. 40) introduces a power to repeal by order references to local 
education authorities. Since no order has been made under the section, the thesis 
refers to LEAs, as this is the term currently referred to in relevant legislation. 
SENT/SENDIST -  the appellate body for SEN appeals was created in 1993 as 
the Special Education Needs Tribunal (SENT). It changed jurisdiction in 2002, 
becoming known as the Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal 
(SENDIST). Both abbreviations are used.
7 Terminology taken from Leggatt 2001.
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There are numerous references to the White Paper ‘Transforming Public 
Services: Complaints, Redress and Tribunals’, which is referred to throughout 
as ‘Transforming Public Services’ and to reports by the House of Commons 
Education and Skills Committee. These are referred to as ‘the Select 
Committee’s 2006 Report’ and ‘the Select Committee’s 2007 Report’.
1.3. LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS
1.3.1. Introduction
The legislative provisions are set out in Chapter 1 of Part IV of the Education 
Act 1996. A child has SEN if he has a significantly greater difficulty in learning 
than the majority of children of his age; he has a disability that either prevents 
or hinders him from making use of educational facilities of a kind generally 
provided for children of his age in schools within the area of the LEA; or he is 
under the age of five and is, or would be if special educational provision were 
not made for him, likely to have a significant difficulty in learning or a 
disability when of, or over, that age8. ‘Special educational provision’ means, in 
relation to a child who has attained the age of two, educational provision that is 
additional to, or otherwise different from, the educational provision made 
generally for children of his age in schools maintained by the LEA (other than 
special schools) and, in relation to a child under that age, educational provision 
of any kind9.
1.3.2. Governing bodies’ obligations towards children with SEN
Governing bodies of maintained schools must use their best endeavours, in 
exercising functions in relation to the school, to secure that the needs of 
children with SEN are provided for10; to secure that a child’s needs are made 
known to all who teach him11; and to secure that teachers are aware of the 
importance of identifying, and providing for, the needs of pupils with SEN12. 
There is a ‘responsible person’ for SEN -  usually the head teacher or a
8 Section 312(2) of the Education Act 1996.
9 Ibid. Section 312(4).
10 Ibid Section 3 17(l)(a)
11 Ibid Section 317(l)(b).
12 Ibid. Section 317(l)(c).
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governor13. Those concerned with making special educational provision for a 
child must secure that he engages in the activities of the school along with the 
other children, provided he still obtains the additional help he needs and this is 
compatible with the efficient education of his peers and the efficient use of 
resources14.
Schools and LEAs are obliged to have regard to the SEN Code of Practice (SEN 
Code of Practice 2001 )15. For the majority of children, their school identifies 
learning difficulties and provision is made. This is referred to as ‘School 
Action’ and ‘School Action Plus’. The child is given an Individual Education 
Plan (IEP) setting out his difficulties, targets, and remedial strategies. The IEP 
is reviewed and updated on a regular basis. If a child is considered to be failing 
to make progress after the school has exhausted all available resources 
including specialist help, it may become necessary for the LEA to conduct an 
assessment of his needs (Ibid. Chapter 4).
1.3.3. LEAs’ Obligations towards children with SEN - The assessment and 
statementing process
LEAs must exercise their powers with a view to securing that they identify 
children for whom they are responsible with SEN and for whom it is necessary 
to make special educational provision16. LEAs have discretion to decide when
1 7an assessment of a child’s needs is necessary , and will do this with reference 
to the principles in the SEN Code of Practice. In contrast to the considerable 
level of discretion afforded to LEAs in relation to the decision as to whether to 
assess, the assessment process must be conducted in accordance with the rigidly 
prescribed procedures and time limits in Schedule 26 of the 1996 Act. If, in 
light of an assessment of a child's educational needs and any representations 
made by the child's parent, it is necessary for an LEA to determine special
13 Defined in section 317(2).
14 Ibid. Section 317(4).
15 Ibid. Section 313(2).
16 Ibid. Section 321.
17 Ibid. Section 323.
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educational provision, they must make and maintain a statement of special 
educational needs18.
The process that must be followed for the making of statements is set out in 
Schedule 27. The Schedule provides that a proposed statement must be served 
upon the child's parents. They must then be invited to express a preference for 
the maintained school or maintained special school they wish their child to 
attend. The LEA must comply with this preference unless they consider the 
school is unsuitable or the child's attendance would be incompatible with the 
efficient education of other children at the school or the efficient use of 
resources. The LEA has discretion to decide whether it is reasonable not to 
comply with the parents’ preference, but if they decide that none of the reasons 
for refusing to comply with the preference apply, they must name the school in 
the statement. The Governing Body of any school proposed to be named in a 
statement must be consulted, and where the school is situated in the area of 
another LEA, that LEA must also be consulted19.
Parents must be advised that they have the right to make representations on the 
content of the statement and to request a meeting with a person nominated by 
the LEA for this purpose. Following this meeting, where parents disagree with 
the advice given in any report, they have the right to request a meeting with the 
person who has provided that advice. The process takes place within prescribed 
time limits20. Where the LEA decide it is not necessary to make a statement, 
they must issue a Note in Lieu21. Statements must be maintained, kept 
confidentially, and reviewed on an annual basis22. A decision to cease to 
maintain a statement must be made formally, and the child's parents notified23. 
Parents may appeal to the SENDIST in respect of the following: refusal to
18 Ibid. Section 324.
19 Ibid. Schedule 27 paragraph 3 and 3A.
20 Ibid. Schedule 27 paragraph 4.
21 Ibid. Section 323.
22 Ibid. Schedule 27 paragraph 7 and the Education (Special Educational Needs) (England) 
(Consolidation) Regulations 2001 (S.I. 2001/3455).
23 Ibid. Schedule 27 paragraph 9.
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assess ; refusal to make a statement ; the content of a statement ; refusal to
97 98re-assess ; changes to the provision in a statement following a review ; and a 
decision to cease to maintain a statement29.
Formal guidance as to the format of a statement is set out in the Education 
(Special Educational Needs)(England)(Consolidation) Regulations 2001. All 
statements follow this format. Part 1 contains details of the child and the 
person(s) responsible for him; Part 2 sets out the special educational needs 
identified with reference to any representations made by the parent(s) and the 
various reports; Part 3 sets out the educational provision in terms of the overall 
objectives, detailed provision to meet each identified need; arrangements for 
establishing short term targets and for regular monitoring of targets, and any 
disapplication or modification of the National Curriculum; Part 4 sets out the 
identified school or type of school that can deliver the provision, or any 
arrangements whereby provision is made other than in a school; Part 5 describes 
any non-educational needs the child has and Part 6 sets out the non-educational 
provision that the LEA proposes to make available. There are prescribed 
appendices consisting of parental representations and evidence, and reports 
from the child’s school and relevant professionals.
There is an obligation upon LEAs to arrange for the parent of any child in their 
area with SEN to be provided with advice and information about matters 
relating to their child’s needs, and to take such steps as they consider 
appropriate for making these services known to parents, schools in their area, 
and such other persons as they consider appropriate30. There is also an 
obligation upon LEAs to set up arrangements for the avoidance or resolution of 
disputes and to make schools and parents of children with SEN aware of those 
arrangements31.
24 Ibid. Section 329.
25 Ibid. Section 325
26 Ibid. Section 326.
27 Ibid. Section 328.
28 Ibid. Section 326.
29 Ibid. Schedule 27 paragraph 11.
30 Ibid. Section 332A inserted by section 2 of SEND A.
31 Ibid. Section 332B inserted by Section 3 of SEND A.
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All school-age children with SEN for whom no statement is maintained must be 
educated in mainstream schools32. Children with statements must be educated in 
mainstream schools unless this is incompatible with the wishes of their parents 
or the provision of efficient education for other children . In order to 
demonstrate incompatibility with the efficient education of other children, the 
LEA must show there are no reasonable steps they could take to prevent the 
incompatibility. Schools are not permitted to rely on the incompatibility 
argument to relieve them of their legal obligation to admit a child where a 
school is named in the statement. Children with SEN do not have to be educated 
in mainstream schools where the costs are not being met by an LEA34.
1.4. THE CONTEXT OF SEN DECISION-MAKING
The concept of 'Special Educational Needs', and the structure of the current 
statutory regime were introduced by the Education Act 1981. This legislation 
enacted such of the recommendations of the Wamock Committee as were 
politically expedient at the time. Wamock reported in 1978, concluding that 
20% of children throughout the country had 'learning difficulties'. These 
children were to be identified and their needs determined by considering the 
results of a multi-disciplinary assessment. This was to consist of reports 
compiled following the administration of a battery of tests, and from the child’s 
parents and those teaching him on a regular basis.
Prior to this legislation, children with learning difficulties were either left to 
sink in mainstream schools, dependent upon individual teachers having the time 
and goodwill to provide extra help without additional resources, or they were 
transferred to special schools where they would remain throughout their school 
career. Under the Education Act 1944, children were tested at the age of 11 by 
means of intelligence tests administered by Medical Officers to assess whether 
they were ' suffering' from particular forms of 'handicap' requiring 'treatment' in 
a special school. Learning and behavioural problems were seen as essentially 
medical rather than educational matters. The 2% of children adjudged
32 Ibid. Section 316 substituted by Section 1 of SENDA.
33 Ibid. Section 316(3).
34 Ibid. Section 316A(1).
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'educationally sub normal' or 'maladjusted' were segregated from their peers. 
Neither they nor their parents had any choice in the matter.
The Education Act 1981 appeared to be an improvement over the previous 
regime. It is important, however, to view the Education Act 1981 in context to 
understand why SEN legislation has continued to be controversial. The 1980s 
saw a raft of legislative reform based upon low standards and school failure -  
Standard Attainment Tests, publication of league tables and independent 
inspection of schools. Children with SEN became an unattractive proposition to 
mainstream schools in a climate where there was pressure to attain goals of high 
academic attainment in order to attract more pupils and avoid public humiliation 
in league tables. LEAs were obliged to delegate as much of their overall budget 
as possible to schools35. This meant they had less money at a time when they 
were facing increased demand for assessments and statements. Parents’ 
expectations that remedial help would be available had been raised, and where 
the demand for resources exceeds what is available, dissatisfaction is inevitable.
A study by Jane Hall conducted in 1999 describes parents’ perception of the
SEN decision-making process.
The process was seen to be ‘stressful ’ and ‘anxiety-provoking ’ and 
parents were left feeling angry and frustrated by the whole procedure 
which they saw as a ‘long drawn out process’. Even when the parent felt 
their child only required marginally more support than the LEA was 
prepared to offer, they were still made to ‘battle through the 
process.\ Hall 1999 p.45).
Hall’s study preceded obligations imposed upon LEAs to set up disagreement 
resolution and advice services. Several of her interviewees stated that only the 
most vocal and knowledgeable parents secured the help they needed for their 
child; parents were unaware of their rights and options; decisions made about 
children by schools were perceived to relate to professional issues about which 
parents know nothing; teachers held prejudices about parents which manifested 
themselves in a ‘blame culture ’, especially in relation to children with 
behavioural problems.
35 The Education Reform Act 1988 introduced local management of schools, giving schools 
their own budgets.
36 Hall’s italics throughout.
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The relationship between parents and teachers was frequently seen as... 
'‘mutually defensive' [...] ‘a very adversarial relationship’ [...] It was 
felt that parents tend to regard teachers as authority figures and the head 
teacher as being particularly imposing. This in turn makes it difficult for 
the parents to see themselves on an equal footing with the school. This 
perceived power imbalance can lead to an early breakdown between the 
two parties [...] By the time parents get to speak to the headteacher they 
are usually ‘so built-up and het-up about the situation’, that is the delays 
they have incurred, the number of people they have had to speak to, and 
the amount of time it has taken them to get that far, that they are quite 
confrontational [...] The impression that the interviewees had of a 
perceived power imbalance between parents and schools was felt to be 
even more exaggerated between parents and LEAs. Parents tended to be 
wary of dealing with officials and felt uncomfortable in doing so [...] 
parents had the impression that provision was rationed and not made 
available as an individual response to an individual need. (Ibid. p35-37).
All parents interviewed had a poor relationship with the LEA shaped by
interactions and perceptions of the LEA’s motives.
Many parents who had dealt directly with the LEA would have 
welcomed some help from an independent third person. Parents 
frequently spoke of having to ‘fight’ or ‘battle’ for what they wanted for 
their child, and this antagonistic relationship carried on through all their 
dealings with the LEA [...]
The overriding perception that parents had was that the LEA was more 
concerned with resources than it was with their child’s education. Whilst 
parents acknowledged that the LEA had finite resources, they did not 
think that there should be a trade-off between the cost of providing for 
their child and their child’s needs. (Ibid. p.42 - 43).
A number of interviewees felt that, before a dialogue could be promoted on a 
wider scale, a shift in attitudes amongst teachers and LEA officials was 
required; that the (then) DFEE should encourage a 'conciliation mentality’ -  a 
culture of ‘resolution rather than blame’ and become involved in monitoring 
SEN decisions.
It is unsurprising that parents should favour individuation. The negative trade­
off of this, however, is that parents who are poor and inarticulate may not be in 
a position to ensure enforcement of LEA obligations towards their child. Such a 
policy framework would have no concern for systemic equity. On the other 
hand, a model focused upon systemic equity appears unpopular with parents 
because it fails to engage them in a positive manner. There appears to be an 
imbalance of trade-offs due to cost being given more weight than needs.
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It was considered that LEAs looked for reasons to delay assessment and 
statementing.
‘The more they draw it out, the more money they are saving. I f  they can 
stretch it so they don ’t go for a term, that’s a term’s money saved. ’ [...] 
The common perception was that ‘the LEA does as little as possible. 
(Ibid p. 43).
An Audit Commission Report (Audit Commission 2002b) which considered 
how well the education system was serving children with SEN following 
introduction of the Government’s inclusion policy observed that one in five 
children has SEN, yet SEN had remained low profile in education policy­
making and public awareness.
Schools have struggled to balance pressures to raise standards and 
become more inclusive. This has been reflected in a reluctance to admit 
and a readiness to exclude some children, particularly those with 
behavioural difficulties. (Ibid. p.2).
Concern was expressed that the separate structures and processes for children 
with SEN had allowed their needs to be seen as peripheral.
The research revealed a picture of great variability. Whether children’s needs 
were identified appeared to be influenced by a range of factors, including 
gender, ethnicity, family circumstances, where they lived, and the school they 
attended.
Some children continue to face considerable barriers to learning, 
including inaccessible premises, unwelcoming attitudes, shortfalls in 
specialist support, and exclusion from aspects of school life. Children 
with SEN are more likely to be consistent non-attenders.. .Very little is 
known about the educational attainment of children with SEN, or about 
how they fare beyond school. (Ibid. p.51).
The report concluded that practice needed to change from picking up the pieces 
of individual children to responding to the diversity of needs within the 
classroom; focus needed to shift from processes and paperwork to children and 
outcomes, and to children’s quality of experience in school as opposed to the 
type of school they attend. Children with SEN should be put at the heart of 
mainstream policy and practice. The report also stated that an attitudinal shift
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was needed, so that children with SEN (including disabled children) feel 
genuinely included in the life of their school. But that attitudinal shift could not 
occur until the resources were provided to respond to diversity.
The House of Commons Education and Skills Committee conducted an inquiry 
into policies relating to children with SEN and disabilities which reported in 
2006 (House of Commons Education and Skills Committee 2006). The 
conclusions of this report and the contribution by the Audit Commission to the 
inquiry indicated that problems identified in the 2002 Report had not been 
addressed. The Committee found significant failings within the system that 
needed to be addressed urgently. The report states that the Committee had 
received ‘large numbers of memoranda from parents whose lives had been 
taken over by the statementing process and who had to fight to achieve a better 
outcome for their child’; and that ‘parents feel a sense of injustice and anger and 
are very dissatisfied with the current system.’ (Ibid. para 147). There was 
evidence that LEAs were operating blanket policies. The Committee considered 
that a letter from the (then) DFES to LEAs of December 200537, whilst 
providing clarification, did not make up for lack of a clear national strategy 
(Ibid. para 151). The Committee’s view was that it is preferable to reduce 
reliance on statements by improving the capacity of schools to meet a diverse 
range of needs. But this, they said, must be done within a national framework of 
guidance offering local flexibility.
The Committee recommended that SEN assessments should not be made 
directly by the bodies that fund such provision (Ibid. para 161); multi-agency 
panels should make decisions about placements and be held accountable for 
those decisions; parents should be kept better informed and involved in the 
decision-making process; greater consideration should be given to the support 
of parents who themselves have SEN and require assistance in coming to 
considered decisions about their children’s futures (Ibid. para 170); expenditure 
on independent special schools should be monitored by the Government (Ibid. 
para 244); and there must be a child-centred approach based upon need (Ibid. 
para 282).
37 The letter is discussed on pps. 91, 105 and 304.
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Around 18% of all pupils in school in England were categorised as having SEN
(1.5 million children). Around 3% had a statement (250,000), and around 1%
(90,000), were in special schools. The Committee concluded:
[...] the original Wamock framework has ran its course. With Ofsted 
identifying a considerable inequality of provision38 - both in terms of 
quality and access to a broad range of suitable provision -  the SEN 
system is no longer fit for purpose and there is a need for the 
Government to develop a new system that puts the needs of the child at 
the centre of provision.
It is simply not acceptable for the Minister to say that the current system 
is “not always working well” Special educational needs should be 
prioritised, brought into the mainstream education policy agenda, and 
radically improved. (House of Commons Education and Skills 
Committee 2006 pps.6-7).
The report states that SEN exists across the whole spectrum of social classes
and abilities. Some conditions that give rise to SEN, in particular along the
autism spectrum and specifically Asperger’s Syndrome, can defy easy
correlation between those conditions and social deprivation. But there is a
strong correlation generally between social deprivation and SEN. In 2006 13%
of all secondary and 16% of all primary pupils were eligible for free school
meals as compared with 26.5 % of secondary school pupils and 26% of primary
school pupils with statements.
It is known that outcomes within the system are still heavily 
differentiated by socio-economic background, gender and ethnicity [...] 
The implication is that those students who are most disadvantaged 
socially and economically continue to suffer the greatest educational 
disadvantage. Moreover, it is precisely these students who are 
disproportionately represented in the SEN population. As Ann Lewis, 
Professor of Special Education and Educational Psychology at the 
University of Birmingham explains ‘there is extensive evidence of the 
overlap between education and social/economic needs. The evidence is 
well documented and sustained over time.’ (Ibid. p. 17).
The Committee observed that there continued to be separate policies for SEN 
that result in it being sidelined away from the mainstream agenda in education. 
Their conclusion was that this could not be allowed to continue. Echoing 
comments from the Audit Commission in their response to the inquiry, they 
suggested that the Common Assessment Framework, in the post Every Child
38 Ofsted 2004 para 69.
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Matters (DfES 2004d) world where services are increasingly expected to be 
integrated, should be developed to include SEN funding and assessment. This 
should become part of the work of Children’s Trusts, enabling comprehensive 
assessments and commissioning of provision across a variety of different 
agencies with access to a pooled budget. Correlation between SEN and 
exclusions, low attainment, not being in education and youth crime provide 
even more compelling reasons for suggesting a holistic approach. There is a 
significant personal cost to the children and families let down by the system, but 
also significant costs to society. (Ibid pps. 19-20).
The Government’s response to the Report was that it is not in the interests of 
children with SEN for a major review of the legislative framework to be 
conducted; that inclusion has not yet been properly bedded-down; and that 
development of local provision and early intervention strategies would bring 
about needed improvement (Government Response to the Education and Skills 
Committee report on Special Educational Needs October 2006).
The Committee followed this up with an exchange between its Chairman and 
the Minister of State for Schools during an Opposition Day debate on the 30th 
January 2007 when the Minister agreed to reconsider proposals on the 
practicalities of implementing separation of SEN funding from the assessment 
process. In October 2007, a further report was published (House of Commons 
Education and Skills Committee 2007) containing options for change. The 
Government’s response was that their response to the previous report had not 
been meant to convey that they would not look critically at SEN policies in the 
future. Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Schools (‘HMCI’) has been asked to 
review progress in 2009/2010, and that they will consider, in the light of 
HMCI’s advice, whether the present framework for SEN should be reviewed 
and what further action might be taken to achieve better outcomes for children 
with SEN and/or disabilities and their families. It was also suggested that pilot 
studies for the contracting out of assessment functions might be conducted and 
that guidance to educational psychologists on maintaining an independent role 
was a possibility.
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1.5. MASHAW’S MODELS
Mashaw suggests three types of justice arguments: that decisions should be:
• accurate and efficient concrete realisations of the legislative will;
• appropriate from the perspective of relevant professional cultures; and
• arrived at fairly when assessed in the light of traditional processes for 
determining individual entitlements.
This produces three distinctive models of justice -  bureaucratic rationality, 
professional treatment and moral judgment. The characteristics of the models 
are set out in the table below (Mashaw 1983 p.31.):
Model Legitimating
Values
Primary Goal Structure or 
Organization
Cognitive
Technique
Bureaucratic
Rationality
Accuracy and 
efficiency
Program
Implementation
Hierarchical Information
Processing
Professional
Treatment
Service Client
Satisfaction
Inter-personal Clinical
Application
of
Knowledge
Moral
Judgment
Fairness Conflict
Resolution
Independent Contextual
Interpretation
The bureaucratic rationality model is likely to be favoured by LEAs; the 
professional treatment model by educational psychologists, teachers and health 
professionals; the moral judgment model by welfare rights and advocacy 
agencies and parents confident enough to mobilise the appeals process. Pre- 
Wamock, the professional treatment model was dominant. Following the 
introduction of the statementing process, and against a background of the 
Conservative reform agenda of the early 1980s and 1990s driven by parental 
choice, market forces and limitation of professional power, there was a call by 
parents’ organisations for a tighter legal framework.
This led to the implementation of a Code of Practice (The Code of Practice on 
the Identification and Assessment of Special Educational Needs (DfEE 1994). 
LEAs began to draw up criteria for assessment, and the decision-making 
process changed to resemble more closely the bureaucratic rationality model. 
Local appeals committees not perceived as sufficiently independent of LEAs
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were replaced by the Special Educational Needs Tribunal which led to an 
appeal process resembling the moral judgment model.
Recognising the danger that a rapid swing towards a moral judgment framework 
might lead to escalating and unmanageable costs, the DfEE grant-aided LEAs to 
set up Parent Partnership Services (PPSs) and subsequently introduced 
legislative requirements for LEAs to make advice available to parents and to 
provide disagreement resolution services with the objective of reducing conflict 
and minimising the number of appeals. There are tensions between the models. 
Bureaucratic rationality applies rules in order to ensure accuracy and 
consistency, whereas moral judgments made in relation to individual children 
pay no regard to the balance of provision within a particular LEA.
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Chapter Two
Formal Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
2.1. CHAPTER SUMMARY
The principal dispute resolution mechanism is the Special Educational Needs 
and Disability Tribunal (SENDIST, formerly the Special Educational Needs 
Tribunal - SENT39). This is a tailor-made SEN-specific tribunal. However, the 
SENDIST only deals with appeals on the merits. It cannot deal with complaints 
about process or rationality of SEN policies, and has no procedure for urgent 
cases. There is no right of appeal to the tribunal against decisions made by 
schools. There are other dispute resolution mechanisms available to parents 
where specific circumstances apply. These are complaint to a Commissioner for 
Local Administration, more commonly known as Local Government 
Ombudsman (LGO), and application to the Administrative Court. They are not 
SEN-specific.
The detailed focus of the thesis is on the SENDIST. In comparison to the 
number of SENDIST appeals, applications to the LGO and Administrative 
Court are small, though this may be because of the remit of the mechanism, as 
opposed to appellants favouring one procedure over another. There is no choice 
of mechanism. This is dictated by the nature of the complaint. The SENDIST 
employs adversarial pre-hearing procedures followed by an enabling hearing; 
the LGO an inquisitorial procedure, and the Administrative Court an adversarial 
procedure and hearing. Consideration of the LGO and Administrative Court is 
less detailed. The thesis makes no suggestion that either the LGO or the 
Administrative Court should be considered as alternatives to the SENDIST.
The SEN statutory framework does not enable appeals to be made to the 
SENDIST against decisions made by schools in respect of SEN. Neither can a 
complaint be made to the LGO about schools. A table setting out the different 
forms of complaints procedures that may be relevant to children with SEN is set 
out in Chapter Six.
39 The tribunal was re-named following the implementation of the SEND A 2001 when it 
expanded its jurisdiction to hear specified claims of disability discrimination.
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2.2. THE SENDIST -  ADVERSARIAL/ENABLING
Partly as a result of the way the legislation has been constructed and 
partly because of the very technical nature of diagnoses and definitions 
of learning difficulty, the SENT is faced with a challenging task. It not 
only has to apply the law accurately and fairly, which is not easy in a 
rapidly developing field, it also has to make fine judgments about the 
needs of children, and the provision required to meet them, which will 
have crucial long term effects as regards the children’s intellectual, 
social, and in some cases, physical development as well as their 
academic attainment. (Harris 1997 p.3).
2.2.1. Wider background (briefly)
Since the inception of SEN legislation in 1981, parents have had a right of 
appeal to a tribunal. Originally this was to a committee of the LEA. A specialist 
tribunal was created in 1993 operating independently of LEAs. It was intended 
to operate as an effective means of access to justice for parents -  ‘a new system 
that is quick, simple, impartial and independent; informality is the 
key’(Baroness Blackstone, Minister of State. Hansard HL, Vol 545 col 567). 
One that is ‘friendly to parents’ (T. Boswell, Minister of State. Standing 
Committee E. Hansard Column 1168. 28th January 1993).
There have been three major reviews of the tribunal system: Donoughmore 
(1932), Franks (1957) and Leggatt (2001). Donoughmore recommended that 
‘judicial’ as opposed to ‘quasi-judicial’ decisions should normally be entrusted 
to the courts. In exceptional circumstances where this was not possible, the 
decision should be entrusted to a tribunal as opposed to a Minister; tribunals 
should be independent, though appointed by the Minister in consultation with 
the Lord Chancellor; quasi-judicial decisions should be left to a Minster unless 
his Department had an interest, in which case an appeal should lie to a tribunal. 
Parties to decisions considered by tribunals should have rights to be heard, to be 
given reasons, and to appeal to the Administrative Court on a point of law.
Franks observed that Parliament had decided that particular decisions should be 
referred to tribunals (as opposed to the ordinary courts) in the interests of good 
administration. This is described as attaining policy objectives without delay by 
means of a system that is perceived as fair. The essential characteristics of this
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system are openness, fairness and impartiality. These characteristics are
essential because:
Administration must not only be efficient in the sense that the policy 
objectives are securely attained without delay. It must also satisfy the 
general body of citizens that it is proceeding with reasonable regard to 
the balance between the public interest which it promotes and the private 
interest which it disturbs.. .Take openness. If these procedures were 
wholly secret, the basis of confidence and acceptability would be 
lacking. Next take fairness. If the objector were not allowed to state his 
case, there would be nothing to stop oppression. Thirdly there is 
impartiality. How can the citizen be satisfied unless he feels that those 
who decide his case come to their decision with open minds? (Franks 
paragraphs 21 to 24).
[...] openness appears to us to require the publicity of proceedings and 
knowledge of the essential reasoning underlying the decisions; fairness 
to require the adoption of a clear procedure which enables parties to 
know their rights; to present their case fully and to know the case they 
have to meet; and impartiality to require the freedom of tribunals from 
influence, real or apparent of departments concerned with the subject- 
matter of their decisions. (Franks paragraph 40).
Franks was a watershed in the development of the tribunal system. As a result 
of the report’s recommendations, tribunals were re-made in the image of the 
ordinary courts. The report recommended that chairmen be legally qualified; 
formal procedures be adopted; there be a right to legal representation; Legal Aid 
be made available (although this was never implemented); full reasons be given 
for decisions, and that a system of precedents be developed.
The independence of tribunals was a key issue in the Franks Report, however 
the centralisation of administrative support was rejected. The report 
recommended that support for tribunals continue to be provided by their 
sponsoring Departments. The conduct and duties of clerks were to be regulated 
on the advice of the (then) Council on Tribunals, which was to have objective 
oversight of the system. It was noted that there was no significant evidence that 
any influence is exerted upon members of tribunals by Government 
Departments. The report concluded that, despite the haphazard way in which 
tribunals had developed, the system worked reasonably well.
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Leggatt recommended a tribunal system with common administrative support 
under the auspices of the DCA working with user groups to ensure that tribunals 
do all they can to render themselves understandable, unthreatening, and useful 
to users, who should be able to obtain all the information they need. There was 
no interference with the Franks model of tribunals as court-substitutes, merely 
an emphasis on the need for enabling hearings. The central tenet of the report 
was that ‘a combination of good quality information and advice, effective 
procedures and well-conducted hearings, and competent well-trained tribunal 
members’ would make it possible for ‘the vast majority of appellants to put 
their cases properly themselves’ (Leggatt para 4,21). Adler and Gulland, who 
summarised the findings of relevant research on users’ experiences, perceptions 
and expectations of tribunals concluded that there is little research-based 
support for this assertion (Adler and Gulland 2003 p.27).
2.2.2. Legislative provisions
The SENDIST has a President and two Panels -  the Chairman’s Panel and the 
Lay Panel. The Chairman’s Panel is appointed by the Lord Chancellor and 
comprises solicitors and barristers qualified for at least seven years. The Lay 
Panel is appointed by the Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families, 
and comprises persons with knowledge and experience of either children with 
SEN or local government. Each individual tribunal comprises a chairman and 
two lay members. The Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council40 acts as 
supervisory body, and its members visit hearings as observers from time-to- 
time. The SENDIST also considers some claims of disability discrimination. 
The composition of the tribunal is different for these claims.
The SENDIST exercises its jurisdiction for SEN disputes pursuant to the 
Special Educational Needs Tribunal Regulations 200141.There are formal pre- 
hearing procedures that must be adhered to strictly. These include time limits42, 
and provisions relating to applications for disclosure and further and better 
particulars of evidence43. Parents must file a notice of appeal no later than 2
40 Formerly the Council on Tribunals.
41 As amended by the Special Educational Needs (Amendment) Regulations 2002.
42 Regulation 7 of the 2001 Regulations.
43 Ibid. Regulation 18.
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months from the date upon which the LEA advise them of their right of appeal; 
both they and the LEA then have 30 working days to file a case statement 
together with any evidence they wish to produce. If the LEA fail to file a reply 
to an appeal within the prescribed time limit, the tribunal may determine the 
appeal without a hearing or, without notifying the LEA, convene a hearing at 
which the LEA are not permitted to be present44. The tribunal has no facility for 
dealing with urgent appeals. It has been unable to meet its target of concluding 
appeals within four months of registration45, with most appeals taking 4-5 
months.
The SENDIST can order LEAs to assess needs, and to make, re-write or 
discontinue statements. The President may summon witnesses to attend46. She 
also has the power to review her own decisions. If either party is dissatisfied 
with a tribunal decision, there is a right to apply to the Secretary for a review47. 
The tribunal may review its own decisions48. There is right of appeal on a point 
of law or by way of case stated to the Administrative Court (though this is about 
to be replaced by an appeal to a second-tier tribunal). Digests of decisions are 
published. There is no system of binding precedent, but decisions are monitored 
to ensure consistency.
Right of appeal to the SENDIST is that of the parents and not the child. Legal 
Aid is not available for representation before the tribunal, but legal advice and 
assistance is available to parents who are financially eligible. This covers initial 
advice, writing letters and preparation of the appeal papers, and may cover fees 
for expert reports provided pre-approval is obtained and the cost is reasonable. 
The tribunal will not ordinarily make costs orders against any party, but has 
power to do so in specified circumstances. Legal Aid is available for appeals to 
the Administrative Court. The Court of Appeal has determined that the child has 
no right of appeal, not having been a party to the tribunal proceedings49. This 
means that it is the parents’ income that is relevant both for the purposes of
44 Ibid. Regulation 15.
45 Hughes 2005.
46 Regulation 26 of the Special Educational Needs Tribunal Regulations 2001.
47 Ibid. Regulation 37.
48 Ibid. Regulation 39.
49 S v Special Educational Needs Tribunal [1995] 1 WLR 1627.
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assessing financial eligibility for legal advice and assistance for SENDIST 
appeals and legal advice and assistance and Legal Aid for appeals to the 
Administrative Court. The tribunal is not a party to appeals to the 
Administrative Court.
In contrast to the formal pre-hearing procedures, an informal enabling 
procedure is employed at the hearing itself. The chair identifies key issues. The 
parties are asked whether there are any points that should be added to the list. 
The tribunal then go through the list asking questions of, and eliciting 
comments from, the parties and their witnesses.
2.2.3. Facts about SENDIST appeals
The table below sets out the number of SENDIST appeals registered since the 
tribunal came into existence:
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NUMBERS OF SEN APPEALS REGISTERED
50 Year Number of appeals Percentage Increase
1994/1995 1161 N/A
1995/1996 1626 40
1996/1997 2051 26
1997/1998 2191 7
1998/1999 2412 10
1999/2000 2463 2
2000/2001 2728 11
2001/2002 3048 11
2002/2003 3532 16
2003/2004 3354 -5
2004/2005 3215 -4
2005/2006 3411 6
2006/2007 3110 -9
SENDIST Annual Reports offer no information about the reasons for 
percentage increases or decreases. The majority of appeals are lodged by whites 
- 1847 (out of 3772) in 2002/3, 1558 (out of 3637) in 2003/4, 1540 (out of 
3513) in 2004/5, 1837 out of 3717 in 2005/6 and 1920 outof3110in  2006/7. 
But it is difficult to obtain an accurate picture in relation to ethnicity because 
significant numbers of forms showing ethnic background are not completed. 
Figures for 2006/7 show that parents had legal representation in 23% of appeals 
and other representation in 29% of appeals; LEAs had legal representation in 
10% of appeals; the number of appeals against SENDIST decisions was 42 (35
50 Table features on SENDIST website www.sendist.gov.uk.
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by parents and 7 by LEAs), an increase of 18% from the previous year. Parents 
have a high success rate in SENDIST appeals, as the table below demonstrates.
51s u c c e s s  r a t e s  f o r  p a r iENTS IN SENDIST APPEALS
2005/2006 2006/2007
Refusal to assess 62% 62%
Refusal to statement 66% 64%
Refusal to re-assess 90% 39%
Cease to maintain statement 50% 71%
Parts 2 and 3 91% 90%
Parts 2, 3 and 4 96% 95%
Part 4 64% 68%
Refusal to change named school 30% 25%
Failure to name school 0% 100%
Where parents appeal against the contents of a statement, the achievement of 
only a proportion of their objectives may result in the appeal being technically 
upheld. Thus, some minor amendments to the wording of Parts 2 or 3 of a 
statement in an appeal registered against Parts 2, 3 and 4 is indicated in the 95- 
96% success rate, whereas the main part of the appeal in respect of Part 4 may 
have been dismissed. Numbers of appeals against refusal to change the named 
school and failure to name a school is very small, Only one appeal against 
failure to name a school was lodged in 2006/7 and in 2005/6.
Trevor Aldridge, former President of the SENDIST, has acknowledged that the
remit of the tribunal could be different, and that there might be a need to review
whether education rights should be those of the parent or the child:
The Tribunal could be directed to consider other matters: the effect of 
appeal decisions on other children, from whom resources may be 
diverted; how far varying local policies should influence appeal
51 Source Hughes 2006 p. 9.
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decisions; what involvement other agencies should have. There is also 
the broad question of whether our education legislation should continue 
to be framed in terms of parental rights, when the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child confers the rights on the child. 
(Aldridge 2002 p. 1.)
Harris reviewed the work of the SENT during the first 20 months of its coming 
into operation. (Harris 1997). Findings were that 25% of parents sought advice 
from a lawyer and 43% from CAB or a voluntary organisation; 90% of those 
who sought advice said they were happy with the advice received and could not 
have coped otherwise; those who sought advice from the outset were more 
likely to appeal; those who had not sought advice thought advice would have 
been helpful; and that 53% -55% of parents were represented.
Harris attributed high levels of representation to the predominance of middle- 
class parents and to ongoing contact between parents and support bodies. Not 
only did those who used legal representation value it very highly, some who had 
not used it wished they had and disagreed with the suggestion in the Tribunal’s 
guidance that it was not necessary. Observations of hearings revealed that chairs 
adopted different approaches. Although there was a uniform attempt to make 
the hearings informal, many hearings were fairly formal, and this was where 
representation was considered to be valuable. Its effectiveness was described as 
variable. Some lay representatives were over-zealous or inclined to make 
political points, and the involvement of legal representatives tended to make the 
proceedings more formal, adversarial and longer.
Although the majority of children with SEN are from social class C2-E, the 
parents who responded to the questionnaire sent out by the researchers 
comprised equal number of A-Cls and C2-Es. Harris remarked that this is 
consistent with other research in the field - ‘the wealth of parents and their 
ability to manipulate the system becomes the ultimate arbiter of a child’s 
educational opportunities.’ (Riddell et al.1994 p i 19). Harris supposed that the 
predominance of responses from middle-class parents could be attributed to the 
fact that such parents are more likely to complete questionnaires, but considered 
it more probable that they would use the tribunal than other parents.
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The research indicated that racial and ethnic minorities were massively under­
represented among appellants. In the 40 hearings observed, all the parents were 
white. This was consistent with research conducted by IPSEA in March 1996 
into the use of its services. (IPSEA provides free advice and representation to 
parents appealing to the SENDIST). In a sample of 42 clients, all had described 
themselves as white (Andrews 1996 para 2.4). Harris observed that, if ethnic 
minorities are neither bringing appeals nor seeking the help of the voluntary 
sector, this is a serious matter which may be part of a much larger issue of 
access to justice for ethnic minorities (Harris 1997 p. 195).
Many respondents to the questionnaire commented upon the helpful approach 
of Tribunal officials, and said that useful factual information was provided. 
(Ibid. pps 81-82). Harris considered that public funding should be available to 
enable parents to be legally represented in complex cases. He concluded that the 
Tribunal had met many of the positive expectations that were held prior to its 
introduction; suggested that weaknesses identified were amenable to practical 
resolution; and recommended extension of powers to enable interim orders to be 
made, and that children’s views should be represented independently through a 
named person equivalent what are now termed Cafcass guardians . The study 
does not yield information about why parents do not appeal.
A report by Evans (Evans 1998) following research conducted in 1997 observes
that the creation of the SENT was seen as necessary by the Government:
.. .to tip the power balance away from the benevolent humanitarianism 
of the Wamock model, where most of the decision-making power lay 
with the LEA and its professionals, towards a more assertive and 
consumerist role for parents, adjudicated by a [...] tribunal independent 
of the LEA. (Ibid. p.7).
The report highlighted a tension between schools and LEAs over resources 
leading to schools encouraging parents to press for statutory assessments. There
52 The function of Cafcass guardians is to represent children’s interests in public law court 
proceedings. Cafcass was set up on under the provisions of the Criminal Justice and Court 
Services Act 2000 which brought together the family court services previously provided by the 
Family Court Welfare Service, the Guardian ad Litem Service and the Children’s Division of 
the Official Solicitor’s Office.
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are a number of inter-related factors that might predispose an LEA to a higher 
or lower level of appeals - social affluence, deprivation, ethnicity, high (or low) 
levels of statements, efficiency in the statementing process; whether the LEA is 
high-achieving; resources spent on SEN; and numbers of exclusions. The inter­
relationship of different factors is complex. The LEA’s policies and processes 
were thought to have a major influence.
Although 41% of LEAs in the study reported that they had made changes to 
their procedures as a result of the possibility of appeals to the Tribunal, there 
was little change in practice. LEAs, on the whole, tended to treat Tribunal 
decisions as ‘one-offs’ -  85% had made no notable change of policy following a 
Tribunal decision. Over half of the LEAs responding to the questionnaire had 
experienced a Tribunal decision with significant financial impact, and were 
worried about the ‘bandwagon effect’ of these cases where parents of other 
children with similar levels of need would be encouraged to seek the same 
provision. Some LEA officers saw unsuccessful appeals as useful in 
highlighting gaps in provision, enabling them to make a case for more resources 
(Ibid. p.27).
The report states that criteria devised by LEAs to decide whether it is necessary 
to assess or statement a child are seen by schools as a series of hurdles to be 
jumped, with the prize of additional resources attached to a statement at the end. 
This has contributed to LEAs making such criteria explicit. Schools’ perception 
of the criteria is seen by LEAs as indicative of a failure by them to understand 
their own responsibilities to meet the needs of children with SEN from their 
available resources.
The practice by LEAs of establishing Panels to make decisions in individual 
cases is seen as useful in ensuring that criteria are adhered to and in providing 
moderation across schools within the LEA. But the report questions whether 
cases presented receive adequate attention. There are comments from parents 
about missing reports and failure to take account of advice. There is an example 
cited of a Panel meeting once a week making decisions on 30 cases per 
meeting; and of one LEA going to strenuous efforts to prevent parents from
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accessing the system, which proved counter-productive as it led to a huge 
increase in appeals.
The report cites a case history involving a child whose parents had requested a
placement at an independent boarding school and placed him at the school
pending a Tribunal hearing. The appeal had been upheld:
This is the type of case which raises questions of equity and efficient use 
of resources. The parents felt that the provision offered by the LEA was 
not adequate to meet their son’s needs. However, LEA officers would 
argue that the level and cost of the provision given to a small number of 
individuals results in distortion of the SEN budget, and consequently 
less money available to fund support for the remainder of pupils with 
special educational needs. The LEA officer commented: We have lost 
few cases, but the common factors in the cases we have lost have been 
(a) prior placement by parents and (b) parents employing a barrister or 
solicitor. (Ibid. p.35).
Other controversial cases were those where a child has severe disabilities, or 
where there are child protection issues suggesting a need for an expensive 
residential placement. These cases led to arguments between different 
Departments within local authorities and between local authorities and health 
bodies as to which Department or body should be responsible for funding. The 
report questions the objectiveness of experts paid by parents to help them make 
their case, and suggests that LEAs should focus their arguments against 
expensive residential placements less on value-for-money and more on 
suitability of provision. It also states that the Tribunal tends to take the wider 
view that family circumstances are key in determining which provision might 
best meet a child’s educational needs.
A number of LEAs with low levels of appeals attributed this to the efforts they 
had made to communicate effectively with, and support parents. These LEAs 
had virtual open-door policies enabling parents to make appointments to discuss 
their case at any time. One Parent Partnership Officer (PPO) had established a 
parents’ support group which the Principal SEN officer attended to explain 
policy or answer queries. LEAs with high levels of appeals used the PPS as a 
buffer to direct access. Those with low levels of appeals placed emphasis on 
direct contact with parents. Two quotations present very different pictures:
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Parents have a human face to talk to. They can get to the people who are 
making the decisions, be involved in the process. We try to be creative, 
not rigid in our procedures. Even if it is not what parents first thought of, 
they appreciate being listened to ... We have a special needs centre 
which houses the Parents’ Advice Centre. We provide a hotline for 
parents to phone in with concerns. We have a parents support group. 
Parents are encouraged to come in and voice their concerns. (SEN 
officer, London Borough, low number of Tribunal cases).
My perception is that the LEA goes ahead against parents just to see 
how far parents will take it. And some do give up, but if parents keep 
going, on several occasions, the LEA has backed down at the last minute 
before the date of the hearing. Partly this must be because they think it 
will cost them less than going to SENT, but I feel there is an element of 
testing the water to see how far they can push parents. I don’t feel this is 
healthy, because then some parents feel that appealing is the only way to 
get the LEA to listen. (PPO, metropolitan LEA, high number of Tribunal 
cases). (Ibid. p.41).
Some LEAs appoint Tribunal officers, which has the consequence of further 
distancing decision-makers from their actions.
The report also suggests that a key factor in accessibility is having sufficient
(LEA) staff to have time to talk to schools and parents to make sure
communication does not break down. The report cites several examples of
schools encouraging parents to request statutory assessments. One LEA officer,
when asked about the role of schools in liaising with parents replied:
Can be good, bad or indifferent, depending on the school. It’s a very 
important question to ask, though, because the major point of trust is 
very often between the parent and the school. We can talk to 
headteachers and explain the policy and the budget etc., but unless the 
school, the headteachers consent to that policy, we have a problem. We 
had a case, just the other day, of a mother telling us that the headteacher 
had said that her complaint about us refusing to assess was ‘an 
indication of what we have to put up with’. Now, if schools are saying to 
parents, ‘Oh, it’s that lot up at the office. Go to the Tribunal’, well,
LEAs can’t win really. (SEN officer, metropolitan authority). (Ibid. 
p.44).
LEA officers varied in their attitudes towards the Tribunal. There were positive
comments, describing the Tribunal as a forum where decisions were tested:
We have always felt that the Tribunal has been fairly conducted. We are 
impressed at how all cases are handled. The Tribunal has always got to
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the heart of the issue and has given both sides a chance to air their 
views. (SEN officer from LEA with high levels of appeals) (Ibid. p. 47).
For some officers, the experience had been entirely negative, though this was 
rare:
Now the Tribunal is a weapon for the middle classes to get more out of 
the system. Either there was an oversight in the drafting of the 
legislation, which set up the dichotomy of the Tribunal’s focus on 
individual cases and the LEAs’ duties to all children and for financial 
prudence, etc., or it was a deliberate strategy and was intended as a way 
of buying off trouble-makers. As it is, the Tribunal’s budget is x 
millions -  it’s out of control. (SEN officer from LEA with high levels of 
appeals). (Ibid. p.47).
The report lists a number of positive impacts of tribunal appeals identified by 
LEA officers:
• positive decisions provide affirmation of the LEA’s approach;
• negative decisions highlight a shortfall in provision and staff expertise, 
which can be redressed;
• some LEAs have changed procedures and re-examined their 
relationships with parents, perceiving the value of negotiation and face- 
to-face contact;
• the tribunal gives parents a voice;
• the tribunal acts as an objective and independent arbiter between 
parents and the LEA (though it was qualified by an observation that the 
tribunal process is a costly one, and can lead to a ‘mindset’ where LEA 
officers who are in conflict with parents stop negotiating at an early 
stage, leaving the Tribunal to decide);
• the existence of an appeals procedure has made LEAs aware of the 
continuing need for close liaison with, and the need to monitor the 
quality of provision in, schools;
• LEAs generally have developed positive relationships with voluntary 
organisations, which may have influenced provision (though some 
interviewees saw these organisations as assisting a small number of 
parents, skewing resource allocation away from the most needy);
• there has been more collaboration between LEAs and other agencies. 
(Ibid. pps. 48-54).
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Negative impacts were:
• the disproportionate amount of time taken in defending appeals, which 
deflects energy away from core tasks;
• the high costs involved, which are met from the LEA budget, depleting 
resources from other services;
• tribunal decisions are focused on individual children and do not take 
into account their impact upon other children who will be affected, 
leading to the perception by LEAs that decisions are inequitable;
• successful tribunal appeals conflict with policy aims e.g. reducing the 
number of statements in line with Government policy;
• some decisions have ‘massive resource implications’, that appear 
‘arbitrary or unfair’ and ‘undermine the credibility of the tribunal in the 
eyes of LEAs’. Almost all LEAs in the study had examples of this, and 
they often involved a situation where parents were represented by a 
solicitor or barrister and had moved their child to a private residential 
placement prior to the hearing. (Ibid. pps. 54-59).
The practice of parents using the Tribunal to get independent school fees paid or 
to get their children into local LEA schools that are over-subscribed was 
perceived by LEAs as a misuse of the process. There were also reported 
instances of voluntary organisations actively exacerbating conflict between 
parents and LEAs, or appearing to have a vested interest in decisions by 
offering parents cut-price places at their schools pending Tribunal decisions.
The report states that, running through many of the comments of LEA officers 
is the perception that Tribunal decisions have implications for the equitable use 
of resources - that the tribunal is dominated by middle-class articulate parents 
whose children are getting resources at the expense of equally deserving 
children whose parents are not so skilled at advocacy. Evans suggests that, even 
if this is the case, the question is whether improvements in services and all 
levels of support gained for some children through the actions of their parents 
will result in a better service for all pupils. The research suggests this is not 
happening, with LEAs regarding appeals as one-offs.
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There are some factors associated with lower levels of appeals:
• adequate staffing levels;
• accessibility of staff;
• hand-delivery of key documents to explain their contents;
• flexibility and willingness to compromise;
• a source of semi-independent advice for parents (in areas where there 
were low levels of appeals, the PPS was part of a network of support 
facilitating communication between parents and LEAs, as opposed to an 
independent advocacy service for parents);
• good relationships with voluntary organisations;
• good relationships between LEAs and schools;
• effective policies and procedures for SEN based upon values shared by 
LEAs, parents and schools accessible to all affected by them and 
reviewed following tribunal decisions;
• LEAs should not adhering rigidly to policies demonstrated to be 
untenable;
• increased willingness to assess and statement; and
• a good range of local provision.
Other relevant factors were that areas with significant populations whose first 
language is not English where parents are educationally and materially 
disadvantaged tended to have low numbers of appeals. Parents had low 
expectations and were disinclined to challenge the LEA. In this instance, low 
levels of appeals indicated that there were issues to address, such as how less 
articulate parents might be enabled to participate more actively in decisions 
about their children’s education. It was observed that pressure groups were 
more active in some areas than others, particularly around provision for autism 
and dyslexia. Professional middle-class parents who appeal have been able to 
assemble a great deal of professional expertise from lawyers, psychologists and 
specialists in particular disorders to help them put their case. The report states 
that such parents appear less likely to negotiate with LEAs and will take their 
case all the way to the Tribunal.
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This study, although highlighting many positive aspects of the SENT, provides 
a clear picture of the tensions caused by the operation of the bureaucratic 
rationality model at the decision-making stage and the moral judgment model at 
the appeal stage. For the purpose of later analysis, it does not appear that the 
positive aspects described must necessarily be derived from a tribunal process. 
The question is whether a different configuration of models and trade-offs 
would enable the positive aspects identified to be retained whilst minimising the 
negative aspects.
The study by Hall (Hall 1999) found that, where parents register appeals, it is
not always the presenting problem that is of most concern ‘it is often more
deep-rooted. ' Some parents were seen as ‘hell-bent on going to Tribunal’, and
some perceived this as the only method of getting things done (Ibid. p.33.).
The processes and procedures that parents have to go through, that is the 
formality of lodging an appeal and attending a hearing are very stressful 
for a great many parents and their advocates [...] Whilst it was felt that 
vocal, articulate and knowledgeable parents can succeed in the formal 
Tribunal setting, others might not be able to [...] Many negative 
opinions about the SEN Tribunal were voiced by a wide-range of 
interviewees; that the Tribunal does not operate independently; that LEA 
officers are not being honest at hearings; that parents’ representatives do 
not feel confident and are therefore not starting out on an equal-footing; 
that people do not feel at ease in the environment; that there are huge 
variations in outcomes, even for very similar cases [...] that outcomes 
depended upon the composition of the Panel [...] that Panel members 
haven’t understood the SEN [...] that nobody is looking at outcomes 
[...] that lay members are biased towards the LEA. (Ibid. p. 38).
A study by Riddell (Riddell et al. 2002) aimed to describe the range of statutory 
assessment practices, and was based upon a comparison between SEN 
procedures in England and Scotland. There was no Code of Practice in Scotland 
and no right of appeal to an independent tribunal. The study referred to 
Mashaw’s models, describing the Scottish system as being dominated by the 
professional treatment model, with educational psychologists being afforded 
discretion about opening a record of needs, whereas the English system 
combined bureaucratisation at the initial decision-making stage with the moral 
judgment model at the appeal stage. The study illustrates that, although parents 
have more power in England to challenge the dominance of the bureaucratic
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model, the professional treatment model in the Scottish system offers fairer 
ways of allocating resources and better ways of balancing collective goals and 
individual preferences.
The study concluded in relation to the English system that, although it gave 
parents more power to claim individual rights, this lead to an increase in their 
involvement as active citizens. There was evidence in one of the English 
authorities studied of parents being marginalised. Passivity of the local 
community was seen by the LEA as the reason for low levels of appeals, rather 
than a failure by them to support use of legal redress; the PPO service focused 
on explaining LEA decisions, as opposed to suggesting alternatives; parents 
found the appeal route ‘particularly unattractive’ (Ibid. p.418); LEA officers, 
educational psychologists and PPOs were complicit in parental passivity.
The overall conclusions of the study were that some parents were able to 
exercise power, resisting the role ascribed to them by LEAs of passive 
consumer, whilst others experienced high levels of social disadvantage and 
became disengaged from the process.
Case studies categorised parents. The ‘consumer’ and ‘transgressive’ parents 
were able to exercise most influence. Both sought independent advice. The 
‘disengaged’ parent and the ‘uneasy client’ both initially displayed interest, but 
later opted out. These parents were from socially deprived backgrounds, as was 
the ‘transgressive’ parent. The most successful was the middle-class ‘consumer’ 
parent who initiated the assessment and drove the process forward. But even she 
compromised on provision and did not take her case to tribunal.
Evidence from SENDIST Annual Reports indicates that high numbers of 
appeals are withdrawn. Little is known about the reasons for withdrawals. There 
is a suggestion in the Evans 1998 study that some LEAs ‘try it on’ to see 
whether parents will back down and concede on the eve of the hearing. There 
was a suggestion by the (then) DfES in the Select Committee’s 2006 Report that
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appeals are withdrawn because the parties settle upon mutually satisfactory 
terms. There is also evidence in a survey by PEACH53 that concludes:
It is clear that some parents are settling and accepting provision which 
only partially meets their needs because of fear of escalating costs.
Of those that settled 48% were not happy with the settlement but did so 
for the following reasons:
• 11% did not feel they would win;
• 23% were glad to have something;
• 22% were too worn down to continue;
• 44% were concerned about the cost of continuing.
‘We settled, we were really skint and couldn’t go on any more.’
‘The cost was high, it was gambling to go for higher stakes.’
PEACH is concerned that parents are settling because they cannot afford 
to continue fighting. In some instances LEAs offer an inappropriate 
financial settlement. This is accepted by parents who then “top up” the 
difference. This sets a precedent, which disadvantages those who come 
later and cannot afford to “top up.” (Williams, M. 2005 p.23).
The SENDIST Annual Report for 2005/6 stated that there were still far too 
many adjournments with the accompanying additional expense and inevitable 
delay to the settlement of a child’s education (Hughes 2006 p.4). The SENDIST 
instigated a case-management pilot scheme in August 2006. This involved a 
small number of chairs giving directions to ensure that the final hearing would 
be effective having read through appeal bundles in appeals about a child’s 
placement after the parties had submitted their case in writing. But the project 
was abandoned due to lack of resources (Hughes 2007 p.2.).
In January 2006 a report entitled ‘Tribunals for Diverse Users’ was published 
(Genn 2006). It is a study of access, expectations, experiences and outcomes of 
tribunal hearings from the perspective of users. Its aim was to compare the 
experiences of white, black and minority ethnic tribunal users to establish how 
they perceive and are treated by tribunals, and whether they experience any 
direct or indirect disadvantage in accessing and using tribunal services. The 
SENDIST was one of three tribunals examined. The benchmark used for
53 Parents for the Early Intervention of Autism in Children
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assessment was one derived from Leggatt - whether the tribunal offered an 
enabling approach that supported the parties in a way that would give them 
confidence in their own abilities to participate in the process (Leggatt 2001 
paras 7.4-7.5).
The main findings were that language and cultural barriers, coupled with poor 
information about systems of redress, were critical obstacles in accessing 
tribunals. Public awareness of advice sources was variable. There were reported 
experiences of difficulty in accessing free advice services, and evidence of 
reluctance to become involved in legal proceedings because of anticipated 
expense and complexity. The dominance of criminal justice in the public 
imagination deterred people from seeking redress. Discussions revealed nagging 
apprehensions among black and minority ethnic groups about their likely 
treatment within the legal system.
The principal motivation for appealing to tribunals was a sense of unfairness. 
Few users had known about the possibility of seeking redress from their general 
knowledge and in most cases information about the possibility of appealing had 
come from the initial decision letter. Users’ expectations of proceedings were 
relatively vague for the other tribunals, but the SENDIST practice of sending a 
DVD to users prior to hearings appeared to be effective in framing their 
expectations. About half of the users interviewed at hearings were attending 
without representation, generally because it had not occurred to them to seek 
representation, or because they had tried and been unable to obtain it. 
Unrepresented minority ethnic users attending hearings were more likely than 
white users to have tried and failed to obtain representation.
Observation of tribunal hearings revealed generally high levels of 
professionalism among tribunal judiciary, with most being able to combine 
authority with approachability. Tribunals used a wide range of techniques to 
enable users to participate effectively and to convey that they were taking the 
case seriously. With the assistance of tribunals, most users were able to present 
their cases reasonably well -  indeed regression analysis indicated that 
representation increased appellants’ success rates at the SENDIST by only 7%.
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But although tribunals have developed the competencies necessary to conduct 
hearings in a way that enables users to present their cases, observation revealed 
deep and fundamental differences in language, literacy, culture, education, 
confidence and fluency, which traversed ethnic boundaries. These differences 
significantly affected users’ ability to present their case. The report concludes 
that, even with the benefit of training, there are limits to the ability of tribunals 
to compensate for users’ difficulties in presenting their cases. In some 
circumstances, an advocate is not only helpful to the user and to the tribunal, 
but may be crucial to procedural and substantive fairness.
Most users interviewed after their hearing and before receiving their decision 
made positive assessments of treatment during hearings and of their own ability 
to participate. Where dissatisfaction occurred, it tended to result from tribunals 
communicating the impression that they had already made up their mind or that 
they were not listening attentively to the user. This underlines the significance 
that users attach to feeling that they have been heard, and that their arguments 
have been taken seriously by the tribunal. Lack of preparedness affected users’ 
responses to the hearing and those startled by the relative formality of hearings 
tended to feel less comfortable and to express greater dissatisfaction.
Despite users’ generally positive assessments of hearings, about one in five, 
when prompted, raised concerns about perceived unfairness or lack of respect. 
There was evidence that those minority ethnic groups most likely to perceive 
unfairness at hearings were less likely to do so when the tribunal was itself 
ethnically diverse. Post-decision interviews revealed that about one-quarter of 
unsuccessful users had not understood the reason for the decision and this was 
more often the case among minority ethnic than white users.
Tribunal judiciary generally displayed high levels of sensitivity to diversity 
issues and most felt that enabling minority ethnic users to participate in 
hearings was an aspect of ensuring fairness that applied to all users. Users were 
treated well during hearings, and the majority perceived this to be the case - at 
least before they received their decision. In spite of the tribunal’s efforts, 
however, there remained significant difficulties with access for minority ethnic
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groups. The study revealed deep and fundamental differences between users in 
education, confidence, fluency and literacy for which tribunals cannot be 
expected to compensate. If the objective is to enable users to make the best of 
their case, it is important to consider factors such as language, education and 
culture in deciding how to assist them in doing so.
The (former) House of Commons Committee for Education and Skills 
concluded in their 2006 report in relation to SENDIST appeals that, whilst there 
is no fee for appellants, there are often substantial costs involved in 
commissioning expert reports and instructing legal representatives. Parents 
reported spending up to £18,000 on Tribunals. The SENDIST do not collect 
data on the costs incurred by parents, but they do recognise that there are 
‘significant costs that parents may incur.’ With regard to the cost of legal 
representation, the SENDIST informed the Committee that, although in recent 
years, they had seen greater use of legal representatives, it was misleading to 
present representation as the norm. In reference to whether these costs are 
necessary, the SENDIST referred to the Genn 2006 research above suggesting 
that legal representation improves success rates of appeals by only 7%. The 
SENDIST’s view was that, ‘unless there are complex areas of law to be 
explored, factual and relevant evidence is better than unnecessary legalese and 
most parents are able to argue their cases effectively.’(House of Commons 
Education and Skills Committee 2006 paras 2.11-2.13).
In relation to the cost of expert reports, however, the SENDIST recognised that 
a single report is likely to cost several hundred pounds. Their view was that, 
even if it is not a necessary part of the tribunal process for parents to 
commission such reports, there are cases where an alternative professional 
opinion will be necessary to sway the Tribunal against the advice of the relevant 
local authority professional. The SENDIST suggested, however, that it was for 
others to consider whether or not parents should receive financial assistance to 
commission reports. The tribunal did not see how they could help. (Ibid. paras 
2.14-2.15).
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The Committee had significant concerns about the issue of equal access to the 
tribunal:
All parents and legal guardians must have equal access to the appeals 
process. Evidence suggests this is not the case at present. The 
Government is responsible for ensuring steps are taken to guarantee 
equal access to an appeals process for all parents and guardians; in doing 
so it should give particular attention to the access of parents from low 
socio-economic backgrounds, parents with SEN themselves, and the fair 
representation of looked-after children.
The Government should start to collect data on the background of 
parents at tribunal, and on expenditure in relation to outcome (Ibid. 
paras 2.17-2.18).
The Committee considered that the issue of equality of access for looked-after 
children needed urgent resolution. The only people who can appeal to the 
tribunal on behalf of a looked-after child are the social workers who are 
employed by the authority whose decision is appealed.
It was also their view that the effectiveness of local authorities in promoting
informal resolution needs to be closely monitored. In relation to the appeal
process, they said:
The standard approach should not be adversarial. We recognise, 
however, that all too often parents had little choice in taking an 
adversarial approach during the appeals process in order to obtain what 
is in the interests of their children (Ibid. para 2.22).
Memoranda received from LEAs referred to frustrations regarding the Tribunal 
process and the lack of ‘fairness’ inherent in the system. There are quotations in 
the report from a spokesperson from Buckinghamshire County Council who 
said ‘The Tribunal process, initially established as a means of appeal for parents 
in disagreement with the local authority, has become a quasi-legal process 
where affluent parents engage barristers to ‘fight’ their case, irrespective of the 
educational rationale’, and from Mark Rogers, Director of Education and 
Children’s Services, Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council, who did not 
consider it helpful for tribunals to be able ‘to make decisions out of context, 
especially as they have no financial responsibility for the decisions that they 
make.’ (Ibid. para 223-4).
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The Committee observed that parents seek an entitlement to have their child’s 
needs met, and a local authority seeks to distribute finite resources as effectively 
as possible. This is a situation that ‘inevitably raises conflict’. They 
recommended:
Conflict between parents and local authorities needs to be minimised 
through clear understanding of roles and responsibilities, transparent 
processes, and better management of expectations. (Ibid. para 225).
Mark Rogers described the need to consider SEN appeals within a broader
appeal system—rather than creating a separate system for SEN. He suggested:
[...] if we took the opportunity that the Child Care Bill gives us to boost 
our Children’s Information Service to include an [...] advocacy and 
disagreement resolution function [it] would be a major start. We have a 
Disagreement Resolution Service already for special educational needs, 
but we do not have it more broadly [...] I would like to see the 
introduction of a generic advocacy and disagreement resolution service 
that had within it the specialisms that you need for particular areas of 
disagreements [...] I think that there are ways and means of putting in 
place universal systems for all children and families and not the 
specialised ones [...] [and] have the specialisms within it. (Ibid. para 
226).
The Committee recommended:
The Government should review whether SEN appeals should be part of 
a broader education appeal process as part of a strategy to reduce 
reliance on a separate system for SEN. (Ibid. para 227).
The Government’s response was to dismiss the concerns of the Committee:
The SENDIST was established to handle SEN appeals and claims 
of disability discrimination. There are no direct costs in appealing to 
the Tribunal. The service is free and the Tribunal reimburses parents 
and their witnesses for travel expenses. Witnesses can also receive 
a standard allowance towards loss of earnings.
SENDIST aims to provide an accessible, supportive and helpful 
service to parents of children with SEN and to avoid formality in 
its proceedings as much as possible. Many parents 
do need help making and pursuing an appeal to SENDIST. Details 
of some organisations that can help parents appear in their appeal 
booklet. It also provides information in a range of accessible 
formats, including Braille and large print, tape and video. The 
video seeks to dispel any notion that parents are coming 
to a court, and reassure them that the Panel will guide them through 
the process.
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Although there are no data on the socio-economic backgrounds of 
parents appealing to SENDIST, its annual report includes a breakdown 
of appeals by local authority. There does not appear to be any clear 
link to economic circumstance between the local authorities with 
relatively high and relatively low levels of appeals.
The Tribunal’s annual report for 2004/05 shows that nearly two thirds 
of all appeals were either conceded by LEAs or withdrawn by parents. 
The Tribunal has indicated that the great majority of withdrawals arise 
because parents are satisfied with their LEA’s response to their appeals. 
A majority of the remaining 35 per cent of appeals resolved by tribunals 
were at least partly upheld.
In 2004/05 the Tribunal upheld 58 per cent of appeals against LEA 
refusals to carry out statutory assessments. In cases involving the 
contents of statements 87 per cent of appeals were upheld at least in 
part -  that is, the resulting statements included some if not all of the 
provision parents were seeking. Given that only a quarter of parents 
retain a lawyer for the hearings, the high proportion of appeals 
upheld or settled in advance in favour of parents indicates that 
legal representation is not required for parents to be successful in 
their appeals.
Decisions about collecting further data on those using Tribunals are 
for the Tribunals Service itself.
(Government Response October 2006 para 54 p.54-55).
On one level, this response is convincing. Any parent who is dissatisfied with 
decisions made about provision for their child’s needs can appeal. The 
SENDIST is a competent specialist tribunal. It operates well, within the remit it 
has been given; provides clear information about how to prepare and present 
appeals; conducts enabling hearings, and parents have a high success rate. 
Parents have access to advice through the PPS. Mediation is available as an 
alternative to reduce conflict. Why should anything more be done if parents do 
not choose to access what is available?
But the response is based upon the premise that the concerns are unfounded 
because there is no clear link between low levels of appeals and social 
deprivation. To a degree this is understandable because the report does not 
establish the link as clearly as it could have done. Although it has a reasonably
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robust evidential base54, there is a tendency to draw conclusions based upon 
anecdotal quotations. What is significant is that its conclusions are in line with 
the earlier studies referred to in this Chapter. Some of these are small studies55 
but, when considered together, a clear picture emerges that the current appeals 
system appears particularly daunting for parents who are educationally and 
materially disadvantaged.
Even if the DfES failed to make the link with these earlier studies, the results of 
the Department’s own league tables show that the gap between rich and poor, in 
terms of educational achievement, is continuing to widen. Figures published by 
the Chief Inspector for Schools show that, in 2005, 28.2 per cent of pupils in the 
10 per cent most deprived areas gained at least five GCSEs, including English 
and maths, at grades A* to C. In the richest 10 per cent of areas, 56.2 per cent of 
pupils reached this level, showing an attainment gap of 28 percentage points. In 
2006 the attainment gap was 28.4 percentage points, and in 2007 it was 43.1 
percentage points56. The DfES have pledged to narrow this gap57.
In light of concerns brought to their attention by a House of Commons 
Committee that inequality of access to the SENDIST may be perpetuating an 
attainment divide based upon social deprivation, it is difficult to understand 
why such concerns were dismissed on the basis that it is for the SENDIST to 
determine whether there is a problem. Lord Adonis, on behalf of the 
Government, has confirmed subsequently that the appeals process is one of the 
subjects of the HMCI review due to conclude in 2009/1058.
In terms of Mashaw’s models, it appears that the trade-off of overall control 
advancing collective interests in favour of individuation in the form of parental 
preference and appeals is having detrimental consequences for children most in 
need of help.
54 230 written submissions, interviews with 50 witnesses, visits to schools, response to a radio 
phone-in discussion and advice from specialist advisers -  see Data Sources.
55 The Evans 1998 study was the largest coving 25 LEAs; the Hall 1999 study covered 8 LEAs; 
the Riddell 2000 study covered 4 -  see Data Sources.
56 The Times 31 December 2007. www.timesonline.co.uk.
57 Ibid. Spokesperson David Willetts.
58 See p. 290.
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2.3. THE LOCAL COMMISSIONERS FOR ADMINISTRATION -
INQUISITORIAL
2.3.1. Legislative provisions
The Local Commissioners for Administration for England and Wales were 
created in 1974. There are three regional Commissioners for England. They are 
referred to collectively in the thesis as Local Government Ombudsman, ‘the 
LGO’. A member of the public aggrieved by a local authority decision may 
complain to the LGO by completing a form. The LGO’s website provides 
guidance about how to do this and the nature of the LGO’s remit. A complaint 
must be made within 12 months of the day on which the aggrieved person first 
had notice of the matters alleged59. Before the LGO investigates, he must be 
satisfied that the complaint has been brought to the notice of the authority to 
which it relates and that the authority has been given a reasonable opportunity 
to investigate60; the LGO may not investigate a complaint where there is a right 
of appeal to a tribunal or a Minister, or where the person aggrieved has a 
remedy by way of proceedings in a court of law, although he has discretion to 
investigate if he is satisfied in the particular circumstances that it is 
unreasonable to expect the aggrieved person to appeal or to go to court61.
The LGO and the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration form a 
Commission that oversees the work, produces annual accounts and business 
plans and provides advice on good practice. The Commission attaches 
importance to ensuring uniformity of treatment. The LGO is impartial. For the 
purposes of an investigation, the LGO has the same powers as the High Court in 
respect of the attendance and examination of witnesses and the production of 
documents. Anyone who, without lawful excuse, obstructs an Ombudsman in 
the performance of his functions is guilty of contempt of court62. The LGO has 
unqualified discretion to decide whether to initiate, continue or discontinue an 
investigation. Investigations must be conducted in private. The procedure for 
the conduct of an investigation is at the LGO’s discretion. The LGO is not
59 Although the Ombudsman has discretion to conduct an investigation not made within 12 
months if he or she considers it reasonable to do so (Local Government Act 1974 section 26(4)).
60 Ibid section 26(5).
61 Ibid section 26(6).
62 Information on the LGO website indicates there has never been a need to resort to 
proceedings for contempt www.lgo.org.uk.
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bound by precedent in reaching conclusions and making recommendations, but 
aims to act consistently.
The LGO investigates ‘maladministration causing injustice’, which is not within 
the remit of the SENDIST. The LGO can consider complaints about the way a 
decision was made, but cannot conduct an appeal on the merits. 
Maladministration is said to comprise:
• delay
• incorrect action or failure to take any action
• failure to follow procedures or the law
• failure to provide information
• inadequate record-keeping
• failure to investigate
• failure to reply
• misleading or inaccurate statements
• inadequate liaison
• inadequate consultation
• broken promises
There is no fixed definition of injustice but it can include:
• hurt feelings, distress, worry, or inconvenience
• loss of right or amenity
• financial loss or unnecessary expense
• time and trouble in pursuing a justified complaint
The injustice must arise from fault by the local authority .
The LGO employs investigators who will decide what information is needed in 
order to reach a decision. Where it is not clear exactly what the complainant 
objects to or what injustice they claim to have suffered, the investigator will 
obtain clarification. Having done so, he will write to the authority, defining the 
complaint and asking for comments. The letter also specifies what information 
is wanted (e.g. copies of policies, minutes of meetings). A copy of the 
authority’s reply is sent to the complainant and he is asked for comments. In the
63 Definition taken from the LGO website.
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light of these, the LGO will decide whether there is a need to inspect files or 
interview witnesses. Information may be commissioned and obtained from 
other sources.
If the LGO is satisfied with the remedial action offered by a council, he will 
regard the complaint as 'locally settled' and discontinue the investigation. The 
LGO both encourages, and oversees, settlements, which proves effective in 
curtailing the numbers of expensive investigations. Before reaching a view on 
whether a case is settled, the LGO will usually consult the complainant but is 
not bound by the complainant's views. Because authorities are willing to offer 
local settlements in so many cases, it is only necessary in a small minority of 
cases to complete an investigation and publish an adverse report. Before issuing 
such a report, a draft is sent to the authority, the complainant and any other 
relevant parties inviting their comments. Formal reports set out findings, 
conclusions and remedies for injustice.
The authority must give notice in newspapers that copies of the report are 
available for public inspection unless a direction has been issued that the report 
should not be made publicly available. Such directions are rare but can be 
necessary where, for example, the identity of the complainant (or others) would 
be likely to become known and could cause harm. Within three months of the 
issue of a report, the authority are required to tell the LGO what action they 
propose to take. In nearly every case, authorities agree to comply fully with the 
recommendations. In the tiny proportion of cases where authorities refuse to 
comply, the LGO may publish a further report formally recommending what 
action the authority should take. The authority must reply. If the LGO remains 
dissatisfied having considered the reply, the authority may be required to 
publish a statement in newspapers setting out the LGO’s findings and why the 
authority's response is considered unsatisfactory. Recommendations can 
influence future practice and lead to wide-scale review of procedures.
2.3.2. Context
The 2006/7 Annual Review Report indicates that, in 2006/7, the LGO decided 
18,192 complaints. The figure 2005/6, the figure was 18,487. The outcomes
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were as follows. The 2004/5 figures are in brackets (Local Commissioner for 
Administration 2006b p. 16):
OUTCOMES OF LGO COMPLAINTS
Complaint outcome Number of complaints
Local settlements 2956 (2,875)
Maladministration causing injustice (issued report) 132(167)
Maladministration, no injustice (issued report) 6(28)
No maladministration 4952 (5,407)
Ombudsman's discretion not to pursue complaint 2631 (2,892)
Premature complaint 5123 (4,713)
Outside jurisdiction 2392 (2,405)
The figures for complaints outside the LGO’s jurisdiction are high, and may 
signify confusion about the LGO’s remit.
The Report also states that 47.6% of all complaints were determined within 13 
weeks (the target was 50%); 78.5% within 26 weeks (the target was 80%); and 
95.4% within 52 weeks (the target was 96%) (Ibid. p.21). There was a slight 
decrease in performance against targets as compared with previous years, which 
was attributed to an increase in the complexity of complaints and slow response 
times by local authorities. SENDIST appeals generally take five months to 
conclude. This is comparable with 80% of LGO complaints. However, 20% of 
LGO complaints may take up to twice as long to conclude. This is higher than 
the percentage of cases in which reports are produced. Figures on the number of 
complaints show that very few parents approach the LGO, and that 
maladministration is found in a tiny number of cases. But the LGO’s remit is 
limited.
A recent customer satisfaction survey (Ipsos Mori 2007) indicated that there 
was a problem with complainants being unclear about what the LGO can do. 
Although satisfaction with the handling of complaints outstripped those 
satisfied with the final outcome, there was dissatisfaction with the level of 
thoroughness of investigations and suggestions that the LGO is not impartial. 
The researchers suggest this was linked to the small number of findings of 
maladministration causing injustice and that it is difficult to change the outcome
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of investigations to improve customer satisfaction. The LGO now provide a 
telephone advice service the purpose of which is to explain their role and the 
complaints process.
The LGO publishes summary reports ‘naming and shaming’ councils. For the 
period June 2006 -  June 2007, there were 242 complaints relating to SEN 
resulting in eight published findings of maladministration causing injustice. All 
of them involved delay. There were examples of inadequate needs assessments; 
failure to provide advice as to availability of ADR; and failure to meet the needs 
of a looked-after child who fell between two different LEAs for months whilst 
they argued about which was responsible. Compensation was awarded in each 
case for the frustration and distress caused to parents and children, and for lack 
of adequate provision during the prolonged period it took for the LEA to 
comply with legal obligations.
The LGO cannot recommend that a statement include specified educational 
provision or that a child be placed in a particular school. Although the remit of 
the LGO is not to adjudicate on the merits of decisions, it appears conclusions 
are reached about failure to comply with obligations in deciding awards of 
compensation. The maximum award was £13,000. Specific recommendations 
for further action were made, including review of procedures, and the making of 
apologies. Two LEAs pre-empted LGO recommendations, and had already 
instigated reviews before publication of reports.
The table below shows the numbers of cases where recommendations were not 
complied with over the entire spectrum of local authority complaints:
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“ LGO RECOMMENDATIONS NON-COMPLIANCE
Year Number of cases
1997/98 1
1998/99 2
1999/00 3
2000/01 2
2001/02 2
2002/03 1
2003/04 0
2004/05 1
2005/06 0
Although the figures indicate that the level of compliance with LGO 
recommendations has been excellent since 1997/8, nevertheless there has been 
some debate about the status of recommendations necessitating intervention by 
the courts to ensure resolution.
In the case of R v Local Commissioner fo r  Administration ex parte Eastleigh
Borough Council5 Lord Donaldson said-
..  .the Parliamentary intention was that reports by Ombudsmen should 
be loyally accepted by the local authorities concerned.. .Whilst I am 
very far from encouraging councils to seek judicial review of an 
Ombudsman's report, which, bearing in mind the nature of his office and 
duties and the qualifications of those who hold that office, is inherently 
unlikely to succeed, in the absence of a successful application for 
judicial review and the giving of relief by the court, local authorities 
should not dispute an Ombudsman's report and should carry out their 
statutory duties in relation to it.
In R (Bradley) v Secretary o f State fo r  Work and Pensions66, Bean J, 
commenting on Eastleigh, said that it was authority for the proposition that the 
findings of an LGO are binding on the relevant local authority in the absence of 
a successful application for judicial review in which such findings are 
objectively shown to be flawed, irrational, peripheral or where there is genuine
64 Figures for 1997/8 -  2005/6 are taken from a table at p.30 in the Annual Report for 2004/5 
(Local Commissioner for Administration 2004). The figure for 2005/6 is taken from the Annual 
Report for that year (Local Commissioner for Administration 2005).
65 [1988] 1 QB 855.
66 [2007] EWHC 242 (Admin).
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fresh evidence to be considered. It follows, therefore, that if the LGO’s findings 
are binding unless challenged, it will be difficult to argue that it is reasonable to 
ignore recommendations based upon such findings.
Giddings says that the strength of Ombudsman schemes has been their ability to 
adapt to a variety of systems and cultures (Giddings 2000 p.459). There has 
been a proliferation of schemes in both the public and private sectors that have 
been adapted successfully to fit diverse contexts. A significant advantage of 
inquisitorial procedures over the SENDIST process of adversarial pre-hearing 
procedures followed by an enabling hearing, is the ability of the inquisitor to be 
pro-active role in seeking information. He may inspect files; interview whoever 
he considers may have relevant information; and commission evidence. As 
Seneviratne says (Seneviratne 2002), Ombudsmen in the UK have been 
remarkably successful, and this is due, in part, to their using methods that 
overcome many of the disadvantages of the court system. They are free to 
complainants, and there is no need for complainants to seek professional advice.
By contrast, the SENDIST’s pre-hearing procedures place the onus on the 
parties for producing the information they think the tribunal should consider. 
The Genn 2006 study shows that SENDIST members can, and do, intervene to 
assist parents who are disadvantaged at the hearing. But this is of no help to 
parents who are deterred from appealing by the prospect of producing 
statements and arguing their case orally, or who are unable to afford to pay 
expert witnesses. As the SENDIST confirmed to the Education and Skills 
Committee of the House of Commons, it is difficult for the tribunal to overturn 
decisions by LEAs based upon expert evidence where parents produce no expert 
evidence to refute the LEA’s evidence, and it is beyond the tribunal’s remit to 
commission evidence. If, as Giddings says, Ombudsman schemes can adapt 
successfully, inquisitorial procedures could bring many advantages in the SEN 
context. A particular strength of Ombudsmen is that they can recommend not 
only reconsideration of decisions, but financial redress and change to 
procedures.
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Seneviratne’s study indicates that Ombudsmen generally receive very few 
complaints. She considers that steps should be taken to make more people 
aware of their existence. A major problem with all Ombudsmen schemes, she 
says, is the time taken to deal with complaints. Seneviratne considers that delay 
is inevitable because investigations need to be thorough and extensive. She also 
notes that, because of this, there is a more-resolution focused attitude, working 
with complainants to try to avoid using formal investigative procedure unless 
absolutely necessary (Seneviratne 2002 p.286). The statistics in the table at p.62 
indicate that the resolution-focused attitude is proving successful, with the vast 
majority of complaints being either settled of filtered-out. It is clear, however, 
that a significant percentage of appeals take up to a year to conclude.
Seneviratne’s contention that delay is inevitable does not necessarily follow.
The time taken to complete an investigation depends upon the nature of 
available resources. It is possible to conclude even extensive investigations 
quickly. This is a question of trade-offs. Complaints necessitating full-scale 
investigation of practice and procedure are likely to be rare. There is a choice as 
to whether resources might be bought in. For complainants, trading-off speed of 
resolution for comprehensive reform may be a trade-off worth making. The 
children’s social services complaints procedure, which is discussed in detail in 
Chapter Six and which employs inquisitorial procedures, imposes an obligation 
upon local authorities to conclude focused reviews within short time-scales, but 
makes provision for time-limits to be waived. This establishes avoidance of 
delay as a principle, with authorities having to justify taking longer and 
complainants having the opportunity to escalate the complaint to an 
independent Panel where they consider the time taken to complete the 
investigation is unreasonable.
2.3.3. Jurisdiction
It is clear that there is not meant to be any overlap of jurisdiction between 
SENDIST, LGO and the Administrative Court, and no choice available. 
Seneviratne says that courts and tribunals are not equipped to investigate the 
manner in which decisions are made. Ombudsmen were designed to fill a gap. 
They are not an alternative -  they have a different role (Ibid. p.310). This is
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why they are precluded from investigating complaints where other remedies are 
available. However, with the expansion of judicial review, there is more overlap 
which, she suggests, calls for a re-evaluation of the relationship between 
Ombudsmen and the courts.
The continued involvement of the LGO in SEN disputes and the nature of the 
LGO’s role merits reconsideration, given the very small numbers of complaints. 
The relationship between the SENDIST, the Administrative Court and LGO in 
SEN disputes was considered in the case of R v Commissioner for  
Administration ex parte PH . This was a case about delay in assessing a child's 
SEN. The mother initiated judicial review proceedings and the LEA agreed to 
an order requiring them to assess the child without further delay. Subsequently, 
the mother complained to the LGO that her child had been caused injustice by 
the delay in making suitable provision for him and sought compensation. The 
LGO took the view that the complaint was outside their jurisdiction because she 
had already sought a remedy by way of the judicial review proceedings. The 
mother sought judicial review of the LGO's decision. She wanted the court to 
order the LGO to investigate her complaint. Mr. Justice Turner said:
It can hardly have been the intention of Parliament to have provided two 
remedies, one substantive by way of judicial review and one 
compensatory by way of the Local Commissioner.... Where a party has 
ventilated a grievance by way of judicial review it was not contemplated 
that they should enjoy an alternative, let alone an additional right by way 
of complaint to a local commissioner68.
He upheld the LGO decision and awarded costs. In two other cases - R v 
Commissioner fo r  Local Administration ex parte Bradford City Council69’, and
70R v Commissioner for Local Administration ex parte Croydon LBC the 
Administrative Court also took a hard line on any suggestion that the LGO 
should be able to consider complaints that had already been the subject of court 
decisions.
67 21 December 1998.
68 The significance of this case is discussed on the LGO website www.lgo.org.uk/origins.htm.
69 [1979] QB 287
70 [1989] 11 ER 103.
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The issue of when each mechanism should be used is not straightforward. It is 
understandable that parents who consider their child has been disadvantaged by 
delay would wish to seek compensation. Had the parents in PH  brought their 
complaint to the LGO in the first instance, compensation might have been 
awarded. But neither the LGO nor the SENDIST have procedures enabling 
immediate decisions to be made, as is the case in urgent judicial review 
applications. Compensation was traded-off for an urgent decision. But why 
should this have to be the case? The continued operation of a proliferation of 
mechanisms, each having different functions and procedures should be re­
evaluated to avoid duplication and confusion, particularly in light of the call in 
‘Transforming Public Services’ for integrated systems. This issue is considered 
in detail in Chapter Four with reference to Adler’s typology of administrative 
grievances.
2.4. THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT - ADVERSARIAL
The courts have a number of roles in relation to SEN disputes. Although not the 
principal dispute resolution mechanism, they have laid down principles as to 
what constitutes reasonable exercise of discretion and fair procedures which 
public bodies must act in accordance with. A judicial review application can be 
made in the Administrative Court, by-passing the SENDIST, where an urgent 
decision is needed. Government guidance, LEA policies and other decisions not 
appealable to the SENDIST may be challenged on the basis that they do not 
comply with administrative law principles, the European Convention of Human 
Rights or relevant EC law provisions.
Proceedings are formal; there is an application fee of £50 injudicial review 
proceedings, with a further £180 payable if the applicant wishes to continue, 
having obtained permission. Costs of legal representation run into thousands of 
pounds. Research by Genn (Genn 1999a) suggests that the courts are so remote 
from people’s everyday lives as to be almost irrelevant. Relatively speaking, 
there have been high numbers of court decisions involving children with SEN, 
but these amount to 20 (approx.) reported cases per year. Of the three available 
formal dispute resolution mechanisms, this is the least accessed. But parents
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cannot choose to apply to the Administrative Court in preference to appealing to 
the SENDIST.
The Administrative Court is also the appellate body for the SENDIST, though it 
is proposed that, when a two-tier tribunal system is implemented, right of 
appeal will be to the Upper Tribunal (Ministry of Justice 2007 ‘Transforming 
Tribunals’). Both parents and LEAs may appeal. In 2006/7, parents lodged 35 
appeals and LEAs lodged 7. No appeals were successful, but 10 were referred 
back to the tribunal, and 12 were withdrawn. 3 were dismissed (Hughes 2006 p. 
17). ‘Transforming Public Services’ makes clear that the prospect of having a 
court as the principal dispute resolution mechanism for public law disputes is no 
longer on the political agenda, and that the debate has moved on from the 1980s 
‘courts vs tribunals’ arguments to an argument of ‘formal vs informal’, with 
tribunals cast in the role of formal mechanisms and the onus becoming 
increasingly in favour of informal mechanisms.
The role of the Administrative Courts in SEN decision-making is discussed at 
various points in the thesis, so this section is brief. Their role in determining 
principles that shape the exercise of discretion and what constitutes a fair 
procedure is discussed in the next Chapter. Jurisprudence on the right to 
education and the rights of the child is discussed in Chapter Seven.
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Chapter Three
Discretion and Controls over its Exercise
If we stay within the comfortable areas where jurisprudence scholars 
work and concern ourselves mostly with statutory and judge-made law, 
we can at best accomplish no more than to refine what is already 
tolerably good. To do more than that we have to open our eyes to the 
reality that justice to individual parties is administered more outside 
courts than in them, and we have to penetrate unpleasant areas of 
discretionary determinations... where huge concentrations of injustice 
invite drastic reforms. (Davis, K. 1969 p.70).
3.1. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter considers the process of SEN decision-making, focusing upon the 
exercise of discretion, boundaries upon its exercise and their effectiveness. This 
is the first stage of analysis. It is essential to conduct this exercise in order to 
consider in detail the balance of trade-offs.
The SEN legislative framework envisages substantial exercise of discretion by 
LEAs. This is limited in a number of ways: by the prescriptive procedural 
requirements identified in the previous Chapter; obligations to advance the 
purpose of relevant legislation and to have regard to the SEN Code of Practice; 
independent scrutiny; enforced corrective action; and the overarching obligation 
upon public bodies to act in accordance with administrative law principles. 
LEAs have self-limited by compiling criteria for the purpose of deciding 
whether to conduct formal assessments. A further limiting factor is the amount 
of resources allocated by Government and the degree of flexibility afforded 
about how local priorities should be met within available resources. This 
chapter consists of a section on discretion and sections on each form of control.
As Mashaw observes, organisations and the bureaucrats that inhabit them have 
their own goals, desires and motivations, which may conflict with the purposes 
of relevant statutory obligations. It is important to examine the tensions between 
organisational goals and programme goals in order to assess whether, and how, 
the exercise of discretion should be controlled and to identify, as accurately as 
possible, the tensions between systemic and intuitive rationality. This Chapter 
identifies that LEAs are adopting ‘blanket policies’ driven by a culture that
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places more emphasis on resources than on children’s needs. If discretion is 
viewed as a continuum or spectrum, the objective must be to achieve an 
optimum point on the rule-to-discretion scale -  a reasonable balance between 
effectiveness and certainty of expectation, on the one hand, and flexibility to 
take into account individual circumstances, on the other.
Exercise of discretion by the SENDIST is limited by some of the same 
constraints as those applying to LEAs - obligations to advance the purpose of 
the legislation, to comply with procedural requirements, and to have regard to 
the SEN Code of Practice, administrative law principles, the ECHR and EU 
law. Tribunals are not bound by previous tribunal decisions, but should act 
consistently. There are, however, three significant differences. SENDIST are 
not bound by any guidance directed at LEAs, other than the SEN Code of 
Practice, nor by any self-limiting criteria developed by them, and they are not 
limited by resources in the same way as LEAs. This has led to a situation 
whereby the tribunal is more likely than LEAs to make decisions favourable to 
parents. The figures shown on p.40 demonstrate a high success rate for parents 
in appeals. The adoption of self-limiting criteria indicates that LEAs are 
interpreting their obligations restrictively which, Mashaw says, increases the 
chance of appeals being successful.
Mashaw’s view is that the courts are ineffective in determining normative moral 
standards because they are only able to lay down principles in judgments on the 
limited number of individual cases that come before them. An examination of 
the general and SEN-specific jurisprudence relating to the exercise of discretion 
and substantive legitimate expectation indicates that, although the courts have 
laid down important principles governing the exercise of discretion in some 
cases, they are not always consistent in approach. Whilst the importance of the 
over-arching administrative law principles laid down by the courts and their role 
as independent check on the Executive cannot be dismissed lightly, they are 
undoubtedly a mechanism of last resort and the effect of this must be considered 
in any proposals for reform.
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3.2. DISCRETION
Teubner has observed an increasing tendency for social relationships to be 
regulated by law. He terms this ‘juridification of the social sphere’ (Teubner 
1987 p. 391-2.), suggesting it marks a substantial departure from the traditional 
position of law’s neutrality and non-interference. Teubner sees this legal 
explosion as ‘puzzling to the public’; as ‘over-regulation’ - an ‘excess of laws’. 
His concern is that this is damaging law’s enforcement role and reducing its 
credibility, as the mastering of increasing numbers of highly technical 
regulations becomes impossible. Galanter (1996 p.2) considers this proliferation 
is in response to a demand for more information, and linked to a decline in trust 
of governments. There is little doubt, however, that rules are an efficient way to 
organise complex societies, and a method of ensuring that legislation is 
interpreted consistently. The purpose of administrative rules is to facilitate 
delegation; allow internal communication within organisations; and to help 
standardise administrative practice by allowing it to be measured and audited.
Theorists are divided into two camps -  those who put their trust in the courts as 
the primary means of controlling discretionary power, and those who believe in 
rulemaking. Mashaw described the contribution of the courts to the control of 
discretionary power as modest at best. Control (he says) is external and largely 
retrospective. Preference for regulation, however, is based upon mistrust, and 
may signal priority for the principles of efficiency and uniformity enshrined 
Mashaw’s bureaucratic rationality model, over individuation and diversity, as 
enshrined in the moral judgment model.
Bradshaw argues that the contradiction between effectiveness and sensitivity to
individual cases calls for a judicious blend of rules and discretion:
Most agencies making decisions do so in a manner which can be located 
on a continuum somewhere between discretion at one end and rules at 
the other. Competing values push the character of the decision between 
these two ends of the continuum. Thus accountability, rationality and 
entitlement push the agency towards rules, and generosity, sensitivity 
and choice push it towards discretion. (Bradshaw 1981 p. 139).
72
Jowell presents a scale:
Discretion is rarely absolute and rarely absent. It is a matter of degree, 
and ranges along a continuum between high and low. Where he has a 
high degree of discretion, the decision-maker will normally be guided by 
such vague standards as ‘public interest’ and ‘fair and reasonable’. 
Where his discretion is low, the decision-maker will be limited by rules 
that do not allow much scope for interpretation. (Jowell 1973 p. 178).
Jowell distinguishes between rules, principles and standards, with rules being 
the most precise form of general direction, requiring for their application 
nothing more or less than the happening or non-happening of a physical event. 
Principles involve normative standards by which rules might be evaluated, and 
arise mainly in the context of judicial decision-making. But principles need not 
necessarily be determined by the courts. Mashaw suggests a ‘superbureau’ as an 
appropriate, sufficiently independent, body to define such principles. Standards 
are distinguishable from rules by their flexibility and susceptibility to change 
over time.
Dworkin considers discretion is always contained within rules, describing it as
‘the hole in the doughnut’.
Discretion does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding 
belt of restriction. It is therefore a relative concept. (Dworkin, R.M.
1979 p.31).
Galligan suggests that any exercise of official power should be capable of being 
explained in terms of its purposes and within a framework of constraining 
principles (Galligan 1986 p.20). As rules structure discretion, so discretion 
structures rules. The exercise of discretion is also shaped by the wording of the 
rule; the body of administrative law principles within which decision-makers 
are required to operate; the intention of the legislature in enacting the power or 
duty from which the rule derives; and the interpretation of the rule by the 
decision-maker. In seeking the optimum point on the rule-to-discretion scale, it 
may be possible to fit rule-type to function. Baldwin considers that precise rules 
are better suited to simple matters. As the matter becomes more complex, 
principles deliver more consistency than rules. (Baldwin 1995 p. 16).
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Rules themselves may not be the optimal means of controlling discretion. As 
Baldwin says:
Using governmental rules is one way of controlling or executing 
governmental functions but it is by no means the only one.
Alternative controls include accountability to variously 
constituted bodies; scrutiny, complaints, and inspection systems; 
arrangements to ensure openness (such as requirements to 
publish performance indicators and statistics) and schemes for 
giving effect to consumers’ views. (Baldwin 1995 p. 16).
These forms of control are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The SEN 
decision-making process incorporates all of them. In addition to those already 
mentioned, local authority education and children’s services and schools are 
inspected by Ofsted71; there are internal complaints systems; requirements to 
publish information on standards in schools; individuals may make requests to 
see personal, and other, information under the Freedom of Information Act 
2000 and the Data Protection Act 1998. In spite of this plethora of controls, 
there remains considerable scope for the exercise of discretion in individual 
cases, which brings into play the tension between the objective of establishing 
settled general standards, and the need to approach individual cases with a 
relatively open mind -  to be willing to modify, extend or make exceptions to the 
standards to take account of the merits of individual cases. The implications of 
this willingness to modify the standards are that they must not be viewed as 
binding rules, and that decisions will not form precedents for future cases.
But, as Galligan observes, decisions made on the merits are simply decisions 
made in accordance with unarticulated standards (Galligan 1986 p.8). The 
argument for having criteria for assessment and statementing in the context of 
SEN decision-making is not simply to assure predictability, but to advance the 
collective good in ensuring fair distribution of limited resources. However, in 
the administrative law context, it is considered important that the discretionary 
authority maintains an attitude of reflective interaction between policy choices 
and the particular features of individual cases. There is evidence in the Hall 
study (Hall 1999 pps 42-43) that LEAs are more concerned about resources
71 Now the Office of Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills.
74
than children’s needs72 and in the Select Committee’s 2006 Report that LEAs 
may not be making decisions on the merits of individual cases -  that they are 
operating blanket policies73. In order to understand why this is, it is necessary to 
understand the internal point of view74 - the way officials approach their own 
powers and perceive their tasks.
Possibly there is a proliferation of ‘bad’ officials who stand on the letter of the 
criteria to prevent children from receiving remedial help. But perhaps a 
prevailing culture is in operation in which resources are seen as more important 
than children’s needs. In cases where a child is failing to make progress but 
does not yet meet the level of difficulty required for a statement, an LEA might 
argue that the child is not sufficiently deserving of this resource. But, in 
situations where such a decision would confine the child to years of 
increasingly significant failure, it might be reasonable to depart from the criteria 
to give the child a statement at an earlier stage. ‘Generous’ officials may bend 
the rules or find loopholes to help more children. But lack of uniformity 
between decision-makers creates arbitrariness, uncertainty and possibly 
unfairness. Eligibility is not determined by the rule or the circumstances of the 
case, but by which particular individual or Panel makes the decision.
In the cases of R v Home Secretary ex.p. Anufrijeva75 and European Roma 
Rights Centre v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport76 examples can be seen 
of rules being disregarded by decision-makers where they were at odds with the 
prevailing culture and of a culture of discrimination that had infused decision­
making, influencing how rules were applied. This practice may be difficult to 
track down, let alone eliminate. In both cases, the courts condemned what was 
happening unequivocally. But, in the case of R (Gillan) v Metropolitan Police
77Commissioner in which the police were accused of using stop-and-search 
powers in an arbitrary manner based upon racial prejudice, the courts did not
72 See p.26 of the thesis.
73 The report refers to a letter from the DfES to LEAs which is discussed at pps. 91, 105 and 304 
of the thesis.
74 This is the notion of H L A Hart in The Concept o f  Law  1961 Oxford UP.
75 [2003] UKHL 36.
76 [2004] UKHL 55.
77 [2006] UKHL 12.
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condemn the practice. It was held that deployment of the power against a higher 
proportion of people from particular ethnic groups was the only legitimate use 
of the power where those likely to perpetrate acts of terrorism were more likely 
to be from one ethnic group than another.
The question these cases raise is whether, and to what extent, rules change 
behaviour -  whether the strongest influences on decision-making are 
strong/weak discretion, the degree of prescription imposed by rules, or social 
conditioning, group morality, attitudes of mind and prejudice. Perhaps LEA 
decision-makers, erroneously, have come to regard the criteria as binding 
conclusive rules, or the relevance of resources is misunderstood. The task of 
LEAs is not to prevent, or delay, children getting remedial help where such help 
is needed. Rationing, which may be a necessity where resources are insufficient, 
is about the nature and degree of what is offered, not about finding reasons to 
refuse a request for help.
It is important to understand the motivation of those operating the rules. They 
are unlikely to have met the child or the parents (Evans 1998 p.31). Parents may 
request meetings, but only after a proposed statement has been prepared78, and 
there is no requirement that the child should be present at such meetings. LEAs 
are cast in the role of defending their decisions. Officials who make decisions 
on a regular basis may have developed a ‘them and us’ attitude, castigating 
middle-class parents who wish to jump the queue and get more for their child at 
the expense of others (Evans 1998 p.34). In the absence of such a culture, one 
might suppose it would be difficult to refuse any request in respect of a child 
who needs remedial help.
Davis says that rulemaking is the most important way in which bureaucracy
creates policy, but this does not mean that discretion should be eliminated:
Even where rules can be written, discretion is often better. Rules without 
discretion cannot take into account the need for tailoring results to 
unique facts and circumstances of particular cases. The justification for 
discretion is often the need for individualized justice. This is so in the 
judicial process as well as the administrative process. (Davis 1969 p.26).
78 Paragraph 4 of Schedule 27 to the Education Act 1996.
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There are three problems with rules -  selective enforcement; a need to mitigate 
their severity in particular circumstances; and over-inclusiveness. Although 
discretion may lead to arbitrariness, uncertainty or manipulation by its 
possessor, it cannot simply be replaced by rules. Rules may reduce arbitrariness, 
but particular prevailing cultures driven by rules may lead to manipulation of 
discretion. They may ‘solve’ problems whilst creating others. A proliferation of 
different types of rules adds to the complexity of the problem. The SEN Code of 
Practice (2001) discussed in section 3.3.1. emphasises the obligation to have 
regard to its provisions. On the other hand, the guidance on Management of 
SEN Expenditure (DfES 2004c title page) discussed in section 3.3.2. is headed 
‘Status: Recommended’. There is no reference to specific powers under which it 
is issued.
There is a need for uniformity where mass decisions are being made in 
order to ensure equal treatment. Yet, even in cases where the most 
prescriptive form of rules operate, the classic rule of administrative law 
is that a public body entrusted with discretion must exercise it, and may 
not fetter its exercise. But departure from rules is complex. The 
existence of particular procedures and practices may engender a 
substantive or procedural legitimate expectation. Rules operate as a 
promise that they will be followed. The more prescriptive the rule, the 
more likely it is that an obligation to follow it will be implied. If a child 
meets tightly-drawn eligibility criteria for a statement, the expectation is 
that he will get one.
In the case of R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex p  
Coughlan and others19 the applicant, a disabled elderly woman, went to 
live in a local authority nursing home, acting on an assurance that this 
would be her ‘home for life’. Later, the local authority, for financial 
reasons, decided to close the home. In considering the status of the 
assurance, the Court of Appeal took the view that it had induced a 
legitimate expectation of a benefit that was substantive, not simply
79 [2000] 2 WLR 622.
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procedural, such that it was open to the court to decide that to frustrate 
the expectation was so unfair that to take a new and different course 
amounted to an abuse of power. It was open to the court to determine 
whether there was a sufficient overriding interest to justify departure 
from what has been previously promised.
o n
The case of R(Rogers) v Swindon NHA advances the principle of 
substantive legitimate expectation. A Primary Care Trust (PCT) had 
adopted a policy of deciding to fund particular treatments based upon 
taking into account statutory guidance; all relevant evidence; the views 
of patients and others involved; and the needs of other groups competing 
for scarce resources. The policy also provided for applications for 
funding to be made in the case of special healthcare problems presenting 
an exceptional need for treatment.
Refusing an application for funding of the drug Herceptin, the PCT cited 
the fact that it was not licensed or approved by the relevant Government 
agency, NICE81. The Court of Appeal held that this was irrational. The 
policy allowed the possibility that Herceptin could be funded for some 
patients under the exceptional applications procedure. This being the 
case, the only rational basis for distinguishing between claims made 
under this category would be to focus on clinical needs and fund 
Herceptin for patients for whom it was properly prescribed. An order 
was made that Herceptin be funded for the applicant.
As in Rogers, there are two exercises of discretion in the SEN context -  
discretion to devise criteria and discretion as to whether to follow them 
in individual cases. LEAs may be concerned to create certainty but not 
an expectation that will bind them to a particular course of action. This 
would lead to negative formulation of criteria - statutory assessments 
will not be undertaken unless the child has x level of difficulty and there
80 [2006] EWCA Civ 392.
81 National Institute for Clinical Excellence.
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is evidence of this from y sources, rather than, if a child has x level of 
difficulty and there is evidence of this from y sources, an assessment 
will be undertaken. Where such a negative formulation is adopted, it is 
possible this may influence the way criteria are perceived and operated. 
Evans refers to schools perceiving criteria as ‘hurdles’ (see p.43 of the 
thesis) which suggests they are operated as barriers.
Because resources are limited, there is a need to secure a balance 
between making appropriate provision for the individual child who is 
the subject of the decision and the interests of all children who will be 
affected by it, such that all decisions are seen as objectively fair. But the 
function of LEA criteria is to determine which children should be 
assessed and statemented. Officials who perceive their function as being 
to limit the distribution of resources are acting in a manner contrary to 
purpose of the legislation, whereas any departure from the criteria 
leading to more help being given to an individual child is advancing its 
purpose. But persistent departure from the criteria might lead to unfair 
outcomes, and not simply in terms of decisions being arbitrary. A parent 
who is told that their child cannot have a statement because the LEA has 
been so generous that the budget is used up, is unlikely to perceive this 
as fair.
Below are Galligan’s observations, which reflect those of both Adler 
and Mashaw, namely that whether the operation of discretion operates 
effectively in any given set of circumstances, may depend upon one’s 
point of view:
There might be good reasons for setting out standards and rules 
in advance, and it might be desirable over a course of decisions 
to develop patterns of standards based on precedents. However, 
the reasons for acting in this way are not inherent in the idea of 
rational action, but derive from a number of factors: it is easier 
and time-saving to have rules of thumb, or it is desirable to give 
those likely to be affected by my decision notice of how I intend 
to act... rules are likely to enhance accountability; they are also 
likely to help overcome some of the organizational difficulties 
within bureaucracies; or where rights are in issue, it might be 
thought that they are best protected by settled standards. It may
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be highly rational and typical to proceed according to settled 
standards even at the cost of a certain flexibility, but it is not a 
requirement of the very idea of rationality to do so; and whatever 
configuration of rules, principles and looser standards is most 
suitable is a matter to be settled in each set of circumstances [...]
The nature and complexity of the task, the expertise of officials, 
and the opportunity for participation by individuals and groups 
are all factors that bear on the final structure of decision-making; 
whatever strategy finally is used is likely to be a compromise 
[. . . ]
[...] any answers to the right balance of formal, substantive and 
reflexive rationality are complex [...] Firstly, much depends on 
the point of view taken and what is considered within that point 
of view to be most important. One approach might stress the 
efficient and effective realization of goals as the dominant 
consideration, while another might emphasize stability in legal 
relationships, or procedural fairness, or extensive participation 
by interested parties [...] the emphasis given to one will affect 
the strategy selected. Secondly, even within a particular point of 
view, there may be different factors which cannot easily or 
uncontentiously be assessed. Assuming, for example, that the 
effective realization of goals is taken to be most important, it 
may be necessary to assess the problem of overinclusion and 
under inclusion in considering the virtues of rules. (Galligan 
1986 p. 148 and 150 and 166-7).
Galligan’s observations are apposite but not particularly helpful in 
solving the problem of achieving a reasonable compromise between 
individuation and certainty. He rightly says that what needs to be done is 
to conduct an assessment in light of all relevant circumstances. 
Unfortunately decisions on SEN policy appear to be made on a 
fragmented and piecemeal basis, as opposed to on the basis of a holistic 
approach. (Audit Commission 2002b).
Laws LJ offers some assistance, suggesting that the answer to the rules v 
discretion dilemma may lie in proportionality. Starting from the 
principle that it is a requirement of good administration for public bodies 
to deal straightforwardly and consistently with the public, he says that 
there is a need to articulate the limits of requirements -  to describe what 
amounts to a good reason to depart from the rule. Where an expectation 
is capable of being engendered by the rule, the only justifiable reason for
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departure is a legal obligation to do so or in circumstances where this 
would be a proportionate response having regard to the legitimate aim 
pursued by the decision-maker in the public interest.
Proportionality will be judged [...] by the respective force of the 
competing interests in the case [...] All these considerations, 
whatever their direction, are pointers not rules. The balance 
between an individual’s fair treatment in particular 
circumstances and the vindication of other ends having a proper 
claim on the public interest (which is the essential dilemma 
posed by the law of legitimate expectation) is not precisely 
calculable, its measurement not exact.82
The development of eligibility criteria by LEAs is an example of public 
bodies exercising discretion to make rules. This is legitimate, given that 
general administrative law principles, such as fairness and rationality, 
provide uncertain guides as to outcome. The difficulty appears to stem 
from lack of understanding that it is legitimate, and sometimes 
necessary, to depart from the rules. In some circumstances, discretion is 
not only compatible with rights, but an essential component in working 
out their meaning and giving them full effect.
The Anufrijeva and Roma Rights Centre cases demonstrate that rules can 
have only a limited effect where they are at odds with the prevailing 
culture. Thus, the best prospect of assuring reasonable outcomes does 
not lie in jurisprudence, or rules but, as Mashaw says, in cultural- 
engineering. In the words of Carol Harlow:
There is little evidence to suggest that regulated (or in the 
fashionable jargon) “grid” administrations perform better than a 
“group” culture operated on trust and forbearance. “Grid” culture 
creates a formalised, juridified, bureaucratic society, which 
becomes impoverished in terms of human relationships (Harlow 
1997 para 250).
In seeking Mashaw’s optimum rules/discretion balance, it appears a 
change of rules would not, of itself, engender trust and forbearance in a 
system that pits parents and LEAs against one another as adversaries and 
drives rigidity in decision-making based upon defensiveness.
82 Naharajah Abdi v Home Secretary [2005] EWCA Civ 1363 para 68.
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3.3. CONTROLS OVER THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION
3.3.1. The SEN Code of Practice
Where the state allocates resources to public bodies for distribution, there may 
be a need to set out broad policies and principles governing such allocation. The 
vehicle for this, in the context of SEN, is the Code of Practice, (Special 
Educational Needs Code of Practice November 2001). LEAs and all persons
83working with children with SEN are required to have regard to its provisions . 
It sets out the principles underpinning the legislation together with guidance on 
the stages of intervention, from pre-school to post-school. It describes the roles 
of the different agencies, and emphasises the principles of inclusion and 
parent/pupil participation.
Two aspects of the Code are relevant for the purposes of this thesis: what it says
about participation of parents and children in the decision-making process, and
the degree to which it prescribes the actions of LEAs84. In relation to the
involvement of parents, Chapter 2 of the Code states:
Partnership with parents plays a key role in promoting a culture of co­
operation between parents, schools, LEAs and others. This is important 
in enabling children and young people with SEN to achieve their 
potential.
Parents hold key information and have a critical role to play in their 
children’s education. They have unique strengths, knowledge and 
experience to contribute to the shared view of a child’s needs and the 
best ways of supporting them. It is therefore essential that all 
professionals (schools, LEAs and other agencies) actively seek to work 
with parents and value the contribution they make.
The work of professionals can be more effective when parents are 
involved and account is taken of their wishes, feelings and perspectives 
on their children’s development. This is particularly so when a child has 
special educational needs. All parents of children with special 
educational needs should be treated as partners. They should be 
supported so as to be able and empowered to:
• recognise and fulfil their responsibilities as parents and play an 
active and valued role in their children’s education;
• have knowledge of their child’s entitlement within the SEN 
framework;
• make their views known about how their child is educated;
83 Section 313 of the Education Act 1996.
84 Participation of children is considered in Chapter Seven of the thesis.
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• have access to information, advice and support during 
assessment and any related decision-making processes about 
special educational provision.
These partnerships can be challenging, requiring positive attitudes by 
all, and in some circumstances additional support and encouragement 
for parents (paras 2.2 and 2.3).
It is said that there should be no presumption about what parents can or cannot 
do to support their children’s learning. Stereotypical views of parents are 
unhelpful and should be challenged. All staff should bear in mind the pressures 
a parent may be under because of the child’s needs (para 2.6).
The Code sets out fundamental overarching principles:
• a child with special educational needs should have their needs 
met;
• the special educational needs of children will normally be met in 
mainstream schools or settings;
• the views of the child should be sought and taken into account;
• parents have a vital role to play in supporting their child’s 
education;
• children with special educational needs should be offered full 
access to a broad, balanced and relevant education, including an 
appropriate curriculum for the foundation stage and the National 
Curriculum (para 1.5).
In relation to assessment, it states:
In deciding whether to make a statutory assessment, the critical question 
is whether there is convincing evidence that, despite the school, with the 
help of external specialists, taking relevant and purposeful action to 
meet the child’s learning difficulties, those difficulties remain or have 
not been remedied sufficiently and may require the LEA to determine 
the child’s special educational provision. LEAs will need to examine a 
wide range of evidence. They should consider the school’s assessment 
of the child’s needs, including the input of other professionals such as 
educational psychologists and specialist support teachers, and the action 
the school has taken to meet those needs. LEAs will always wish to see 
evidence of, and consider the factors associated with, the child’s levels 
of academic attainment and rate of progress. The additional evidence 
that authorities should seek and the questions that need to be asked may 
vary according to the child’s age and the nature of the learning difficulty 
(para 7.34).
There then follows a list of the evidence to which LEAs should pay particular 
attention. The Code states that LEAs will always require evidence of academic
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attainment, but cautions that attainment is not in itself sufficient for LEAs to 
conclude that a statutory assessment is or is not necessary. An individual child’s 
attainment must always be understood in the context of the attainments of the 
child’s peers, the child’s rate of progress over time and, where appropriate, 
expectations of the child’s performance (para 7.39).
LEAs should be alert, therefore, to significant discrepancies between a child’s 
attainments:
• in assessments and tests in core subjects of the National 
Curriculum and the attainment of the majority of children of 
their age;
• in assessments and tests in core subjects of the National 
Curriculum and the performance expected of the child as 
indicated by a consensus among those who have taught and 
observed the child, including their parents, and supported by 
such standardised tests as can reliably be administered;
• within one of the core subjects of the National Curriculum or 
between one core subject and another;
• in early learning objectives in comparison with the attainments 
of the majority of their peers (para 7.40).
LEAs should seek clear recorded evidence of the child’s academic attainment 
and ask, for example, whether:
• the child is not benefiting from working on programmes of study 
relevant to the key stage appropriate to their age or from earlier 
key stages, or is the subject of any temporary exception from the 
National Curriculum under section 364 of the Education Act 
1996;
• the child is working at a level significantly below that of their 
contemporaries in any of the core subjects of the National 
Curriculum or the foundation stage curriculum;
• there is evidence that the child is falling progressively behind the 
majority of children of their age in academic attainment in any of 
the National Curriculum core subjects, as measured by 
standardised tests and the teachers’ own recorded assessments of 
a child’s classroom work, including any portfolio of the child’s 
work (para 7.41).
Whilst the Code sets out what LEAs must take into account and the evidence 
they must seek in making a decision, there are the phrases such as ‘significantly 
below that of their contemporaries’, which are not defined, and ‘progressively 
behind’, which is not clarified in terms of degree. The Code does not prescribe 
specific levels of attainment. It also makes clear that attainment is not the only
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relevant factor. It sets out the principles governing decision-making and 
evidence that must be taken into account, but leaves scope for the exercise of 
discretion by LEAs.
The Select Committee’s 2006 Report recommended that the Government issue
guidance about when children should be assessed and statemented in order to
standardise provision across local authorities. This was the DfES response:
The Government has issued the SEN Code of Practice which gives 
statutory guidance to schools, local authorities and others. It sets out a 
graduated approach to meeting children’s needs including general 
guidance on moving between the provision made at School Action, 
School Action Plus and through SEN statements.
It is difficult to go beyond this general guidance and become more 
prescriptive as this recommendation proposes.... because more 
prescriptive guidance from the centre would not sensibly take account of 
local variation.
Whilst the Government wishes to see greater consistency of approach to 
SEN across local authorities it recognises that there can be perfectly 
valid reasons why a child might receive a statement in one area and not 
in another. For example, in one area the SEN expertise contained in 
schools and local SEN arrangements may be such that a child’s needs 
are met without requiring a statement, whereas in another area where 
SEN provision has not been developed in this way the child may require 
a statement.
Removing Barriers to Achievement set out a programme to spread best 
practice and promote consistency but no prescriptive central guidance 
could take proper account of these local variations. (Government 
Response to the Education and Skills Committee Report October 2006 
para 34 p.46).
3.3.2. Resources
Attempts at justification for particular rights to welfare may take various 
courses. The principle of equal concern and respect might appear to be a 
powerful principle, although according to one of its main exponents, 
R.M. Dworkin8 , it does not yield welfare rights but requires only that 
each individual’s interests be considered in allocating resources. 
(Galligan 1986 p. 187).
LEAs are allocated funding for education purposes from two main sources -  the 
Revenue Support Grant (RSG) and the Direct Schools Grant (DSG). The LEA
85 Dworkin, R.M. 1979.
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Budget for prescribed expenditure is funded through the RSG. It funds 
(amongst other things): educational psychologists; identification and assessment 
of children with SEN and the making, maintaining and reviewing of statements; 
monitoring provision for pupils in schools for the purposes of disseminating 
good practice; collaboration with other bodies to provide support for children 
with SEN; provision of PPSs and mediation services. RSG is allocated to LEAs 
in respect of general local government expenditure, therefore the amount 
available for SEN expenditure described will be determined with reference to 
local priorities.
DSG, on the other hand, is ring-fenced - paid on condition that it is appropriated 
for the purposes of the schools budget. LEAs may retain a proportion of the 
schools budget for prescribed purposes87. The rest must be delegated to schools. 
There are limits on the proportion of the schools budget that may be retained 
centrally88 and also a requirement that each school receives a percentage 
funding increase annually89. This means that LEAs must obtain exceptional 
permission to retain more where this would breach the limit, or where schools 
would receive less than the guaranteed percentage increase. The schools budget 
may be topped-up from other sources, but this will either mean that the LEA 
must raise additional revenue or that funds allocated for a different purpose are 
diverted. Fees of children with SEN in independent schools are retained 
centrally.
Unplanned costs arising from successful appeals which result in increased 
numbers of assessments and statements and other specialist provison funded 
from the LEA Budget may cause significant funding difficulties. Because this 
budget is not ring-fenced, these additional costs will usually be met at the 
expense of other local services. There are also significant difficulties caused by 
any unplanned placements for children in independent schools met from the 
schools budget. LEAs regard SEN pupils in maintained schools as fully-funded. 
They receive an age-weighted per pupil allocation plus an enhancement for
86 See Schedule 1 to the School Finance (England) Regulations 2008.
87 Ibid. Schedule 2.
88 Ibid. Regulation 7.
89 Ibid. Regulation 22 and Schedule 4.
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SEN from the DCSF for all pupils in maintained schools. Input from the 
educational psychology service is not viewed as an additional cost because 
LEAs employ educational psychologists. Local specialist services, such as 
speech therapy and occupational therapy, are provided at no cost to LEAs by 
NHS bodies.
Where a child with SEN moves from a mainstream school to an independent 
school, the LEA must pay the school fees, but there are no means of securing 
immediate funding from the DCSF to cover the cost. The LEA lose the child’s 
per-pupil allocation and any enhancement for the next financial year following 
the January census count, but are are permitted to claim a fixed credit from 
central Government in respect of the independent school fees. This is linked to a 
DSG funding unit for the LEA which is less than the per-pupil allocation plus 
SEN weighting and usually substantially less than the full cost of the fees.
There is both an immediate shortfall of the full cost of the fees and a long-term 
shortfall of the difference between the credit and the actual cost which must be 
found from the centrally-retained element of the schools budget. Because of the 
limits upon how much the LEA can retain centrally, funding of independent 
school fees must be met at the expense of other services. Where the LEA 
obtains exceptional permission to retain more, this means less money is 
delegated to schools.
By way of an example of the effect of unplanned independent school fees, in the 
Royal Borough of Kingston upon Thames in 2001, four successful appeals 
resulting in placements at independent schools led to the disbanding of the 
LEA’s specialist dyslexia service providing outreach support to all secondary 
schools which had been funded by the centrally-retained element of the schools 
budget. The additional costs of the school fees might have been met in other 
ways, but what is significant for the purposes of this thesis is that the SENDIST, 
in allowing each individual appeal would not have considered the cumulative or 
overall effect caused by other successful appeals. It is not within their remit to 
do so. Each tribunal will have considered whether the proposed maintained 
school and local provision were suitable for the child who was the subject of the 
appeal. If not, they might name an independent school requested by the parents
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as suitable to meet the child’s needs. If both were suitable, the tribunal would 
balance the wishes of the parents against reasonable use of public expenditure. 
It is important that the methodology for deciding what is ‘unreasonable public 
expenditure’ be examined closely.
Section 316(3) of the Education Act 199690 imposes an obligation upon LEAs 
to educate children with statements in mainstream schools, unless this would be 
incompatible with the wishes of the parent or the provision of efficient 
education for other children. Children with SEN who do not have statements 
(the vast majority) must be educated in mainstream schools91. Parents may 
choose an independent school and pay for it themselves92. Parental choice of an 
independent school does not give parents a veto over a mainstream placement93. 
Neither does it give parents the right to insist on such a placement94. The 
legislation creates a strong presumption in favour of mainstream education. 
LEAs are required to have regard to the general principle in section 9 of the 
1996 Act that children are to be educated in acordance with the wishes of their 
parents, provided this is compatible with the provision of efficient instruction 
and training and the avoidance of unreasonable public expenditure95. This 
qualified duty merely means that parents’ wishes must be taken into account 
and balanced against other factors.
Paragraph 3 of Schedule 27 to the 1996 Act requires LEAs to allow parents to 
express a preference for a mainstream school to be named in the statement96 and 
to uphold the preference unless the school is unsuitable, or the child’s 
attendance would be incompatible with the efficient education of other children
90 Section 316 was substituted by section 1 of SEND A.
91 Section 316(1) and (2) of the Education Act 1996.
92 Section 316A of the Education Act 1996 was inserted by section 2 of SENDA.
93 See R v London Borough o f  Brent and Vassie ex parte AF [2 0 0 0 ] ELR 550; L  v Hereford and 
W orcester County Council and Hughes [2000] ELR 375; L  v W orcester County Council and 
Hughes [2000] ELR 674.
94 In various cases, parents have sought to rely on Protocol 1 of Article 2 of the ECHR to 
suggest there is an obligation to educate children in accordance with the religious and 
philosophical convictions of their parents (see PD  and LD v UK  (1989) 62 DR 292; Graeme v 
U K  (1990) 64 DR 158; Simpson V UK  (1989) 64 DR 188) discussed further in Chapter 7.
95 C v Buckinghamshire County Council and SENDIST [ 1999] ELR 179.
96 This duty also applies where the LEA propose to amend the statement (Schedule 27 para 3(1), 
as amended by para 1 of Schedule 4 to SENDA) and upon request for change of the named 
school (Schedule 27 para 8).
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at the school or the efficient use of resources. LEAs are not required to facilitate 
the expression of a preference for an independent school, neither are they 
obliged to uphold such a preference. Parents wishing to express a preference for 
an independent school must rely upon section 9.
In balancing the wishes of parents against avoidance of unreasonable public 
expenditure, it appeared, until recently, that LEAs could only take into account
Q7their expenditure qua LEA . However, it appears they may now include other 
expenditure of the authority in the calculation, specifically children’s services 
expenditure98. Expenditure by other public bodies (such as health authorities)99 
may not be included. SENDIST calculate resources in a different way to LEAs 
in relation to independent school placements100. Their guidance to LEAs 
provides that, in case statements, LEAs should set out the per-pupil allocation 
for the child including any enhancement; the cost of a placement at the 
independent school of the parents’ choice; transport costs for both schools and 
any additional costs101.
The SENDIST views the difference102 between the per-pupil allocation (plus 
any transport/additional costs) and the independent school fees (plus 
transport/additional costs) as the additional cost, whereas LEAs regard the 
additional cost as the immediate unfunded shortfall plus the long-term 
difference between the credit from the DCSF and the actual cost of the fees. 
LEAs view the cost as greater and are more likely than the SENDIST to 
conclude that a placement in an independent school is unreasonable public 
expenditure. There is considerable uncertainty about what the phrase means, 
with the courts suggesting they could not interfere with a SENDIST decision to 
reject an LEA placement calculated as costing £12,200 p.a. in favour of the
97 See B v LB o f  H arrow [222] ELR and S v Somerset County Council [2002] EWHC 1808 
(Admin).
98 O v Lewisham and SENDIST [2007] EWHC 2092 (Admin).
99 C v Special Educational Needs Tribunal [1997] ELR 390.
100 See further N. Armstrong and D Wolfe ‘Special Educational Needs: Counting the Costs’ 
(2002) Legal Action  January 23.
101 www.sendist.gov.uk/forms.
102 The courts upheld this as the correct approach in R v Special Educational Needs and  
Disability Tribunal and the London Borough o f  Hillingdon [2005] EWHC Admin 580.
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i rnparents’ choice of independent school at a cost of £70,000 p.a. , but also 
finding cost differentials of £2000 p.a.104 and £200,000 p.a.105 significant.
Also, the SENDIST -  unlike LEAs - in considering whether it is necessary to
assess or statement are not making this decision with reference to a list of
children with SEN to whom obligations are owed compiled in order of need, or
measuring children against criteria designed to ensure that only 2% of children
with SEN (approx.) are statemented, they are considering whether it is
necessary make special educational provision for a particular child. Their
guidance to LEAs states:
We will take LA policies into account if they are set out in the written 
evidence or explained verbally. But you cannot assume that a LA 
decision that was made in line with its policy will necessarily be 
approved by the tribunal (if it were the case there would be no need for a 
tribunal). We will seriously consider local policies, particularly if you 
explain why they were adopted and how they reflect national policy and 
guidance10 .
The SENDIST Annual Report for 2006/7 shows that 65% of appeals for 
placements at independent schools were successful (137 upheld out of 214 
appeals lodged). This is a relatively low number, though a high percentage.
Even one or two appeals where there are independent school fees of £70,000 
p.a. can have a significant effect on an LEA’s schools budget. The report does 
not show the spread of these appeals between LEAs.
Government policy, as set out in a document entitled ‘Management of SEN 
Expenditure’ is to reduce the number of statements, the objective being for 
parents to have confidence that their child’s needs will be met without the need 
for a statement:
We would expect only those children with the most severe and complex 
needs, requiring support from more than one specialist agency, to need 
the protection a statement provides. (DfES 2004a p.3).
103 R (Wiltshire County Council) v YM and Special Educational N eeds and D isability Tribunal 
[2005] EWHC Admin 2521.
104 S v London Borough o f  Hackney v SENT [2002] ELR 45.
105 R (D) v D avies and Surrey County Council [2004] ELR 416.
106 www.sendist.gov.uk/forms.
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In line with this, LEAs are delegating more money to schools for provision.
This is likely to lead to a raising of the threshold at which it becomes necessary 
for LEAs to intervene, resulting in fewer children being assessed and 
statemented, and LEAs ceasing to maintain some existing statements. Obviating 
the statutory assessment process will reduce costs expended on cumbersome 
procedures, allowing these costs to be re-deployed into making additional 
provision for children in schools. This may lead to an increase in appeals, but 
with schools having the lion’s share of both resources and responsibility for 
provision, it is becoming increasingly odd that the SEN-specific appeals 
procedure relates exclusively to LEA decisions. The general complaints 
procedure that governing bodies are required to set up under section 29 of the 
Education Act 2002 does not involve external scrutiny, and the LGO has no 
jurisdiction to consider complaints about governing bodies.
3.3.3. LEA Criteria
LEAs have developed criteria for the exercise of discretion. There is no 
requirement for LEAs to have criteria. Where they choose to have them, general 
principles of administrative law dictate that they must be rational. In December 
2005, the Department for Education and Skills wrote to all Chief Education 
Officers and Directors of Children's Services as follows:
Statutory assessments
Authorities have developed, or are developing or amending criteria for 
statutory assessments as a means of securing greater consistency in their 
decision-making. It is, of course, open to authorities to develop criteria 
as guidelines to help them decide when it is necessary to carry out 
statutory assessments and they have a wide discretion to determine what 
criteria they will adopt. But authorities must be prepared to depart from 
those criteria where there is a compelling reason to do so in any 
particular case and demonstrate their willingness to do so where 
individual circumstances warrant such a departure. In our view, for the 
avoidance of any doubt, any published criteria should make this very 
clear. Although local authorities appear to be aware that they must not 
operate a blanket policy for all children, some appear to believe that 
blanket policies can be developed for particular groups of children or 
certain types of need. Yet having a policy that assessments will not be 
undertaken for particular groups of children or certain types of need, in 
our view, constitutes a blanket policy that prevents the consideration of 
children's needs individually and on their merits.
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The letter echoes what Laws LJ said in the case of Naharajah Abdi v Home
1 07Secretary . It states that it is was written in view of enquiries and complaints
received in recent months, which would suggest a number of LEAs are applying
their criteria rigidly. An example of what the letter refers to features in
Warwickshire’s criteria which state:
Referrals for literacy and numeracy should not be made until time has 
been allowed for Action Plus intervention. Therefore, literacy and 
numeracy referrals will not normally be appropriate before the 
beginning of National Curriculum Year 2.
Decisions on any Year R and Year 1 referrals will be subject to 
moderation.
Reading (accuracy) at or below 2nd percentile108 
And/or
Reading (comprehension) at or below 2nd percentile 
And/or
Spelling at or below 2nd percentile
Evidence of difficulty in the area of spelling alone will not be sufficient 
to indicate the need for statutory assessment but, together with evidence 
of other cognition and learning difficulties, may warrant an 
‘exceptional’ referral.
In every case a test recommended in this document must be used and 
poor attendance eliminated as a significant factor in attainment109.
The concern would be that, although the criteria do not preclude referrals before 
year 2, they would be operated in this way. If this were the case, it would not be 
as a result of the criteria themselves. These allow ‘exceptional referrals’.
A typical criticism of the bureaucratic rationality model is the rigidity referred 
to in the DfES letter. The Select Committee’s 2006 Report suggests that the 
letter has not solved the problem. It seems odd that more has not been done by 
the Department to assure greater emphasis on individuation at the initial 
decision-making stage following this report.
107 Ibid. Note 82.
108 The lowest 2% in British Ability Scales.
109 The criteria can be observed on www.warwickshire.gov.uk/web/corporate/pages.nsf/Links/.
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3.3.4. External scrutiny
3.3.4.1 Procedural fairness
The SENDIST, LGO and the Administrative Court bring independent scrutiny 
and an assurance of procedural fairness to the process. The PDR goals make no 
reference to independence or fair procedures, but the principles of 
administrative law dictate that the system, as a whole, must comply with 
common law requirements of procedural fairness. The two main pillars of 
procedural fairness are the rule against bias, which requires that a person may 
not be a judge in his own cause, and the rule that a person must be given a fair 
hearing. Article 6 of the ECHR imposes similar requirements. Article 6(1) 
provides that:
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing 
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly by the press 
and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of 
morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where 
the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the 
parties so require, or the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the 
court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the 
interests of justice.
It was said in the case of Simpson110 that Article 6 of the ECHR is not engaged 
in SEN disputes, therefore it is not discussed in this section. But, as Article 6 
enshrines principles similar to those of the rules of procedural fairness, case law 
relating to compliance with its requirements is useful in providing a benchmark 
for assessing whether procedures are fair. This is discussed in Chapter Seven 
with reference to proposals for reform.
3.3.4.2. Independence/impartiality
The principle is that justice must not only be done, but must be seen to be done, 
suggesting a need to avoid bias and any appearance of bias. The purpose of the 
rule is to foster confidence in the process. What constitutes bias will depend 
upon the context. A person with some interest in the outcome of a decision may 
be capable of putting that interest aside and making an impartial decision. 
Fostering of confidence in the process has particular relevance in the context of
110 (1989) 64 DR. 188.
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SEN because the SENDIST replaced local appeal committees perceived as 
insufficiently independent of LEAs. This issue is the subject of discussion in the 
next Chapter in relation to Mashaw’s argument that it is possible to achieve 
confidence in the process without externality. The Evans study (Evans 1998)111 
suggests that some LEAs perceive the SENDIST as favouring parents, citing 
high levels of successful appeals as evidence for this. Possibly this has arisen as 
a result of enabling hearings where SENDIST members actively assist parents 
who appear to be disadvantaged by the process. The independence of the LGO 
does not appear to be in question. All formal SEN dispute resolution 
mechanisms are independent and impartial.
3.3.4.3. Procedures
The form of any external scrutiny; whether procedures should comprise oral 
hearings, and the process adopted in such hearings will depend upon the 
context. SENDIST appeals and judicial review applications offer oral hearings. 
The procedure of complaining to the LGO does not. Procedural fairness entails 
being able to put one’s case by presenting evidence and argument, and being 
able to respond to opposing evidence and argument. Galligan suggests the 
procedure that is necessary is one that secures treatment according to relevant 
standards. (Galligan 1996b).
In Mclnnes and Onslow-Fane112 an oral hearing was held not to be necessary in
11 o
an application for a boxing manager’s license. In Lloyd v. McMahon Woolf
LJ did not consider councillors accused of willful misconduct by the district
auditor should have been given an oral hearing -  the opportunity to make
written representations was sufficient. Here the task was investigatory and
adjudicative, as in LEA decisions about SEN. Galligan considers that the notion
of a hearing is open and variable and capable of being construed by many
different kinds of procedural forms based upon three basic elements -  notice,
disclosure and hearing.
The question in each context is what combination of the three elements 
is needed for effective and fair decisions. That is both the main practical
111 The Evans study is summarised at pps 42-49 of the thesis.
112 [1978] 1 WLR 1520.
113 [1987] AC 628.
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and normative point of a hearing, and we should be wary of suggesting 
that the hearing is in some sense independent and self-contained. For 
that reason, the highly developed procedures of a judicial trial are not 
necessary in most areas of administrative process: they are not necessary 
because decisions can be made properly and fairly on the basis of lesser 
forms of hearing. (Galligan 1996b p.349).
Galligan argues that an accurate decision may be made about a person without 
relying on him as the source of the information. The place of a hearing in 
administrative procedures relies on the extent of its contribution to better 
outcomes, and this needs to be balanced against cost. If, as Galligan says, the 
right to be heard derives from the principle of respect, it is difficult to see why, 
in the SEN context, such respect should not be shown to parents and children at 
the initial decision-making stage. This principle is, after all, at the heart of the 
SEN Code of Practice.
Where parents are dissatisfied with a decision, given that important obligations 
are involved, there is an argument that any appeal or review stage should 
involve an opportunity for parents to state their reasons for disagreement and 
for the child’s views to be made known, especially where the only other 
possibility for parents to challenge a decision would be judicial review114. 
However, Galligan suggests that, where a decision contains two elements, one 
being how to treat a person and the other being what is in the public interest, the 
first element has an affinity with the adjudicative mode, the second gravitates 
towards the policy-making consultative mode. The union of the two, he says, is 
unsteady.
Nevertheless the standards of fair treatment are reasonably well-settled: facts 
must be accurately assessed; the decision-maker must consider the 
circumstances of the case and the consequences of any decision; and the party 
affected should have the opportunity to influence the policy element. Thus, 
participation has three functions -  to assist in establishing facts; to assist the 
decision-maker to understand the consequences; and to inform policy relating to 
future decisions (Ibid. p.376).
114 See Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40. R v. The Army Board, ex parte  Anderson  [1991] ALT 
297.
95
The analysis in the next Chapter illustrates that inquisitorial procedures better 
meet these objectives than the adjudicative/enabling hearing model adopted by 
the SENDIST which does not allow wider interviewing of witnesses, inspection 
of files or commissioning of evidence. The SENDIST do not consider all the 
implications of their decisions, and parents have no opportunity to influence the 
policy element. It is for the LEA to decide whether there should be policy 
changes following successful appeals.
In the context of the SEN dispute resolution process, oversight by the 
SENDIST, LGO and Administrative Court envisages a complex split between 
policy-making and policy-application. This is examined in detail in the next 
Chapter with reference to Adler’s typology of administrative grievances.
Galligan states that a common response to the difficulties of providing adequate 
recourse is to provide a plurality of procedures. He argues that the negative side 
of this is that the initiation and pursuit of procedures for recourse is not an 
activity that comes naturally to most aggrieved parties. Even to initiate an 
informal review can be a major effort for many, let alone to pursue those of a 
more formal kind or to have several running at once. The implications of this in 
the SEN context are that the small minority of parents who appeal to the 
SENDIST may incur the anxiety and expense of following that process to a 
conclusion, but come away with important aspects unresolved. They would then 
face the prospect of having to embark on another process to resolve those 
aspects. Or, as happened in the PH case115, they may get their processes in the 
wrong order and be penalised in costs by the Administrative Court.
Although the courts have conceded Galligan’s essential elements - notice, 
disclosure and hearing in particular cases, they have not been prepared to 
concede a right to representation in civil disputes. Mashaw argues that, in the 
absence of representation, there is very little chance that unrepresented 
appellants can be enabled to master relevant law and procedural requirements 
within the time available to enable them to put their case properly. Thus, 
unrepresented appellants may be disadvantaged. As Galligan says:
115 Ibid. Note 67.
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The practical problems of knowledge, access and determination are real 
obstacles to the usefulness of recourse and should have a major 
influence on the shape and design of appeal procedures. (Galligan 1996b 
p.406).
Galligan suggests that representation is a better solution to inequality of access
than adoption of an inquisitorial procedure.
That is not to say that an enquiring, investigative approach will never be 
adequate: it is only to say that a properly presented case on behalf of the 
party has a strength and influence, the absence of which is not easily 
compensated for by other procedures. (Ibid. p.367).
Galligan’s remark is based upon the premise that a tribunal will never have the 
same incentive as an appellant to pursue evidence and facts. Mashaw suggests 
something similar, however his study of disability benefit appeals revealed a 
high success rate for appellants in a review process incorporating inquisitorial 
hearings before Administrative Law Judges (ALJs). It is possible that a review 
body may pursue evidence and facts to a degree that some appellants 
themselves may be incapable of. It is important, therefore, to consider how 
proper investigation can be assured. The SENDIST’s practice of conducting 
enabling hearings has contributed to the fact that absence of representation 
makes little difference in SENDIST appeals (Genn 2006). This suggests that a 
competent tribunal is capable of redressing power-imbalance. Indeed, one of 
Leggatt’s recommendations was more training for tribunal chairs to enable them 
to fulfil this role.
It is clear, however, that there are some cases where an enabling hearing will be 
unable to compensate for the inability of appellants to put their case and the 
lack of evidence to substantiate it. Genn recommends representation for difficult 
cases. Making publicly-funded representation available is one option for 
redressing power-imbalance, a tailor-made inquisitorial procedure is another. 
Both need to be examined in context. It is difficult to assess the extent to which 
oral hearings are valued by parents of children with SEN, or whether they 
present a prospect so daunting that it deters them from appealing. A recent 
study by the (then) Council on Tribunals on the value of oral hearings (Council 
on Tribunals 2005) indicates that the debate about inquisitorial, adversarial and 
enabling approaches is still very much alive. This was a small study that did not
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involve seeking the views of tribunal users. Responses from the advice sector 
suggest strong support for oral hearings by users, but it is not possible to infer 
conclusions about whether parents of children with SEN value oral hearings 
from these general conclusions.
There is no evidence in the SEN context of support (or otherwise) for oral 
tribunal hearings as a process of choice. Whilst studies by Genn (2006) and 
Harris (1997) indicate that those who appeal generally consider the process is 
conducted well, the Genn study also indicates that those from minority ethnic 
backgrounds who appeal tend to be the most determined and confident, or those 
who are successful in obtaining advice and support. The study found evidence 
of reluctance to become involved in legal proceedings because of anticipated 
expense and complexity. Although this was, in part, due to a misconception 
about what the process involved, there are no answers to the questions of what 
sort of process people might choose and what might make those who decide not 
to appeal act differently. Would they prefer to meet an adjudicator and explain 
their circumstances, leaving him to do all that is necessary to investigate to a 
process where they have to argue their case orally in the presence of the LEA by 
applying relevant facts, as established by evidence that they have had to go to 
the expense of obtaining, to unfamiliar complex legal provisions?
‘Transforming Public Services’ envisages a choice for complainants between 
formal mechanisms (tribunals) and informal mechanisms. But this means that 
those who choose formal resolution must choose a hearing. If such hearings are 
valued, they should remain on offer. But it is clear that more needs to be done in 
terms of assuring equal endowments.
3.3.4.4.Effectiveness
A further factor relevant to any discussion of external scrutiny is effectiveness. 
Are decisions by the SENDIST, LGO and Administrative Court complied with, 
and do they influence future decisions? Prior to the coming into force of the 
SENDA, there had been concern about delays and failures in complying with 
SENDIST decisions. Section 4 of the SENDA now provides that, if the Tribunal 
makes an order, the LEA concerned must comply with it before the end of the
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prescribed period beginning with the date on which it is made116. There are no 
statistics on compliance with SENDIST decisions. In relation to the issue of the 
extent to which appeals influence future practice, the Select Committee’s 2006 
Report states that fewer than 1% of parents of children with SEN appeal and the 
Evans research indicates that 85% of LEA officers interviewed said that they 
had made no notable changes in policy - that losing appeals was a ‘price worth 
paying’ to defend SEN policies (Evans 1998 p. 27).
The LGO cannot make binding decisions, only recommendations. The figures 
in section 2.3.2. indicate that virtually all recommendations are complied with. 
Nevertheless, Seneviratne suggests that the fact that there are authorities that do 
not comply with LGO recommendations may bring the system into disrepute 
(Seneviratne 2002 p.306). This is a difficult argument to sustain where the 
numbers are so low. It is not an argument that could legitimately be made to 
rule out more extensive use of the inquisitorial model. The LGO does not have 
enforcement powers because they have not pressed for them. This is because 
they consider it would change their relationship with authorities, making it more 
investigative than co-operative. This is a trade-off rationalised in a particular 
context that can be re-evaluated if necessary.
3.3.5. Other overarching principles
Decision-making by public bodies, courts and tribunals is confined by 
principles of rational achievement of purpose and legal stability. These bodies 
operate within a context of political and moral values, and the courts have a role 
in defining principles that enshrine those values and developing societal norms. 
This is the role described by Teubner and referred to in the introduction to this 
chapter, and by Fiss in his critique of settlement (see Chapter Five).
Relevant standards about how discretionary decisions should be made have 
been laid down by the courts. These are that: that the decision-maker must: 
consider the merits; address himself to relevant matters and exclude irrelevant 
matters; not act arbitrarily or with prejudice; and act in good faith and for the 
right purpose. Decisions must be reasonable.
116 Section 4 of SENDA inserts new section 326A into the Education Act 1996.
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Administrative Courts regulate the operation of discretion by interpreting and 
applying statutory provisions, and have developed their own principles of 
judicial review. It is difficult to calculate the precise effect these principles have 
on decision-makers. In deciding appeals and reviewing the actions of LEAs, the 
courts’ role is both to uphold or overturn a decision, and to lay down principles 
for future cases. In doing so, the courts are both reviewing the exercise of, and 
also themselves exercising, discretion. They consider whether to overturn 
decisions in accordance with general principles:
• power to overturn decisions must be exercised sparingly;
• legitimate expectations should not be disappointed;
• the future consequences of the rule should be considered;
• the importance of certainty should be taken into account; and
• decisions may be overruled where there is a sufficiently important 
principle of justice at stake. (Galligan 1986 p.43).
In setting up a normative framework, courts may overturn rules and set up new
ones whose meaning and specificity is developed incrementally through case
law, becoming settled until there is a need for adjustment.
This process, which is the quintessence of the common law method, has 
its costs in terms of certainty; but it also has the considerable advantages 
of providing a way of handling complexity, overcoming the perpetuation 
of unjust and outdated rules, and of ensuring against over-rigidity. (Ibid. 
p. 43).
Relatively speaking, there has been a high number of judicial decisions in the 
area of law relating to SEN, but these number in the hundreds, in contrast to the 
hundreds of thousands of decisions made. Former SENDIST President, Trevor 
Aldridge has implied that the courts have added to uncertainty in SEN decision­
making, producing further disputes and increased delay. His view is that what is 
wanted is more detailed legislation, and that court judgments may not be best 
suited to laying down principles because they necessarily only deal with the 
facts before them117.
117 Aldridge 2000 pp 13-14.
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There are a number of observations that can be made about this statement. 
Firstly, it is undoubtedly true. Legislation and guidance may be pre-emptive and 
anticipatory, whereas court judgments can only lay down principles in a 
reactive fashion. Secondly, it neglects to mention the chicken-and-egg 
relationship between the courts and the Executive. Legislation and guidance, 
and the principles behind them, may be driven by court judgments. Thirdly, the 
over-arching principles of administrative law derived from jurisprudence, the 
influence of the ECHR, and EU jurisprudence form a fundamental backdrop to 
the exercise of discretion by public bodies that cannot be disregarded. Evolution 
of these principles through a public dialogue driven by a body independent of 
the Executive is a fundamental check on Executive power.
When tribunals were introduced as an informal alternative to the courts for 
particular disputes, there was a wide-ranging debate about whether they 
constituted an inferior substitute. With the courts becoming increasingly remote 
from ordinary citizens due to cost and perceptions of inaccessibility118, it 
appears to have become accepted not only that it would be inappropriate for the 
courts to be the sole formal dispute resolution mechanism for welfare disputes, 
but that tribunals are now the principal formal mechanism119. The High Court 
may be replaced by a second-tier tribunal which will become the appellate body 
for parties dissatisfied with SENDIST decisions. This is to be a superior court 
of record able to exercise juridical review functions.
Harris argues that the courts have played an important role in the development 
of the law of SEN. He suggests that their role goes beyond the function of 
ensuring procedural fairness. Their scrutiny has served to add greater certainty 
and fairness of outcome in this imprecise field of law -  though they have been 
limited in their ability to re-allocate resources and unable to resolve major 
tensions in the statutory framework. He describes relevant cases as ‘closely 
positioned dots on the legal map of SEN that cannot easily be ignored by LEAs 
and other decision-makers.’ (Harris 2002 p. 155). He also suggests that decisions 
in the field have demonstrated the judiciary’s awareness of some underlying
118 See ‘Paths to Justice’ (Genn 1999a).
119 See ‘Transforming Public Services’.
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ideologies and their reasonable attempts to engage with professional educational
concerns. He concludes, however:
Voluntary bodies and LEAs alike are correct in claiming that the courts’ 
involvement has reinforced the highly technical nature of SEN law, 
making this field something a of a lawyer’s paradise (even though a 
minority of appellants are represented). (Ibid. p. 156).
It is necessary briefly to examine the case law to assess whether the courts have 
added certainty. The cases referred to earlier in the chapter about what 
constitutes unreasonable public expenditure illustrate inconsistency. It would 
not be possible for an LEA in an individual dispute to look at the case law and 
know whether a particular amount constitutes unreasonable public expenditure. 
The case of S (A Minor) v Special Educational Needs and Another [1996] 
determines that right of appeal against a SENDIST decision is the right of the 
parent as opposed to the child. Broadly the implications of the decision are that 
it is the parents’ income, as opposed to the child’s that will be used to determine 
eligibility for public funding of legal representation. This at least adds certainty, 
though the decision might raise objections in terms of children’s rights.
SEN legislation implies that needs can, and should, be met up to a finite point.
Perhaps this is the only way it can operate against a background of insufficient
resources. The courts, in reviewing LEA decisions, will consider the policy
basis for such decisions.
It is surely common knowledge that [LEAs] have the unenviable task of 
eking out resources inadequate to meet all the demands upon them and it 
is obvious that the consequences of making provision for one child may 
mean under-provision for others. (Beldam LJ120).
The Administrative Courts have laid down the following principles in respect of 
the relationship between needs and resources: LEAs are entitled to have a 
general policy of meeting the needs of dyslexic children in mainstream schools, 
so long as this does not lead to inappropriate provision for any particular 
child121; LEAs are entitled to have general policies operating as a guide to
120 Richardson v Solihull M etropolitan Borough Council and the Special Educational Needs 
Tribunal; White and Another v London Borough o f  Ealing and Special Education Needs 
Tribunal and W orcester County Council v Lane [1998] ELR 319 pp 334H - 335A
121 R v London Borough o f  Newham ex parte R  [1995] ELR 156 p. 161 C -  F.
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whether they should make a statement122; meeting the needs of the child is the 
primary consideration as opposed to curbing of expenditure - LEAs cannot cut 
provision in order to make financial savings where this would mean needs were 
not being met123; budgetary constraints can be considered in determining how 
needs should be met, provided always that they are met124. It is difficult to see 
why such principles need to be settled by courts. They could simply be 
enshrined in the SEN Code of Practice.
The courts have failed to resolve the definitional issue as to what constitutes 
SEN and what constitutes special educational provision125. This is an important 
distinction in terms of legal obligations - LEAs have a duty to make provision 
for educational needs and discretion to arrange non-educational provision. 
Sedley LJ remarked that, whilst there is uncertainty that is less than ideal, this is 
preferable to rigid categorisation, which he considered would lead to more
■I
dispute and litigation . By contrast, guidance given by Lord Woolf in relation 
to the distinction between health care and social care in the Coughlan case has 
proved helpful127 in a situation that is not dissimilar.
Harris asks whether Sedley was being sensitive to the practical realities of 
decision-making or failing to ‘bite the bullet’ in an area that is regularly the 
subject of conflict. The question is whether Sedley should be left to ‘bite the 
bullet’, or whether the Executive, aware that this distinction is one of some 
debate, should be pro-active in order to achieve some consistency in decision­
making. The Court of Appeal recently declined to become involved in the 
debate, holding that nappy-changing may be an educational need where the 
LEA had accepted it as such by putting it in Part 3 of a statement128. This is an
122 R v Cumbria County Council ex parte NB [1996] ELR 65 p. 68 B -  C.
123 R v East Sussex County Council ex parte T  [1998] ELR 251.
124 R v London Borough o f Hillingdon ex parte Governing Body ofQ ueensm ead School [1997] 
ELR 331.
125 R v Hampshire Authority ex parte J  [1985] 84 LGR (dyslexia constitutes a disability); R v 
London Borough o f  Lambeth ex parte MBM and London Borough o f  Bromley v Special 
Educational Needs Tribunal and Others [1999] ELR 260 (requirement for use of lift was held 
not to be special educational provision, but a combination of occupational therapy, speech 
therapy and physiotherapy was).
126 LB Bromley case above p.296E.
127 Ibid. Note 79 atp.77.
128 K  v The School and SENDIST [2007] ELR 234.
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example of the courts evading an important issue because to tackle it in the way 
that it needed to be tackled would have led to an adverse result for parents 
coping with very difficult problems. But what is extraordinary is the waste of 
public money involved in having the debate. How can it be right that this 
argument can go all the way to the Court of Appeal and still not be resolved?
The test of whether a child should be assessed and statemented is one of 
necessity. The courts have never developed a test to guide LEAs. On the 
contrary, they have confirmed that the legislation confers wide discretion129, 
and have been reluctant to interfere. When assessing resources, there has been
130some inconsistency about which expenditure may be taken into account ; 
where a school is named in a statement, it must admit the child131; statements 
must be specific and detailed132, but the courts have allowed LEAs some 
flexibility133. As mentioned previously, the courts have said that statements 
cannot simply refer to funding bands. The need for the DfES to send a reminder 
of this to LEAs calls into question the effectiveness of laying down principles in 
this way. Perhaps the time has come for the Department to recognise the need 
for, and provide, the much-needed clarity called for by Mr. Aldridge.
Many LEAs have adopted a process of banding. Instead of specifying in a 
statement the person or body making the provision and the number of hours, the 
statement refers to a band that equates to a sum of money. This is devolved to 
the school who decide how the money should be used. In the case of R v 
Cumbria County Council ex parte P134, a statement failed to specify an amount 
of speech therapy but referred to ‘extra funding at band Level 3 ... £6,000 p.a..’ 
Professional advice indicated that the child needed three hours of speech 
therapy a week and that £6,000 p.a. could not pay for this. The court ruled that 
although it was not unlawful for an LEA to refer to a funding band or an
129 R v Secretary o f  State fo r  Education and Science ex parte Lashford  [1988] 1FLR 72; O  v 
London Borough o f  Harrow and Another [2001] EWCA Civ 2046.
130 See discussion in section 3.6.
131 R v Chair o f  Governors and H eadteacher o f  A and S School ex parte T  [2000] ELR 274.
132 See the SEN Code of Practice 2001 which reflects the Court of Appeal decision in R v 
Secretary o f  State fo r  Education and Science ex parte E  [1992] 1 FLR 377.
133 In Joyce v Dorset County Council [1997] ELR 26 an LEA was permitted to adduce evidence 
of how needs were to be met where the statement left room for doubt.
134 [1994] ELR 25.
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amount of money, this on its own did not fulfil their duty in law to specify the 
provision a child should receive in a statement. Cumbria were ordered to rewrite 
the statement to make it clear what they considered the child ought to receive. 
This is an example of the courts redressing the balance between resources and 
individual needs.
This decision has been followed in subsequent cases, including R on the 
application o f IP SEA Limited and the Secretary o f State for Education and 
Skills and was also referred to by the DfES in their letter to LEAs in December 
2005:
Specifying provision in statements
Authorities will know and understand the legislative background and the 
Court of Appeal judgment in the case of The Queen (on the application 
of IPSEA Ltd) and the Secretary of State for Education and Skills... .135 
But it appears that some authorities are operating blanket policies of 
never quantifying educational provision for particular groups of 
children, types of need or particular types of placement.
In some cases, authorities set out the child's special educational needs in 
detail in Part 2 of their statement but leave provision open to the school 
to determine completely or in terms of options, for example a particular 
number of hours support from a support assistant or a pro-rata amount of 
time from a support teacher or some equipment, without specifying the 
provision to meet children's individual needs. Other authorities refer 
solely to a particular band of funding from their local system of 
calculating funding or a sum of money and do not always specify clearly 
the provision it is meant to fund.
In our view, any local authority policy which prohibits, deters or even 
discourages its officers from specifying educational provision clearly 
and in detail and/or from quantifying educational provision for particular 
groups of children is likely to result in breaches of:-
• section 324(2) and (3) of the Education Act 1996, which provide that the 
statement must contain such information as may be prescribed and must 
specify the educational provision to be made for the purpose of meeting 
the needs identified in the statement;
• regulation 16(b) of the Education (Special Educational Needs)
(England) (Consolidation) Regulations 2001, which provides that the 
statement must contain the information specified in Schedule 2 to those 
Regulations, which requires educational provision to be specified in 
terms of “any appropriate facilities, equipment, staffing arrangements 
and curriculum”; and
135 [2003] EWCA Civ 7.
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• section 313(2) of the Act, which imposes a duty on LEAs to have regard 
to the provisions of the Special Educational Needs Code of Practice 
(2001), paragraphs 8.36 and 8.37 of which make clear that statements 
should specify the special educational provision necessary to meet the 
needs of the child, detail appropriate provision to meet each identified 
need and normally quantify the provision.
In view of the recent cases we have had, I should be grateful if you 
would consider again the terms of the judgment referred to above, in 
particular paragraphs 14, 15 and 17 in which Lady Justice Hale notes 
that:
"[...] the statement clearly has to spell out the provision 
appropriate to meet the particular needs of, and objectives 
identified for, the individual child" (paragraph 14); and
"[...] any flexibility built into the statement must be there to 
meet the needs of the child and not the needs of the system."
(paragraph 15)
"It remains the case that vague statements, which do not specify 
provision appropriate to the identified special needs of the child, 
will not comply with the law." (paragraph 17).
The letter imposes no new obligations. It implies that the Government 
suspect large-scale non-compliance with the law, but are not doing 
anything substantive to address this. It appears that neither the Executive 
nor the courts are prepared to be pro-active in laying down detailed 
controls governing the exercise of LEA discretion. LEAs are self- 
limiting to a large degree. Within the context of legislative provisions 
whose objective is to ensure appropriate remedial help is provided to 
children with learning difficulties, the current system may not be 
achieving the optimum rules/discretion balance. There is evidence of 
rigidity driven by a culture of placing over-emphasis on the significance 
of resources. The courts, the SENDIST and the Executive continue to 
emphasise the importance of individuation. But the ‘before the event’ 
control of laying down principles in a Code of Practice, and the ‘after 
the event’ controls of SENDIST appeals and court judgments appear not 
to be influencing practice to the extent that LEAs are clear that they may 
depart from their own rules when it is reasonable to do so.
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Chapter Four
Analysis of the SEN Decision-making and Dispute 
Resolution Processes with Reference to the Works of 
Mashaw and Adler
.. .the importance of the provision of an education appropriate to the particular 
needs of children cannot be denied. It is not only in the interests of the child and 
his or her parents that such provision should be made, but also in the interests of 
the country that its citizens should have the knowledge, skill and ability to play 
their respective parts in society with such degree of competence and 
qualification as they may be able to develop. (Lord Clyde in X  and Others 
(Minors) v Bedfordshire)136.
4.1. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This Chapter continues the theoretical analysis of the SEN decision-making and 
dispute resolution processes by applying observations derived from relevant 
studies conducted by Mashaw and Adler to reach conclusions about:
• the balance of trade-offs among goals;
• collective goals and individual interests;
• adequate redress; and
• problems identified and options for change.
It is divided into sections with each of these as sub-headings. The objective of 
this thesis is to determine whether the introduction of conciliation and 
mediation into SEN dispute resolution assures PDR. It is therefore necessary 
firstly to examine formal dispute resolution mechanisms, which this Chapter 
does, and secondly to evaluate what is added to the process by the introduction 
of informal alternatives, which is the subject of the next Chapter.
Section two comprises an analysis of the SEN decision-making and dispute 
resolution processes with reference to Mashaw’s work on bureaucratic justice. 
Observations about the exercise of discretion and facts derived from the reports 
and studies cited in previous Chapters form the basis for the analysis, which 
comprises two stages. The first is an application of Mashaw’s models and 
observations on bureaucratic justice to the SEN context. A comparison between 
SEN decision-making and the operation of the disability benefits programme
136 [1995] 2 AC 633.
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(DBP), which is the subject of Mashaw’s study, reveals that, where both 
systems employ similar configurations of trade-offs, the same tensions emerge. 
Outcomes of operating different configurations in the disability benefit context 
provide information about how some of the problems identified in the context 
of SEN may be resolved. The analysis teases out themes derived from 
Mashaw’s work, highlighting trade-offs and tensions associated with those 
themes. It develops and adds value to Riddell’s broad observations derived from 
application of Mashaw’s models in the SEN context (Riddell 2000 and 2002).
The second stage comprises an examination of the trade-offs among goals. The 
starting point is that none of the SEN dispute resolution mechanisms assures 
attainment of all of the PDR goals. A comparison between the LGO, SENDIST 
and Administrative Court reveals that the LGO incorporates the most, which 
suggests that it is the most promising model in the context of SEN. Analysis of 
the trade-offs leading to failure to assure attainment of goals reveals what might 
be done to ensure their achievement.
Section three comprises an analysis with reference to Adler’s study of school 
admission appeals. Its starting point is the observations made in Chapter Three 
about discretion and controls upon its exercise. Adler’s study reveals that 
similar trade-offs are made in admissions to those adopted in SEN decision­
making and appeals. Individual interests are traded-off for collective goals at 
the initial decision-making stage. This is followed by an appeals process 
focusing upon individual interests. In both instances this has led to steps being 
taken to limit the exercise of discretion and defensiveness at the initial stage, 
and the adoption of more formal bureaucratic modes of dealing with clients.
Thus, it appears that the problems Adler describes as flowing from this - rights 
of appeal benefiting those who are least disadvantaged, and who gain at the 
expense of others; inhibition of comprehensive social reform; procedural rights 
that confer symbolic appearance of legality actually inhibiting the achievement 
of fundamental change that could enhance social welfare -  are predictable 
consequences of this configuration of models. The model does not assure fair
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outcomes for all children affected by decisions. Adler advocates a more equal 
balance between collective goals and individual interests.
In section four, Adler’s typology of administrative grievances, which has been 
developed with reference to the definition PDR is used to illustrate starkly that 
no formal SEN dispute resolution mechanism is capable of dealing with all of 
the grievances identified. The ensuing risk is that identified by Galligan that, 
even if a complaint is formally pursued using a mechanism that can resolve 
some of its aspects, other important aspects will remain unresolved.
Section five is a summary of the problems identified and suggestions for 
change. Models used in sections two and four are used to assess attainment of 
the PDR goals and adequacy of redress in relation to mediation, conciliation and 
the children’s services complaints procedure in Chapters Five and Six.
4. 2. THE BALANCE OF TRADE-OFFS AMONG GOALS
There is a continuing tension between a Tribunal’s decision, which is 
made ‘in the interests of the child’, and the LEA’s allocation of 
resources to meet the needs of all children with special educational 
needs for who it is responsible. (House of Commons Education and 
Skills Committee 2006 p.viii.)
4.2.1. Stage One
4.2.1.1. Mashaw’s models
Mashaw queries whether bureaucratic justice is possible, desirable and 
appropriate in a particular context. He asks whether there might be an internal 
law of administration that guides the conduct of administrators: a law capable of 
generalisation, critique and improvement -  of producing a sense of satisfaction, 
acceptance and justice quite apart from its connection to external legal 
institutions. He analyses the administration of a disability benefits programme 
(DBP) to see how the internal process functions - to consider the ideals created; 
the images of ‘good administration’ that guide behaviour, and the techniques by 
which ideals are realised, reinforced and sanctioned. In order to do this,
Mashaw evaluates performance with reference to models of administrative
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justice. His technique for developing the models is, he says, part empirical and 
part intuitive and analytic.
Criticisms leveled at the DBP were that it failed to provide an adequate service; 
individual claimants were unable to assert their rights to benefits because the 
decision-making process lacked the essential ingredients of judicial trials, and 
that it failed to manage claims in a way that produced predictable and consistent 
outcomes. Mashaw hypothesises that these criticisms reflect particular models 
of administrative justice; that each model is coherent and attractive; although 
the models are not mutually exclusive, they are highly competitive. The models 
are meant to indicate general features. Whole models and features shade into 
one another at the margins, but the internal logic of any one of them tends to 
drive the others from the field as it works itself out in concrete solutions. The 
models are described on p.31 of the thesis -  bureaucratic rationality; 
professional treatment; and moral judgment.
Mashaw states that the best system of administrative adjudication that can be 
devised may fall tragically short of our ideals, and that ideals may be 
inconsistent and will differ according to the values of the person holding them. 
Applying this in the SEN context, an LEA officer may view the SEN decision­
making process as ideal because criteria are operated to assure control and 
predictability; a parent might prefer the SENDIST appeals process because it 
places greater emphasis on individuation. But such perceptions would be based 
upon the models as they currently operate, and might be misconceived. The 
question is whether, from an objective perspective, the current configuration of 
models can be said assure a reasonable balance of collective and individual 
interests, or whether it can best be described as production-line decision-making 
with an add-on to buy off the worst troublemakers.
The adoption of criteria at the initial LEA decision-making stage reflects a 
desire to adopt the rational hierarchical structure to ensure control of costs 
enshrined in the bureaucratic rationality model. Wide discretion is limited in an 
attempt to make decisions consistent and predictable. Although there is a need
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for decisions to be made about deservingness137, the moral judgment model is 
not the model of choice. The process is steered away from individuation.
Parents are enabled to participate, but this is limited to the right to make written 
representations. There are indications of a prevailing culture of interpreting 
obligations restrictively and perceiving resources as more important than 
children’s needs. Individuation is traded-off for accuracy, transparency and 
consistency.
The LEA, as decision-maker, should be neutral, their role being simply to 
allocate resources in accordance with legislative objectives. Unfortunately, the 
conflict generated by the process and the fact that LEAs are placed in the role of 
actively-defending their decisions as parties to appeals have led to a situation in 
which parents are unlikely to regard either the LEA or local professionals 
commissioned to produce reports by them as neutral deciders or contributors. 
There is a focus on accuracy, with requirements to obtain reports from all 
relevant professionals, and an attempt to avoid the delay, which might be 
inherent in such an assessment, by the imposition of time-limits. Process costs 
are traded-off for accuracy, possibly at the expense of provision.
Although the SEN decision-making process is heavily reliant upon expert 
evidence, it does not follow the professional treatment model at the LEA 
decision-making stage. The LEA -  the holder of the purse-strings -  is the 
decider, as opposed to practitioners who have assessed, or are working with, the 
child. The process could lend itself to the professional treatment model but 
LEAs have chosen to subordinate the judgment of experts to the necessity of 
controlling cost against a background of limited resources. Individuation is 
traded-off for control of the costs of provision.
Arguably, in some ways, the SENDIST itself enshrines the professional 
treatment model -  the members are lawyers and SEN specialists who make 
decisions applying professional judgment. However, it seems more realistic to 
describe the SENDIST as a specialist tribunal that follows the moral judgment
137 This is Mashaw’s word. Alternatives might be ‘worthiness’ or ‘merit’, but ‘deservingness’ 
better conveys what is meant.
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model using evidence of professional witnesses to assist in adjudicating 
between competing claims. The pre-hearing appeals process resembles that of 
adversary court procedures, albeit that there is an enabling hearing. There are 
pleadings rules; the decider is neutral; and the parties control the evidence 
submitted. It is more expensive than the system it replaced. Process costs and 
the costs of provision are traded-off for individuation and confidence in the 
system deriving from the perception of impartiality that externality brings.
There is evidence of systemic stress. The reports referred to in Chapter Two and 
the letter from the DfES to all LEAs in November 2005 portray LEAs as being 
pre-occupied with resources. This may signify that bureaucratic rationality’s 
demand for accuracy and efficiency at the initial decision-making stage is 
leading to the objectifying of norms conflicting with those of moral 
deservingness that are dominant at the appeal stage. Successful SENDIST 
appeals, on the other hand, curtail efficiency and cause financial 
unpredictability for LEAs. The stress is generated by the fact that different 
models are used at different stages.
4.2.I.2. A comparison between the SENDIST appeals process and the DBP 
dispute resolution process
The DBP model features an inquisitorial de novo hearing, whereas the SEN 
model features an adversarial de novo enabling hearing. As is the case with the 
SEN decision-making and dispute resolution process, the DBP which is the 
subject of Mashaw’s study, combines the bureaucratic rationality model at the 
initial decision-making stage and the moral judgment’ model at the appeals 
stage. Mashaw considers the rationality behind the combination of models 
adopted for the DBP.
Due to political pressure to expand the class of beneficiaries in times of 
economic downturn, there was a need for a system incorporating tight 
administration. The experience of private disability insurance in the 1920s 
suggested that adversarial adjudication was not such a system, with several 
insurers bankrupted as a result of judicial expansion. Nor did ‘farming out’ 
disability decisions to professionals seem an attractive option where there was a
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need to control the process. A rational hierarchical structure was seen as the 
only option for ensuring control of programme and administrative costs, or put 
more positively the best option for operating cautious benevolence: a system 
tailor-made to the specific legislative purpose, not linked to professional values 
or the dominant legal culture.
But specialists’ professional judgment’s must have a role in determining both 
disability and capability for work. In fact, the professional rehabilitation 
perspective is relied upon to ‘sell’ ineligibility decisions -  to ameliorate stress 
in the system caused by its all-or-nothingness. A negative decision could be 
accompanied by a recommendation for treatment or a particular rehabilitation 
programme. Furthermore, there are risks with the bureaucratic rationality 
model. It cannot be assumed that the underlying culture of the bureaucracy will 
follow the legislative objective, and there are limits to the degree to which this 
can be controlled. Decision-makers may pursue local interests and may be 
influenced by personal prejudice. Thus, a model that determines deservingness 
may be a more equitable model.
But Mashaw argues that, because a deservingness model necessitates 
individualised hearings, it brings with it the risk of inequality due to lack of 
experience, resources and skill on the part of the claimant. Also that subjective 
judgment appears inconsistent with responsible management of a national 
benefits programme. Compromises were made. Most decisions were to be made 
by the State agency under the auspices of a matrix of bureaucratic standards, 
routines and structures. There was to be some delegation of decisions to an 
arms-length body of professionals, but this was to be controlled by contract. 
There was to be some individuation for those dissatisfied, but the adversary 
model was considered unsuitable for the hearing stage because the agency, as 
the statutory body responsible for delivering the programme, should not be 
charged with defeating the claims of the sick. In view of the fact that the 
administration was not a neutral decider of claims but an organisation charged 
with taking forward the disability programme, it was decided that it should be 
investigatorially active in the initial determination of claims.
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Mashaw observes that this model has withstood attempts to change it, including
attempts to judicialise the review process by moving to adversary presentation,
but this (he says) does not necessarily signal a happy blending. Bureaucratic
rationality’s demands for accuracy and efficiency may lead to an objectifying of
norms that conflict with professional treatment modality and moral
deservingness; just-allocation for individuals may conflict with objective rules;
adjudication may curtail efficiency. Thus, the story of disability administration
is one of systemic stress. As he says:
When one steps back from administrative implementation to ask what 
we want from it (bureaucratic justice), and forward into the empirical 
realities of a particular system, it becomes clear that structuring and 
controlling a system of administrative action that can also claim to 
provide “justice” is a very subtle enterprise. (Mashaw (1983) p. 17).
Any dispute resolution model will have advantages and disadvantages. In 
choosing a model, rationalisation of the process, as a whole, is important. The 
model should, as Mashaw says, be subject to the normative evaluation and 
improvement that is the subject of legal discourse. Mashaw considers that a 
hearing process fits uneasily into the bureaucratic scheme. The adoption of 
decisional neutrality and just desert leads to the agency being unable to control 
the programme. In order to do this, it must control each stage of the process.
The DBP model has inconsistencies: appellants who seek de novo hearings 
before ALJs obtain an award in 50% of appeals, but in only 15% of 
reconsiderations by state examiners. The process of appealing to an ALJ has 
been criticised for inefficiency and delay. Attempts have been made by the 
legislature to curtail the number of ALJ awards. One such attempt was the 
threat of regulations that would allow representation for the benefits agency at 
appeal hearings, abandoning the non-adversary posture. This was meant to 
serve as a warning shot across the bows for ALJs. They responded by bringing a 
class action against the agency.
As with the DBP, the large number of decisions made by LEAs about children’s 
SEN are invisible both in terms of literature on the subject and empirical 
evidence. The focus is on tribunal decisions and court decisions. Both systems
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are subject to economic and political stresses. In the SEN context, there are 
powerful lobby groups representing the interests of children with particular 
learning difficulties, and significant political interest in outcomes for children 
involved in the process. Decisions are made at central Government level as to 
how much funding LEAs receive, and at local level as to the amount of funding 
deployed to SEN with reference to numerous different national and local 
priorities. Both the DBP and the SEN decision-making process involve the 
decision-making body taking responsibility for compiling the evidence, and 
both incorporate an initial decision-making process dictated by collective goals 
followed by an appeal process focusing on individuation.
There are, however, significant differences between the DBP and the SEN 
decision-making and dispute resolution process. In the DBP, applicants are 
precluded from instructing their own experts, whereas in the SEN context, 
parents obtain their own expert reports to discredit evidence in reports 
commissioned by the LEA. Because of the nature of the appeals process, it may 
be essential for parents to obtain such reports in order to succeed. In SEN 
decisions, representatives from the services that prepare reports for assessments 
sit as advisers on LEA Panels making decisions in individual cases, whereas the 
DBP decision-making process envisages a clearer separation between the 
experts employed to provide evidence and the decision-maker. Whilst the fact 
that each case is discussed by multi-disciplinary Panels in the SEN context 
might have the advantage of reducing the likelihood of any one individual 
influencing decisions in line with their own value sets, the disadvantage is that 
this practice may exacerbate any perception by parents that professionals 
commissioned by the LEA to produce reports are influenced by the LEA’s 
rationing agenda.
The consequences of trading-off confidence in the process are significant. 
Parents may have been in conflict with their child’s school before approaching 
the LEA, and an adversarial stance has developed. Perceiving that the odds are 
against them securing proper help for their child, they seek their own expert 
reports, and a contest emerges. This is in stark contrast to the DBP procedures. 
A potential advantage of employing an arms-length body of professionals to
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conduct SEN assessments is that this might foster more confidence in decisions. 
The difficulty is that, unless this body has decision-making powers, it may not 
be perceived as adding very much. On the other hand, if it were to be given the 
function of decision-making without resource constraints, this might result in 
unworkable outcomes for LEAs.
The differences between the SENDIST procedure and that adopted by ALJs in 
disability benefit appeals are significant. In the DBP context, appellants put 
their case to an ALJ. The agency is not present to argue with, or discredit, 
anything said. The ALJ is free to ask whatever questions he sees fit. By 
contrast, when appealing to the SENDIST, parents must initiate an appeal with 
a case statement. If the LEA oppose the appeal, they must file a reply 
discrediting the parents’ arguments. Each party submits evidence to advance 
their own position at the expense of the other; there is provision to request 
further and better particulars; to have an appeal or a reply struck out; for the 
calling of witnesses -  all fostering litigiousness. The SENDIST conducts an 
enabling hearing, leading the questioning and discussion, however the LEA is 
present and will seek to advance their case in opposition to the parents. Each 
party chooses the evidence they think should be considered. The SENDIST do 
not examine files or instruct their own experts.
If the DBP practice of inquisitorial review conducted in the absence of the 
decision-maker were substituted for the SENDIST appeals procedure, the 
process might be perceived as more accessible by parents. It might also be less 
damaging to the ongoing relationship between the LEA and parents. But this 
might lead to more appeals, and more successful appeals, with costs spiraling 
out of control. Appellants have a high success rate both in reviews by A U s and 
in appeals to the SENDIST, albeit that the procedure is different. This suggests 
that the nature of the process may not be as significant as the move from the 
bureaucratic rationality to the moral judgment model, or from a focus on 
collective welfare orientation to individuation.
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4.2.1.3. Mashaw’s observations applied in the context of SEN
Mashaw says it is necessary to consider two things in evaluating different 
models of dispute resolution -  what makes a model work successfully, and is 
success a good thing? A central argument in this thesis is that the SENDIST 
model operates successfully within the remit it has been given, but that success 
is not a good thing. LEAs have obligations to large numbers of children with 
SEN. In light of limited resources, they devise a priority system for determining 
who should receive additional remedial help, and the extent of that help.
In making decisions about children’s needs, there will be a list of children. If 
child A gets more help, child B, C, D ... all get less. It may be possible for them 
not to get less if funding can be obtained from other sources. But the effects of 
reducing the amount available for another service would need to be considered. 
Child C may not meet the criteria for a statement. There may be reasons to 
make an exception, but this should not be decided without considering the 
effects of this in terms of certainty, precedent, and implications for other 
children on the list. A reason for making the exception that does not feature 
within the decision-making framework might be that the additional resources 
going into a school for C can be accessed by D,E and F who attend that school 
and have needs similar to A. Z school has a unit attached where there is spare 
specialist teaching capacity. If A attends Z school, additional costs will be 
minimal, so less funding will be diverted from provision for B, C, D.
This is a necessary exercise if all children involved in the process are to be 
treated fairly. It may operate imperfectly. But, if decisions are irrational, they 
should be taken properly, not considered afresh with only limited consideration 
of the context. The concept of rights, in terms of them being moral rights that 
must be accorded even if a utilitarian calculation shows that the general good
no
would be maximised by denying them , sits oddly in context of a long list of 
children all of whom need additional help. As long as the SENDIST continues 
to advantage those parents who appeal, this creates and perpetuates inequality.
If more parents were enabled to appeal, the SENDIST would be a more 
successful model, but more appeals would drain further resources from those
138 Dworkin, R.M. 1979.
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who did not appeal, exacerbating the inequality. Mashaw concludes that perfect 
justice in the rational bureaucratic model is impossible. His focus is then on 
searching for the good within the constraints of the possible, which is the task of 
this thesis in the context of SEN.
Mashaw’s starting point is to view the decision-making agency as being 
involved in formulating, interpreting and communicating policy; designing 
decision-making processes that support both systemic rationality and important 
dignitary values; and exercising supervision and control over the 
implementation of the system’s ideals. There are irresistible demands for 
systemic rationality that necessitate specification of adjudicatory criteria; the 
process does not allow the production of effective precedents, QED the decision 
maker must make rules to guide adjudication. This is what has happened in the 
SEN context, with LEAs developing criteria.
Mashaw asks whether there is a need for escape-hatches allowing intuitive 
judgment where rule-making constrains discretion. As mentioned in the 
previous Chapter, the difficulty is that this may lead to perceptions of inequality 
of outcomes. Prescriptive regulation has advantages in terms of systemic 
rationality, but considerable disadvantages where over-generalisation in 
situations involving complex considerations leads to irrational decisions. It is 
difficult to argue that it is inappropriate for decision-makers to have some rules. 
The objective is to seek a workable balance of trade-offs between collective 
goals and individuation. The next section teases out various themes from 
Mashaw’s analysis.
4.2.I.4. Mashaw’s Themes
4.2.1.4.1. Goals
Mashaw argues that, when examining the exercise of discretion, it is difficult to 
specify a single set of ‘relevant, absolute, consistent, stable, precise and 
exogenous goals’ and find fault with failure to implement them. Desirable goals 
are:-
• to ensure that discretion is exercised rationally;
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• to provide claimants with the opportunity to contribute to the decision­
making process and the opportunity to complain where they consider 
discretion has been exercised improperly;
• to ensure that the outcomes of complaints influence future practice; and
• to reduce conflict and engender trust, particularly where the parties’ 
relationship is ongoing.
The opportunity to complain and the assurance that outcomes of complaints 
influence future practice are reflected in the goals of PDR, as is rationality 
(expressed in terms of accuracy). PDR envisages that people will be able to 
seek the symbolism of formality and binding decisions, or an agreed solution. 
The examination of the SEN decision-making and dispute resolution system in 
the previous three Chapters reveals that it appears to fulfil some of Mashaw’s 
goals to a limited degree. There are concerns about rational exercise of 
discretion in light of the evidence of rigidity and over-emphasis on resources.
Parents are able to contribute to the LEA decision-making process, but their 
contribution is limited initially to being able to put their views in writing. They 
are entitled to request meetings to discuss a proposed statement, but only after 
the LEA have made decisions about whether it is necessary to assess and 
drafted a proposed statement setting out needs and provision. The Code of 
Practice recommends that parents and children be involved in decision-making 
on an ongoing basis. The Exeter Study (University of Exeter 2004a) referred to 
in Chapter 7 suggests that children are not involved in decision-making. The 
Hall 1998 study and representations made by LEAs to the House of Commons 
Education and Skills Committee for the purposes of their 2006 Report indicate 
that the vast majority of parents do not appeal, and that outcomes of successful 
appeals do not influence future practice. Whilst it would be wrong to suggest 
that the existence of the SENDIST has no influence upon LEA day-to-day 
decision-making, it is apparent that LEAs continue to make decisions with 
reference to resource constraints and in accordance with their criteria in pursuit 
of collective goals, whilst the SENDIST follow a child-centred approach.
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Parents’ lack of trust in the willingness of LEAs to make appropriate provision 
for children’s SEN is evident from the Hall and Evans studies, and from the 
Select Committee’s 2006 and 2007 Reports which recommend separation 
between the assessment function and the holder of the purse-strings. As 
mentioned previously, the DCSF are considering the possibilities of guidance to 
educational psychologists and piloting the contracting-out of assessment 
functions if any LEAs will volunteer for this. (There is no provision that allows 
the Secretary of State to compel LEAs to contract-out functions unless there is a 
failure to perform those functions adequately).
The recommendations of the Committee are misconceived because they are 
based upon the premise that there is a conflict between the requirement to make 
provision for children’s needs and the consideration of resource implications 
necessitating a split between the two functions. But this needs/cost balancing 
exercise is inherent and necessary in virtually all local authority decisions about 
provision of services in light of the fact that budgets are finite. The problem is 
not one of conflict of interest, but lack of confidence that LEAs accord 
sufficient weight to children’s needs in decision-making and suspicion that local 
professionals collude with LEAs’ assigning of disproportionate importance to 
resources.
4.2.I.4.2. Fact-finding
The SEN decision-making process is based upon an investigatorial process that 
is prescriptive in terms of the information to be collected and the timescale 
within which this task must be completed. Fact-finding may nevertheless 
present difficulties: what to do about missing information; how to decide 
between conflicting expert reports; prediction of the effect of a particular 
difficulty on future performance; subjectivity or bias in the making of value- 
judgments. The optimum objective is to take into account all relevant facts and 
values plus the costs in order to maximise the total net benefit of each decision. 
There are concerns expressed in the Evans study that cases do not receive 
adequate attention - that parents complain about missing reports and failure to 
take information into account. Evans gives the example of a Panel meeting once 
a week making decisions on 30 cases per meeting. Mashaw’s contends that
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decisions are often based on a sub-set of the relevant values and facts. This then 
leads to the question of whether the organisation has made sensible judgments 
about how to deal with the bounds of its competence.
Requirements imposed upon LEAs about the nature of the information that must 
be collected are designed to ensure a comprehensive assessment with 
contributions from all relevant sources. The fact-finding task is carried out by 
low-level officials. There is no incentive for them to read reports to ensure they 
contain all relevant information. Indeed, the necessity of compliance with time­
limits may render this unlikely. As Mashaw observes, officials who gather 
information in this way do not have the same incentive as parents to ensure all 
relevant information is obtained.
If information is lacking, this may be detected by Panels comprising more 
senior officials who make decisions on provision. They then have the dilemma 
of whether to remit the case back, causing delay and breach of the time-limits.
It is important to the issue of equality that any initial fact-finding process is 
conducted properly. Mashaw rightly says that it is more relevant to consider 
whether the decision-maker has chosen the correct value than the correct fact. 
Whether an official values accuracy and individuation above delay will be 
influenced by the prevailing culture. There is no guidance in relation to this 
issue, so practice may vary between LEAs with different outcomes. On closer 
examination, the assessment process is an expensive one that gives the 
appearance of trading-off cost for accuracy, but provides no guarantee of 
accuracy.
4.2.I.4.3. Process-values
Considering whether the best choices have been made for a particular system, 
and how this should be evaluated, is not an easy task. Mashaw suggests that 
rejection of the adversary adjudication paradigm necessarily suggests 
nonsupport of some of its values -  party control, equality of access, 
transparency -  all linked to individuality and autonomy. But he says their 
association with the adversary process is not indisputable, and they may be 
retained in the bureaucratic rationality model. Further, that the dynamics of the
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adversary system accentuate the negative. Oral examination and cross- 
examination of witnesses is a better method for highlighting gaps and 
uncertainties around a decision than it is for portraying notions that would 
support it.
In a section entitled ‘the Elusive Value of “Process-Values”’ Mashaw identifies 
process-values as:
• equality,
• transparency,
• privacy,
• humaneness,
• appropriate symbolism and
• participation.
Most of these process-values are present at the LEA decision-making stage. In 
relation to equality, LEAs are obliged to assess and make appropriate provision 
for the needs of all children for whom they are responsible. Any parent can 
make a request for assessment or provision. Schools may also request 
assessments, so children are not dependent upon the capability and willingness 
of their parents. This is an important facet of the system, the political motivation 
for which derives from the principles of distributive justice as enshrined the 
works of Rawls (1973), R.M., Dworkin (1979) and others -  a recognition that 
parents are not equal in their endowments in terms of having the capability to 
take the steps needed to enforce LEA obligations towards their children, and 
that the state must take positive steps to compensate for this. The same principle 
drives the actions of the SENDIST in taking positive steps to assist parents, 
particularly those who are manifestly on an unequal-footing with the LEA. This 
point is revisited in the final Chapter. Evidence in various reports suggests that 
LEA decisions about children with SEN are being taken consistently -  perhaps 
too consistently, but this is the purpose of adopting criteria139. Consistent 
decisions ensure equality. The initial decision-making stage appears to offer 
equality in terms of both access and treatment.
139 The Select Committee’s 2006 Report and the Audit Commission’s Report (Audit 
Commission 2002b) suggest lack of consistency between LEAs.
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In relation to fact-finding, there is doubt about whether equality of treatment 
can be assured where LEA officials develop the evidence. Allowing parents to 
commission their own evidence, however, also causes problems. It enhances the 
position of children whose parents commission reports over children whose 
parents do not (or cannot), but places parents who do commission evidence on a 
more equal basis with the LEA. Adjudicators at all levels accept responsibility 
for ensuring they have the necessary evidence to develop a claim. The 
SENDIST are unable to fulfil this responsibility to the extent necessary where 
parents submit no evidence to counter LEA expert evidence.
Mashaw says that, if claimants are in contest with the government, they are in 
an unequal position, both in terms of expertise about the system and in terms of 
access to the decision-maker. The studies and reports referred to in Chapter 
Two highlight concerns about equality of access at the appeal stage. This lends 
credence to Mashaw’s statement that strict equality of access in adversary 
systems only assures equality in a formal sense -  that there may still be material 
and substantial inequality due to inequality of resources with which to wage 
battle. This reflects the views of Galligan and Adler, as referred to in the 
previous chapter. In the SEN context, the reports referred to in Chapter Two 
indicate that, in spite of the efforts of the SENDIST to make the tribunal process 
more accessible, this has not overcome the problem of access and unequal 
endowments.
Mashaw considers that transparency, in terms of openness and 
comprehensibility, contributes to the self-respect of all participants in the 
system. There is transparency in SEN decision-making in the sense that the 
SEN Code of Practice and the LEA’s criteria enable parents to know the 
parameters within which decisions are taken. They are given reasons for 
decisions. There is also transparency at the appeal stage, with each party being 
given notice of the other party’s case; both parties being present at the hearing 
and a requirement for reasoned written decisions. Privacy is important in view 
of the confidentiality of the information provided. All information about a 
child’s educational needs is confidential. His difficulties are only made known
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to those who are assessing and teaching him. SENDIST hearings are conducted 
in private, and decisions published on an anonymised basis.
In relation to humanity, the SEN Code of Practice, in setting out the principles 
within which LEAs must operate, should assure that children and parents will 
be treated humanely and with respect. However, the Exeter and Gersch studies 
referred to in Chapters Five and Seven convey the impression that some LEAs 
have embraced the ethos of the Code, while others have not. This is likely to be 
influenced by the prevailing culture. Arguably, the SENDIST appeals process is 
more ‘humane’ than the initial decision-making stage because it offers an oral 
hearing focusing upon the child’s needs. A recurrent theme in the Genn’s work 
is the importance to people of being listened to (Genn 1989, 1993, 1994, 1999a, 
2006).
Symbolism assures participants that the state takes decision-making seriously: it
causes them to treat decisions as final and legitimate. There are difficulties with
appropriate-symbolism at the initial SEN decision-making stage. Where parents
are dissatisfied with an LEA decision, it is understandable that they would
consider that conclusions in reports by local professionals might be coloured by
their close working relationship with the LEA and biased in favour of the
LEA’s perspective. Oversight by an independent body brings legitimacy.
Mashaw says, in relation to this:
Emphasizing the moral content of the disability decision and invoking 
the legitimating symbolism of quasi-judicial judgment after quasi­
adversary process is also possible though I believe it to be ill-advised. 
Mixing professional, moral and bureaucratic judgment, of course, makes 
it difficult to maintain the legitimizing power of the symbols. But there 
is no reason to believe that there are no choices to be made -  that all 
mixes or all pure models have equivalent symbolic costs and benefits. 
(Mashaw 1983 p.95).
In the SEN context, legitimacy comes at the cost of further undermining 
confidence in the initial decision-making process and exacerbating conflict. 
Because most people receiving adverse decisions do not appeal, the emphasis 
arguably should be on transparency and encouraging the perception that the 
initial decision has been arrived at following a process that is fair. Organisations
124
can provide independent representation and hearings; they can treat people with 
humanity; they can produce rational, fair and efficient adjudications.
In relation to participation, Mashaw cites the contextualization school, the 
principal proponents of which, Thibault and Walker (1978), argue strongly for 
the adversary process on the basis that it maximises the control of the 
participants. Yet, Mashaw says, even that school admits that adversariness 
contributes to powerlessness where disparity of resources yields disparate 
power over the process. Mashaw asks whether oral presentation and argument 
enhance meaningful participation, and what type of process will support 
perceptions of meaningful participation and therefore self-respect. He suggests 
that such a process might be one that would make general legal rules of fairness 
applicable to the bureaucratic process and permit individual process choices 
whenever these choices have no clearly detrimental effect on decisional 
accuracy.
Allowing parents and children to express their views orally at the initial 
decision-making stage might be considered more effective participation and 
more humane treatment. One LEA’s practice of calling in parents who are 
dissatisfied with decisions has proved an effective technique in deterring 
parents from appealing to the SENDIST (see the second example of conciliation 
arrangements taken from Gersch 2003 discussed at p.217 of the thesis). There 
may be other concerns about this practice which are discussed further. Also it is 
not extended to all parents and children, merely to dissatisfied parents who are 
considering an appeal. Nevertheless, it does illustrate that listening to parents 
can cause LEAs to compromise and change decisions, and that re-assurance for 
parents that they are being listened to reduces dissatisfaction and conflict.
A possibility for ensuring that all parents and children are listened to might be 
to impose a requirement upon LEAs to invite them to attend the meeting of the 
Panel making decisions about whether the child should be assessed and 
statemented. This might lengthen the time taken by Panels to consider 
individual decisions, but if delay were minimal, this might be a trade-off worth 
making. This would need to be considered in light of the fact that the decision-
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making and appeal processes are both already lengthy, though this would not 
necessarily have to remain the case.
Mashaw suggests it might be possible to import the values of an adversary 
system -  party control, equality of access and transparency - into a non- 
adversarial system. This is worthy of consideration in the SEN context. A 
possible model for achieving this is suggested in Chapter Six. If such a model 
were to operate successfully, this would necessitate all of Mashaw’s core values 
being present at each stage of the process.
4.2.I.4.4. Culture
Mashaw says there is information within an organisation -  the feel and craft of
experienced decision-makers; a sense of what works when ferreting out
information. But what is also significant is that, as he says-
Organizations and the bureaucrats that inhabit them have their own 
goals, desires, motivations. Action that seemingly contradicts statutory 
purposes may be taken not only because those purposes are vague and 
their application uncertain, but because it is in the interests either of the 
organization or the particular decision-makers to behave in this fashion. 
(Mashaw 1983 p.68).
Those who operate statutory provisions develop a value matrix. Sometimes this 
will conflict with goals established by the courts and other bodies charged with 
oversight of their operation. The critical question, he says, is to what degree the 
pursuit of organisational goals undermines the pursuit of programme goals.
In the SEN context, the emphasis in the Code of Practice on seeking the views 
of parents and the importance of their role, together with the warning that 
stereotypical views of parents are unhelpful and should be challenged, might 
suggest that there is (or was) a prevailing culture within LEAs of under-valuing 
parents’ views. Working in partnership with parents is enshrined in the Code. It 
appears that the obligation to have regard to its principles may not have 
prevented the development of prevailing cultures within some LEAs that 
conflict with those principles. Breaches of the Code cannot be complained 
about to the SENDIST, only to the Administrative Court. There is a risk that 
prevailing cultures running contrary to the Code’s principles will not be
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challenged. It appears criteria devised by LEAs are being operated as a barrier 
to resources -  that the criteria have transcended and subverted the principles of 
the Code, albeit that they appear to have been developed from its principles.
The outcome is the operation of blanket-policies driven by a culture that 
perceives resources as more important than children’s needs.
In order to place controls over human decision-makers, discretion may be 
constrained by programmatically specified values. Mashaw suggests this must 
be done to prevent what he terms contextual rationality. This is where decision­
makers exercise discretion within a value-set that is influenced by local politics, 
the organisation itself, or the culture of particular professions involved. Possible 
control mechanisms are rules of relevance; presumptions in case of doubt; clear 
rules; objective oversight from within the organisation re-enforced by objective 
performance standards.
Although there are a number of controls on the exercise of discretion in the 
SEN context, Mashaw’s suggestions do not number amongst them. There is also 
the issue of the degree to which decision-making should be controlled. In light 
of evidence of rigidity, narrowness, and a forgetting of what is being set out to 
be accomplished, arguably what is needed in order to assure a better balance 
between systemic and intuitive rationality is not more rules, but clearer 
guidance on when it is legitimate to depart from the rules and a change of 
culture140.
4.2.I.4.5. Tensions
Mashaw argues that there are disadvantages in having a different system at the 
decision-making and appeal stages. This is because initial decision-makers will 
not consider that a successful appeal means that they were at fault, simply that a 
body, which has considered the matter from a different perspective, has come to 
a different conclusion. Thus, appeal decisions do not inform best practice. 
Mashaw does not consider that a multi-level, apparently inconsistent, type of 
system is inappropriate per se, but suggests there might be preferable
140 Goodin (1986) makes the point that everything that can be done with discretion can be done 
by means of rules.
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alternatives: allowing first-level decision-makers more discretion; making 
appeal judges more systemic; changing the ‘sorting mechanism’; employing 
different deciders for different types of cases. He observes that legitimating a 
quasi-adversary process by following it with quasi-judicial judgment is one of a 
number of choices, and the perception of legitimacy is a factor to be taken into 
account in making such choices, but there are other factors that might be taken 
into account and other choices to be made.
Evidence from the Council on Tribunals that was accepted in the Leggatt
review of the tribunal system indicated that the SEN appeals process
exacerbates conflict and leads to wasted costs.
The time the LEA takes to prepare detailed evidence on each child can 
result in a long period between the initial statement of education needs 
and the tribunal hearing. During that period, it is not uncommon for 
relations between the LEA and the parents to break down, so their 
meeting on the day of the hearing can provide the first serious 
opportunity for negotiations to resume. 50% of appeals are withdrawn, 
some on the day of the hearing. This wastes LEA and tribunal resources, 
and puts parents through unnecessary stress. We agree with the Council 
on Tribunals that SENT cases are particularly suitable for conciliation or 
mediation. We recommend that the DFEE considers with LEAs the 
scope for formal or informal mediation or conciliation in the period 
before a SENT hearing. (Leggatt 2001 para 15 Part II Individual 
Tribunals).
Although mediation and conciliation have been introduced to reduce such 
conflict, the observations of the Select Committee in their 2006 Report suggest 
that parents have little choice in taking an adversarial approach, which implies 
more needs to be done.
Mashaw argues that various studies have demonstrated that decision-making 
processes involving second-stage hearings systematically disadvantage the 
uneducated, the unintelligent, racial minorities and women141. He also suggests 
that the substantially higher level of awards for those who appeal to A U s in 
disability benefit claims may simply be a reward for pursuing the claim, which
141 Institute for Community Studies “Case Facilitator Project” (undated) SSA 71-3409: M 
Bendick “Why Do Persons Eligible for Public Assistance Fail to Enrol?” (Urban Institute 
Working Paper, August 1979).
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begs the question of whether this ‘perseverance bounty’ is in some way 
discriminatory.
Arguments against this are that the hearing, with its focus on individuation, 
achieves a just outcome. Those who appeal are simply those whose claim 
should have been granted in the first place. They have just been disadvantaged 
by the delay involved in convening a hearing. Alternatively that adjudication is 
simply a means of legitimising the resolution of a conflict in which neither side 
can be can be said to be correct. Since those who appeal seek legitimisation, 
non-appealing claimants are ‘satisfied’ claimants.
Mashaw says it is difficult to argue against the contention that increased 
participation and control gives claimants a stronger belief that they have been 
treated fairly, yet he is unconvinced that oral appeal hearings are the best way of 
achieving this. He accepts that participation may promote greater understanding 
of adjudicatory norms on the part of the claimant; that collection of evidence 
provides re-assurance that all material facts have been considered; and that 
presentation of the evidence promotes a feeling, on the part of a claimant, that 
he has been listened to. But, as the chances are slim that the claimant can be 
brought up to sufficient standard to understand the law and regulations at an 
acceptable cost, just outcomes are not assured. Supply of brochures and 
explanations is insufficient. He argues that the system would operate more 
effectively and productively if the ‘right’ claims could be appealed and pursuit 
of unmeritorious claims deterred. Pursuit of claims that are never likely to 
succeed simply increases dissatisfaction with the system. This might, he 
suggests, be facilitated by independent representatives who are knowledgeable 
about the system acting as information mediators.
But there are two ways of judging whether an initial decision-maker is getting 
things right -  appeals and quality assurance. Mashaw is critical of the appeal 
system for the DBP. Only claimants can appeal, therefore a large part of the 
caseload can never be reviewed. Appeals are de novo, so the hearing process:
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employs live testimony, substantial redevelopment of the documentary 
record and vaguer criteria for judgment so transforms cases that ALJs 
could be said to be dealing with different cases. (Mashaw 1983 p. 148).
He concludes that appeals do not promote high-quality adjudication at 
organisational level. This makes a strong quality assurance programme (QA) 
essential. Standards must be developed and performance judged against those 
standards. But this is by no means straightforward. Where decisions involve the 
exercise of judgment, it is difficult to say they are erroneous except perhaps 
where they are made on the basis of insufficient information or where relevant 
facts or expert opinion have been ignored. Mashaw says that what is essential is 
that the system ensures the record is complete and that review is fed back to 
influence future cases, therefore information on performance must be gathered 
and analysed. This does not happen in the SEN context. LEAs may review 
compliance with statutory time-limits, but where the SENDIST allows an 
appeal resulting in a child being assessed who would not have met the LEA’s 
criteria for assessment, it appears LEAs are unlikely to amend their criteria to 
allow assessments where similar circumstances exist, they will simply try 
harder to win the next appeal.
4.2.I.4.6. Cost
In a climate of limited resources, trade-offs between costs and benefits are 
inevitable. This is at the heart of any analysis. Costs feature twice in the PDR 
goals -  cost-effectiveness to the complainant and cost-effectiveness to the state. 
The bureaucratic rationality model is focused upon achievement of the 
maximum benefit at the minimum cost. The SEN decision-making process 
relating to assessment and statementing is costly. As mentioned previously, 
Government policy is that LEAs should devolve more monies to schools for 
provision, with a view to reducing the number of assessments and statements 
enabling administrative costs also to be deployed on additional provision. A 
further argument for this course of action is that the statement is of limited 
value because it is only amended annually. It quickly becomes out of date if 
detailed. Other assessment tools employed by schools, which are amended more 
frequently, are more accurate and serve as benchmarks for whether a child’s 
needs are being provided for.
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On the other hand, the statutory framework for assessment and statementing 
assures consistency of dealings within a set of visible and predictable 
procedures. It is arguable that the statutory assessment process, whilst it might 
be cumbersome and expensive, is thorough. More importantly, the making of a 
statement transforms the nature of the LEA’s obligations towards the child from 
a general responsibility to one of individually enforceable obligations.
4.2.I.4.7. Reform
As with the disability benefit programme analysed by Mashaw, the system of
determining eligibility for SEN provision by LEAs is an ‘accuracy-oriented,
investigatorially active, hierarchically organised and complexly engineered
system of adjudication.’ Mashaw’s view is that:
The quality of justice provided in such a system depends primarily on 
how good the management system is at dealing with the set of 
conflicting demands that define rational, fair and efficient adjudication. 
It must translate vague and conflicting statutory goals into administrable 
rules without losing the true and sometimes subtle thrust of the 
programme. It must attempt to ensure decisions are consistent and that 
development is adequate, without impairing the discretion necessary for 
individualization. It must simplify and objectify the data relevant to 
adjudication in order to direct action and to monitor outputs, but without 
so distorting perception that decision-making is in fact divorced from a 
reality that is also complex and subjective. It must deploy appropriate 
expertise while screening out inappropriate professional bias. It must 
balance perceptible administrative costs against the less perceptible 
costs of error, delay and demoralization. (Ibid. p. 172).
Clearly the task Mashaw describes is a subtle and difficult one. His suggestion 
for reform of the DBP is the abandonment of the appeal process conducted by 
judges and judicial review, but tighter controls on initial decision-making, 
greater participation by claimants and review by medical or multidisciplinary 
Panels, with oversight by a superbureaucracy.
He asks whether there are ways of overseeing and engineering a system so that 
it produces predictable and acceptable responses. This would necessitate 
hierarchical control -  the engineering of a ‘culture’. He suggests that, although 
this notion is jarring, it must be attempted. Decision-makers who function in an 
identical decision culture should apply norms and evaluate facts in the same
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way. The organisation can ensure these values pervade decision-making using 
structural and personnel techniques -  recruitment of staff who embrace the 
culture, training and establishing appropriate relationships between all who 
participate in the process.
The difficulty with cultural engineering, however, is that where discretion is 
exercised there is always an element of norm ambiguity. Excessive guidance 
may produce rigidity. Producing consistency across organisations is also 
problematic. Mashaw concludes that unified administration can only be 
achieved by the elimination of discretion. He then asks whether this is a good 
thing and whether it will contribute to the achievement of bureaucratic justice. 
His conclusion is that it would not. The complaints of rigidity and narrow­
mindedness that would ensue would be valid, and this would undermine the 
legitimacy of administrative action.
Mashaw considers that hearings contribute to, rather than eliminate, 
bureaucratic stress. The processes of initial decision-making and appeal are too 
radically different not to produce different results. He says that ultimately a 
decision will have to be made as to whether the hearing process is brought into 
line with initial decision-making, or the moral judgment model will have to be 
used as the primary decisional tool in all cases. In the latter case, budgetary 
concerns might need to be off-set by an adversary process, with the organisation 
providing a vigorous defence. He says that this may seem inappropriate in the 
case of an organisation charged with implementing a social welfare programme, 
but that it must be remembered that deservingness is not one-sided, and that the 
organisation is concerned with administering benefits fairly to all applicants.
Mashaw observes that people appear to have greater confidence in adversary 
systems and that such confidence diminishes as the process moves towards an 
inquisitory mode. He does not, however, advocate a move to adversary hearings 
in the context of the disability programme, predicting that this would lead to 
extensive pre-hearing delay, expensive settlements, lengthy hearings and 
disadvantage to unrepresented claimants. He says:
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Although the moral judgment model in an adversary process mode can 
be defended, reform that emphasizes the role of hearings should be 
contemplated only if one despairs of the acceptability of some modified 
form of bureaucratic rationality. (Ibid. p. 193).
The route to bureaucratic justice is to make the internal structure and operation 
of organisations respond to a sensible set of demands for rational, fair and 
efficient adjudication. This is done through management of decision-makers 
and by influencing decisional technique rather than through intensified legal or 
political control or by adopting adversary hearings into the bureaucratic process. 
In order to ensure consistency across different organisations making the same 
decisions, Mashaw suggests defining accuracy objectively by identifying 
determinants of claim strength. If cases could be classified as strong, weak or 
marginal, this would enable analysis to be conducted.
Mashaw considers that bureaucracy cannot escape the impression that it 
provides second class justice, as compared with the courts. Policy is cast in a 
defensive mode so that it neither identifies the shortcomings of the court system 
nor develops correctives to bureaucracy that might be more effective. There are 
several possibilities that could improve rationality, fairness and efficiency. The 
first he describes as modest - claimants themselves could be the counter-force to 
facelessness. Examiners could be forced to talk to them, treat them as important 
sources of information, and explain decisions.
This might lead to claims taking longer, more claims being allowed (therefore 
an increase in programme costs), but it might also enhance the humaneness of 
the process and improve its standing and transparency leading to a higher level 
of satisfaction, fewer appeals, and fewer reversals on appeal. The feeling of 
being listened to may make adverse decisions more palatable. Successful 
claimants who would otherwise have succeeded only on appeal will be spared 
(possibly) expense and delay. An experiment conducted in the context of the 
DBP showed that interviewing claimants had all of these effects, though it was 
not possible to tell why the interview made a difference142. But interviews are
142 Mashaw says that the results of the experiment were contained in a plethora of unpublished 
memoranda and letters.
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costly and may cause delay, so time and expense would be traded-off for 
increased satisfaction. If this led to fewer appeals, there might be an overall 
cost-saving.
A second counter-force is representation for claimants. Where claimants have a 
limited understanding of the system, specialist representatives could assist them 
to make informed choices, filter out frivolous claims, ensure all relevant 
evidence is considered and even counsel acceptance of defeat where 
appropriate. Mashaw suggests that representatives should operate through 
relevant voluntary organisations. They should have specialist knowledge. If 
representatives are to be Government employees, this must be their clear and 
explicit role. He suggests a bureau of general benefits claims representatives 
detached from the agencies distributing benefits.
He also suggests a combination of face-to-face reconsideration interviews and 
representation from the time of denial is worth trying in a carefully controlled 
test incorporating data on both correctness and satisfaction. He considers this 
would yield results so superior to the existing system that the costs could be 
recouped by eliminating ALJ hearings and judicial review. Claimants could 
choose their own representative if they did not wish to have one assigned; ask 
their representative to attend and speak for them at the interview; or represent 
themselves.
A more radical policy option is his suggestion that reconsiderations of disability 
eligibility decisions be made by a Panel of physicians following examination, or 
by multiprofessional Panels comprising specially trained teams who would 
investigate the claimant’s background, medical problems, psychological state, 
work capabilities and prospects for rehabilitation. The Panels would meet to 
discuss the case and make a decision. A study was conducted by Nagi in 1970 
of the multiprofessional Panel option where Panels took samples of decisions 
and developed them substantially. Disadvantaged applicants were provided with 
assistance. The outcome was that refusals were changed to awards in 21% of 
cases and awards were changed to refusals in 8% of cases.
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Improved development of cases favoured claimants with particular 
characteristics -  those with low IQs, low educational levels; those with low 
socioeconomic status; those who have combinations of unlisted impairments; 
and those who have adverse vocational factors but only modest impairments. 
Mashaw suggests that the multidisciplinary approach may constitute a powerful 
legitimating symbol. Where a claim is refused, the vocational expert could 
provide a list of appropriate jobs, training and rehabilitative therapy. Possible 
criticisms are that it is likely to be an expensive model; there might be 
considerable variation in Panel decisions; it would be intrusive -  the claimant 
would have to submit to interviews and tests.
But focus on dispute resolution is misplaced according to Mashaw’s analysis. 
Second-stage hearings systematically disadvantage the uneducated, the 
unintelligent, racial minorities and women, so the principal aim should be to 
ensure that the initial decision-making process operates as well as possible, 
enabling external review to be avoided. The system would need to ensure a 
reasonable balance between consistency and individuation.
The arguments referred to by Mashaw, that successful appellants are those who 
should have been successful at the initial decision-making stage and that those 
who do not appeal are satisfied claimants, are, as he says, unconvincing. He 
refers to a study of the DBP in which unsuccessful claimants were asked why 
they did not request a review. Only 4% said this was because they considered 
the denial was correct. Where this is the case, two questions follow: why did 
96% think the denial was incorrect -  because it was not what they wanted, or 
because they did not believe that their application had been considered properly 
- and why did they not appeal? What was it about the appeals system that made 
them unwilling or unable (in their own eyes) to access it?
Through Genn’s research more is now known about why people do not access 
formal dispute resolution mechanisms. What remains unknown is what would 
make them change their minds, or what mechanisms, if any they would be 
prepared to access. Reform of SEN dispute resolution has been directed at 
encouraging early settlement on the basis that most cases settle anyway, and
135
towards improving access to the SENDIST, as opposed to consideration of 
other processes.
An argument that the SENDIST should be replaced with something different, or 
given a different role, is an unusual one in light of general findings that the 
tribunal operates well. But it is important that distributive justice arguments, in 
terms of properly facilitating equal endowments (as opposed to simply 
improving access), are made. Education policies driven by choice and ‘parent 
power’ appear to be resulting in an ever-widening gap between rich and poor. A 
study published in January 2008 by the Institute of Education (Ball 2008) 
reveals that in 2000, 18 per cent of young people from skilled manual or 
unskilled backgrounds went to university. While this was up 8 percentage 
points from 1990, the increase for young people from professional and non- 
manual backgrounds was 11 percentage points (from 37 per cent to 48 per cent), 
indicating that the gap between the higher and lower social classes has grown.
Today’s education policies focus on the production of high-level skills, 
at the expense of disadvantaged working-class children -  there are still 
high levels of failure among working-class students, and the UK has one 
of the worst post-16 participation rates in the OECD. (Ibid. p.7).
SEN and attainment are inseparable as issues. The balance between collective 
goals and individuation is at the heart of the attainment divide, with better- 
educated middle-class parents being able to gain more for their children from 
the educational system.
As with the DBP claimants in Mashaw’s study, some parents of children with 
SEN may perceive the LEA as a faceless bureaucracy and have little 
understanding of the basis of a decision based upon complex expert evidence 
and criteria. This perception might be altered if more face-to-face contact 
between LEA officers and parents were incorporated into the decision-making 
process. In the SEN context, perhaps any delay and additional expense resulting 
from oral participation by parents and children at the initial decision-making 
stage might be evaluated in light of possible savings of appeal costs and 
concerns by the House of Commons Education and Skills Committee about 
access to the appeals process. An interview conducted prior to decision-making
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might serve to ensure that LEA officers consider parents and children as 
individuals, as opposed to names on paper, and might re-assure parents that they 
are being listened to. Participation in the form of attendance at a tribunal 
hearing, although allowing parents to have their say, may place some at a 
disadvantage, and deter others completely.
Mashaw’s suggestion that independent advocates should be employed to ensure 
that the ‘right’ claims are pursued is considered further in the next Chapter in 
terms of advocacy and case management. Another question is whether the 
advocate should represent the child or the parents. This is considered in Chapter 
Seven. In relation to QA analysis, currently there is no requirement for LEAs to 
conduct any. LEAs do not review the rationality of their own decisions as a 
matter of course. Mashaw says that monitoring and self-correction are important 
at organisational level.
But what about the risk of a prevailing culture or criteria that allow too few 
children to be assessed or statemented? Can this ever be uncovered and 
redressed in the absence of external review? Mashaw suggests that cultural 
engineering must be attempted. The SEN Code of Practice contains the 
normative elements in terms of values that should inform LEAs’ adjudication. 
Oversight of the drafting of rules and culture driven by a superbureau is 
Mashaw’s suggested alternative to correction in isolated individual cases. It is 
difficult to quarrel with the logic that suggests that the better way forward is to 
drive a particular culture from the outset and enshrine decision-making within 
that culture, so that decision-makers receive training and are immersed in the 
culture. The difficulty with implementation of Mashaw’s suggested reforms in 
the SEN context is that the extensive level of mistrust between parents and 
LEAs would mean that cultural engineering driven and monitored through 
internal mechanisms may not be considered by parents as preferable alternatives 
to external review.
4.2.I.4.8. Comment
Mashaw considers that the disability programme has succeeded remarkably well 
in embracing neutrality, expertise and efficiency. The ‘cloud over Camelot’ is
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that new goals, such as fiscal restraint and consistency may undermine or distort 
these goals. There are tensions in the system -  appending uncontrollable 
hearings and judicial review has undermined and contradicted the fairness and 
accuracy of the initial decision-making stage. They ‘criticise a stringency that 
their profligacy promotes’ (Ibid. p.215).
There is a further cloud. Mashaw cites a number of studies suggesting that it is 
difficult to control the behaviour of adjudicators to ensure they conform with 
normative goals. His view is, however, that this is possible where decision­
makers cannot avoid review by QA analysis. In the DBP, investigators are desk­
bound bureaucrats who work ‘elbow to elbow’ with their peers and supervisors 
and yards from the QA unit. In the QA process, virtually every dimension of 
examiner behaviour has a statistical check. Also, increased contact with 
claimants may also avoid a tendency to stray too far towards stringency.
Mashaw concludes that bureaucratic rationality is a promising form of
administrative justice. It permits the pursuit of collective ends without
sacrificing individuation. External modes of control, in the form of judicial
review, not only provide inadequate remedies, they undermine the premise of
the bureaucratic ideal. They are ‘wrongheaded’, though the images of justice
they evoke are hard to dislodge. In relation to bureaucracy, Mashaw asks:
Must we strive forever within a conceptual framework that either denies 
its own underlying reality or compares it deprecatingly with institutional 
and legal structures that our substantive public policy long ago 
abandoned? [...] Our constitutional myth is that liberal democracy 
requires political leadership tied to electoral politics, with individual 
rights guaranteed by judicially administered law. (Ibid. p.225).
In his view there is a gap in the constitutional order of both symbolic and 
functional significance. A superbureau would fill the gap. Its function would be 
to supervise the drafting of administrative legislation; review the competence of 
Departmental policy analysis; provide binding counsel on managerial technique, 
and hear complaints of maladministration. This might then become the model 
for ordinary bureaus, which might reorient the evaluation of fairness of 
administrative judgments toward the adequacy of the internal structure and 
functioning of organisations.
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4.2.2. Stage Two -  PDR and false-absolutes
Mashaw observes that there are many value dimensions within decision-making 
processes -  costs, delay, accuracy, service delivery -  that must be traded off 
against each other, and that an attempt must be made to achieve a harmonious 
and consistent balance between competing goals. But the critical question of 
how much these trade-offs are worth is so difficult to answer that it is often 
ignored, or false-absolutes -  ‘due process’, ‘accuracy’, ‘efficiency’, ‘fairness’ 
are substituted for critical analysis. He suggests that the most that can be 
achieved is careful weight of the trade-offs among goals, but recognises that 
such methodology will satisfy neither the theoretician nor the service manager. 
Also that it demands consideration of every value and value-conflict involved in 
every process feature.
An analysis with reference to ‘false absolutes’ will only yield limited 
information. The Leggatt review of the tribunal system concluded that the 
SENDIST operates successfully within the remit it has been given. Whilst this 
is true, it does not mean that the tribunal has the correct remit, or even that its 
successful operation is a ‘good thing’. The Select Committee’s 2006 Report 
identifies problems with SENDIST appeals relating to equality of access, expert 
evidence, stress and cost. This would suggest that proper evaluation of dispute 
resolution systems cannot be achieved simply by consideration of attainment of 
pre-determined goals -  that the system as a whole needs to be examined, and 
that there needs to be a second stage of identifying the advantages and 
disadvantages of possible models and assessing the trade-offs that could, or 
should, be made in order to achieve the good within the constraints of the 
possible.
This section comprises an evaluation of the balance of trade-offs in SEN 
decision-making and dispute resolution processes, but not with reference to 
every value and value-conflict enshrined in the process. The benchmark for 
analysis in this thesis is PDR. Therefore its definition prescribes the relevant 
goals which are:
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• Accessibility which divides into:
Quick
Uncomplex 
Cheap for Appellants;
• Misconceived and Trivial Complaints Rooted-out Quickly;
• Accuracy
• Changes Feed back in to the System leading to:
Less error
Less uncertainty;
• Cost-effective to the State
The first task is to assess which goals are attained by the formal SEN dispute 
resolution mechanisms. The goals are all of equal value. Where a goal is 
attained, the mechanism is a success in this respect and further discussion is 
unnecessary. Where a goal is not attained, there is consideration of the balance 
of trade-offs relevant to the goal to assess what might be done to attain it.
SENDIST, LGO, ADMINISTRATIVE COURT - ATTAINMENT OF PDR
G<3ALS
SENDIST LGO ADMINISTRATIVE
COURT143
Cheap for 
Appellants
? Yes. No. But Legal Aid may be 
available
Quick No. ? Relatively quick for appeals 
involving children and very 
quick for urgent judicial review 
applications
Uncomplex ? Yes. No.
Misconceived and 
trivial complaints 
rooted out quickly
No. Yes. Yes. There is case-management, 
and a permission stage of 
judicial review proceedings.
Accuracy Yes. Yes. Yes.
Changes feed back No. Yes. Yes.
Cost-effective to 
the State
Yes,
comparatively.
No. No.
143 The Administrative Court is considered in terms of urgent applications for judicial review, as 
an alternative to SEN appeals and LGO complaints, rather than as an appellate body.
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It is necessary to explain some of these answers. SENDIST is queried as being 
cheap because of the evidence in the House of Commons Committee’s 2006 
Report and the PEACH study (Williams, M. 2005) that appeals are expensive 
for parents. The Administrative Court is an expensive procedure for parents in 
view of the court fees and costs of legal representation.
The SENDIST procedure is queried as being complex. It is complex insofar as 
parents need to relate relevant facts, and evidence (including expert evidence) to 
the law in order to establish their case. There is evidence, however, that 
SENDIST members use a wide range of techniques to assist users to participate 
effectively in hearings, though there are limits to the ability of tribunals to 
compensate for users’ difficulties in presenting their case144. On the other hand, 
there is evidence that parents do not feel they are on an ‘equal-footing’145.
High numbers of successful appeals might suggest that the tribunal is effective 
in assisting parents. This may be influenced by the relatively high level of 
representation, though there is evidence suggesting that representation makes no 
significant difference146. Representation is not universally available, and there is 
evidence suggesting that parents from minority-ethnic backgrounds have greater 
difficulties in securing representation147. Possibly the task of preparing a case- 
statement and explaining one’s case at a hearing is perceived as so complex that 
parents are deterred from accessing the tribunal. By contrast, a complaint to the 
LGO is less complicated because complainants simply write a letter and the 
LGO investigates.
The LGO and Administrative Court employ filters to ensure that investigation 
and contested court hearings proceed only where absolutely necessary. The 
SENDIST has no such filter. The issue of changes not feeding back is 
important. There is evidence that where parents succeed in SENDIST appeals, 
this does not result in LEAs changing their practice, whilst the LGO may 
recommend systemic change. Both the LGO (where there is a full investigation)
144 Genn 2006 Executive Summary p. ii. and discussion at pps. 165-167.
145 Hall 1999 p.38.
146 Genn 2006 p.264.
147 Ibid. p. 133.
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and the Administrative Court are expensive mechanisms for the state. Costs 
figures referred to at p. 160 of the thesis show that there are small numbers of 
Ombudsman complaints, but these are more resource-intensive than tribunals. 
SENDIST is cheap, but not per se, only in comparison to the LGO and 
Administrative Court.
Looking at failure to attain PDR goals firstly in terms of the SENDIST, it 
appears that the SENDIST trades off five (out of seven) PDR goals for accuracy 
and cost-effectiveness to the state. It is not cheap for parents because the 
commissioning of expert evidence is essential to their success on appeal. 
Alternatives might be an inquisitorial process or a system similar to that 
adopted in the DBP envisaging one set of reports prepared by an arms-length 
body. Both are possible reforms. But what would be traded-off would be the 
opportunity for parents to advance their own case which both Galligan and 
Mashaw suggest is difficult to replace. In light of the fact that this is part of the 
adversarial pre-hearing procedures which exacerbate conflict, replacing the 
ability of parents to procure expert reports by a universal set of reports compiled 
by an arms-length body might be a worthwhile reform. Replacing the SENDIST 
procedure by an inquisitorial one would need to be considered alongside the 
strengths and weaknesses of the LGO (as an example of a body operating such a 
procedure) in terms of attainment of PDR goals.
SENDIST is not quick. There is no fast-track procedure. When Harris identified 
this as a shortcoming (Harris 1997), the response was that effort would be put 
into disposing of all cases more quickly because the acceleration of some cases 
would cause more delay for others. The procedure was shortened, but there is 
still a period of 5 months (approx.) between the LEA decision and the appeal 
decision. The advantage of having quick decisions, which is significant for the 
child who is the subject of the dispute, is traded-off for individuation and 
enhanced participation, as enshrined in the moral judgment model. But this 
model enshrines pre-hearing procedures enabling each party to prepare their 
case properly that lead to delay. Yet the Administrative Court, which has 
similar pre-hearing procedures, has an effective fast-track system. This is a
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possible reform for the SENDIST that would need to be evaluated in terms of 
practicalities and additional cost.
SENDIST is queried as being uncomplex. The process of identifying relevant 
facts, assimilating expert evidence and applying these to legal provisions and 
case law is a difficult one. Since representation is not assured, the issue is 
whether the assistance available from the tribunal is sufficient to overcome the 
difficulties given the limits as to how far this can go without compromising 
independence. This is at the heart of the access to justice debate. There is force 
to the arguments of Mashaw, Adler and Galligan that this type of adjudicative 
procedure does not assure equality between citizen and state. There will be 
some parents whose endowments are so lacking that they will be unable to 
contemplate access and, where they do, the tribunal will be unable to 
compensate. In terms of distributive justice, a considerable amount is traded-off 
for confidence, symbolism and other perceived benefits of due-process.
Misconceived complaints are not rooted out quickly, other than those that are 
obviously outside the tribunal’s jurisdiction. This appears to be an example of 
efficiency being traded-off for the perceived benefits of due process. In terms of 
the outcomes of successful appeals prompting changes in process, consistency 
and control are traded-off for the perceived benefits of due process. Because the 
rationale for decision-making adopted by the SENDIST is different to that 
adopted by LEAs, they appear not to learn from appeals.
If the trade-offs were re-evaluated, it would be possible to have one set of 
expert reports; a fast-track procedure; representation for hard cases and 
appellants who, for whatever reason, would have particular difficulty in 
bringing cases by themselves; a case management system; and wider-ranging 
powers for the SENDIST to order changes in practice, but there would still 
remain a fundamental problem. If the function of the SENDIST should be to 
replicate the decision-making process followed by LEAs, this will lead them 
further into the realms of polycentric decision-making. Fuller draws an analogy 
between polycentric decisions and a spider’s web (Fuller 1978 p.353). A pull on 
one strand distributes tensions in a complicated pattern throughout the whole.
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As each decision communicates itself to other centres of decision, the 
conditions change necessitating a new basis for the next decision. Fuller argues 
that adjudication cannot encompass the complex repercussions of this type of 
situation148.
In terms of PDR goals, the LGO trades-off only two, and so emerges as the 
‘winner’. There are failures to attain the goals of speed and cost-effectiveness to 
the state. The consequences of delay for a child with learning difficulties can be 
detrimental, and delay is inherent in Ombudsman systems according to 
Seneviratne. Also, the fact that this is such a resource-intensive model might 
rule out its use, from a practical point of view, because the state is unlikely to 
countenance having such a system as the principal dispute resolution 
mechanism in light of the number of appeals. The failures are only relevant, 
however, in relation to 20% of LGO complaints -  those where there is a full 
investigation where delay and expense to the state are traded for accuracy, lack 
of complication for, and minimal cost to, complainants, and for 
recommendations that will influence future decisions. If delay can be obviated, 
whilst keeping state costs to a minimum, the inquisitorial model may be 
promising one. This would entail its being managed effectively. The prospect of 
the inquisitorial model operating as the LGO currently operates taking on the 
entirety of complaints about SEN would appear to be both unworkable and 
undesirable.
A relative scale is used to enable further comparison between the mechanisms. 
Points available are 1, 3 and 5, with 5 being the most successful. The difficulty 
is that, even with careful justification, the weighting of these values is open to 
debate.
148 This argument is developed further on p. 158.
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RELATIVE ATTAINMENT OF PDR GOALS (1)
SENDIST LGO ADMINISTRATIVE
COURT
Cheap for Appellants 3 5 1
Quick 3 1 5
Uncomplex 3 5 1
Misconceived and trivial 
complaints rooted-out quickly
1 5 3
Accuracy 3 5 1
Changes feed back 1 5 3
Cost-effective to the State 5 3 1
TOTALS 19 29 15
In terms of speed, the courts are quickest, the SENDIST is second and the LGO 
third. The LGO is weighted highest in terms of cheapness for appellants 
because there are no process costs; the SENDIST is second because, although 
there are no process costs, obtaining expert reports is essential for parents; the 
courts are last with high process and representation costs.
The LGO scores highest in terms of being uncomplicated for parents because 
they simply have to write a letter; SENDIST is second because of the assistance 
provided to parents, with the courts last. The LGO scores highest in rooting-out 
misconceived and trivial complaints because this is effected at the earliest 
possible stage. Although the courts employ filters in the form of pre-action 
protocols, case-management and a permission-stage in judicial review 
applications, parents may have already incurred expense in instructing a lawyer 
before their application is filtered-out. SENDIST employs no filter.
The LGO scores highest in terms of accuracy on the basis that the range of 
information that may be considered is wider than that submitted by the parties; 
SENDIST is second because the members are specialists; the courts are third, 
which might appear controversial in light of the fact that some writers consider
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them to be the ‘Rolls-Royce’ mechanism. Although there is a high level of 
competence among Administrative Court judges, they are not SEN specialists.
The LGO scores highest in terms of changes feeding back to influence future 
decisions. The courts are second because individual decisions create precedents. 
SENDIST is lowest in view of the evidence in the Evans study. The LGO again 
emerges as the ‘winner’, with the SENDIST most frequently in the middle, or 
compromise, position. Perhaps this is significant where it is also the cheapest 
mechanism.
Although SENDIST, LGO and the Administrative Court attain all of the PDR 
goals between them because each employs different trade-offs, it cannot be said 
that the formal system as a whole assures PDR. This is because the nature of the 
dispute will dictate a particular dispute resolution mechanism. If parents appeal 
a decision not to assess, the appropriate mechanism is the SENDIST in all but 
the most urgent cases. Should the LGO be approached, jurisdiction would be 
declined. Only the goal attainment of the appropriate jurisdictional mechanism 
is relevant in determining whether PDR is assured in individual cases.
Only the LGO appears to display all of Mashaw’s process-values of equality, 
transparency, privacy, humaneness, appropriate symbolism and participation. In 
terms of Mashaw’s models, the LGO appears to enshrine features of both the 
bureaucratic rationality and moral judgment models, facilitating accurate and 
efficient concrete realisations of the legislative will in terms of making sure 
things are done properly, whilst also focusing on individuation, though not in 
determining entitlements and without the hallmarks of due process common to 
the moral judgment model. There is a balance between collective goals and 
individual interests within the model.
There is one value prescribed in PDR that must self-evidently be left out of any 
consideration of dispute resolution systems -  that is that initial decisions must 
be right. The Evans study recommends various practices that should improve 
LEA decision-making, which this thesis endorses. These are set out in section 
4.5. The central question posited by this thesis is whether the introduction of
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mediation and conciliation assure PDR. None of the formal dispute resolution 
mechanisms assure this by themselves because none attain all of its goals.
Having assessed whether the PDR is assured by formal SEN decision-making 
processes and having concluded that it is not, it is necessary to look more 
carefully at the over-arching trade-off between collective goals and 
individuation. If it can be shown that the nature of this trade-off predictably 
causes the problems identified in the SEN context, this suggests a powerful 
argument for altering the balance.
4.3. COLLECTIVE GOALS v INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS
Adler’s study of school admission appeals (Adler 1989) has been chosen as a 
basis for analysis because it examines a system that is similar to the SEN 
decision-making and appeals systems. Decisions are made with reference to 
collective goals at the first stage with an appeal system placing greater emphasis 
on individual interests. The thesis contends that the balance of trade-offs 
between collective goals and individuation is responsible for the system’s most 
significant flaw -  a failure to assure equality in the face of unequal endowments 
as between parents and LEAs and as between parents of different social and 
ethnic backgrounds.
Social welfare programmes typically provide benefits and services intended to
promote collective welfare. In deciding which benefits an individual is to
receive, his personal circumstances are only one factor that must be taken into
account. As Adler observes:
Social welfare agencies need to devise ways of balancing the claims of 
an individual client vis-a-vis those of other clients against a background 
of limited resources and in such a way as to promote the achievement of 
policy goals in an efficient manner.
The dependence of clients on social welfare programmes, coupled with 
those considerations that can lead programmes to disregard a particular 
client’s circumstances, raises central questions about how social welfare 
programmes balance the claims of individual clients against other 
concerns. (Adler 1989 p.l).
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Adler notes that social welfare legislation tends not to establish individual
rights, but to impose general duties upon public bodies. This is the case with
SEN legislation. Conflicts between individual and collective concerns are dealt
with in the course of case-level decision-making149.
Clients were not seen as being entitled to particular levels of benefits or 
services, or to having their claims dealt with in a particular way. Rather, 
subject to availability of resources, the manner in which their claims 
were dealt with and the level of benefits or services they received were 
seen to fall within the discretion of those vested with responsibility for 
administering the benefits or providing the service. One result of this 
was that the distribution of benefits and services frequently reflected the 
moral judgments of officials and the presence of situational constraints 
on decision-makers as well as the collective concerns of the agency. 
(Ibid. p.2).
Adler proposes two ideal-type approaches to case-level decision-making that 
may be constructed to provide a framework for analysis. The first he terms 
collective welfare orientation. In this model, decision-making is oriented 
towards the achievement of collective ends, emphasising the programme 
objective of promoting the welfare of all its clients. It has four characteristics:
• it focuses on collective ends;
• it is primarily concerned with the pattern of decisions and the way this 
relates to the programme’s goals rather than decisions in individual 
cases;
• it exercises control over case-level decisions through the development 
and application of bureaucratic standards and procedures that can be 
adjusted to produce a satisfactory pattern of outcomes; and
• it recognises that resource constraints make it necessary to make trade­
offs between the various ends the policy seeks to achieve.
Adler says:
Taken together these four characteristics entail the subordination of 
case-level decision-making to the achievement of collective policy 
goals. This is, in part, because the programmes seldom have the 
resources to satisfy the claims of every client and, in part, because the 
programmes often have distributive goals. (Ibid. p.4).
The second ideal-type is primarily oriented towards the achievement of 
individual ends. This is known as the individual client orientation, and is rooted
149 For further discussion of the influence of choice-based theories on governance in the 1980s 
and 1990s, see Lewis 1996.
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in two sets of ideals -  the client’s autonomy and the professional judgment of 
case workers. Both versions reject the subordination of individuation to policy 
goals. The client autonomy version can be described in terms of four 
characteristics:
• it focuses on the client’s case, and precludes consideration of the claims 
of other clients and resource constraints;
• case-level decisions respond to the preferences of the client -  there are 
no bureaucratic constraints upon the decision-maker;
• clients are encouraged to participate in decision-making and may 
challenge unfavourable decisions; and
• trade-offs are precluded -  the claims of the clients determine what the 
programme provides.
The professional judgment version shares the first and third of these 
characteristics, but assumes that individuals are not necessarily the best judges 
of what is in their interests and that case-level decisions call for exercise of 
professional judgment. There is, however, no comparison between one 
individual’s circumstances and another’s. Adler says that conflict between these 
ideal-type orientations underlies case-level decision-making in social welfare 
programmes and that, although no orientation entirely dominates, social welfare 
programmes in Britain have tended to favour the collective welfare orientation. 
In the context of both admissions and SEN, the collective welfare model is used 
at the decision-making stage but, although the appeal stage follows Mashaw’s 
moral judgment model focusing on individual interests, consideration of other 
factors is not excluded.
The question then is what weight should be given to individual interests? In 
answering this question, Adler says this depends upon which rights theory is 
adopted. There is choice theory, which suggests clients’ choices must prevail, or 
interests theory, which suggests that clients’ wishes must be weighed against 
other relevant factors to determine how they should be treated. In both the 
admissions and SEN contexts, interests theory is adopted. Adler suggests that an 
understanding of rights in social welfare programmes requires detailed analysis 
of the duties they can invoke. In analysing the effect of legislation introducing
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parental preference in school admissions, he says that, prior to its introduction, 
the system was based upon mutual trust and political accountability: parents 
placed their trust in LEAs to discharge their powers in such a manner as to 
enhance collective well-being; the Government would restrain unreasonable 
LEAs, but would trust LEAs generally and rarely exercise default powers.
LEAs have no interest in whether a child attends a particular school -  their main 
concern will be even distribution and efficient use of resources. Parents, 
however, may care a great deal about which school their child attends.
Adler characterises the two approaches as ideal models. A collective welfare 
(authority-wide) approach would be to ensure that each school admits a 
sufficient number of pupils to enable it to offer a broad set of curriculum 
options in an efficient manner; has a balanced academic and social mix of 
pupils; and does not admit so many pupils that its facilities and/or teaching staff 
are over-burdened. A client orientated (child-centered) approach would be 
concerned with matching children to schools. This can be done by allowing 
experts to place children following an assessment of ability and aptitude, or by 
allowing parents, as the persons best-placed to decide what is in their child’s 
interests, to choose a school. An LEA could determine policies in the light of 
parental choice by simply putting more resources into popular schools.
Thus, policy would be determined by case-level decisions as opposed to vice- 
versa. Schools could be run independently: resources available to schools would 
relate to the number of pupils. They would compete with each other in terms of 
quality, and those that failed to attract pupils would close. The role of the LEA 
would be largely administrative. The current system in England is something of 
a mix, with LEAs directing admission by limiting numbers and imposition of 
over-subscription criteria for some maintained schools but not others, and 
different categories of maintained and independent schools competing for 
children. Adler’s study made the important finding that, although the 
introduction of parental preference had led to integration of some pupils from 
areas of multiple deprivation into schools in adjacent catchment areas, it had 
also increased the segregation of those who remained in the district schools for
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these areas. Schools that ‘lost’ pupils were almost without exception in the least
prosperous housing schemes:
The legislation has quite clearly led to a widening of educational 
inequalities and to a re-emergence of a ‘two-tier’ system of secondary 
schooling in the big cities. (Ibid. p.219).
Adler observes that the adoption of a policy allowing parents to express a 
preference in relation to school admissions highlights that a rights strategy 
might have different attractions for Government and parents both of whom 
might see the exercise of LEA discretion as problematic for different reasons. A 
Conservative Government introduced parental preference to control LEA 
discretion. The welfare rights movement, perceiving LEAs as exercising 
discretion restrictively in a manner detrimental to clients, viewed its 
introduction as leading to more favourable outcomes strengthened by an appeals 
procedure.
The appeals procedure was also seen as important in providing guidance to
case-level decision-makers - a deterrent to unreasonable decision-making and
an opportunity for parents to participate in decisions affecting their child. Adler,
however, cites several studies indicating that clients frequently do not challenge
decisions because they lack the legal or administrative competence to do so, or
for fear of antagonising officials with whom they have a continuing relationship
(Nonet 1969; Cranston 1986); appeals are not independent and are dominated
by presenting officers representing the agency and influenced by the clerk, who
is employed by the agency; successful appeals fail to bring about improvements
in case-level decision-making because agencies frequently concede cases
without revising their general approach to decision-making (Jowell 1973;
Harlow and Rawlings 1984); and appeal processes may be strengthened while
substantive rights are reduced. Clients end up with stronger rights to fewer
benefits (Prosser 1977; Adler and Asquith 1981). He says:
A pessimistic assessment of these shortcomings might point to the 
failure of rights in social welfare programmes. Thus, while rights (in 
particular the right of appeal) may have benefited those clients who 
appealed, they have not transformed the treatment of clients in general. 
This is because officials continue to make case-level decisions more or 
less as they did in the absence of rights. Moreover, rights can impose 
substantial costs which may work to the detriment of clients. The
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existence of rights may eliminate discretion that could be used to help 
clients (Titmus, 1971; Bull 1980). Officials may respond defensively to 
the possibility of an appeal, adopting more formal and bureaucratic 
modes of dealing with clients to insulate themselves from criticism 
(Simon 1983; Harlow and Rawlings 1984). Clients who gain most from 
the existence of rights may be those who are least disadvantaged at the 
outset (Galanter 1975). Moreover, those who gain do so at the expense 
of others. Thus rights may limit the ability of social welfare programmes 
to achieve a reduction in inequalities. The existence of rights may inhibit 
the efforts of those seeking more comprehensive reform: strengthening 
procedural rights may confer the symbolic appearance of legality on the 
programmes in question and make it more difficult to achieve 
fundamental changes that could really enhance social welfare (Piven and 
Cloward 1972: Prosser 1977; Adler and Asquith 1981; Simon 1985) 
(Adler 1989 p.22).
The studies referred to in Chapter Two indicate that all of these are relevant and 
significant concerns in the context of SEN, calling into question whether true 
equality can ever be achieved within the current system.
However, Adler’s study identified benefits to parents. The existence of appeal 
rights -  to an admission appeals committee and thereafter to a sheriff - led 
LEAs to make restrictive interpretations of the statutory grounds for refusal of 
appeals, strengthening parents’ ability to get their child into the school of their 
choice. The prospect of appeals reinforced LEAs’ concerns to interpret and 
apply parents’ rights correctly. Appeals allowed parents to participate in the 
process; to know the reasons for refusal; and to obtain information about 
alternative schools. They also ensured that decisions were consistent with 
parents’ rights and that compelling reasons for choice and individual 
circumstances were taken into account. Appeal committees however, fell short 
of fulfilling their functions. They often failed to fulfil even their basic 
responsibilities of determining whether refusal was justified in accordance with 
the statutory grounds and determining whether parents’ reasons merited an 
exception to the school’s admission limit. Also, the members acted more like 
officials of the authority than independent arbiters.
Sheriffs adopted two different approaches -  the single-child approach and the 
school-level approach. In the former, sheriffs took the view that, unless the 
authority could show that the admission of even one further child would require
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the employment of an additional teacher, significant alteration to school 
premises or serious detriment to discipline at the school, the child should be 
admitted. Following the school-level approach sheriffs decided that, where a 
school is overcrowded, such that some additional measures would need to be 
taken, the statutory grounds for refusal exist. They also considered the fact that 
other parents had been refused admission, reasoning that the authority was 
entitled to take into account the effect of admission of the whole group when 
turning down individual requests. This latter approach is now enshrined in the 
Admissions Code of Practice (DfES 2007).
Adler suggests that both approaches are plausible readings of an authority’s 
duties. But the outcomes of adopting each approach are very different. Under 
the single child approach it would be difficult to dismiss an appeal. Arguably 
schools can usually accommodate one extra desk and chair without having to 
make adaptations to premises. Admission of one additional child can generally 
be managed without employment of more teachers and is unlikely to lead to a 
serious breakdown in discipline. Sheriffs adopting this approach allowed 
appeals disregarding the possibility that parents could appeal one-by-one, and 
the fact that the adoption of this approach would lead to each appeal being 
upheld in turn. On the other hand, sheriffs adopting the school level approach 
were able to view individual parents’ rights in the context of all parents’ rights. 
None of the sheriffs adopting this approach allowed any appeals. But Adler says 
that this was not a foregone conclusion. The argument embodied in this thesis is 
that an analogous version of the school level approach should be used in SEN 
appeals, and that a failure to adopt this approach precludes the holistic reform 
referred to as essential by the Audit Commission to enable inclusion to operate 
effectively (Audit Commission 2002b).
In terms of findings, although appeal rights appeared to have a minimal effect 
because so few parents had exercised the right at the time the study was 
conducted, there was evidence that the existence of appeal rights influenced 
LEA practice. One authority in the study conceded 40 appeals as soon as they 
were lodged with the sheriff. Appeal committees and sheriffs differed in the 
way they viewed admission limits imposed by LEAs. The committees
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considered the limits justified or that only a few children could be admitted 
above the limit. Sheriffs adopting the single child approach ignored the limit, 
requiring the LEA to justify refusal with reference to the admission of even one 
further child. Sheriffs who adopted the school-level approach reviewed both the 
reasonableness of the limit and whether there were compelling reasons why any 
justifications for imposing it should be overridden.
Adler says that differing approaches rest upon differing value-judgments.
Some people will welcome any move towards an individual client 
orientation while others will regret any departure from a collective 
welfare orientation. Likewise, some people care more about aggregate 
welfare, e.g. about the proportion of the population at school which 
acquires educational qualification, while others care more about 
distribution, e.g. about equality of educational opportunity [...] Thus, it 
is impossible to produce an assessment [...] which everyone will accept. 
(Adler 1989 pps. 219-220).
However,
The encouragement of individual choice, the matching of pupils with the 
schools selected by their parents and the introduction of quasi-market 
forces into education have imposed constraints upon authorities’ 
attempts to achieve an academic and social mix, set upper and (more 
crucially) lower bounds on school intakes and school rolls, achieve an 
efficient use of scarce resources, and promote equality of opportunity. 
(Ibid. p.220).
Adler does not suggest that LEAs were particularly good at achieving these 
goals. He cites a study which predicted that government policies enhancing 
parents’ rights would inhibit, and even reverse, the processes of equalisation 
and improvement (McPherson 1987). He observes that giving parents rights 
may not lead to their desired outcome. Will they still want their child to attend 
the school they have chosen when it becomes overcrowded and children are 
taught in temporary accommodation? Hirsch describes this as ‘the tyranny of 
small decisions’ resulting from the promotion of ‘positional competition’ -  
individuals gain only by dint of losses for others (Hirsch 1977 p.52). Adler 
suggests that the positional sector is a misleading guide to what individuals 
would demand if they could see and act on the results of their combined 
choices.
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In considering whether the optimum balance is achieved between collective and 
individual rights, Adler cites McAuslan’s important article in which it is argued 
that judges exhibit preferences for individualising issues and seeing all issues 
brought before them as battles between individuals and bureaucracies 
(McAuslin 1983). McAuslan argues that judges have an ideological preference 
for the individual as opposed to the collective, and that this has prevented them 
from grasping what is really at issue. Instead of acting as a check on 
government, they actively facilitate the government’s attack on collective 
consumption, and they do so in a highly partisan way. Adler says that the 
behaviour of the sheriffs adopting the single-child approach in his study 
supports McAuslan’s arguments. His view is that the effect upon the individual 
should be balanced against the collective effect. Evidence in the SEN context 
supports these arguments. If SEN appeals are lodged predominantly by white, 
well-educated, middle-class parents it is difficult to see why they should be 
advantaged by having decisions made in respect of their child on what, 
according to Adler’s study, is a substantially more favourable basis.
MacCormick highlights the difference between choice and interest theories:
Are rights to be conceived primarily in terms of giving a special status to 
the choice of one individual over others in relation to a given subject 
matter or primarily in terms of the protection of individuals against 
possible forms of intrusion (or the advancement in other ways of 
individuals’ interests)? (MacCormick 1977 p. 192).
Adler observes that rights only become problematic in conditions of scarcity.
He also observes that interests theory perceives rights as devices for protecting 
clients’ interests, but that their interests in ensuring their wishes prevail are 
weighed against other interests as relevant factors. This, he says, enables 
consideration of how rights should be balanced, and against what. Adoption of 
the interests theory as a basis for decision-making would enable decision­
makers to evaluate parents’ reasons for wanting their child to go to a particular 
school, and the implications of granting the request against the implications for 
the child of refusing it. This would then be balanced against the interests of the 
other children whose parents’ requests have also been refused and the interests
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of children already in the school. Adler favours interests theory over choice 
theory as a basis for inter-personal comparisons.
Adler felt unable to conclude that the introduction of parental preference has 
achieved the right balance between individual and collective concerns. For 
LEAs, the shift to individual client orientation threatens too many collective 
goals. The imbalance, however, is exacerbated by the failure of LEAs 
themselves to promote collective goals; the failure of the legislation to enable 
LEAs to secure some protection for schools with falling rolls; the failure of 
appeal committees and sheriffs to act as the sort of check on decision-making 
that ensures a better balance between the concerns of individual parents; and the 
fact that parents do not base their preferences on an understanding of 
educational processes and outcomes, but on social considerations and the 
influence of other parents’ preferences.
Obvious parallels can be drawn between the admissions and SEN decision­
making and appeals frameworks. In both, parents’ wishes and children’s needs 
are weighed against other relevant factors at each stage. The initial LEA 
decision-making stage enshrines the four hallmarks of the collective-welfare 
orientation. It is focused on collective ends, and more concerned with the 
pattern of decisions and the way they relate to programme goals than decisions 
in individual cases. Bureaucratic standards have been developed, in the form of 
criteria for assessment/statementing, which can be adjusted to produce a 
satisfactory pattern of outcomes. There is recognition that resource constraints 
necessitate trade-offs.
The appeal stage, by contrast, has some resemblance to the individual client 
orientation. It focuses on the client’s case; precludes consideration of the claims 
of other clients; case-level decisions respond to the preferences of the client; 
and clients are encouraged to participate in decision-making and may challenge 
unfavourable decisions. There are differences, however. Although SENDIST 
are not subject to the same bureaucratic constraints as LEAs, it would be wrong 
to suggest that those constraints are disregarded entirely. For example, SEN
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legislation requires consideration of efficient use of resources and the interests 
of the child’s peer group in determination of placement.
The differences between the decision-making and appeals processes stem both 
from the nature of what is considered and the degree of emphasis afforded to 
individual circumstances. In terms of what is considered, because the SENDIST 
does not conduct a review, members do not make decisions dictated by the stark 
confines of a list of children and a limited budget, or concerns about the wider 
impact on provision. But, in terms of emphasis, there is not a straight dichotomy 
between the collective welfare orientation at the initial decision-making stage 
and the individual client orientation at the appeal stage.
Rather it could be said that the interests theory of rights, which acknowledges 
the relevance of other factors, is used at both stages, but within cultures placing 
differing emphasis on individual interests. LEAs take into account the needs of 
the child and balance these against other relevant factors at the initial decision­
making stage -  but they place more emphasis on collective goals and resources. 
The SENDIST are obliged to take into account resources (and effect on peer 
group when making placement decisions), but they do this is in a different way 
to LEAs. They take into account LEA policies -  but, as stated in their guidance, 
they are not obliged to follow them; they will consider resources -  but not in a 
way that reflects the true costs to the LEA. Their brief of conducting enabling 
hearings and de novo considerations leads to them individualising issues and 
perceiving the cases brought before them as battles between individuals and 
bureaucracies. They behave like the judges in McAuslan’s study.
What emerges from this analysis is that the admissions and SEN decision­
making and appeals processes both follow the same model in terms of the 
balance of trade-offs between collective welfare and individual client 
orientations. This is a model incorporating an appeal stage identified in the 
studies cited by Adler as one that eliminates discretion which could be used to 
help clients; advantages those who are least disadvantaged at the outset, and 
enables them to gain at the expense of others; inhibits comprehensive reform, 
and makes it more difficult to achieve the fundamental changes that will
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enhance social welfare. It is not a model that will promote successful operation 
of inclusion.
There is another factor about the admissions appeals process that yields 
important information relevant to the SEN context. This relates to the operation 
of admission appeals. Parents attend and present their case. The decision-maker 
constructs a comparison between the circumstances of their child and the 
circumstances of other children whose parents have also appealed. This means 
that, in presenting reasons why their child should be admitted to a school, 
parents have no idea of what they are competing against because they are not 
aware of the circumstances of these other children. Arguably this is a breach of 
one of the fundamental principles of procedural fairness. If parents do not know 
‘the case against them’, this impedes their ability to make their own case to the 
best of their ability. Also, the adjudicator’s list of priorities goes unchallenged. 
Reasons relating to children who are not the subject of the appeal cannot feature 
in the notification of decision for reasons of confidentiality. The detailed 
rationale for the decision is invisible.
For these reasons, Harlow and Rawlings have been critical of the methodology 
of decision-making followed by Admission Appeals Panels (Harlow and 
Rawlings 1997). They adopt Fuller’s argument that polycentric decisions are 
unsuitable for adjudication. Decisions about children’s SEN are polycentric 
decisions - made by LEAs having taken into account a range of factors, and 
with knock-on effects. Admissions Panels (and SENDIST) conduct de novo 
hearings, re-establishing facts based upon new information. How would this 
work if the collective welfare orientation were adopted for SEN appeals?
Parents would attend and present their case with reference to their child’s needs. 
They would then presumably have to leave whilst the LEA made their argument 
about how (not whether) the child’s needs could be provided for with reference 
to available resources as balanced against other obligations. They would 
produce the list and explain the needs of B,C,D and the effect of the decision 
upon these children and upon other services. Parents would be unable to 
challenge the information. The proposition would be problematic within the
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current remit of the SENDIST. An inquisitorial procedure would be more 
suitable for such a process.
4.4. ADEQUATE REDRESS
In January 2006, a report entitled ‘Administrative Grievances: a Developmental 
Study’ was published (Adler 2006c). The researchers developed a top-down, 
bottom-up and composite typology of administrative grievances. The top-down 
element of the typology was constructed by reviewing literature on 
administrative law and public administration and consulting experts in these 
fields, the bottom-up element was constructed by asking people with 
administrative grievances to describe the problems they had experienced. The 
project was not simply an attempt to assess the feasibility of undertaking a 
large-scale study of administrative grievances, it was also designed as a study in 
its own right. The aims of the qualitative research were:
• to describe the problems people encounter in their dealings with 
government departments and public bodies and explore the 
nature of their grievances;
• to develop a bottom-up typology of administrative grievances 
based on participants’ accounts;
• to identify the factors that encourage and inhibit people’s 
attempts to resolve their grievances and the sources of 
information and advice that they use. (Ibid. p.5).
43 participants were recruited using a household screening method, which was 
based on that used in the ‘Paths to Justice’ surveys (Genn 1999a), and 71 
grievances were discussed by the participants. Eight categories of grievance 
were identified relating to: delays; information and communication problems; 
decisions and actions perceived to be unfair; errors in administration; staff 
manner and attitude; access to services; quality of services; and policy issues.
The research showed that there was considerable variation in the length of time 
that participants spent trying to resolve their grievances. Some attempts were 
very short-lived while others lasted for years. Some participants made no 
attempt to resolve their grievance. Those who did, adopted a number of 
different strategies, including making face-to-face or contact by telephone or 
letter; obtaining material or moral support for their case; seeking advice and/or
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representation; taking direct action. Whether or not participants made an 
attempt to resolve their grievance was influenced by the following six factors:
• the individual’s assessment of the seriousness of the grievance;
• expectations of a positive outcome;
• knowledge of how to proceed;
• access to the right procedure for resolving the grievance;
• personal and financial resources;
• previous experience of successfully resolving a grievance. (Ibid.
Chapter 4).
The perceived seriousness of a grievance was seen to be a function of its actual 
or potential impact; the immediacy of its impact; the identity of the person who 
was most affected by it, in particular, whether it affected someone vulnerable, 
for example a young child, an aged parent or someone with a disability.
The report states that research focusing on individual public agencies suggests 
that many people who are dissatisfied with public services do not make use of 
complaints and appeals procedures. It refers to data compiled from a report by 
the Comptroller and Auditor General (Comptroller and Auditor General 2005) 
following a survey of 284 central government departments, executive agencies 
and non-departmental bodies indicating that, in 2003/4, 1.3 million cases 
(approx.) were received through redress systems; there were 765,000 appeals 
and tribunal cases which cost £343m; 542,000 complaints which cost £65m; 
and 39,000 Ombudsman and mediator cases which cost £39m (Adler 2006c 
p.5).
Adler suggests that, since it is reasonable to assume from the number of 
requests for advice from CABx, that the number of letters to ministers and the 
number of cases considered by redress mechanisms are a small proportion of 
the number of problems experienced, and that the number of these problems 
must be very large indeed. Thus it is surprising that there has been no 
comprehensive research into the nature and incidence of such problems and, as 
a result, there is no solid empirical basis for distinguishing between different 
types of administrative problem, or assessing the incidence of problems of
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different types, the availability of information and advice for those who 
experience these problems, or the effectiveness of the existing procedures for 
resolving them.
The report adopts PDR as its definition of administrative justice, along with a 
set of normative expectations that the Government accepts is reasonable for the 
citizen to have also described in ‘Transforming Public Services’:
• to receive correct decisions on our personal circumstances;
• where a mistake occurs, we are entitled to complain and to have the 
mistake put right with the minimum of difficulty;
• where there is uncertainty, we are entitled to expect a quick resolution of 
the issue; and
• we are entitled to expect that, where things have gone wrong, the system 
will learn from the problem and will do better in future. (DCA 2004 para
1.5.).
It also adopts a framework adopted by Festiner, Abel and Sarat (1980) for 
analysing the process by which unsatisfactory experiences are transformed into 
disputes -  naming an unsatisfactory experience transforms it into a problem; 
blaming transforms a problem into a grievance; and claiming transforms a 
grievance into a dispute. Information, according to Adler, may be instrumental 
in persuading people that they have a grievance and whether to pursue it by 
making a formal complaint. The focus of research has traditionally been on the 
later stages of the process. Thus, many unsatisfactory experiences are not 
recognised as problems; many problems do not become grievances or proceed 
further. This means that the grievance remains unresolved.
The report cites three reviews of the literature on complaints which show that 
many people are dissatisfied with public services but very few complain; that 
the most common reason for not complaining is that people consider it would be 
pointless; that most people who complain do so informally; that the factors 
involved in whether people complain are subtle and complex; some people find 
it easier to complain than others and a variety of personal and social factors 
such as education, income, gender or age may help to explain whether an
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individual takes steps to resolve a grievance.150 Most people prefer making a
complaint orally, and to front-line staff, rather than in writing or by submitting
complex forms to officials further up the organisational hierarchy151. The role of
front-line staff can influence people’s propensity to make and pursue
complaints. Their lack of knowledge of the complaints procedure; lack of
ability to communicate with people experiencing problems; defensiveness and
unwillingness to listen can all deter people from making and pursuing
complaints152. Where people who complain fail to get satisfaction, they are
1unlikely to pursue the matter further .
Genn’s ‘Paths to Justice’ study (Genn 1999a) is cited as indicating that social 
class and employment status are not associated with taking steps to resolve a 
problem, but educational qualifications and income are. Most of the factors 
identified by Genn as being influential relate to attributes of the individual, as 
opposed to the characteristics of the complaint, and none of the factors she 
identifies relates to the seriousness of the complaint or its impact. Another 
survey conducted by the Legal Services Research Centre has revealed that 
persons suffering social exclusion experience more problems more often 
(Pleasance et al. 2004).
Adler’s top-down typology makes the distinction between grievances that relate 
to people not getting what they want and grievances relating to process; 
between unlawful decisions that are unlawful per se, and unreasonable exercise 
of discretion; between grievances amenable to individual redress and grievances 
that can only be challenged by collective action (i.e. amending the law, 
changing the policy or providing more resources). A bottom-up list was 
compiled through discussion in focus groups. The different categories in the 
top-down typology were then developed by citing specific examples following
150 Leadbetter, D. and Mulcahy, L. (1996); Mulcahy et al. (1996) and Williams, T and Goriely, 
T. (1994).
151 The report cites Harris, N. (1992) Complaints about Schooling: the role o f  section 32 o f  the 
Education Reform A ct 198, National Consumer Council.
152 Lloyd-Bostock, S. and Mulcahy, L. (1994). ‘The Social Psychology of making and 
Responding to Hospital Complaints, Law and Policy, 16(2) 123-147.
153 Lloyd-Bostock and Mulcahy (1994) op cit.
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the bottom-up analysis to form a composite typology, as follows (Adler 2006c 
P-61):
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ADLER’S COMPOSITE TYPOLOGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE
GRIEVANCES
Composite Category Examples
Cl Decision wrong or 
unreasonable.
decisions perceived to be wrong or unfair;
decisions involving discrimination;
decisions that involve imposition of 
unreasonable conditions;
refusal to accept liability.
C2 Administrative errors. record lost or misplaced; 
no record of information received.
C3 Unacceptable treatment by 
staff.
staff rude and unhelpful; 
staff incompetent and unreliable; 
presumption of ‘guilt’ by staff; 
threatening or intimidating behaviour by 
staff;
staff did not acknowledge mistake or offer 
an apology.
C4 Unacceptable delays. delays in making appointments; 
delays in making decisions; 
delays in providing services.
C5 Information and 
communication problems.
lack of information;
conflicting or confusing information;
poor communication;
objections ignored by staff;
lack of privacy.
C6 Benefit/service unavailable 
or deficient.
benefit/service withdrawn (either for 
everyone or for some people);
benefit/service not available (Either for 
everyone or for some people);
benefit/service deficient in quality or 
quantity.
C7 General objections to policy. policy unacceptable.
C8 Other types of grievances. other types of grievances not covered by 
categories C l-7.
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Adler envisages a study of administrative grievances that would consider not 
just the factors motivating people to turn unsatisfactory experiences into 
grievances, but factors influencing a decision not to complain.
This thesis does not utilise the composite typology of grievances in the SEN 
context as Adler envisaged. It is used on the basis that it identifies the different 
aspects of grievances that are common in public law disputes. This enables 
consideration of how the dispute resolution mechanisms deal with each aspect, 
and provides information about adequacy of redress. Evidence from the Hall 
and Evans studies suggests that the merits of decisions are only one aspect of 
what parents might wish to complain about. Hall refers to delays; a ‘blame 
culture’ with teachers holding prejudices against parents and perceived power- 
imbalance (Hall 1999 p.35). She suggests that the presenting problem is not 
always the one of most concern, and that it is often more deep-rooted. It appears 
likely that many issues parents would wish to complain about stem from a 
culture that subverts the principles of the Code of Practice. Looking at the 
model, it appears likely that any complaint will comprise more than one of the 
identified categories.
But how does this feature in terms of redress? Adler says that both bottom-up 
and top-down analysis result in a subjective characterisation and that some 
complex grievances may have the characteristics of more than one element of 
the typology. The first point that is striking is that, although the SENDIST is the 
principal dispute resolution mechanism only one of the grievances in the list can 
be dealt with by the tribunal -  that is, decisions perceived to be unfair. Other 
matters might form the subject of a complaint to the LGO -  delays, problems 
with information and communication, administrative errors, and access to 
services. Some would fall to be dealt with by the courts -  adoption of irrational 
policies, an application for Mandamus in cases of excessive delay. Complaints 
about staff manner and attitude might be dealt with by internal complaints 
procedures (although not required to have such procedures, most local 
authorities do).
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The fact that complaints are likely to comprise more than one category of 
grievance and that one mechanism is unable to deal with all of the grievances 
that commonly arise in SEN disputes is significant. It means that, for a number 
of complaints, important elements will remain unresolved because, as Galligan 
says, people are unlikely to access even one formal mechanism, let alone two or 
three. It is possible that parents who appeal to the SENDIST about failure to 
comply with statutory obligations and unreasonable exercise of discretion may 
also consider that the decision-making process has been too slow; or that they 
have been given insufficient information, or they haven’t been listened to. They 
may think the LEA’s criteria are unreasonable, or that the LEA have adopted a 
blanket policy. The SENDIST cannot deal with most of these aspects. They can 
overturn a decision not to assess a child or re-write a statement, but they cannot 
offer compensation for failure to properly identify a child’s needs over a 
lengthy period; re-write an LEA’s criteria; or order an LEA to change their 
policies or procedures.
An examination of whether each of the principal SEN dispute resolution 
mechanisms deal with the grievances in the composite list is set out below.
ABILITY OF FORMAL SEN DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS 
TO DEAL W ITH ADLER’S COMPOSITE TYPOLOGY OF 
GRIEVANCES
Composite Category SENDIST LGO Administrative
Court
Cl Decision wrong or 
unreasonable.
Yes. No* Yes.
C2 Administrative errors. No. Yes. Yes.
C3 Unacceptable treatment by 
staff.
No. Yes. No.
C4 Unacceptable delays. No. Yes. Yes.
C5 Information and 
communication problems.
No. Yes. No.
C6 Benefit/service unavailable or 
deficient
No. Yes. Yes.
C7 General objections to policy. No. No. Yes.
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*The LGO cannot conduct an appeal on the merits, but could investigate a 
decision that is ‘wrong’ decision because it was made as a result of a procedural 
error. This is a further example of the jurisdictional complexities. The ‘Other 
types of grievance’ category is omitted because it is not possible to determine 
whether a mechanism can deal with a grievance without knowledge of the 
nature of the grievance.
An examination of how the composite list of grievances identified by Adler are 
dealt with is set out below:
HOW ADLER’S COMPOSITE TYPOLOGY OF GRIEVANCES MIGHT 
BE DEALT WITH IN THE SEN CONTEXT
Composite Category Redress
C l Decision wrong or 
unreasonable.
SENDIST or the Administrative Court for 
urgent cases.
C2 Administrative errors. LGO.
C3 Unacceptable treatment by 
staff.
Schools’ and LEAs’ internal complaints 
procedures and the LGO.
C4 Unacceptable delays. LGO for complaint, the Administrative 
Courts for injunctive relief.
C5 Information and 
communication problems.
LGO.
C6 Benefit/service unavailable 
or deficient.
Possibly LGO or the Administrative court -  
would depend upon the circumstances.
C7 General objections to 
policy.
Internal complaints procedures, the 
Administrative courts for review.
C8 Other types of grievances. Would depend upon the nature of the 
grievance.
How is a parent to negotiate this complex system? It has evolved from different 
pieces of legislation, and becomes even more complex in cases where, for 
example, a child is disabled or looked-after by the local authority. A significant 
factor in relation to SEN decision-making is that most parents do not appeal to 
the SENDIST or complain to the LGO. Although the DCSF contend that this is 
because most have nothing to complain about, there is evidence contradicting 
this. Firstly, the Hall, Evans and Harris studies. Although these are ten years 
old, the Select Committee’s 2006 Report appears to echo the same complaints, 
suggesting there has been no improvement. Adler refers to Genn’s ‘Paths to
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Justice’ research and the factors that influence whether grievances are taken 
forward. These are, as he says, subtle and complex. In light of the research 
evidence, the DCSF’s contention appears disingenuous.
There is a suggestion that the SENDIST is dominated by middle-class parents. 
But children whose parents may be less well-educated, or who value education 
less, who are on low incomes, or for whom English is not their first language 
may constitute a high proportion of the parents of children with SEN. It appears 
that they are not accessing the current systems, and are being disadvantaged by 
the success of those who do. Because the system is not accessed by the majority 
of parents who have children with SEN, and because it is necessary to access a 
plethora of mechanisms to resolve all aspects of a complaint, it cannot be said to 
offer adequate redress. At the very least, there appears to be a need for 
management of disputes to assist parents in locating the correct mechanism, but 
what would be preferable would be to have a single system. Suggestions as to 
how this can be achieved are in Chapter Six.
The typology is used in Chapter Five to assess the ability of mediation and 
conciliation to deal with all of the grievances in the list, and in Chapter Six to 
assess the ability of the children’s services complaints procedure to do so.
4.5. SUMMARY OF PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED
Problems with SEN decision-making and dispute resolution processes identified 
through this analysis are:
• that it perpetuates inequality;
• initial decisions are made on a different basis to appeals;
• failure to give sufficient weight to individuation at the initial decision­
making stage;
• failure to give sufficient weight to collective goals at the appeal stage;
• no one mechanism deals with all possible aspects of a dispute;
• the cost to parents of engaging expert witnesses to prepare reports and 
give evidence;
• access;
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• too many appeals;
• delay;
• conflict.
Possible options are:
• no change
Problems identified would remain unresolved. The appeal system would 
continue not to be accessed by parents whose children may be most in 
need of help. Those children will have less resource available to them as 
a result of successful appeals, perpetuating an unfairness based upon 
inequality of endowments.
• no change to the appeals process, but ensure all of the factors 
referred to by Evans154 as being associated with low levels of appeals 
are in place
These were: ‘open door’ policies; listening to parents; taking time to 
explain decisions; staff training; a source of semi-independent advice for 
parents; good relationships with voluntary organisations and local 
agencies; clear and accessible policies drawn-up in agreement with 
parents and schools; more assessments; and a good range of local 
provision. If the putting in place of these practices leads to fewer 
appeals, this should mean resources are distributed more equitably to all 
children for whom the LEA is responsible, provided LEAs are 
exercising discretion reasonably. These practices (“the Evans practices”) 
should be put into operation regardless of whether any of the other 
options for change referred to below are adopted.
Compliance with the ethos and principles of the SEN Code of Practice 
should ensure that these practices are already in place. Whilst it is not 
possible to inspect cultures, Ofsted could be provided with a checklist of 
these practices and take into account whether they are being operated in 
their rating of education services following an inspection.
154 Evans 1998. See p. 48 of the thesis.
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• bureaucratic rationality plus the superbureau
This option would involve ‘cultural engineering’ backed by training and 
management of staff, QA and internal review, but without external 
review. There would be a superbureau that would supervise the drafting 
of administrative legislation; review the competence of policy analysis; 
provide binding guidance on managerial technique, and hear complaints 
of maladministration. There is an example of a tribunal being replaced 
effectively by internal review155.
• retaining external review, but employing the same balance of 
collective interests and individuation at the initial decision-making 
and review stages
There is evidence suggesting that there should be greater emphasis on 
the needs of the child who is the subject of the dispute at the initial 
decision-making stage and greater emphasis on collective goals at the 
appeal stage. This would necessitate that the same rules should operate 
at both stages within the same culture. This could be facilitated by the 
adoption of Mashaw’s recommendations relating to QA, training, 
recruitment and management. Adopting a practice of interviewing 
parents and children, if children were willing to participate, might lead 
to LEAs regarding them as people, rather than names on a list.
Interviews would increase process costs; increased focus on children’s 
needs might lead to more assessments and statements, so there would be 
an increase in provision costs stage, but there might be a reduction in the 
costs of appeals. There are difficulties, though, with the SENDIST 
reviewing LEA decisions to take into account collective interests 
because polycentric decisions are unsuitable for adjudication for the 
reasons advanced by Harlow and Rawlings (Harlow and Rawlings 
1997).
155 See Dailey and Berthoud 1992. Introduction of an internal review procedure for Social Fund 
applications led to decisions being made more quickly and a high satisfaction rate. Discussed in 
Harlow and Rawlings 1997 pps 486-491.
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• widening the remit of the SENDIST to enable the tribunal to deal 
with all aspects of SEN complaints
There would be advantages in having one mechanism deal with all 
aspects of complaints. The question is whether it should be a tribunal 
adopting an adversarial adjudicative procedure. There would be 
problems with polycentric decision-making, and the problems of 
unequal access, high costs of expert reports and appeal decisions not 
improving future practice would continue.
• LGO to consider all SEN Disputes
As above, there would be advantages in having a single system of 
redress. Also, the involvement of a body employing inquisitorial 
procedures would overcome many of the disadvantages identified in 
relation to the SENDIST. The LGO’s ‘naming and shaming’ practice, 
ability to award compensation and remit of being able to make 
recommendations in relation to future practice should improve LEA 
decision-making. The LGO can identify systemic abuse in a way that 
tribunals are ill-equipped to do.
Disadvantages are that the LGO is not SEN-specific and not widely used 
by parents of children with SEN (though this may be because the 
principal concern of parents is appealing the merits of a decision, as 
opposed to the process) and, because the procedure is cumbersome, it 
can be slow. Figures on p. 160 show it is an expensive mechanism.
• choice
One of Mashaw’s options for reform of the DBP appeals process was to 
allow appellants a choice of process, where this would have no 
detrimental effect upon decisional accuracy. Perhaps parents could be 
allowed to choose whether SENDIST or LGO deals with their 
complaint, having had the advantages and disadvantages of each 
mechanism explained to them. The remit of both could be extended to 
enable them to deal with any sort of complaint or appeal. Parents might 
find an inquisitorial procedure a less-daunting prospect than a tribunal
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hearing at which they would have to prepare and present their case. The 
disadvantage of more LGO complaints would be cost. Allowing choice 
would be difficult to resource, certainly in the initial stages, because 
demand would be unpredictable.
• a complaints procedure including impartial review operating locally
A potential model is considered in Chapter Six.
• independent assessment
SEN decisions are currently made following discussion by Panels 
incorporating professionals whose services prepare reports for the 
statutory assessment process. The difficulty is that those conducting 
assessments and participating in decision-making are not perceived by 
parents as exercising independent professional judgment -  they are seen 
as colluding with LEAs’ rationing agenda. The Select Committee’s 2006 
and 2007 Reports both suggest that separation between the function of 
assessment and decisions relating to funding is needed. Difficulties with 
this suggestion are that, if independent assessors were to make 
decisions, LEAs would have no control of the budget which might lead 
to costs spiraling out of control and, if independent assessors were to 
make recommendations, LEAs might not comply with them if they were 
unable to resource them.
• SEN appeals to be made to an independent professional panel
This is one of Mashaw’s suggestions for reform. What is envisaged is 
that the appellant will be re-examined by an independent Panel. In the 
SEN context, this would comprise educational psychologists, speech 
therapists etc. The Panel would be specialist, competent, impartial and 
technically independent, (though the SENDIST has all of these 
qualities); there would be no necessity for parents to incur the expense 
of obtaining expert evidence or contests of experts; the Panel could 
discuss different options with the child, the parents, the LEA, the school 
and anybody else who is relevant. Disadvantages are that it would be 
intrusive and expensive.
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a single system for children’s complaints
This is discussed in Chapter Six.
Chapter Five
Mediation and Conciliation
The central quality of mediation lies in its capacity to reorient the parties 
towards each other, not by imposing rules on them, but by helping them 
to achieve a new and shared perception of their relationship, a 
perception that will redirect their attitudes towards one another... the 
primary quality of the mediator... is not to propose rules on the parties 
and to secure their acceptance of them, but to induce the mutual trust 
and understanding that will enable the parties to work out their own 
rules. (Fuller 1971 p.324).
5.1. CHAPTER SUMMARY
None of the formal SEN dispute resolution mechanisms assure PDR. This 
chapter considers what is added by mediation and conciliation. ‘Transforming 
Public Services’ refers to tailored dispute resolution - improvement of people’s 
understanding of their rights and responsibilities; access to advice and 
assistance so potential disputes can be ‘nipped in the bud’ before they escalate 
into formal legal proceedings; and cost-effective tribunal and court services 
better targeted to cases where a hearing is the best option for resolving a dispute 
or enforcing the outcome. A distinction is made between binding decisions and 
agreed outcomes.
The process is to be dictated by what people want -  a legal remedy/binding 
decision, or something else, like an apology/agreed outcome. It is stated that, 
although mediation is usually voluntary, there is no reason why it should not be 
strongly encouraged. The SEN dispute resolution system enables parents to 
choose informal resolution. This can be chosen both for ‘trivial’ complaints and 
disputes involving important points of law or disclosing widespread systemic 
abuse. Choice is not managed. Advice is available to assist parents in making 
this choice from Parent Partnership Services (PPSs), but recent studies call into 
question the nature, quality and availability of such advice.
This Chapter comprises four broad sections -  introduction, mediation, 
conciliation and evaluation. The introduction section defines mediation and 
conciliation and describes how they came into operation in SEN disputes. The
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section on mediation is divided into two parts. The first relates to SEN 
mediation. It summarises operational guidance; sets out what is known about 
SEN mediation; and uses a case study as an example of how mediation might 
operate. This provides a reference-point for subsequent discussion.
The second part widens the analysis to draw on information about the operation 
of mediation from theoretical work and recent empirical studies relating to civil 
and family disputes. There is consideration of the benefits claimed for 
mediation. Concerns about its operation in public law and family disputes and 
their relevance to SEN disputes are discussed. In the SEN context, LEAs derive 
advantages by being repeat-players, and by being the stronger party. A brief 
look at research conducted within the last five years on the operation of 
mediation generally reveals that take-up is low, and compulsion does not appear 
to increase the prospects of mediated settlements. By contrast, mandated 
mediation in Australia has resulted in high take-up and high rates of mediated 
settlements in family disputes. In relation to the issue of whether mediation 
facilitates improvement in ongoing relationships, a study on mediation in 
custody disputes reveals that, although short-term settlements were reached, 
these did not endure. However there is some research about SEN mediation 
which reveals that settlements do endure -  at least for six months following 
agreement.
If the risks of manipulation of outcomes by LEAs are to be avoided, 
‘competence’ on the part of parents must be ensured -  competence in the sense 
of having all of the necessary information to enable them to make informed 
choices about both the decision to mediate and to agree a particular settlement. 
The system provides the mechanics to enable this through the PPS, but it is not 
clear that PPSs in individual LEAs operate to ensure that parents receive the 
help and support they need. SEN mediation is contrasted with rights-based 
conciliation as operated by the former Disability Rights Commission in 
disability discrimination disputes. This is an example of a managed system that 
operates successfully because it directs disputes to the most suitable 
mechanism. It operates within a culture that recognises the benefits of
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settlement and enables them to be realised without risk of disadvantage to the 
weaker party.
The SEND A and the SEN Toolkit envisage that PPSs will undertake a 
conciliatory role in disputes between parents and schools and between parents 
and LEAs. Various studies are summarised revealing that the operation of this 
service is variable in terms of what it provides, and that this is linked to the 
resources LEAs allocate to it. The DCSF have compiled standards and guidance 
on best practice that form the basis upon which LEAs will be judged in their 
regular Ofsted inspections. Other examples of local conciliation services are 
described. The benefit of conciliation is that it may offer a quick solution. But, 
as with mediation, if the system does not operate to ensure ‘competence’ on the 
part of parents, there is a risk that they will be disadvantaged.
The evaluation conducted in respect of formal SEN dispute resolution 
mechanisms in the previous Chapter is repeated for mediation and conciliation. 
Mediation and conciliation assure attainment of most of the PDR goals if the 
system operates as it should. Rights-based conciliation is used as a comparator. 
It assures attainment of all of them. In terms of relative weightings, the LGO 
remains the ‘winner’. Access to mediation and conciliation significantly 
improves the prospects for resolving all aspects of a dispute.
There is a risk of power-imbalance in SEN disputes. This is acknowledged and 
dealt with in the context of SENDIST appeals. The tribunal is overtly helpful to 
parents as the weaker party. The same risk is present in SEN mediation. 
Arguably it is greater because settlements are reached in private. There is no 
requirement to record outcomes; they are not overseen by an independent body, 
and there is no system of ongoing external monitoring. Mediation operates in a 
different way to formal adjudication. There is no objective ‘truth’. The rights- 
based paradigm is abandoned, as are the ‘protections’ of informal systems. If 
the system of SEN mediation envisaged this, it would be true to mediation’s 
underlying principles. But it does not.
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The risk of power-imbalance in mediation is acknowledged in the SEN Toolkit. 
The suggestion for dealing with it is that the mediator should ensure that each 
party is ‘fully supported’, but the mediator must maintain a neutral position. It is 
envisaged that parents might be supported through an Independent Parent 
Supporter, but this is not assured. Faced with a situation where parents are being 
disadvantaged, it is unclear how the mediator should react. This is clear in 
SENDIST appeals -  the tribunal assists the parent. If a mediator assists parents, 
this resembles covert adjudication. If it is acknowledged that power-imbalance 
needs to be dealt with at both the formal and informal stages, arguably it should 
be dealt with consistently. Suggesting that help might be available but not 
ensuring such help is universally available and not providing a contingency plan 
for mediators is unsatisfactory, particularly where there is no management of 
disputes, so cases involving important rights may be mediated.
The evaluation of rights-based conciliation reveals that it meets all of the PDR 
goals. If this model were adopted, it would solve the problem of power- 
imbalance. Assurance of representation would be another option, but less cost- 
effective because there would need to be a mediator and an advocate. It is 
argued in the final Chapter that the system should provide advocates, but their 
function would be to represent children who wished to complain.
The issue of whether mediation and conciliation improve the ability of the 
system as a whole to achieve all of the PDR goals is considered in the next 
Chapter. An alternative model is suggested for dispute resolution which could 
incorporate mediation as part of the informal stage of resolution. Ongoing 
studies of mediation may reach conclusions about whether mediation brings 
benefits in SEN disputes or whether take-up is so low that it does not offer 
value for money and should be abandoned. If these studies conclude that 
mediation should continue to be offered, consideration could be given to its 
incorporation within the model. The Exeter research suggests that informal 
conciliation is more widely used than mediation (University of Exeter 2004a). If 
this is the case, the existence of power-imbalance would suggest that 
conciliation should operate within a managed system with independent 
oversight, as envisaged by the alternative model.
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5.2. INTRODUCTION
For the purposes of this Chapter, conciliation means any informal attempt by an 
LEA to resolve a complaint. Mediation means a process involving an 
independent third-party whose intervention is supportive of negotiation. The 
mediator’s role, within such a process, is to facilitate other people’s decision­
making. He has no power to impose an outcome on the parties, but his presence 
will alter the dynamics of the negotiations. Palmer and Roberts say that 
mediators have a number of tasks: to secure an arena and a climate conducive to 
negotiation; to ensure that all parties articulate clearly the issues as they see 
them; to ensure that the various options for resolution of a dispute are identified 
and explored; and to drive the process forward into a bargaining phase and 
towards settlement (Palmer and Roberts 1998 p. 101). The mediator may also 
assist in formulating a written agreement. Mediation may involve caucusing -  
separate meetings where the parties communicate only with the mediator and 
not directly with each other.
Various dilemmas arise for the mediator within this process. Is his function to 
provide a structural framework for negotiations? How far should he bring any 
professional expertise to bear in informing the exchange of information or in 
evaluating options? How far is it appropriate for him to go to off-set power- 
imbalances between the parties? Should he adopt an advisory role in identifying 
the terms of any settlement? This leads to wider questions, such as should the 
mediator seek to influence the outcome? Is he responsible for the outcome? 
Gulliver describes the mediator’s role as a continuum that runs from virtual 
passivity, to ‘chairman’ to ‘enunciator’ to ‘prompter’ to ‘leader’ to virtual 
arbitrator. (Gulliver 1979 p.200). Guidance on SEN mediation in the SEN 
Toolkit offers no suggestions as to how these dilemmas might be resolved.
Obligations upon LEAs to set up disagreement resolution and advice services 
for parents of children with SEN were introduced by the SENDA following 
recommendations in the Leggatt review of tribunals. Leggatt did not conduct 
research into the appropriateness of mediation in SEN disputes, but followed a 
recommendation in a report by the Council on Tribunals (2000). This 
recommendation was made on the basis that the delay between parents
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receiving an adverse decision and SENDIST hearings led to a breakdown in 
dialogue between parents and LEAs, and that early settlement would avoid last- 
minute withdrawals of appeals and achieve costs savings to the state.
Neither Leggatt, the Council on Tribunals, nor the DfES in the Green and White 
Papers preceding the introduction of mediation (DfES 1996 and 1998) 
considered whether there might be potential disadvantages for parents in terms 
of there not being a level playing-field. This is despite the fact that, when the 
SENDIST came into being in 1994, there was much discussion about the issue 
of power-imbalance between parents and LEAs. The SENDIST addresses 
concerns by provision of advice to parents and conducting enabling hearings.
5.3. MEDIATION
5.3.1. SEN Mediation
5.3.1.1. Operational Guidance
Chapter Two of the SEN Code of Practice sets out the minimum standards that 
LEAs are expected to meet in delivering an effective disagreement resolution 
service. It states that independent persons appointed to facilitate disagreement 
resolution must have a range of qualifications, training and experience in 
dispute resolution, counselling and negotiation skills, ability to establish and 
maintain communications and knowledge of the SEN legislation and 
framework.
The SEN Toolkit envisages a two stage ‘informal process’. The stages are 
referred to as local conciliation and ‘formal’ mediation. In relation to the 
conciliation stage, it is said that as soon as a difficulty becomes apparent, 
parents and schools, and parents and LEAs should have informal discussions 
with the aim of resolving their differences locally. PPSs may act as conciliators 
by encouraging the parties to come together; assisting them to assess their 
relevant positions; negotiating between them, or on behalf of them; identifying 
areas of compromise, and making suggestions or recommendations about 
possible ways forward. In exercising this function, PPSs should be neutral and 
should not be an advocate for any one party.
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Where these discussions have been exhausted and matters cannot be resolved, 
any of the parties may wish to consider recourse to ‘formal’ mediation. The 
Toolkit states that the process must be entirely voluntary and that the mediator 
must be independent. The parties decide the terms of the mediation. The venue 
should be neutral. Parties should be on an ‘equal footing’. The aim is to achieve 
practical educational solutions quickly in order to prevent long-term breakdown 
of relationships and minimise any disruption to the child’s education. It is 
suggested that mediation may be inappropriate where either side does not wish 
to engage in the process; matters of policy are at stake; the main issue is one 
that would set a precedent which LEAs would not wish to concede; there is no 
goodwill; or there has been a substantial recent change in the child’s 
circumstances.
The role of the facilitator is described as taking responsibility for the resolution 
process; enabling all parties to articulate their views and tell their story, have 
their perceptions challenged, and work through possible outcomes; exploring 
and testing any agreement; assisting in drafting agreements; and providing 
feedback to the LEA to inform good practice. The Toolkit emphasises the 
importance of the parties’ perception of the mediator’s independence, 
suggesting that any perceived bias is likely to hinder progress towards 
agreement and cause resentment. It is recommended that mediators have 
training and experience in disagreement resolution, counselling and negotiation 
skills, and knowledge of SEN legislation and the Code of Practice.
It is not envisaged that the parties should be legally represented - this would be 
contrary to the spirit of informality. It is acknowledged that parents need to 
have an understanding of SEN policies and procedures and their entitlements 
under SEN legislation, so that they are able to participate fully and effectively 
in discussions. The mediator’s role is to ensure that all parties are ‘fully 
supported’ (SEN Toolkit Section 3 p. 14 para 41). Parents are encouraged to 
bring their Independent Parent Supporter with them if they have one. The 
question is how the mediator should proceed where the parents are not in a 
position to make informed choices about settlement and have nobody with them 
to help. Given the explicit statement that the mediator must be neutral, it cannot
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be envisaged that he would give advice on SEN legislation and entitlement or 
the likely outcome of an appeal to the SENDIST.
It is stated unequivocally that it will not be appropriate to involve children in
mediation discussions between their parents and school/LEA, but that their
views should be sought. It is acknowledged that the views of children and their
parents may differ, and that every effort should be made to establish the child’s
own point of view:
Discussions that do not have the child at the fore can deteriorate 
into a battle between the parents and the school/LEA. It is 
essential that the child’s needs and best interests remain at the 
fore. (Section 3 p. 15 para 44).
It is said that there will always be cases where it would be more appropriate for 
parents to seek recourse to the SENDIST. Where agreement is not reached and 
parents appeal, any discussions that took place during the mediation may not be 
made available to the SENDIST without the consent of all relevant parties.
LEAs are told to review their arrangements periodically to ensure they are 
delivering a high quality service capable of meeting changing needs. It is 
recommended that LEAs seek feedback from mediation services as to the 
factors that trigger disagreement to enable changes to be made in policy and 
practice. The SENDIST has no oversight of mediated agreements.
5.3.L2. Available information
SEN Regional Partnerships were established in 1999/2000 to facilitate effective 
collaboration between LEAs and other agencies to improve the quality of, and 
access to, SEN services. Following the implementation of the SENDA, the 
DfES grant-funded these organisations to arrange mediation in SEN disputes. 
Disagreement Resolution Services (DRSs) were operational throughout England 
by January 2002. This funding ceased in March 2004. Statistics published on 
the DfES website revealed that there were 608 mediation referrals for the period 
January 2002 to March 2003 across all regions in England; 406 cases went 
through mediation and 78 cases were due for mediation. Of the cases that went 
to mediation, 44% were fully resolved; 23% partially resolved; 20% remained 
unresolved and 3% produced other outcomes.
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There was no information about whether the number of DRS referrals varied 
between the regions, or between LEAs, or why that might be. The number of 
referrals to mediation was extremely low. Reports by regional providers 
collated by the DfES showed considerable variation in content and quality.
Some included statistics on numbers of cases and outcomes in terms of whether 
or not disputes had been resolved; others focused on value-for-money and cost- 
effectiveness. None examined the outcomes of cases. There were only two 
detailed reports. The DfES planned to review the operation of mediation after 
its first year of operation, but this did not happen.
A case study conducted by the University of Manchester for the DfES (DfES 
2003) provides a broad overview, describing how disagreement resolution 
services had been set up by SEN Regional Partnerships. Three pairs of 
Partnerships had joined forces to establish a single service operating across their 
two regions; three Partnerships had developed services that were co-terminus 
with their own regional boundaries; and two Partnerships had developed 
different arrangements for different parts of their region. Early evidence from 
the London, South East and South Central and South West SEN Regional 
Partnerships indicated that fewer referrals were received than anticipated, but 
that the majority of cases that had been mediated had been resolved. From 
evidence taken from all 11 Partnerships, demand appeared to vary significantly. 
It was suggested that an evaluation soon to be commissioned by the DfES 
should explore the reasons for such variations.
The South West SEN Regional Partnership commissioned research on how 
LEAs were managing SEN disputes to identify the extent to which the agencies 
involved (including mediation services) elicited children’s views in resolving 
disputes. An interim report was published in 2004 (University of Exeter 2004a). 
Its findings on eliciting children’s views are discussed in Chapter Seven. The 
research provides information about the operation of mediation. Seven LEAs 
participated. Interviewees included LEA officers, mediators, educational 
psychologists, PPOs, parents, young people, representatives from schools, 
social services, disability services, Connexions, and child advocacy services. 
Interviews were analysed by group and detailed case studies undertaken.
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Interviews with mediators revealed that mediating SEN disputes was not a 
significant part of their workload. Most considered that, although possible to 
conduct SEN mediations with mediation skills alone, it was advisable for the 
mediator to have some knowledge of the mechanics of the process. Some felt 
that, rather than all mediators undertaking specialist training, it would be more 
practical for SEN mediations to be conducted by specialists.
Most PPOs and volunteers were parents of children with a disability. Others had
had experience in schools and understood the school perspective. Some felt that
they were not perceived as professionals, and were seen by schools as
‘interfering’. Most had undergone training in counselling or mediation.
PPO: I think (mediation) is a really valuable process, I think we need to 
do a lot more work on how lots more people in the field can have those 
skills, because I actually think it’s something people are using and 
touching on a lot of the time in their jobs, lots of professionals in 
educational, well and in other agencies, I’m actually keen to see, you 
know, more training in skills so that it’s not just ‘well I’m doing 
mediation but I’ve never had any formal training’. Certainly Parent 
Partnership Services are using it all the time and in the case I actually 
went to I found personally it actually made me feel much better because 
I actually thought ‘actually I’m doing a good mediation job here,’ but I 
do think that it needs disseminating further. (University of Exeter.a.
2004 p.8).
PPOs did not view themselves as impartial. Neither did they see themselves as 
allied to the LEA. Their bias was towards helping parents. There was little use 
of formal mediation, though this varied between areas. Some LEAs had 40 
appeals to the SENDIST in one year. Others had none. Some officers viewed 
resorting to mediation as failure. Some thought the tribunal existed to force 
LEAs to make provision they could not otherwise make on financial and 
equitable grounds. Some considered that ‘becoming more parent friendly’ and 
training in mediation and counselling skills for LEA officers and PPOs helped 
prevent disagreements escalating. Views were mixed as to whether formal 
mediation played such a role.
There were positive comments, such as ‘mediation is a useful tool for getting 
people to start talking to each other’, ‘improves relationships and outcomes’
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(Ibid. p.l 1). But there was also a feeling that it was not always the best process
for parents, and that it was only as good as the mediator. Mediation skills
themselves, however, were of great value in helping to prevent disagreements.
PPO: I think we need to look at different ways of using it at different 
levels in different ways and by different people in different studies, not 
just this ‘well we’ve set up the thing we’ve been told by the Code we 
must set up, we’ve got access to an independent mediator’. It’s a fairly 
expensive way of doing it and I think we really need to have more ideas 
of how we’re actually doing it in other ways and at other levels as well 
as I say, you know, other people doing it maybe [...] (Ibid. p.12).
Enquiries of the DfES in July 2005 disclosed that information for the purposes 
of monitoring the operation of mediation was being compiled for them by the 
SEN Mediation Network. Information obtained from the Network Co-ordinator 
in September 2005 revealed that the majority of LEAs had continued with the 
mediation arrangements they had in place when the funding ceased, using 
regional services; some LEAs had made their own arrangements with local 
mediation providers or through their PPS, and some had no arrangements at all.
The Network Co-ordinator indicated that mediation providers produced reports. 
These were of variable quality. The Network was supporting providers to 
develop a standard format for reports, and to work towards acquisition of the 
Legal Services Commission’s Quality Standard Mark for Mediation. Regional 
providers were in contact with one another through the Network. They had 
asked the DfES and SENDIST to promote awareness of mediation, suggesting 
that SENDIST could ask the parties whether they have been to mediation and, if 
not, adjourn the hearing to allow the parties to mediate. The SENDIST were 
said not to be in favour of this.
There were variations in the use of the mediation service not simply between 
regions, but between LEAs within regions. Cost was a relevant factor.
SENDIST is ‘free’ to LEAs, whereas they have to pay the costs of providing 
mediation. The Network Co-ordinator’s concerns were that, whilst LEAs are 
obliged to facilitate mediation, they are not obliged to participate. Where they 
have to pay for mediation, they may have to take into account budgetary 
implications in deciding whether a dispute can be mediated. In view of the low
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take-up of mediation, the concern was that it was not cost-effective for LEAs to 
enter into annual contracts with regional providers, and that they would cease to 
do so, preferring to use local services on an ad-hoc basis. The Co-ordinator 
considered that national standards driven by the Network would suffer, and it 
would become less likely that mediators would be SEN specialists.
In previous Chapters, empirical studies have been used to provide a factual 
underpinning for analysis. It is not possible to do this in relation to mediation 
because there has been no evaluation of its operation. The Select Committee’s 
2006 Report recommended that the DCSF conduct a review of the operation of 
mediation. This has now been commissioned. A Stage 1 report was due to be 
completed by July 2007; a Stage 2 report, including preliminary findings, was 
due in November 2007, with the final report due in March 2008. It had been 
planned to include the findings of this study in the thesis. Unfortunately the 
DCSF advised on the 28th March 2008 that the final report is not expected until 
July. There are no interim reports. There is also another study ongoing 
conducted by the Universities of Manchester and Edinburgh.
This thesis seeks to establish what is added by mediation and conciliation in 
terms of assuring PDR in SEN disputes. As will be demonstrated, it is possible 
to conduct this analysis by assessing the ability of mediation and conciliation, as 
models, to attain PDR goals and offer adequate redress. Conclusions about the 
future role of mediation in SEN disputes are, however, made contingent upon 
the findings of the ongoing studies156.
There was a further dilemma as to whether some information should be 
obtained for the purposes of the thesis. It would have been possible to 
summarise information from reports by mediation service providers. These are 
variable in terms of quality and level of detail. But a sustained study is needed. 
There are two ongoing. A hasty compilation of statistics risked being
156 Consideration was given to whether possibilities for delaying the deadline for the submission 
of this thesis should be explored in order to incorporate the findings of these studies. It was 
decided that, although information from these studies would enable the establishment of a 
firmer evidential basis from which to conduct analysis, this was not essential. Full 
acknowledgement of the consequential limitations of deductions based on limited factual 
material is made here.
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insubstantial and anecdotal. So this thesis makes observations on the basis of 
very little information in full acknowledgement of the limitations of so doing, 
but argues nevertheless that this evaluation is worthwhile.
The DCSF research brief is to determine:
• how accessible mediation services are;
• how well they are promoted by all parties;
• whether there are significant variations in the provision of the service
and its use;
• how the service is advertised;
• how the service is accessed -  whether additional support is provided;
• follow-up;
• barriers to use by some or all of the partners;
• practical recommendations for improvement in line with the three key 
elements of economy, efficiency and effectiveness set out in ‘Improving 
Value for Money’. (DfES 2005).
The brief envisages analysis of different types of resolution. Information about 
parents using the service is to be gathered in terms of numbers, social 
deprivation and ethnicity. Information is to be obtained about the involvement 
of PPSs and voluntary organisations. The brief does not settle the size of the 
sample, and envisages surveys but not observation of mediation. The research 
conducted by the Universities of Manchester and Edinburgh will examine the 
strategies used by schools and local authorities to prevent SEN disputes arising; 
the ADR mechanisms in place and the way in which these are experienced by 
parents and service providers; and the success of ADR approaches in reducing 
the number of cases referred to courts.
This Chapter considers power-imbalance, which, as will be explained, has been 
raised as a significant concern in citizen vs state disputes. Determination of the 
effects of power-imbalance on the basis of empirical analysis is problematic. 
Observation might be conducted. The DCSF research does not envisage 
observation. But, in any event, conclusions derived from observation might be
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of limited value because LEAs would be less likely to dominate or manipulate 
parents if being observed. Another method might be to assess the outcome of a 
mediation against what the parents would have achieved before a tribunal. But 
how could this be predicted accurately? Some of the benefits derived from 
mediation are unquantifiable -  improved relationships, reduction of conflict, 
getting to the ‘heart’ of a dispute. Asking parents whether they are satisfied is 
also problematic because people can be happy with the outcome even though 
they have been exploited because they have low expectations or are ignorant of 
their entitlements.
This thesis proceeds on the basis that an assumption can be made that there is a 
risk of power-imbalance in SEN disputes and that empirical evidence is not 
essential to the making of this assumption. Below is a case study which serves 
as an example of how mediation can operate.
5.3.I.3. A case study157
A was 13 years of age. He had speech and language difficulties. At the end of 
his first year in a mainstream secondary school, he moved to the area of this 
LEA. His parents enrolled him in an independent special school (HH school) at 
their expense. They then requested that the LEA carry out a statutory 
assessment. In the context of the assessment, the parents expressed a preference 
for HH school. Upon completion of the assessment, the LEA prepared a 
statement that named a local mainstream secondary school as the appropriate 
placement. The parents appealed to the SENDIST, but also requested mediation.
At the mediation, A’s parents explained, in detail, their concerns about A. They 
wanted the LEA to pay HH schools fees and ancillary costs:
157 Taken from a report to the Education Committee of the Royal Borough of Kingston upon 
Thames 6th October 2002.
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Placement at HH School -  annual fees £11,510
Speech and language therapy £ 2,300
Occupational therapy £ 1,000
Transport £ 3,000
Total £17,810 p.a.
Privately (to the mediator) they did not expect the LEA to pay for everything 
they had asked for. Their solicitor had advised them that there was a good 
chance that the SENDIST would order the LEA to pay for the placement at HH 
school, and that they should not agree to anything less.
The LEA’s case was that the local school named in the statement could meet 
A’s needs.
The cost of the local provision was:
Delegated funding per secondary pupil £6892.
Weighting for SEN £3046.
Specialist teacher £1,440.
NHS Speech and language therapy £ nil
Transport £ nil
Total £11,378 p.a.
Privately, (to the mediator) the LEA considered they had been ‘hi-jacked’; that 
the parents (possibly on advice of their solicitor, whom the LEA had 
encountered in other appeals where this had happened), had presented them 
with a fait accompli. They knew the parents were in a strong position with the 
tribunal -  irrespective of whether the local provision met the child’s needs -  
because the tribunal would be reluctant to see the boy moved. The LEA thought 
the parents were ‘trying it on’. Their first offer was a contribution of £11,378 
towards the cost of the placement. The parents rejected this as being 
insufficient.
The LEA, after much discussion, agreed to fund the cost of the placement at HH 
school; 2 x 1  hour group sessions per week of speech therapy at £30 per week
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for the ten weeks, and a contribution of £60 per year towards travel costs. The 
total amount settled was £11,870 -  only £492 p.a. more than the original offer.
Both parties were happy, and the relationship between them appeared to have 
improved. The parents considered they had been listened to. The LEA had 
avoided the time and expense of a tribunal hearing for little more than they had 
originally been prepared to pay. There was further discussion about the wording 
of the statement. This proceeded amicably. An action plan was agreed. The case 
study illustrates potential for compromise in SEN disputes. Although a dispute 
about placement may be a win/lose argument, provided the parents secured their 
principal objective, they were willing to compromise on other issues. The 
primary concern of the LEA appeared to be costs. They were willing to concede 
the placement on the basis that they could avoid ancillary costs.
A different analysis might be that the parents could have got more if they had 
proceeded to appeal, or if their solicitor had attended the mediation to negotiate 
on their behalf; the solution was not a permanent one, possibly there would be 
further disagreement over speech therapy at the end of the ten week period. The 
parents’ ‘bottom line’ was informed by legal advice on the likely outcome of a 
tribunal appeal. They might have conceded more if they had not had such 
advice.
It is important to consider SEN mediation in light of the wider theoretical and 
empirical work on mediation to understand the benefits it can bring, concerns 
about its operation and issues currently under scrutiny. The next section 
considers the benefits and concerns, and the issues of pressure to mediate, low 
take-up, cost-effectiveness, regulation and customisation.
5.3.2. A Wider Perspective
5.3.2.1. The benefits of mediation
In order to evaluate the operation of mediation, it is necessary to suspend the 
cynicism and negativity deriving from indoctrination of the legal paradigm 
apparent in the preceding paragraph. Mediation involves turning away from a 
rights-based culture. Its aim is resolution of conflict. It does not promise
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substantive justice. Understanding mediation necessitates a re-thinking of the 
rights ideology, both in terms of dispute resolution and social relations. It 
envisages a realisation that legal standards do not, of themselves, ensure an end 
to systemic inequalities or change attitudes. Mediation has the potential to 
design solutions reflecting consensus when conducted in an arena that does not 
intimidate one-shot participants. It can replace the game of winners and losers 
because it moves beyond rights-based discussion by exploring the issues of real 
importance to each party, thus disengaging rights from remedy. It represents a 
paradigm shift in how disputants think about the resolution of their conflict.
The process uncovers information about the parties’ true needs and interests that 
might never emerge in a formal conflict arena. Each party is enabled to 
understand the other’s point of view. In the above case study, the discussion 
focused upon costs. Rightly or wrongly, this was the ‘real’ issue for the LEA, so 
in a sense the process was more honest than a tribunal appeal focused upon 
conflicting expert evidence about needs. The parents were able to explain their 
concerns about moving A to a different school and be listened to. MacFarlane 
suggests that those who are concerned about the operation of what is essentially 
a private law inter-parties resolution process being used in disputes about the 
determination of rights, misunderstand the nature of public law disputes which 
are mostly about resources as opposed to a conflict of values (MacFarlane 1997 
p.7.). The empirical studies referred to in Chapter Two bear out this 
observation. But, as rights determine provision and resources equate to 
provision in the SEN context, it is difficult to see how categorising disputes as 
being about resources alleviates the concern.
Advocates for mediation argue that its strength is in its educative and 
transformative character. It enables people to achieve solutions following 
interests-based bargaining, which enhances their strength of compassion (Ibid. 
p.20). Transformation on a personal level can change the relationship between 
the parties (confident with their success in the mediation, the parents in the case 
study might be in a stronger position to argue for the continuation of speech 
therapy). It can also lead to transformation on a societal level. In the context of 
SEN, where LEAs see and speak to parents, they are no longer simply names on
190
a list. Mediation might prevent LEAs castigating parents as queue-jumpers and 
manipulators. It might also be possible to explain to parents that LEAs’ 
preoccupation with resources derives from a need to make provision for other 
children, so they are not perceived as faceless penny-pinching bureaucrats.
If the paradigm shift in the values of disputing processes can achieve the 
transformations claimed, there is potential for benefit. But this needs to be 
weighed against the disadvantages highlighted by critics. Significant concerns 
have been expressed by feminist writers about the disadvantages to women in 
family mediation as a result of power-imbalance. Their work has been used as 
an analogy for discussion about citizen vs State disputes. This is discussed in the 
next section.
It is worth noting here, though, that feminist writers also perceive advantages to 
women in family mediation. Providing a context that facilitates self- 
determination means that mediation gives parties the opportunity to exercise 
their own ‘right and ability to make decisions and take actions to follow those 
decisions through’(Grillo 1991 p. 1548). Mediators will often be engaged in 
explicitly validating ‘the ability of individuals to speak for themselves’, and 
expressly recognising an ‘individual’s competency and right to make their own 
decisions’ (Lichtenstein 2000 p.23). Such actions and attitudes can, in effect, 
license women to step out of gendered inequalities to take a more equitable 
stance in terms of seeking a resolution of the dispute that accommodates, and 
incorporates, their own interests and needs. If parents, as the weaker party in 
SEN disputes, can be empowered in the manner suggested, this could enhance 
the strength of their position in what may be a long-term relationship with an 
LEA.
Other benefits claimed for mediation are, in summary, that it is ‘quick, cheap 
and satisfying’ (Genn 2006b). But mediation only brings time and costs savings 
where it is successful. Where it fails, this can prolong the time taken to resolve a 
dispute. Studies of the operation of mediation in civil and family disputes 
during the last five years indicate that mediation may bring savings of time and 
costs. A study by the National Audit Office concluded that, in family disputes,
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mediated cases were quicker to resolve, taking on average 110 days, compared 
to 435 days for non-mediated cases. The average cost of Legal Aid in non­
mediated cases was estimated at £1,682 compared with £752 for mediated 
cases, representing an additional cost to the tax payer of £74 million (National 
Audit Office 2007 p.5 - ‘the NAO study’).
An evaluation of the Exeter County Court’s small claims mediation scheme also 
concluded that mediation had saved 216 hours of judicial time over an 11 month 
period (Enterkin 2005 p.7 - ‘the Enterkin study’). But a study by Genn of quasi- 
compulsory and voluntary mediation schemes operating at the Central London 
County Court concluded that, although judicial time spent on successfully 
mediated cases was lower, there was an increase in the time spent on 
administration in mediated cases. In relation to the parties’ costs, whilst parties 
in successful mediations felt that there had been a saving, significant additional 
costs were incurred in unsuccessful mediations (Genn 2007 p.l 10 - ‘the Genn 
2007 study’).
Genn argued in an earlier study that the suggestion that saving time saves costs 
had yet to be established in a systematic way (Genn 1998 p.73). In order for a 
case to settle at mediation, a person with sufficient authority to agree this must 
attend. Their time will need to be factored in. Where mediation fails, time and 
costs spent on mediation will be added to the costs of preparing for, and 
attending, the formal hearing; parties may have incurred most of the expenses 
they will incur in obtaining advice and commissioning expert reports before the 
mediation takes place. Australian research suggests that, although mediation 
does not achieve significant costs savings, it may achieve early settlement in 
cases that would settle anyway (Astor and Chinkin 2002).
The costs, risks and incentives to the parties in mediating civil disputes do not 
exist in the same way for SENDIST appeals because the tribunal does not make 
orders that the loser pays the winner’s costs. Also, there is no cost advantage to 
LEAs in mediating because they have to fund mediation, whereas there are no 
process costs in SENDIST appeals. It appears the ongoing study commissioned 
by the DCSF is investigating low take-up of mediation and value for money.
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In relation to satisfaction, as mentioned previously, there are issues about how 
appropriate it is to measure success in terms of satisfaction where one party may 
be in a weaker position due to power-imbalance. The Enterkin, NAO and Genn 
2007 studies all indicated satisfaction with the mediation process, with those 
who had participated expressing confidence in the mediators.
A study by Walker relating to private family law proceedings covering 11 
geographical areas indicated that 46% of mediation users were satisfied with 
mediation , but 19% were dissatisfied and a further 19% very dissatisfied 
(Walker 2004, ‘the Walker study’). Where parties were dissatisfied with 
mediation, their most common concerns were that outstanding issues were 
unresolved; mediation agreements were unenforceable; they felt that they had 
been put under pressure to make an agreement and had not received sufficient 
advice; mediation had not helped to make divorce less distressing, neither had it 
helped with improved communication or shared decision-making about 
parenting; it had not helped reduce conflict or led to the avoidance of a court 
hearing. The report concluded that mediation would continue to be used by only 
a minority of divorcing or separating couples, and that the majority, including 
most of those who do use mediation, would continue to be dependent on legal 
services.
A benefit claimed for mediation is that it brings about long-term improvement 
in relationships. A study by Trinder of the long-term outcomes of in-court 
conciliation in disputes between divorcing couples about arrangements for 
contact with children (Trinder 2007) indicated that, whilst conciliation was 
successful in helping couples reach agreement, this was not sustained. Two 
years after initial agreement had been reached, contact arrangements were in 
place in the majority of cases. But during that period, there had been further 
litigation in 40% of cases and 60% of agreements had been dropped or had 
broken down, necessitating re-negotiation. The study concluded that, although 
conciliation had been effective in achieving agreement and restoring contact in 
the short term, it was often followed by further negotiation and had limited 
impact on making contact work for children. Whether agreements endure in the 
SEN context is largely unknown. A report on SEN mediation by Global
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Mediation for the SEN South Central and Eastern Regional SEN Partnerships 
includes the results of a six month follow-up survey for disputes successfully 
mediated. This shows that 67% of disputes remained resolved, but this was only 
in 8 out of 12 mediated cases. (Global Mediation 2004).
5.3.2.2. Concerns about the operation of mediation
Concern has been expressed by public law practitioners about mediation being 
used injudicial review proceedings158 on the basis that there is a need to 
consider the implications of power-imbalance and lack of transparency and 
accountability on the part of public bodies arising from the fact that mediation is 
held in private. These reflect the well-known critique of informalism which 
continues to be the subject of debate. Abel, one of its principal proponents 
argues:
Only within the legal system can advocates even hope to pursue the 
ideal of equal justice in a society riven by inequalities of class, race and 
gender and dominated by the power of capital and state. Formal law 
cannot eliminate substantial social inequalities, but can limit their 
influence. Law is the sole arena in which unequals can hope to achieve 
justice. Only equals can risk a confrontation within the informal 
processes of the economy and the polity.. .formality is the best, often the 
only, defence against power. (Abel 1985 p383).
Abel perceives the growth of informal institutions as covert expansion of state 
power - ‘the velvet glove has largely hidden the iron fist’ (Abel 1982c p.270). 
Because coercion through informal institutions is less visible and less extreme, 
the state can seek to control more behaviour. The state is the only legitimate 
source of authority, therefore other forms of social control must either be its 
creation or at its sufferance. Beneath the rhetoric of consensus, ADR suppresses 
conflict and the disadvantaged are worse off than they would have been under 
an adjudicatory process.
If informalism grants additional offensive weapons to those already 
endowed with disproportionate legal resources while depriving the 
legally disadvantaged of the protection of formal defences, it also denies 
the latter the sword of formality whilst assuring the former that they can 
continue to invoke formality as a shield. (Ibid. pps. 294-6).
158 See representations made by the Public Law Project and signed by 66 leading practitioners 
www.dca.gov.uk/response-litigation.pdf.
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[...] informal institutions deprive grievants of substantive rights. They 
are antinormative and urge the parties to compromise; although this 
appears even-handed, it works to the detriment of the party advancing 
the claim -  typically the individual grievant. Informalism may ensure 
that claimants get some redress, but the relief is almost always less 
adequate. (Ibid. pp297-8).
Abel considered that ADR is only desirable in very precise and limited 
circumstances. The Bowman review of the Crown Office List (Bowman 2000) 
concluded that mediation was unsuitable for public law disputes. Despite these 
concerns, the Government continues to place increasing pressure on individuals 
to participate in mediation without taking measures to address them.
A conference convened by the Public Law Project in April 2004 identified a 
need to develop clear guidelines for courts and practitioners to enable 
identification of cases most likely to benefit from mediation, and a need to 
ensure that the focus of ADR is on achieving better outcomes for claimants, as 
opposed to costs savings. It was considered that, in promoting mediation in 
public law disputes, the Government appeared to have given insufficient 
consideration to the fact that there are important distinctions between private 
and public law disputes. A theme emerging from the Conference was that the 
Government should acknowledge that the ‘one-size fits all’ mediation window 
(Bondy 2004 p.3) may need re-thinking.
Adler deals with the matter shortly in a recent article in the Modem Law 
Journal:
[...] although conciliation/mediation may well be appropriate in party 
vs. party disputes and in disputes that call for the exercise of discretion, 
it is not clear that it is appropriate in citizen vs. state disputes and in 
disputes where rights are central. This is because the imbalance of 
power between the citizen and the representative of the government 
department or public body may be too great.
In order to deal with these power imbalances, some degree of partiality 
is often required and mediators frequently find that they have to ‘take 
sides’159. However, from a feminist perspective, the existence of power 
imbalances between men and women -  especially in cases involving
159 Adler says this issue is examined in depth in a number of studies, e.g. R. Dingwall and J 
Eekelar (eds.) 1988; Dingwall and Greatbatch 1993; and Raitt 1995.
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domestic violence — has been used as an argument against 
conciliation/mediation160. Although there has, as far as I am aware, been 
no discussion in the literature of the power imbalances that are found in 
citizen vs. state disputes, the inequalities that characterise disputes 
between ‘one shotters’ and ‘repeat players’ would undoubtedly be 
evident in these cases and it would take a very skilled mediator to be 
able to deal effectively with them.
Against this, it has been argued that, in the context of an individual 
appeal, appellants will be considerably more familiar with the facts of 
their case than the ‘harassed and overworked officials’ representing the 
government department or public body, who may be only too keen to 
settle so that they can get back to the office or on to the next case. It has 
also been argued that the alleged imbalance of power between the 
citizen and the representative of the government department or public 
body applies just as much to tribunal hearings as to 
conciliation/mediation. However, although the first argument may apply 
in some cases, it overlooks the tenacity with which some government 
officials seek to defend the decisions of their colleagues and the fact 
that, if an appellant presents new evidence, the representative of ‘the 
other side’ is likely to request time to check and consider. If so, this 
would reduce the cost-effectiveness of mandatory conciliation/mediation 
in tribunal cases. In addition, the second argument overlooks the 
important role played by representatives in tribunal hearings and the fact 
that tribunal chairs are much more pro-active than mediators.
Because, if appellants were required to attempt conciliation/mediation, 
many of them might settle for less than they are entitled to, tribunal 
hearings may be needed to protect their interests. In addition, it may be 
in the public interest that some cases are taken to a tribunal so that there 
can be a clear and authoritative ruling on a point of law. Thus, the scope 
for conciliation/mediation and, for similar reasons, for negotiation, in a 
system of proportionate dispute resolution for administrative justice 
would seem to be rather less that the White Paper envisages. (Adler 
2006a p.977).
It is difficult to quarrel with the logic of Adler’s statement. He raises two issues 
-  mediators ‘taking sides’ and power-imbalance.
In relation to the first issue, Dingwall asks whether mediation facilitates a 
process whereby the insidious influence of the mediator is substituted for the 
open decision of the judge. In some disputes, he says, it may be appropriate for 
mediators to act merely as facilitators. But, where neutrality allows one party to 
exploit the other, ‘real’ negotiations can only be possible where the mediator 
deliberately enhances the power of the weaker. Where third parties, especially
160 Adler cites Bottomly 1984.
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children, are to be ‘victimised’ by an agreement, the mediator is under a duty to 
speak out and ‘act forcibly’. Thus, mediation can incorporate some elements of 
enforcement where settlements are required to meet moral criteria external to 
the standards of the disputants. But, where this is the case, mediation does not 
increase party control, but merely ‘imposes a different set of norms about 
conduct and outcome’. (Dingwall 1988 pl42).
Although intervention on the part of the mediator is for the purpose of assisting 
the weaker party, Dingwall says it must be acknowledged that, if mediators are 
more than facilitators, this also creates a potential for abuse. Ingleby refers to 
the mediation as ‘Quasi-adjudication without judges and without the safeguards 
of the judicial process’ (Ingleby 1993 p.441). If mediators intervene and direct 
the process towards what they consider to be a fair outcome, they are (he says) 
assuming the role of judges.
But the issue of lack of impartiality on the part of the mediator may not be
problematic, provided it is acknowledged. As Dingwall and Greatbatch say:
[...] the crucial considerations are that clients should not be misled into 
thinking that they are entering a neutral arena, that they are clear what 
values mediators have adopted about the relative merits of various 
outcomes and what degree of pressure they consider legitimate. It is also 
important that clients should be genuinely free to enter or leave 
mediation at any point without prejudicing the subsequent course of 
their divorce . . .  mediation may well be more effective if the mediator’s 
influence is more explicitly acknowledged and the clients are 
encouraged to see it as an opportunity to consult a professional adviser 
who has more knowledge of divorce matters than either of them [...] 
(Dingwall and Greatbatch 1991 pps. 301-302).
Rights-based conciliation, as employed by the former Disability Rights 
Commission (see section 5.3.2.6.), proceeds on the basis that the function of the 
mediator is not that of a neutral facilitator, but a person who is there to explain 
the nature of obligations towards the claimant and to assist in designing 
solutions that fulfil those obligations. It is accepted in the context of enabling 
hearings, that a tribunal can, and will, intervene to assist the weaker party to put 
his case but that, in so doing, independence is not compromised. What is
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problematic is where this is not explicit. Criticisms of covert manipulation, in 
the context of a mediation process conducted in private, are unanswerable.
In relation to power-imbalance, Adler draws an analogy between the theoretical 
concerns of feminist writers on women’s interests in mediation and individuals 
in citizen v state disputes. The argument of these writers161 is that inequality 
between the parties is re-enforced by being ‘privatised’ and concealed, as 
opposed to emerging in the ‘public sphere of formal justice’; agreements are not 
shaped by true consensus; and power-imbalances are masked and perpetuated 
(Bottomley 1984 p.80). Grillo has queried whether for women mediation 
merely ‘substitutes another objectivist, patriarchal, and even more damaging 
form of conflict resolution for its adversarial counterpart’(Grillo 1991 p. 1549).
The risks women encounter in informal dispute resolution processes directly 
reflect ‘the factors by which women’s subordination is maintained in society 
generally’, and removing family disputes into the private sphere of mediation 
works to undermine ‘efforts to expose the relevance of power differentials 
between men and women’ (Astor 2000 p.3147).
Grillo describes family mediation as a ‘wolf in sheep's clothing, relying on
force and disregarding the context of the dispute, while masquerading as a
gentler, more empowering alternative to adversarial litigation’. The difficulty is
a commitment to formal equality. Equating fairness in mediation with formal
equality results in, at most, ‘a crabbed and distorted fairness on a microlevel; it
considers only the mediation context itself.
Of course, subordinated people can go to court and lose; in fact, they 
usually do. But if mediation is to be introduced into the court system, it 
should provide a better alternative. It is not enough to say that the 
adversary system is so flawed that even a misguided, intrusive, and 
disempowering system of mediation should be embraced. If mediation 
as currently instituted constitutes a fundamentally flawed process in the 
way I have described, it is more, not less, disempowering than the 
adversary system — for it is then a process in which people are told they 
are being empowered, but in fact are being forced to acquiesce in their 
own oppression. (Grillo 1991 p. 1568).
161 See for example Bottomley 1984; Deech 1994; Grillo 1991.
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Marian Roberts, writing in answer to these concerns, says they are underpinned 
by two assumptions: first that women do not know what they want and cannot 
speak for themselves, and second that when they make demands, these are 
mistaken, reactionary and contradictory (Roberts 1996). Power, in the context 
of dispute resolution, means bargaining power which comprises a number of 
endowments. Rarely, she argues, are the advantages all stacked one way.
Neither is the position static. Roberts remarks that empirical studies show high 
levels of satisfaction among women who have participated in mediation. 
‘Agreements were perceived to be fair, even among those who objectively 
might be viewed as the losing party.’ (Ibid. p.241).
There may be advantages in exploring settlements in private, but this is at the
expense of holding public bodies to account publicly and establishing societal
values and norms. Fiss argues that settlement reduces the functions of a lawsuit
to determining the interests of the parties, ignoring the wider and important role
of the courts in determining societal values.
The courts’ job is not to maximise the ends of private parties, nor simply 
to secure the peace, but to explicate and give force to the values 
embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes; to 
interpret those values and bring reality into accord with them [...] A 
settlement will [...] deprive the court of the occasion to render an 
interpretation. (Fiss 1984 p. 1084).
Astor and Chinkin argue:
The provision of institutional or public ADR mechanisms creates an 
outlet for claims by informed citizens about inadequate service or 
inappropriate behaviour that may foster the appearance of a responsive 
employer or government while concealing the lack of substantive 
reform. (Astor and Chinkin 2002. p.27).
As Roberts says, competence is a central tenet of mediation - competence in the 
sense of a person being able to define the issues for discussion to arrive at their 
own decisions (Roberts 1996 p.8). If this can be assured, then mediation has the 
potential to bring benefits. But, in order to assure competence where there is 
unequal power, either the mediator has to become overtly partial to the weaker 
party to ensure equality, or the weaker party must be assured advice and 
representation. Further answers to concerns might be monitoring of outcomes of 
mediations; binding codes of ethics for mediators; established procedures
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enabling the mediator to call in expert assistance for a party who is being 
disadvantaged when needed; exclusion of some cases from mediation, or 
judicial scrutiny of mediated agreements.
None of these safeguards exist in SEN mediation. In terms of the balance of 
power in SEN disputes, as Riddell observes, the appeals system should 
empower parents (Riddell 2002). They start from the position that they can put 
an LEA to a considerable amount of time, expense and trouble by lodging an 
appeal. They may increase their power by complaining to elected members or
t f\0engaging the services of representatives. But LEAs are repeat players - they 
are familiar with the process, which brings confidence. LEAs may have 
developed relationships with local mediators, and they are familiar with relevant 
legal requirements and the characteristics of various learning disorders. In 
mediation, their experience enables them to know how to trade-off symbolic 
defeats for tangible gains. Looked at cynically, perhaps this was what happened 
in the case study -  much was made of conceding the placement, whereas, in 
terms of resources, the LEA did not perceive the effect of this concession as 
substantial.
Although SENDIST hearings are held in private, decisions are published on the 
SENDIST website. LGO findings of maladministration are also published, as 
are court judgments. Outcomes of mediations may, or may not feature on the 
websites of Regional Providers. Mediation was in operation for six years 
without the effects of its introduction being evaluated centrally. Despite the 
wealth of literature on the advantages and disadvantages of mediation, when 
mediation was introduced in SEN disputes this was not preceded by an 
empirical evaluation. The question is whether the values and principles of 
public law governing formal procedures can safely be substituted by a process 
facilitated by a private individual whose focus is on reaching agreement, as 
opposed to arriving at a decision compliant with such principles.
Drawing an analogy between the position of women in family disputes and 
parents in SEN disputes, whilst it may not be legitimate to make assumptions
162 See Galanter 1974.
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about power-imbalance in the context of family disputes, it is legitimate to 
make an assumption that parents may be disadvantaged in SEN disputes 
because there will always be advantages for LEAs by virtue of being repeat 
players. Although the Riddell study (Riddell 2002) comprised a small number 
of case studies, it illustrates starkly the disadvantageous position parents are in 
throughout their dealings with bureaucrats and professionals and the pressure on 
them to assume a passive role. Only the most determined and assertive parents 
were able to challenge the power of LEAs, and this was with the benefit of 
independent advice. The Hall study also highlights power-imbalance between 
parents and schools and parents and LEAs.
But even if it cannot be assumed that parents will be the weaker party in every 
dispute, or that they are incapable of placing themselves on an equal-footing, 
what can be assumed is that there is a risk of unfairness. Where such a risk 
exists, there needs to be something in place to obviate that risk where disputes 
are settled in private with no ongoing objective monitoring and evaluation of 
outcomes. Roberts’ ‘satisfaction’ argument is only convincing against the 
background of the Riddell and Hall studies if her essential element of 
competence is assured in every case.
5.3.2.3. Pressure to mediate
‘Transforming Public Services’ refers to ‘strongly persuading’ people to 
mediate. The first signs of pressure to mediate were seen in Lord W oolf s 
Access to Justice Report (Woolf 1996) and the 1995 White Paper on Family 
Law Reform (DCA 1995) which heralded the promotion of early settlement. 
Various changes were made to Court Rules and Legal Aid entitlements. In the 
context of civil disputes, the parties are placed at risk that they will fail to 
recover their costs, even if successful, where they have unreasonably refused to 
mediate. In family law disputes, legally aided parties may be refused funds for a 
contested hearing unless they first agree to participate in mediation, or there are 
reasons why mediation would be inappropriate. However these measures have 
not persuaded people to mediate. As a result of low take-up, pressure on parties 
to mediate is being increased.
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The case law on ADR reflects differing opinions amongst the judiciary about 
the role of mediation in civil and public law disputes. In Cowl and Others v 
Plymouth City Council163, Lord Woolf stated that there was a duty on parties to 
consider ADR prior to engaging in the judicial process, particularly if the case 
involved public money. In Dunnett v Railtrackjplc164, the court dismissed Mrs. 
Dunnett’s appeal, but refused to order that she pay Railtrack’s appeal costs 
because they had declined to mediate after this had been suggested by the court. 
In Hurst v Leeming165, it was said that, although mediation is not compulsory, it 
is at the heart of today’s civil justice system; that unjustified failure to give 
proper attention to the possibilities of mediation may attract adverse 
consequences; and that it is for the judge to decide whether refusal to mediate is 
justified.
This line was confirmed in two further cases - Leicester Circuits v Coates 
Brothers p/c166and Royal Bank o f Canada Trust Corporation v Secretary o f 
State for Defence161. In the latter case, the Ministry of Defence declined to 
mediate because they considered the case involved a point of law that needed to 
be resolved. The court resolved the point of law in the Department’s favour, but 
refused to award costs. This was because the Government had pledged in March 
2001 to use ADR in all suitable cases and where the other party accepts it. In 
this case, the bank had agreed to mediate. It was said that involvement of a 
point of law did not make the case unsuitable for mediation.
But in 2004 there was a sea-change in the case of Halsey v Milton Keynes 
General NHS Trustm . The Court of Appeal did not accept the Civil Mediation 
Council’s argument that there was a presumption in favour of mediation, 
preferring the argument of the Law Society that the question of whether 
mediation had been unreasonably refused should depend upon a number of 
factors evaluated by the court in individual cases. Dyson LJ held that the courts 
have no power to order the parties to mediate, and questioned whether such an
163 [2002] EWCA Civ 1935.
164 [2002] EWCA Civ 2002.
165 [2001] EWHC 1051 Ch.
166 [2003] EWCA Civ 333.
167 [2003] EWHC 1479 (Ch).
168 [2004] EWCA Civ 576.
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order would infringe Article 6 of the ECHR. The court is able to impose a costs 
sanction on a party who unreasonably refuses to mediate. But factors to be 
taken into account in deciding whether a refusal is unreasonable might include 
whether the successful party reasonably considered he would win; cost benefits; 
and whether the unsuccessful party can show that mediation has a reasonable 
prospect of success. As Genn says, the case represented something of a retreat 
from the relentless escalation of judicial pressure to mediate (Genn 2007 p.8). 
But the subsequent case of Burchell and Bullard169appeared to signal a return to 
the climate of Dunnett and Hurst.
A study by Genn of mediation in the Central London County Court in 1996/7 
showed only a 5% demand for mediation (Genn, 1998). The Genn 2007 study 
compared quasi-compulsory and voluntary mediation schemes for the period 
between April 2004 and March 2007 to assess the effect of increased pressure to 
mediate. There were problems with the quasi-compulsory scheme element of 
the project coinciding with the Court of Appeal ruling in Halsey because the 
judgment undermined the object and operation of automatic referral. The report 
states that it is not possible to speculate as to the exact effect of the judgment, 
but that it may have made those who were inclined to opt out of mediation more 
confident in doing so.
By the end of the evaluation period (10 months after its completion), a 
mediation appointment had been booked in only 22% of cases and only 14% of 
cases originally referred to mediation had mediated. In 81% of cases where the 
court received a reply to a referral, one or more parties objected (though this 
number declined slightly after the first few months). Case management 
conferences dealing with objections did not generally result in mediation 
bookings and tended to delay the progress of the cases. Settlement rates of 
mediated cases followed a downward trend, with a high of 69% at the beginning 
of the project, to a low of 38% at the end. The majority of cases settled without 
going to mediation.
169 [2005] EWCA Civ. 358
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There was no simple factor predicting the likelihood of settlement. The report 
suggests that the explanation is likely to lie in the attitude or motivation of the 
parties and the skill of the mediator. The scheme was not perceived by most 
solicitors as compulsory. Justifications for opting out were the timing of the 
referral, the anticipated costs of mediation in low-value claims, the 
intransigence of the opponent, the subject matter of the dispute, and a belief that 
mediation was unnecessary because the case would settle.
In relation to the voluntary scheme, court direction, judicial encouragement and 
fear of costs penalties were the principal reasons given for mediating. There had 
been an increase in take-up following Dunnett, however the settlement rate had 
declined from 62% in 1998 to below 20% in 2000 and 2003. Although 
comments were generally positive, there were some complaints centred on 
failure to settle, rushed mediation, court facilities and poor skills on the part of 
the mediator. Failure to settle was most commonly attributed to intransigence 
on the part of opponents, inappropriate court direction, time constraints and 
failings on the part of the mediator.
It was concluded that facilitation and encouragement together with selective and 
appropriate pressure to mediate are likely to be more effective than blanket 
coercion; motivation and willingness of the parties to negotiate and compromise 
are critical to the success of mediation; and that efficient administrative support 
and creation of an environment conducive to settlement are important.
There are currently no pressures on the parties to mediate in SEN disputes.
What would be worrying would be if, following the outcome of the current 
mediation studies, the DCSF were to assert pressure to mediate in order to 
increase take-up in the absence of a mechanism which ensures that the ‘right’ 
cases are mediated and that parents are enabled to make ‘competent’ choices.
5.3.2.4. Low Take-up
The Enterkin study revealed that judges referred 34% of the total number of 
cases on the small claims track to the in-court mediation scheme. This appears
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low, and the study concluded that mediation was under-used, but the researchers 
observe that it compares favourably with the 5% figure in the Genn 1998 study.
Low take-up of mediation was also an issue in the Walker study. Only 10% of 
those who responded to the questionnaire had used mediation (152 people out 
of 1500), and 62% of them left mediation with issues still needing to be 
resolved. The NAO study revealed that only 20 per cent of people who were 
funded by Legal Aid for family breakdown cases (excluding those involving 
domestic violence which are deemed unsuitable for mediation) opted for 
mediation. In the period October 2004 to March 2006, 29,000 people who were 
funded through Legal Aid attempted to resolve their dispute through mediation. 
In the same period 120,000 family disputes involving finances and children 
were completed through court proceedings or bilateral negotiation between 
solicitors. In response to a survey of recipients of Legal Aid, 33 per cent said 
that they had not been made aware by their adviser that mediation was an 
option. Of those who were not told about mediation, and so did not try it, 42 per 
cent said they would have been willing to do so.
The report recommended, amongst other things, that the Legal Services 
Commission actively promote mediation; review the list of exemptions from 
using mediation and the way exemptions are being applied; and reflect in 
contracts between solicitors and the LSC a presumption that mediation should 
normally be attempted before other remedies are tried. Solicitors who have 
significantly lower numbers of mediated cases should be investigated to 
ascertain the reasons for the low take-up and, where these prove unsatisfactory, 
should have their contracts curtailed.
It is possible to draw some parallels between the results of these studies and 
mediation in the SEN context. The NAO study shows lack of awareness 
resulting from the fact that legal advisers (who have an interest in the case 
proceeding to trial because their costs will increase) were not telling their 
clients about it. Perhaps it is worth noting that, in the SEN context, although 
LEAs have an obligation to make parents aware of disagreement resolution
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services, they also have a financial interest in cases not going to mediation 
because they have to pay for it.
Studies of the Australian Civil and Family jurisdictions have shown settlement 
rates for mediation in administrative disputes of 55% in the Federal Court, 
though a relatively small proportion of cases was mediated (Buck 2005). There 
is a power to require mediation that does not appear to have caused difficulties. 
Mediation has been pervasive within the Family Law system, with the Family 
Court having a target of 90% of cases being resolved through mediation within 
six months of filing. Buck suggests that there has been an attitudinal shift in 
favour of ADR that is lacking in England.
5.3.2.5. Regulation
Regulation of the process in terms of setting out the circumstances in which an 
impartial mediator should intervene is problematic in the SEN context. It would 
not be possible to say that a mediator should intervene to prevent parents 
settling for less than they would have got at tribunal because this cannot be 
predicted with certainty. It might be possible to impose rules requiring 
intervention where there is coercion. But overt coercion may be unlikely in the 
presence of an independent party; what is more likely is that there will be a 
more subtle gain derived from better knowledge and familiarity with the 
system. Perhaps what happened in the case study was an example of subtle 
manipulation. Did the LEA know that they would have lost the argument on 
speech therapy and occupational therapy, and offer the ‘big prize’ of the private 
school fees knowing that this would enable them to trade-off the other costs? Is 
there even anything wrong with this? Where, and how, is the line to be drawn?
If regulating the process of mediation is problematic, consideration might be 
given to screening types of dispute that might be unsuitable. Where mediation 
operates within the ambit of the court system, possibilities for recommending 
appropriate cases for mediation and screening unsuitable cases exist at the case 
conference stage. There is also scope for mediated agreements to be overseen 
by a judge. This does not happen in SEN disputes. Mediation takes place before 
an appeal is lodged with the SENDIST. The tribunal neither screens cases for
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suitability nor approves mediated agreements. Where a case settles following 
mediation, the only information the SENDIST receive is that the appeal has 
been withdrawn. Screening would necessitate case management at LEA level.
5.3.2.6. Customisation
Buck argues that the fact that there is a lack of clarity about issues such as the 
extent to which mediators should intervene to redress power-imbalance and 
whether mediation should be compulsory does not mean ADR has a flawed 
theoretical framework (Buck 2005). ADR methods must be valued in context in 
order to produce meaningful reflections on success (Ibid. p.v). ADR (he says) 
now has a robust infrastructure. It is integrated in law school curricula, the legal 
professions are generally supportive of its development. It has been customised 
and used as a major technique by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities 
Commission and in industry-based disputes.
Buck considers that concerns about power-imbalance may be alleviated by 
customisation. He also argues that the success of ADR will depend upon the 
quality of mediators. He refers to a review by Mack (Mack 2003) of ADR in the 
Australian Federal Court system, which concluded that it is not possible to 
regularly ‘match’ particular types of dispute with particular ADR models, and 
that each court or tribunal must develop its own referral process and criteria 
taking into account programme goals, users, culture, resources and available 
service providers. Mack’s review found that, where courts had developed their 
own systems, there were high levels of satisfaction that varied little according to 
whether mediation is voluntary or compulsory.
Buck concluded that what is required is a system that is sufficiently sensitised to 
identifying appropriate routes of dispute resolution in their individual contexts. 
He also concluded that:
In the realm of administrative justice, a great challenge remains to 
ensure that there are sufficient safeguards to ensure that significant legal 
rights are not jeopardised by the promise of expedition and costs savings 
held out by an increased use of ADR. (Ibid. p.vii).
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A successful example of customisation of ADR is the form of rights-based
conciliation arranged by the Disability Rights Commission (DRC)170. Access to
conciliation was through a helpline. Caseworkers assessed the circumstances of
the case and decided the appropriate form of dispute resolution. Appropriate
cases were referred to rights-based conciliation. This was contrasted with
mediation as follows:
Mediation can be seen as a process that actively promotes its 
independence, neutrality and confidentiality. Mediators don’t take sides, 
don’t offer advice, and seek to neutralise power imbalances.
Within rights-based conciliation, the process is not premised on equality 
between the parties, but on the fact that obligations exist between them.
The DRC puts the rights of disabled people as a non-negotiable issue 
within the conciliation process. The conciliator must be active to ensure 
the service-user’s issues are addressed, be active in suggesting ways in 
which the service-provider might meet their obligations and be clear 
whether a proposed solution would uphold the service-user’s rights [...] 
in this way mediation achieves a just resolution, as opposed to just a 
resolution.171
In addition to referring cases to Mediation UK for ‘formal’ conciliation, DRC 
caseworkers resolved cases through a range of methods, including negotiation 
and provision of advice. In their first year, the DRC referred 146 cases to formal 
conciliation, 60% of which settled through telephone ‘shuttle’ conciliation. In 
2002/3, 140 new cases were referred to conciliation with an overall settlement 
rate of 79%. Conciliation was encouraged, and its advantages heralded in terms 
of cost and speed. In the first three years of the Disability Discrimination Act 
1995, only 43 Part IE cases were commenced in the civil courts. 240 disputes 
were referred to conciliation. The DRC published on their website digests of the 
outcomes of cases as ‘success stories’, and ‘name and shame’ articles 
identifying organisations refusing to comply with their obligations towards 
disabled people. The DRC endorsed ADR unreservedly:
In short, whilst the DRC entirely recognises the value of litigation and 
law enforcement in the achievement of justice for individuals and in the 
pursuit of broader social change, it is discovering in its own work that 
those objectives are in many instances served as well by alternatives to 
the legal process, whether formal conciliation or problem-solving
170 The DRC is now part of the Commission for Equalities and Human Rights
171 www.mediationuk.org.ok. The website no longer exists.
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casework. It is a function of the DRC's modem outlook that it will 
continue to encourage its existing ADR initiatives as an effective way of 
securing rights for disabled people and thereby promoting the spirit as 
well as the letter of the DDA ... What is conciliation? Conciliation is a 
"win/win" approach - it is about finding a solution which satisfies
172everyone .
The model provides an example of how management of cases and overt 
intervention on the part of the mediator has increased the number of settlements 
whilst ensuring that rights are protected. The model envisages screening of 
cases to determine suitability, assures monitoring of outcomes, and enables the 
strengths of ADR to be realised without risk of disadvantage due to power- 
imbalance. Cases are only taken to court when necessary to establish points of 
legal importance, and as a last resort where organisations refuse to comply with 
the law. The majority of disputes are resolved by talking to people and 
persuading them of the error of their ways. Conciliation is favoured by the DRC 
not simply because of the quantity of settlements but because of their quality. 
The attraction of ADR is its capacity to deliver outcomes that transcend the 
formal limitations of judicial remedy. ADR settlements can achieve results that 
get to the heart of the matter in a way that compensation awards rarely achieve.
This model of case management and rights-based conciliation overcomes 
concerns about the ‘wrong’ cases being mediated and the risks of disadvantage 
caused by power-imbalance. It would therefore appear to be a promising model 
in the SEN context. In considering whether the information from the ongoing 
studies of SEN mediation might alter this conclusion, it is difficult to see how it 
could. The studies will not be able to conclude that there is no risk of parents 
being disadvantaged by being the weaker party or of resolution being agreed in 
individual complaints whilst systemic abuse is allowed to continue unchecked 
because mediation, as it currently operates, allows both. The studies might 
conclude that it is not cost-effective for mediation to continue to be offered in 
view of low take-up. In light of the potential benefits mediation can bring, 
consideration might be given to ‘customisation’ and case management in 
deciding the future of SEN mediation. Case management might encourage take-
172 www.drc.gov.uk. The site no longer exists.
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up and increase the use of mediation services so that they provide better value 
for money.
5.3.2.7. Comment
Mediation has been shown to be successful in Australia where it is mandatory. 
Take-up in the English Civil and Family jurisdictions has been low, despite 
covert and overt pressure to engage. The Genn 2007 study highlights that 
motivation and willingness of the parties to negotiate and compromise are 
critical to the success of mediation. It appears more likely that these can be 
encouraged within a dispute resolution system that operates within a culture of 
listening to concerns and facilitating resolution.
Buck’s observations on customisation and management are significant. They 
suggest that, even if there are concerns about power-imbalance, or the ‘wrong’ 
disputes being mediated, those concerns may be addressed, enabling the 
advantages of mediation to be realised without the risk of adverse 
consequences. If PDR envisages that choice of dispute resolution mechanism is 
to be driven by desired outcomes in the form of either agreements or 
adjudicated decisions, its objective of accuracy implies a need to ensure 
informed choice of process, and that negotiations proceed from the basis of an 
awareness of entitlements.
If mediation works effectively and cases are appropriately settled at an early 
stage, this may benefit all involved. But if significant legal rights are not to be 
jeopardised by the objectives of expedition and costs savings, mediation needs 
to be customised appropriately to ensure this does not happen.
5.4. CONCILIATION
5.4.1. Advantages and disadvantages of conciliation
The advantage of conciliation is that it can comprise many different forms -  a 
telephone conversation, a meeting, liaison by an intermediary such as an 
Independent Parent Supporter or representative from a voluntary organisation. 
In section 5.4.3., a system of internal review is described as conciliation. It 
would be impractical to preclude conciliation from any dispute resolution
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system, although it is the process in which there is the greatest risk of 
manipulation by the more powerful party.
If the parents’ complaint that their child needs more one-to-one tuition can be 
solved by ringing up the LEA, it would be a nonsense for the system to require 
that the LEA’s response to the phonecall would be not to attempt to resolve the 
problem, but to tell the parents that the matter must be dealt with by way of 
either mediation or an appeal to the SENDIST. The advantages of parents being 
able to secure additional tuition on the basis of a phonecall are obvious. The 
questions, then, as with mediation, are whether, and how, the benefits may be 
derived whilst obviating the risk of the weaker party being disadvantaged. 
Given that conciliation may take any form, this can really only be assured by 
operation of the ‘right’ culture.
5.4.2. The Parent Partnership Service (PPS)
“When I called in the PPS, the school stopped working against me and 
apologised”.
“Schools still do not tell people the PPS is in operation”.
“It is excellent.. .it is a voice to represent those who don’t feel confident 
or articulate enough to get the best for their child.. .parents can gain 
more information about procedures”. (Woolfendale and Cook 1997 pps 
99 and 100).
The SEN Code of Practice 2001 states that all LEAs must make arrangements
for parent partnership services:
It is essential that parents are aware of the parent partnership service so 
that they know where they can obtain the information and advice they 
need. LEAs must therefore inform parents, schools and others about the 
arrangements for the service and how they can access it. LEAs must 
also remind parents about the parent partnership service and the 
availability of disagreement resolution services at the time a proposed 
statement or amendment notice is issued (Ibid. para 2.10).
PPSs have the principal role of facilitating conciliation between parents and 
LEAs.
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During 1994-97, the DfEE grant-funded LEAs to encourage parental 
participation in the process of assessing their children’s SEN. Most set up PPSs, 
but they operated differently in different areas. Some LEAs provided the service 
through employed staff and volunteers; others through voluntary organisations. 
In 1996, the DfEE commissioned a study of PPSs (Woolfendale and Cook 
1997) which focused on 25 LEAs. A number of activities were found to be 
common in the different models: preparation and distribution of written 
materials for parents on SEN procedure; initiation of a ‘Named Person 
Scheme’173; and the creation of a key post of Parent Partnership Officer (PPO). 
There was evidence that PPSs had helped LEAs to work in partnership with 
parents, but there had been little progress with schools, and PPSs were generally 
becoming involved only at the statutory assessment stage.
The study concluded that there was a need for any PPS to be part of the core 
functions of the LEA, and to offer impartial support to parents. The research 
findings indicated that this was problematic for parents. Some accepted that the 
PPS needed to be located within the LEA to influence the LEA, whilst others 
thought that the PPS service should be provided by a voluntary organisation.
The researchers suggested that this was an issue that needed to be resolved 
locally. They suggested that Named Persons needed support; that their role 
should be made clearer, and that they should be paid out of pocket expenses. 
They also recommended that the preventative role of the PPS in mediation, 
negotiation and conflict resolution should be enhanced.
In the first year of operation, the number of referrals to PPSs varied between 0 
in one LEA and 350 in another. In all but one LEA, the number of referrals 
increased significantly in the second year. In addition to identifying many 
benefits to parents through responses to questionnaires, the researchers also 
identified factors inhibiting parents from accessing the PPS. These were:
• issues associated with ethnicity/cultural barriers, and lack of ethnic 
diversity amongst PPS staff;
• schools not passing information to parents;
173 ‘Named persons’ were volunteers who gave parents information and advice on their child’s 
SEN (Code of Practice 2001 p. 128). They are now called Independent Parent Supporters’.
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• parental perception that schools were against contact with the PPS;
• parental attitude to lack of independence from the LEA;
• lack of resources to cover parental need (all parents who participated 
cited this);
• communication breakdown;
• parents having literacy problems;
• unwillingness on the part of parents to become involved with another 
layer of bureaucracy;
• parental attitude to their child’s difficulties;
• lack of parental time to be involved with more professionals.
There are also the ‘silent’ parents -  those who did not respond to any 
communication from the LEA or PPS.
All PPSs provided advice about SEN and the statutory process. Only one 
regularly represented parents at tribunal; some never attended LEA meetings 
with parents, never visited schools on behalf of, or with parents, and never 
contacted other agencies on parents’ behalf. The study recommended that 
services should be widely advertised in schools and in the community; PPSs 
should retain independence of judgment in advising parents; they should 
operate a quality assurance model, and there should be an annual report.
PPSs saw their services as crucial and indispensable, and were concerned that 
they lacked the resources to reach more parents. A number of services offered 
by PPSs assisted parents to assert themselves, and enabled them to assume a 
central role in reaching decisions about their children. As with mediation, initial 
funding to set up partnership arrangements ceased after three years. Some PPSs 
were disbanded. But many LEAs allocated funds unequivocally to maintain the 
service.
A further study was commissioned by the DfEE in 1999. This consisted of a 
study of 26 schools operating in 6 LEAs. It revealed that PPSs were becoming 
involved in planning and contributing to training courses for school staff. PPSs 
with closest links to schools were LEA based, giving them ‘credibility’.
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Although voluntary organisations were uniquely placed to promote partnership 
with parents, there were tensions between these organisations and LEAs/schools 
because the voluntary organisations adopted an advocacy based approach.
There were many different models of PPS in operation. They differed as to 
whether they focused upon working with parents in groups or as individuals, 
and whether they adopted an advocacy, conciliation or facilitating role. Some 
had few links with schools, others worked directly with the LEA and school 
staff to influence practice.
The report concluded that PPSs are in a unique position to promote partnership 
with parents, but suggested that certain questions needed to be addressed: 
whether parents should be worked with in groups or as individuals; whether 
partnership with parents involves working with professionals and parents; and 
whether partnership is best promoted by targeting the parents of all children, or 
just those whose child has SEN. It also concluded that the advocacy based 
approach adopted by voluntary organisations commissioned by LEAs occurred 
at the expense of broader developmental activities with the LEA and schools. 
Although it was stated that there was scope for debate at local and national 
level, the report recommended an LEA-based service with links to schools and 
which informs local practice, rather than an advocacy-based service. The 
argument for this was that partnership should be embedded in local policy and 
practice. It therefore needed to be embedded in local education structures. An 
advocacy-based approach fosters a ‘them and us’ situation between parents and 
professionals that is counterproductive to the promotion of partnership.
The advice to parents on Directgov is that PPSs provide ‘accurate and neutral 
information on the full range of options available... training to guide you 
through SEN procedures, or link you to organisations who can help’. They can 
help to prevent difficulties from developing into disagreements, and with access 
to informal arrangements for disagreement resolution.
Independent Parent Supporters (IPSs) help by:
[...] listening to your worries and concerns; providing you with ongoing
and general support; helping you understand what is happening during
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SEN procedures [...]; explaining your rights and responsibilities; 
helping you to prepare for and attend visits and meetings; helping you 
make phone calls, fill in forms, write letters and reports; helping you to 
express your views and communicate with schools and LEAs; finding 
further sources of information, support and advice174.
A further study conducted in 2006 (Rogers 2006) revealed that there were still 
wide variations in practices and outputs within PPSs. Other findings were that: 
the service is valued by parents and rooted in a culture committed to 
partnership; the level of service provided was linked to resources; and that there 
was inconsistency in the numbers of IPSs and the roles assigned to them. The 
original intention was that IPSs would be involved in casework and fulfil a key 
role. But, in some areas, their role is restricted to undertaking less complex 
casework and managing help-lines. This is due to concerns about relying upon 
unpaid staff to conduct complex and demanding work.
There remained evidence of failure to extend relationships to schools and hard 
to reach parents. Because LEAs are not equally convinced of the benefit of 
PPSs and therefore fail to resource them adequately, the researchers concluded 
that this threatened the equality agenda set out in the Audit Commission’s 2002 
report (Audit Commission 2002b). One of the recommendations was that there 
should be a minimum staffing requirement of one strategic worker, one 
caseworker and one person providing administrative support, and that smaller 
LEAs would either need additional funding or to work collaboratively with 
other LEAs in order to deliver a reasonable range of services. The SEN Toolkit 
suggests that IPSs should attend mediations with parents to offset problems of 
power imbalance. It appears this service may not always be available.
Following this report, the DCSF devised standards for PPSs to enable 
compliance to be assessed on inspection by Ofsted. The objective of introducing 
these standards was to increase parental confidence in the service. The 
standards include requirements that the service must have a developmental plan 
and the resources necessary to deliver the targets it sets out; and that parents 
must be provided with accurate, neutral information on their rights and the 
range of options available for their child’s education. Where appropriate, and in
174 www.direct.gov.uk/Education.
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conjunction with their parents, the ascertainable views and wishes of the child 
should be taken into consideration. An example of best practice is that all 
parents should have access to an IPS who is appropriately trained. PPSs should 
have clear policies setting out how they operate impartially and at arms’ length 
from the LEA, with separate offices, logo and monitoring arrangements.
5.4.3. Other Examples of Conciliation Arrangements
Gersch provides some examples of conciliation arrangements in operation 
(Gersch 2003). The first was a service operated by the educational psychology 
service in an Outer London Borough which conducted reviews of decisions 
parents were unhappy with. In 12 out of 31 cases analysed, conciliation 
prevented appeals to the SENDIST. Where reviews were successful, there was a 
high level of satisfaction on the part of parents in terms of both process and 
outcome, but some did not view the service as impartial. It was considered to be 
quick and efficient. Of the cases resolved, 26% were resolved without a face-to- 
face meeting and 37% involved only one meeting.
Features valued by parents were efficiency, accessibility, specialisation, and the 
feeling of being listened to. Educational Psychologists considered the question 
of impartiality and independence problematic -  particularly since the Principal 
Educational Psychologist (PEP) was an ‘influential’ member of the decision­
making panel. The PEP considered that having specialist knowledge of SEN in 
the Borough was essential in operating the service. In 75% of the cases 
resolved, the outcome was what the parents requested, and in 25% of cases the 
outcome involved ‘more creative problem-solving’. Not all cases resolved in 
favour of parents had resource implications for the LEA. It was considered that 
disputes can be avoided where there is good communication with parents, 
where they are involved in the process from the outset, and where there is an 
effective PPS.
Parents said they wanted from the LEA:
• more information;
• greater transparency in decision-making;
• to be listened to and have their views taken into account;
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• improved clarity about the operation of the administrative process and in 
the wording of statements.
The second example involved an Inner London LEA. In 2003, that LEA had 
only had 2 appeals to the SENDIST. It was said that this might have been due to 
the high proportion of parents for whom English was their second language 
feeling daunted by the appeal process, but that the LEA would like to think that 
there were so few appeals because the SEN team had a strong ethos of 
‘listening’ and parental involvement. Their core values were about 
acknowledging and appreciating parents’ thoughts and concerns. New members 
of staff, when being trained, were asked to put themselves ‘in the shoes of 
parents.’ (Gersch 2003 p.74).
Parents were invited to contact the head of the SEN service at every point of
communication in the assessment process, and this person met with all parents
at the point of a proposed statement:
In many instances parents have had to wage war, probably since their 
child was bom, against a range of different agencies in order to secure 
the provision of what their child needs. They may have built up an 
expectation of an adversarial stance to fight for the rights of their child. 
(Gersch 2003 p.75).
An example of a successful conciliation was where a parent was persuaded not 
to appeal to the SENDIST because the LEA agreed to purchase her son a lap­
top to help him with spelling and concentration problems.
This is probably an illustration of how an appropriate culture can operate 
effectively to facilitate resolution of disputes and prevent the escalation of 
conflict. It could also be an illustration of the exclusion of entire communities 
from the formal system. If this LEA were manipulating their position (and this 
is not suggested), this would not be apparent. There is no involvement of 
independent persons in decision-making or monitoring of agreed outcomes.
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5.5. EVALUATION
Mediation conciliation and rights-based conciliation are evaluated using the 
methodology in Chapter Four.
5.5.1. Mashaw’s models
Mediation and conciliation in the SEN context follow the bureaucratic 
rationality model in the sense that they are internal redress mechanisms. There 
are elements of the moral judgment model in relation to the focus upon 
individuation, but mediation and conciliation do not incorporate the features of 
due process featured in this model. Adler (2003 and 2006) developed and 
adapted Mashaw’s models of administrative justice. His models are entitled 
‘bureaucratic’, ‘professional’ and ‘legal’, which broadly equate to the 
bureaucratic rationality, professional treatment and moral judgment models, but 
he adds two further models -  ‘consumerist’, and ‘managerial’. Redress systems 
for the consumerist model are characterised by a focus on customer satisfaction 
-  allowing the complainant’s voice to be heard. Mechanisms are not 
independent and are closely linked to service provision. Redress mechanisms 
for the managerial model envisage informing future actions and resource 
allocation. There is a need for careful record keeping. Mediation and 
conciliation most closely reflect the characteristics of Adler’s consumerist 
model.
In terms of whether mediation and conciliation fulfil Mashaw’s goals:
• rational exercise of discretion -  mediation and conciliation provide no 
assurance of this. The outcome may be anything agreed by the parties. 
Rights-based conciliation should ensure this;
• an opportunity for claimants to influence decisions and to complain -  
mediation, conciliation and rights-based conciliation afford an 
opportunity to complain. The strengths of informal processes lie in 
enabling the parties to say what they wish without the confines of a 
formal structured adjudicative hearing focusing on legal entitlement.
The resolution is consensual, and so will be influenced by the 
complainant unless he has been intimidated or exploited. This should not 
happen in rights-based conciliation;
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• assurance that outcomes of complaints will influence future practice - 
there is no guarantee of this in relation to conciliation. In relation to 
mediation, the Toolkit recommends that LEAs seek feedback from 
mediation services to enable changes to be made in policy and practice 
to avoid future disagreements. It appears regional services produce 
reports for LEA, but it is not known whether LEAs change their practice 
as a result of these reports. Perhaps the ongoing studies will provide 
information on this. Rights-based conciliation, as operated by the DRC, 
did assure this. Embracing the culture of mediation and conciliation may 
influence decision-making generally. Where parents are successful in 
mediation, this may influence future LEA decisions in relation to their 
child;
• reduction of conflict -  conciliation, mediation and rights-based 
conciliation have the potential to resolve disputes quickly, and so 
prevent escalation of conflict. It is not known whether settlements 
endure. The ongoing studies might provide information.
In relation to Mashaw’s process-values:
• equality -  SEN mediation may assure equality if parents are able to have 
an IPS with them. If not, whilst the mediator maintains a neutral stance, 
there is a risk that parents may be disadvantaged and that this will 
remain undetected because mediations are conducted in private with no 
external monitoring of outcomes. Rights-based conciliation assures 
equality. In relation to conciliation facilitated by the PPS, advice and 
assistance is provided to place parents on a more equal footing. There is 
no guarantee of equality in other forms of conciliation. No independent 
person is present and agreements are not recorded;
• transparency -  only rights-based conciliation assures transparency. 
Mediation and conciliation are conducted in private. There is no 
legislative obligation to record the existence of disputes, their nature or 
outcomes. Regional providers produce reports on the operation of 
mediation services, but these have not been evaluated for the last eight 
years;
• privacy -  this is assured;
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• humaneness -  where mediation operates fairly, arguably it is the most 
‘humane’ of all the mechanisms described. Its essence is that it allows 
the parties to relate to one another on a human level. It can provide 
empowerment; the opportunity to get to the true cause of a problem, and 
for a wrong to be acknowledged and apologies made. On the other hand, 
exploitation conducted in a private setting is not humane. Rights-based 
conciliation assures humaneness. Whether or not conciliation provides 
humaneness would depend upon its form and outcome. To increase a 
child’s tuition following a phone call from parents is humane, but to 
suggest in a phone call that the child is getting more than his entitlement 
and that there is nothing the parents can do about this may be 
manipulation of a person who is in a weaker position due to lack of 
knowledge about obligations;
• appropriate symbolism -  does not apply. In choosing informal 
mechanisms, people forego the legitimating symbols of binding 
decisions arrived at following a formal adjudicative process. This is why 
it is essential that the system ensures that this choice is an informed one;
• participation -  is assured, though meaningful participation is not 
because, in mediation and conciliation, there is no guarantee that the 
disadvantages of power-imbalance will be overcome. Rights-based 
conciliation assures meaningful participation.
5.5.2. Collective goals and individual interests
Mediation and conciliation afford opportunities for parents to bring concerns 
about their child to the attention of the LEA, so it might be assumed that the 
focus would be on individual interests. However, the mediation case study 
referred to in section 5.3.1.3. shows a bargaining process centred on resources. 
The purpose of saving resources in individual cases is to ensure they may be 
more equitably distributed elsewhere. The extent to which collective goals will 
feature will depend upon their champion -  the LEA - so advancement of 
collective interests will depend upon LEA’s dominance. Ironically, it appears 
that the exploitation of parents, as the weaker party, may assist the collective 
objective.
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Although the argument in this thesis is that more emphasis should be placed 
upon collective goals in SEN appeals in order to ensure greater overall equality, 
advancement of collective goals through domination of parents in closed 
session is not advocated. Rights-based conciliation would ensure this does not 
happen. Arguably mediation could be a vehicle for LEAs to help parents to 
understand the overall purpose of collective goals.
5.5.3. PDR Goals
MEDIATION, CONCILIATION AND RIGHTS-BASED
CONCILIATION -  ATTAINMEN[T OF PDR GOALS
MEDIATION CONCILIATION RIGHTS-BASED
CONCILIATION
Cheap for 
Appellants
Probably. Yes. Yes
Quick Yes. Yes. Yes.
Uncomplex Probably. Yes. Yes.
Misconceived 
and trivial 
complaints 
rooted-out 
quickly
Yes. Yes. Yes.
Accuracy Possibly if 
parents are 
assisted by IPS.
Possibly. If parents 
are assisted.
Yes.
Changes feed 
back
Yes. No. Yes.
Cost-effective 
to the State
Yes. Yes. Yes.
Rights-based conciliation is included in this table to illustrate the difference 
‘customisation’ makes. The answers call for justification. Mediation, 
conciliation and rights-based conciliation are cheap for appellants. There are no 
process fees; legal representation is discouraged, and precluded in mediation. 
But parents may need their own expert reports to establish a basis for arguing 
that the child’s needs are not being met (it is for this reason that it is cited, in the 
next table, as being less cheap than the LGO).
Mediation, conciliation and rights-based conciliation can be arranged quickly. 
The issue of whether they can be considered uncomplex is a difficult one. In 
mediation, this will depend upon the nature of the dispute and the skills of the
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17Smediator. There is evidence in the Exeter study (University of Exeter 2004a ) 
which suggests that SEN mediators may not be specialists. If IPSs attend 
mediations with parents, they might assist parents with complex issues. 
Conciliation should be uncomplex, but this will depend upon the form it takes. 
Rights-based conciliation will be uncomplex because the mediator assists the 
weaker party.
Mediation and rights-based conciliation have the potential to resolve 
misconceived and trivial complaints quickly. Conciliation may resolve 
misconceived or trivial complaints without the need for mediation. The 
difficulty is that quick resolution is not limited to misconceived and trivial 
complaints, whereas case management in the model of rights-based conciliation 
operated by the DRC ensures the ‘right’ cases settle. LEAs are supposed to seek 
feedback from mediation services to enable changes to be made to avoid further 
disputes. It is not known whether this is happening. In the rights-based model 
operated by the DRC, learning from disputes was an important feature. There is 
no assurance that any agreements reached by conciliation will influence future 
practice. LEAs may be persuaded of the benefit of compromise generally where 
it achieves what they perceive as satisfactory outcomes.
Successful mediation and rights-based conciliation should be cheaper for the 
State than formal mechanisms, but this has not been established for mediation. 
If regional providers are being under-used, there may be value for money 
issues. The DCSF are evaluating this. The cost of conciliation will depend on 
the form it takes. Meeting and talking to parents should not involve additional 
costs. PPSs must be resourced, but IPSs are unpaid volunteers. The Gersch 
model involving the educational psychology service should not have involved 
additional cost because psychologists are LEA employees. In mediation and 
conciliation, accuracy and decisions influencing future practice are traded-off 
for cost-effectiveness for parents and the State and expedition. This is not the 
case in rights-based conciliation, which attains all of the PDR goals. This 
illustrates the effectiveness of ‘customisation’.
175 See pps. 182-4 of the thesis.
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A comparison between mediation and conciliation and formal mechanisms in 
terms of relative weightings is set out below. Scores are 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9. The 
LGO remains the ‘winner’, but conciliation is a close second. Rights-based 
conciliation is not included in the table because it is not part of the SEN dispute 
resolution system.
ATTAINMENT OF PDII GOALS (2)
SENDIST LGO COURT MED CON
Cheap for Appellants 3 7 1 5 9
Quick 3 1 7 5 9
Uncomplex 7 9 1 5 3
Misconceived and trivial 
complaints rooted-out quickly
1 7 5 3 9
Accuracy 7 9 5 3 1
Changes feed back 3 9 7 5 1
Cost-effective to the State 5 3 1 7 9
TOTALS 29 45 27 33 41
Conciliation is considered the cheapest mechanism for appellants. The LGO is 
considered cheaper than mediation for the reasons explained above. Mediation 
would probably be cheaper than the SENDIST because it would be convened 
locally and there would be no costs for the attendance of expert witnesses. 
Conciliation is quickest. Mediation is arranged more quickly than a SENDIST 
hearing, though less quickly than an urgent application to the court. An LGO 
investigation is the lengthiest procedure.
This issue of complexity is not straightforward because the complexity of any 
process depends upon the nature of the dispute. A complaint that the LEA is in 
breach of statutory time-limits should be a straightforward question of fact, 
whereas a dispute about provision where there is conflicting expert evidence 
might take more unraveling. Relative weightings in terms of complexity are, 
therefore, judged in accordance with the extent to which parents are assisted to 
engage with the process. Parents get the most help in LGO complaints. This is 
followed by SENDIST where they also receive considerable assistance.
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Mediation is rated as less effective in reducing complexity for parents than the 
SENDIST because it is unclear whether all parents who want help from an IPS 
will get this. The impartial and non-adjudicative role of the mediator make pro­
active intervention to assist weaker parties problematic. Conciliation also scores 
low using this methodology of rating because there is no assurance that parents 
will be assisted in one-to-one informal discussions with the LEA, though it is 
accepted that, on a practical level, conciliation may be uncomplex depending 
upon its form and the nature of the dispute. In terms of the Administrative 
Court, as stated in the previous Chapter, judicial review applications involve the 
most complicated and formal procedures. Albeit that a judge may provide some 
assistance to unrepresented applicants, the hurdles for such applicants in terms 
of complexity are difficult to surmount effectively.
Conciliation scores highest in rooting-out misconceived and trivial complaints 
because it has the ability to do this quickly. Mediation is considered less- 
effective than the LGO because the mediation would need to take place in order 
for this to happen, whereas the LGO would determine whether to refer the 
matter back for local resolution, refer it elsewhere or decide to conduct an 
investigation simply on the basis of the complainant’s letter or a dialogue in 
correspondence with the parties. Because mediation takes place at an earlier 
stage than the SENDIST hearing, it is considered more effective in this regard 
than the tribunal because the SENDIST does not employ a filter other than 
refusing to register appeals that ask the tribunal to do something it cannot do. 
This is not the same as considering whether a complaint can be settled easily or 
whether there is an arguable case to be considered, which is the function of the 
pre-action protocols and the permission stage injudicial review applications. 
Filtering-out occurs at an early stage in urgent cases.
In terms of accuracy, conciliation scores lowest followed by mediation because 
there is no guarantee that the outcome will reflect the correct application of the 
law to relevant facts. It is simply an agreed outcome. Conciliation and the 
SENDIST score lowest on changes feeding back to influence future decisions. 
Mediation and conciliation score highest in terms of cost-effectiveness to the 
State (where they are successful).
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5.5.4. Adequate redress
The table below speaks for itself.
ABILITY OF MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION TO DEAL WITH 
ADLER’S COMPOSITE TYPOLOGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE
GRIEVANCES
Composite Category MED CONC
C l Decision wrong or unreasonable Yes. Yes.
C2 Administrative errors Yes. Yes.
C3 Unacceptable treatment by staff Yes. Yes.
C4 Unacceptable delays Yes. Yes.
C5 Information and communication problems Yes. Yes.
C6 Benefit/service unavailable or deficient Yes. Yes.
C l General objections to policy Yes. Yes.
C8 Other types of grievances Yes. Yes.
This illustrates a significant advantage of informal mechanisms -  they enable 
redress of all forms of complaint in one arena, increasing the prospect that all 
aspects of a complaint will be resolved. A model that assures management, 
monitoring and support for parents in conciliation and mediation -  either in the 
form of an adviser/advocate or by way of overt recognition that the function of 
the mediator is not that of a neutral facilitator, but a facilitator of compliance 
with obligations towards children -  might fully realise the potential of these 
mechanisms. But what is emerging is the importance of culture. The system 
must operate in a way that will persuade complainants of the value of early 
resolution. In order for this to happen, LEAs must believe in its value 
themselves.
Proportionate dispute resolution or justice on the cheap? Mediation and 
conciliation assure attainment of many PDR goals. It appears they could 
achieve all of them if operated within a managed system that provided support 
for parents. Otherwise, there can be no assurance of ‘justice’, in terms of fair 
outcomes, in light of the risk of power-imbalance. Whether SEN mediation is 
cheap has yet to be properly established.
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Chapter Six
PDR, Adequate Redress and a Unified System of 
Children’s Complaints
6.1. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Thus far, the analysis reveals that none of the formal SEN dispute resolution 
mechanisms attain all of the PDR goals. Neither is any able to afford adequate 
redress in terms of having jurisdiction to consider all of the types of 
administrative grievances identified in Adler’s typology. Mediation and 
conciliation bring a considerable amount to the table in terms of being high in 
the PDR goal-attainment stakes and enabling all aspects of a dispute to be dealt 
with in one forum. But their introduction does not improve the PDR goal- 
attainment and adequate redress prospects for the system as a whole. Parents are 
able to choose between binding enforceable outcomes and agreed solutions. But 
unless all of the formal mechanisms are fully PDR goal-compliant and afford 
adequate redress, all that is achieved by the introduction of mediation and 
conciliation is the choice to make different trade-offs.
There is a model in operation incorporating dispute resolution mechanisms that 
attain each of the PDR goals and have jurisdiction to consider all of the 
grievances in Adler’s typology. The strengths and weaknesses of the model are 
considered, and it is examined in detail with reference the framework derived 
from the works of Mashaw and Adler; attainment of PDR goals; and the trade­
offs between goals. The possibilities for using the model as the basis for a 
unified system of education and children’s services complaints are considered. 
Unification is both the objective of PDR’s ‘one-door’ approach and a 
recommendation of the Select Committee’s 2006 Report. The Chapter is 
divided into two sections -  an alternative model and a unified system.
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6.2. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL -  THE CHILDREN’S SERVICES
COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE17*
An initial complication, which is not relevant to the discussion of whether the 
children’s services complaints procedure (CSCP) is a better model than the 
current SEN appeals system, but which needs explaining, is that there are two 
systems for complaining about provision of local authority social services -  one 
for adults and one for children. Though set up under different legislative 
regimes, the model is essentially the same except that the adults’ procedure does 
not guarantee advocacy for complaints. Some complaints about children’s 
services must be made under the adult procedure. Before the alignment of 
children’s social services and education services under a single Director of 
Children’s Services177, adults and children’s social services complaints were 
operated as one system, although enacted under different legislation. Some 
research applies to both, and research about the operation of the adults’ social 
services complaints procedure can be used to provide information about 
children’s services complaints. Functions of determining adults’ and children’s 
social services complaints are now divided between Social Services and 
Education Departments at local authority level and between the DoH and the 
DCSF at Central Government level. Amalgamation of health and social services 
complaints is envisaged to enable a seamless system for adults.
Consultation has been undertaken in relation to the operation of children’s 
services complaints about what is wanted from a complaints procedure. The 
concerns and aspirations that emerged are described, as are the revisions made 
to the model in order to take these into account.
6.2.1. The Model
Local authorities must appoint an independent Complaints Manager to deal with 
representations and complaints. The child, anybody appropriate representing 
him, his parents and anybody with sufficient interest may complain. Complaints 
may be about:
176 The procedure is set out in the Children Act 1989 Representations Procedure (England) 
Regulations 2006 and in guidance entitled ‘Getting the Best from Complaints’ (2006).
177 See the Children Act 2004.
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• an unwelcome or disputed decision;
• the quality or appropriateness of a service;
• delay in decision-making or provision of services;
• provision, or failure to provide services including complaints 
procedures;
• quantity, frequency, change or cost of provision;
• attitude or behaviour of staff;
• application of eligibility and assessment criteria;
• the impact on a child or young person of the application of a local 
authority policy; and
• assessment, management and review.
Where a complaint is received from a representative acting on behalf of a child 
or young person, the local authority should normally confirm where possible 
that the child or young person is happy for this to happen and that the complaint 
submitted reflects his views. The procedure consists of local resolution followed 
by investigation followed by review by an independent panel all within fixed 
timescales. The model is set out below:
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PROCEDURE FOR CHILDREN’S SERVICES COMPLAINTS
If not resolved
If not resolved
If not resolved -  or if there is agreement for 
investigation
Referral to Local Government Ombudsman (note that complainant can 
approach the Local Government Ombudsman at any stage)._________
A Panel of 3 independent people should meet to consider the complaint and 
produce recommendations.________________________________________
Stage 3 -  Review Panel
The local authority should provide an investigation that produces a report and 
an adjudication within 25 working days (or within the extended period of 65 
working days).
Stage 2 -  Investigation
Complainant brings concerns to the attention of the person providing the 
services locally. The local authority should consider mediation and conflict 
resolution at this stage and at all other stages. The local authority should make 
an initial attempt to resolve matters within 10 working days (unless an 
extension is agreed).
Stage 1 -  Local Resolution
The key principles are:
A good procedure should ensure that children and young people who 
make representations have their concerns resolved swiftly and, wherever 
possible, by the people who provide the service locally. The complaints 
procedure should be a useful tool for indicating where services may 
need improving. It is a positive aid to inform and influence service 
improvements, not a negative process to apportion blame.
Local authorities should develop a listening and learning culture where 
learning is fed back to children and young people who use services -  
and fed into internal systems for driving improvement. The same 
listening and learning culture should shape wider opportunities for 
working in partnership with children and young people, such as
229
individual reviews and systematic quality assurance. It should give 
children and young people opportunities to tell the local authority about 
both their good and bad experiences of the service. (Getting the Best 
from Complaints 2006 para 1.5.).
The Complaints Manager
[...] should be independent of operational line management and of direct 
service providers (e.g. children’s social work). Issues around possible 
‘conflict of interest’ need to be considered when organising local 
structures [...] should be sensitive to the particular challenge of regular 
involvement with children and young people who are likely to be 
distressed or angry [...] should also take an active role in facilitating 
resolution of complaints by identifying appropriate colleagues and 
external people (including Investigating Officers and advocates) to 
contribute to complaints work [...] [and] should foster good working 
relationships with key bodies and partner agencies. (Ibid. Para 1.6.).
The existence of the complaints procedure must be published widely to create 
awareness of its existence. ‘Complaints’ include ‘representations’. A complaint 
may be made to any member of staff, verbally or in writing (including 
electronically). The Complaints Manager (CM) must be informed as soon as 
possible so that the complaint may be monitored. It may not be necessary to 
engage the complaints procedure if the complaint can be resolved immediately, 
but a complaint will always be recorded. As soon as it becomes apparent that a 
person wishes to make a complaint, they must be given information about the 
procedure. If the complainant is a child, the local authority must provide him 
with information about advocacy services and offer help to obtain an
178advocate . The CM should ensure that a suitable person meets the child or 
young person to discuss the complaints process and address any questions or 
concerns. Where an advocate is being used, the local authority must ensure that 
the advocate is acting with the informed consent of the child.
The expectation is that the majority of complaints should be considered (and 
resolved) informally at Stage One. Staff at the point of service delivery -  
including an Independent Reviewing Officer where appropriate -  and the 
complainant discuss and attempt to address the complaint quickly by 
exchanging information, exploring the thinking behind decisions and trying to
178 This is to be revised in the Children and Young Person’s Bill to impose obligations upon 
local authorities to provide advocates.
230
agree a way forward (Ibid. para 3.5.). The child’s advocate may be present. If 
the local authority or the complainant believe that it would not be appropriate to 
resolve the matter in this way, they should discuss this together. Where both 
parties agree, the complaint can move directly to an investigation.
Where the matter is not resolved informally, the complainant has the right to 
request consideration of the complaint at Stage Two. The CM ensures there is a 
full written record of the complaint. Where it has been made orally, the CM 
must ensure that the details and the complainant’s desired outcome are recorded 
in writing and agreed with the complainant. He may do this in conjunction with 
the Investigating Officer (10) and Independent Person (IP) appointed to conduct 
Stage Two. The CM should arrange for a full investigation of the complaint to 
take place without delay. He may request any person or body to produce 
information or documents to facilitate the investigation. Consideration of the 
complaint at Stage Two should be ‘fair, thorough and transparent with clear and 
logical outcomes.’ (Ibid. para 3.6.).
The CM appoints an IO to lead the investigation and prepare a written report for 
adjudication by a senior manager. The IO may be employed by the local 
authority or be brought in from outside. The IO must not be in direct line- 
management of the service or person about whom the complaint is being made. 
An IP (a person who has no connection with the authority) must be appointed to 
the investigation179 and must be involved in all aspects of consideration of the 
complaint including any discussions about the action to be taken in relation to 
the child.
A copy of the complaint is sent to any person involved, unless doing so would 
prejudice its consideration. The 10 has access to all relevant records and staff. 
Information should be released within the bounds of normal confidentiality and 
with regard to relevant provisions in the Freedom of Information Act, 2000 and 
the Data Protection Act, 1998. The investigation must be completed and the 
response sent to the complainant within 25 working days180. Where it is not
179 Regulation 17(2) of the 2006 Regulations.
180 Ibid. 17(3).
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possible to complete the investigation within 25 working days, Stage 2 may be 
extended to a maximum of 65 working days181. All extensions must be agreed 
by the CM. The guidance says that the important thing is to maintain dialogue 
with the complainant and, where possible, reach a mutual agreement as to what 
is reasonable where a response in 25 working days is not feasible (Ibid. para 
3.6). The authority must inform the complainant as soon as possible in writing
of the reason for the delay and the date by which he should receive a
182response .
The IO writes a report including details of findings, conclusions and outcomes 
against each point of complaint (i.e. ‘upheld’ or ‘not upheld’); and 
recommendations on how to remedy any injustice as appropriate. The IP should 
also provide a report to the authority once he has read the IO’s final report. He 
may wish to comment on:
• whether he thinks the investigation has been conducted in an impartial, 
comprehensive and effective manner;
• whether all those concerned have been able to express their views fully 
and fairly;
• whether the IO’s report provides an accurate and complete picture of the 
investigation; and
• the nature of the recommendations.
The IO may make his own recommendations as necessary (Ibid. para 3.7).
A senior manager acting as Adjudicating Officer will consider the complaint, 
the IO’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations, any report from the IP 
and the complainant’s desired outcomes. He may wish to meet the child as part 
of the adjudication process or afterwards to explain the details of the 
adjudication i.e. the outcome of the complaint and any actions that he proposes. 
The local authority then write to the complainant with their response containing 
a complete copy of the investigation report; any report from the IP; the 
adjudication; and details of the complainant’s right to have the complaint 
submitted to a Review Panel if he is dissatisfied and that he has 20 working
181 Ibid. 17(6).
182 Ibid. 17(6).
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days to make this request183. The Adjudicating Officer should ensure that any 
recommendations contained in the response are implemented. The CM must 
monitor implementation and report to the Director of Children’s Services on 
what action has been taken on a regular basis.
Where the complainant remains dissatisfied, he may request a review by a 
Panel. The function of Panels is to:
• listen to all parties;
• consider the adequacy of the Stage 2 investigation;
• obtain any further information and advice that may help resolve the
complaint to all parties’ satisfaction;
• focus on achieving resolution for the complainant by addressing his clearly 
defined complaints and desired outcomes;
• reach findings on each of the complaints being reviewed;
• make recommendations that provide practical remedies and creative 
solutions to complex situations;
• support local solutions where the opportunity for resolution between the 
complainant and the local authority exists;
• identify any consequent injustice to the complainant where complaints are 
upheld, and recommend appropriate redress; and
• recommend any service improvements for action by the authority. (Ibid.
para 3.10).
The guidance states that Panels should not reinvestigate complaints, nor should 
they be able to consider any substantively new complaints that have not been 
first considered at Stage Two. It is said that no party should feel the need to be 
represented by lawyers. The purpose of the Panel is to consider the complaint 
and, wherever possible, work towards a resolution. It is not a quasi-judicial 
process and the presence of lawyers can work against the spirit of openness and 
problem-solving. However, the complainant has the right to bring a 
representative to speak on his behalf. The Panel should be alert to the 
importance of providing a ‘demonstrably fair and accessible process for all
183 Ibid. 17(8).
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participants’ because many complainants, particularly children and young 
people, may find this stage to be a stressful experience. It is important that the 
Panel is ‘customer-focused in its approach to considering the complaint and 
child or young person-friendly’ (Ibid para 3.11).
The following principles should be observed for the conduct of the Panel:
• The local authority should recognise the independence of the Review 
Panel and, in particular, the authority of the Chair;
• Panels should be conducted in the presence of all the relevant parties with 
equity of access and representation for the complainant and local authority;
• Panels should uphold a commitment to objectivity, impartiality and 
fairness, and ensure that the rights of complainants and all other attendees 
are respected at all times;
• The authority should consider what provisions to make for complainants, 
including any special communication or mobility needs or other 
assistance;
• Panels should observe the requirements of the Human Rights Act 1998, 
the Data Protection Act 1998, and other relevant rights-based legislation 
and conventions in the discharge of their duties and responsibilities;
• The standard of proof applied by Panels should be the civil standard of 
‘balance of probabilities’ and not the criminal standard of ‘beyond all 
reasonable doubt.’ This standard will be based on evidence and facts; and
• It will be at the Chair’s discretion to suspend or defer proceedings in 
exceptional circumstances where required, including the health and safety 
of all present. (Ibid. para 3.11.)
The local authority should be mindful of the specific needs of children and 
young people. They must ensure that:
• the Panel acts in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child;
• the Panel safeguards and promotes the rights and welfare of the child or 
young person concerned;
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• the wishes and feelings of children and young people are ascertained, 
recorded and taken into account;
• the best interests of children and or young people are prioritised at all 
times; and
• where the complaint is made by a person deemed to have a sufficient 
interest in the child's welfare, they should, where appropriate, seek the 
child or young person's views with regard to the complaint. (Ibid. para 
3.11.)
The Panel must set out its recommendations to the local authority on any 
strategies that can assist in resolving the complaint. These may include 
financial compensation or other action within a specified framework to promote 
resolution.
The Panel must consist of three independent people184. There are factors the 
authority should take into account in selecting Panel members set out in the 
guidance; regular training should be provided; Criminal Record Bureau checks 
must be carried out etc. The review must take place locally within 30 working
1 fiSdays of receipt of a request . The complainant must be notified of the date and 
location in writing at least 10 working days before the Panel meets and be 
invited to attend. Panel papers should be sent to Panelists and other attendees as 
soon as these have been agreed by the Chair and no later than ten working days 
before the date of the Panel. These will include: information on Stage One (as 
relevant), the Stage Two investigation report(s), the authority’s adjudication, 
any policy, practice or guidance information relevant to the complaint, and any 
comments that the complainant has submitted to the Panel. The complainant has 
a right to attend the Panel and should be assisted in attending as appropriate.
He should also be informed of his entitlement to be accompanied by another 
person and that this person may speak on his behalf.
The Chair makes the decision on attendees (including asking the local authority 
to make specific members of staff available to provide specialist advice or
184 Ibid. 19(2).
185 Ibid. 19(4).
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opinion). He should also decide whether additional policies or procedures 
should be circulated with the Panel’s papers. The CM will attend. The Panel 
should be conducted as informally as possible, but in a professional manner and 
in an atmosphere that is accommodating to all attendees. This is particularly 
important where the complainant might be a child or young person. The need 
for other support in response to diversity and disability issues should be catered 
for.
Panel hearings should normally be structured in three parts: pre-meeting, 
presentations and deliberation. The pre-meeting is an opportunity for the 
Panelists and their administrative support to meet in closed session to discuss 
the order of business and any other relevant issues (e.g. taking legal advice). 
The hearing itself consists of the complainant, or his representative, and the 
local authority explaining their desired outcomes on the points of complaint. 
Panelists should then have sufficient opportunity to ask questions of all present 
and seek clarification on the issues being discussed so they are in a position to 
make recommendations regarding the outcome. The complainant, local 
authority and other attendees may also ask questions and raise points of 
information and opinion. The Panel should then go into closed session to 
deliberate on their findings and conclusions.
They are required to produce a written report containing a summary of the 
representations and their recommendations for resolution of the issues . They 
must send this to the complainant, the authority, the IP and any other person 
with sufficient interest within five working days of the Panel meeting. The 
authority’s Director of Children’s Services must send a response to the Panel’s 
recommendations to the complainant (and other participants as necessary) 
within 15 days of receiving the Panel’s report187. If the Director deviates from 
the Panel’s recommendations he should demonstrate his reasons. In developing 
his response he should invite comment from all the attendees including the 
Independent Person from Stage Two. The complainant must be advised of his
186 Ibid. 20(3).
187 Ibid.
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right to refer his complaint (if still dissatisfied) to the LGO188.
In R v Avon County Council ex parte M189 Henry J made it clear that panel 
findings and recommendations should normally be adhered to by local 
authorities. The LGO has taken the view190 that where a review panel's 
recommendations have not been properly implemented, despite an undertaking 
to do so, prima facie this would be maladministration. In the event of this 
occurring, complainants should be advised of their right to proceed immediately 
to the LGO. The guidance now makes clear that the Director of Children’s 
Services is responsible for ensuring implementation and must state what action 
is to be taken, specify the timescales, or justify why he disagrees with 
recommendations.
There had been confusion about whether the existence of the complaints 
procedure precluded applications for judicial review. The Court of Appeal have 
provided guidance on this issue in R v Birmingham City Council ex parte A191 
where it was said that judicial review would be available to grant applications 
for Mandamus in cases of severe delay in providing an appropriate service.
Williams made the following comment -  even before the revisions to the 
model:
there can be little doubt that the complaints procedure has come a long 
way since it was first introduced by the Children Act 1989 and it has 
much to commend itself. It has enabled the genuinely aggrieved to bring 
their complaints to the attention of their local authority and, at least in 
the authorities of which the author has personal knowledge, has resulted 
in a number of changes of social service practice to the advantage of 
service users in general. (Williams, C. 2002).
6.2.2. Analysis of the Model
6.2.2.1. What is known about its operation192
There have been problems with the operation of this model. Ongoing reform has 
been partly triggered by instance of high levels of dissatisfaction and low levels
188 Ibid.
189 [1994] 2 FLR 1006, at p 1019.
190 Expressed in letters (dated 2 June 1998 and 18 May 1999) to complaints officers groups.
191 (1996) 40 BMLR 137.
192 This section considers research on adult and children’s services complaints.
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1of complaints . Simons (1995) found problems with inconsistency and 
insufficient detail in the annual reports on complaints. This issue is now dealt 
with in the guidance. Quality assurance must be in place, and annual reports are 
looked at on inspection of social services: Coombs and Sedgewick described the 
complaints procedure as ‘exhausting and demanding’ (1998 p.48) - their 
recommendation was for advocacy services. These are now part of the process. 
Dean et al. (1996) found that Review Panels were unclear about the nature of 
their role. The guidance now makes this clear. Preston-Shoot’s (2001) research 
revealed dissatisfaction; a lower level of complaints than might be expected, 
given the levels of dissatisfaction; lack of information and help; and perceived 
lack of independence. The children’s services procedure now offers help and 
information from the CM, advocacy services and independent Panels.
Ferris (2006) found that some local authorities had been struggling to know 
how best to operate the complaints system, given the lack of detailed procedures 
and clear direction, and suggested that there should be national standards with 
which all authorities should comply. The procedure is now set out in detail, 
prescribing the standards and the recording requirements. This enables its 
operation to be judged on inspection. Williams and Ferris (2005) suggested that, 
although Panels may vary from one local authority to another, their competence 
has been endorsed by the LGO, and they present a more promising redress 
mechanism than the alternative of the Commission for Social Care Inspection 
(CSCI) undertaking the independent review function. Of particular concern in 
relation to the proposal that the CSCI should replace Panels was the 
involvement of a proliferation of dispute resolution mechanisms and the 
confusion this would cause for vulnerable complainants, the possibility of 
delay, and duplication of the original investigation194.
Gulland, in her PhD thesis on community care disputes in Scotland, observed 
many operational problems (Gulland 2006). These are listed below, along with
193 See for example Davis (1998); Nuffield Community Care Studies Unit (2002); Office of Fair 
Trading (2005); Oldman and Quilgars (1999); Parry (2004); Rummery (2002); Tanner (2001).
194 Williams and Ferris were referring to proposals in the consultation document An Independent 
Voice -  New Social Services Complaints Procedure (Commission for Social Care Inspection 
2004).
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how the reforms to the system in England will address such problems should 
they arise:
SOCIAL SERVICES COMPLAINTS - PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
Problems Solutions
Differences in the practice of recording 
complaints and lack of awareness of the 
procedure.
• all complaints must be 
recorded;
• the existence of the 
complaints procedure 
must be made widely 
known;
• those who wish to 
complain must be assisted 
to do so.
Confusion about ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ 
complaints, with some people wanting to 
make ‘formal’ complaints immediately; 
confusion about which stage of the model 
had been reached; and concern about failure 
to recognise something as an informal 
complaint.
• an option to forego the 
informal stage for people 
who want to make 
‘formal’ complaints;
• close central control by 
the CM who will know 
which stage has been 
reached and is responsible 
for driving the process 
forward towards 
resolution.
Delays in resolving complaints due to 
confusion about when the formal stage 
began.
The timescales and distinctions 
between the different stages are 
now much clearer195.
Problems with complainants not being 
informed about the existence of Panels.
The revised procedures now 
require that, if complainants 
remain dissatisfied following an 
investigation, they must be told 
how to access the Panel stage.
Presence of a legal adviser from the local 
authority led to a perception that Panels 
were not independent*.
Panels are now comprised 
entirely of independent members.
* Complainants in the study who doubted the independence of the Panel were 
those whose complaints had not been upheld. Some complainants appreciated
195 Because the regulations stipulate a time-limit, it is open to the complainant to bring an action 
injudicial review where there has been a breach. This was confirmed by the decision of Ward J 
in R v Royal Borough of Kingston-upon-Thames ex parte T. 1994 1FLR. 798.
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the independence of the Panel and valued it; some saw the procedure as similar 
to being in court. Gulland’s conclusions about Panels must be treated with 
caution because she was able to observe very few hearings. Also an English 
study has not raised concerns about Panels not being perceived as independent 
(Ferris 2006). Both studies found that, where complaints were upheld, the 
authority almost always complied with the recommendations of the Panel -  this 
was described by Gulland as virtually a ‘rubber-stamping exercise’. (Gulland
2006 p.221)
Gulland attempted to classify complaints using Adler’s composite typology, 
which proved difficult. This was for the reasons alluded to in Chapter Four of 
this thesis -  that a complaint may be about more than one of the identified 
grievances - and also because those interviewed might characterise a complaint 
in one way, whereas the complaint might be characterised differently on an 
objective basis.
Taking one example, failure to provide a service could be characterised as 
breach of a statutory obligation, or simply as delay. It might be unclear what the 
problem is, and there might be differing views on the cause. The highest 
percentage of complaints was about a service being unavailable or deficient 
(34%); next was unacceptable treatment (23%) and quality of services (23%). In 
terms of outcomes sought by complainants, though not straightforward because 
views changed as complaints progressed, the research indicated that 60%, 55%, 
& 50%196 of complainants wanted a service to be provided; 40%, 19% & 30% 
wanted reassurance that what had happened to them would not happen to 
others; 10%, 37% & 22% wanted vindication; and 25%, 19% & 22% wanted an 
apology (Ibid. pps 148 and 156)..
In relation to the model itself, Gulland suggests that it fails to make a distinction 
between complaints and appeal procedures. Taking definitions from a report by 
the National Audit Office, complaints systems are described as ‘raising issues 
of administrative blame... indicators of things having gone wrong’, while 
appeals relate to substantive decisions and are ‘not treated... as raising matters
196 The research considered three local authorities, hence the three sets of figures.
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of administrative fault’ (National Audit Office 2005 p. 18). The National Audit 
Office report argues that the distinction is unhelpful - that what is needed is a 
combined system for ‘getting things put right’ (Ibid. p.7) and that, ‘whether they 
are called complaints or appeals, grievances should be used as a management 
tool to improve delivery of services’ (Ibid. p.14)197.
An important consideration in Gulland’s thesis was whether there should be an 
appeal for cases relating to entitlement to services. Her concern was that a 
model that fails to make the distinction between complaints and appeals could 
be defective because each reflects a distinct model of justice, whereas the 
redress mechanism caters only for one. Gulland characterises the model using 
Adler’s terminology (Adler 2003 and 2006).
People’s motivations for complaining appeared to be the desire to be listened to, 
but also to bring about change to prevent other people from experiencing the 
same problems, so the fact that the model comprises elements commonly found 
in the ‘consumerist’ and ‘managerial’ models was seen as positive in terms of 
providing redress. Gulland was sceptical about whether complaints influenced 
future practice. There is now explicit guidance on monitoring and quality 
assurance to ensure lessons are learned from complaints and that procedures 
operate effectively. There is also a requirement that each complaint outcome is 
recorded on an anonymised basis and circulated to line-managers, so they can 
discuss complaints with staff and use them to assess training requirements. The 
Annual Report must now contain a summary of all complaints and how they 
were dealt with, and a review of the effectiveness of the procedure. This enables 
a local authority’s performance in handling complaints to be assessed on 
inspection by Ofsted.
Very few complainants in Gulland’s study viewed their complaints in 
‘legalistic’ terms -  as a breach of entitlement to services, or of procedural 
rights. Gulland suggests this is not necessarily a bad thing. But she suggests that 
it would be expected that the legal model should have more prominence. What 
Gulland does not argue is that the model is incapable of dealing with complaints
197 This report is considered further in Chapter Eight.
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about breach of statutory obligations because it does not comprise the common 
features of due process. Her conclusion, following careful examination of the 
system, was that complaints cross boundaries between entitlement and the way 
that people are treated, and that an appeals procedure lacks the flexibility to deal 
with this. Most complainants were not seeking ‘legalistic’ solutions.
Gulland’s conclusion is significant for the purposes of this thesis. The legal 
regime setting up local authority obligations in relation to community care
1 Qfiservices is similar to that in operation for SEN . Both are premised upon 
obligations to provide services where this is determined to be necessary 
following a needs assessment, therefore it is legitimate to draw comparisons. 
Having started from the point of considering that the community care 
complaints procedure should be replaced by an appeals process, following 
sustained analysis, and despite having found operational faults with the 
procedure, Gulland’s conclusion was that it should not -  that the complaints 
model is more appropriate. The problems identified in this thesis in relation to 
the SENDIST appeals procedure are not operational difficulties -  they flow 
from the model itself. It exacerbates conflict; fails to assure equal access; and 
perpetuates a fundamental unfairness based upon the luck of parentage which is 
something children have no control over. Further, the system overall presents a 
plethora of mechanisms which is likely to be confusing for parents and militates 
against any prospect that all aspects of a grievance will be redressed.
As Gulland says, community care services are not rights-based, and so it is 
important that redress mechanisms are procedurally fair. She suggests, as a next 
step, research into understanding the difference between different types of 
redress mechanisms and what people would choose. This is information that is 
lacking in the research on SEN dispute resolution. SEN services are also not 
rights-based, so procedural fairness is equally important in this context. Where 
there are choices, procedural fairness would require that, where there is a risk of
198 Section 47 of the National Health and Community Care Act 1990 imposes an obligation 
upon local authorities to conduct assessments of persons who are disabled or who appear to be 
in need of community care services.
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power-imbalance, such choices should be informed choices leading to ‘risk- 
free’ alternatives. Procedural fairness is discussed further in Chapter Seven.
Although there have been problems with the operation of the CSCP model, it is 
significant that each of the problems appears to have been identified and 
addressed. That is not to say that all local authorities comply with obligations. It 
would be naive to suggest that, even reasonably comprehensive guidance and 
regulations will obviate bad practice. However, the model incorporates 
independent oversight at an operational level. Additionally, local authority 
children’s services, including the complaints service, are inspected by Ofsted. 
Inspectors may scrutinise records, collect evidence, and take enforcement action 
if necessary. They may refer concerns to the DCSF who can direct that the 
complaints function be performed by a third party where an authority are failing 
to operate it to a satisfactory standard199. The model, if operated as it is meant to 
operate, has many promising features, the most significant of which is its 
flexibility to deal with all aspects of a complaint.
6.2.2.2. Mashaw’s models, collective goals v individual interests and PDR
The CSCP has some characteristics of Mashaw’s bureaucratic rationality model. 
Its object is to facilitate the legislative will in terms of entitlement to services. 
But its focus upon individuation is more commonly a characteristic of the moral 
judgment model, though it does not have the common characteristics of due 
process generally associated with this model. As Gulland says, its 
characteristics most resemble those of Adler’s managerial and consumerist 
models. In terms of Mashaw’s goals -  rational exercise of discretion; an 
opportunity for claimants to influence decisions and to complain; assurance that 
outcomes of complaints will influence future practice; and reduction of conflict, 
the CSCP would appear to fulfil all of them.
In terms of fact-finding, the CSCP envisages the initial decision-maker and then 
the investigator as fact-finders. A possible disadvantage of this is that the 
investigator may not have the same incentive as the complainant to establish
199 Section 50 of the Children Act 2004 amends section 497A of the Education Act 1996 to 
enable this.
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facts discrediting the authority. Arguably this is nevertheless a preferable fact­
finding model to the one currently in operation in SEN disputes. Independent 
oversight of investigations should ensure that they are conducted properly. In 
order for this to be the case, all relevant information will need to be obtained. 
Although complainants are not precluded from adducing their own evidence, 
the model avoids the necessity of complainants being forced to incur costs in 
instructing experts. Such costs are unavoidable if parents are to succeed in SEN 
appeals.
In relation to Mashaw’s process-values -  equality; transparency; privacy; 
humaneness; appropriate symbolism and participation - the CSCP appears to 
have all of them. There may be some doubt in relation to appropriate 
symbolism, however, because the authority facilitates conciliation, conducts the 
investigation and convenes the Panel. This is an important point. Procedural 
fairness is discussed in detail in Chapter Seven. However, to summarise here, 
the argument embodied in this thesis is that there is sufficient involvement and 
oversight by independent persons to ensure that the model operates fairly and 
incorporates independent and impartial scrutiny at the investigation and Panel 
stages provided Panels are comprised entirely of members who are independent 
of the local authority. Management, availability of advocates and involvement 
of IPs ensures procedural fairness at the conciliation stage.
An assessment of PDR goal attainment at each stage of the children’s services 
complaints procedure, of the system as a whole and of the SEN dispute 
resolution as a whole is set out in the table below:
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CSCP AND SEN DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS -
ATTAINMENIT OF PDR G<3ALS
STAGE 1
INFORMAL
RESOLUTION
STAGE 2 
INVESTIGATION
STAGE 3
PANEL
REVIEW
CSCP SEN DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 
PROCESS
Quick Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. ADR and 
urgent judicial 
review 
applications.
Uncomplex Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. LGO
complaints.
Mis­
conceived 
and trivial 
complaints 
rooted out 
quickly
Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Conciliation,
Mediation,
LGO
complaints 
and urgent 
judicial 
review 
applications.
Accuracy Yes.
Advocacy 
provided. 
Independent 
oversight 
assure risks 
of power- 
imbalance 
obviated.
Yes. Yes. Yes. Formal 
mechanisms 
but not ADR 
mechanisms.
Changes 
feed back
Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. LGO
complaints,
judicial
review
applications,
mediation.
Cost-
effective to 
the State
Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Conciliation,
mediation,
SENDIST.
Cheap for 
Appellants
Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Conciliation,
mediation,
LGO.
All stages of the CSCP and the procedure as a whole assure attainment of PDR 
goals. Each stage is time-limited to ensure delay is avoided and uncomplex 
because advice and advocacy are available. Outcomes are recorded and 
monitored so that complaints can be learned from. The risk of power-imbalance 
is obviated, and accuracy, in terms of realisation of legislative objectives, is 
assured by facilitating balanced consideration of all relevant factors. Although it
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is possible for trivial complaints to go all the way to Panel, the likelihood is 
that, if the issue is trivial, it will be resolved at the first stage or after a short 
investigation within a culture of listening to complainants. There should be no 
necessity for complainants to incur costs at any stage. The procedure is likely to 
be cost-effective to the State. There will be the salary of the CM and some 
payment will need to be made to secure the services of advocates and IPs. 
Investigators are local authority employees and Panel members are only paid 
expenses. Complaints systems are generally the cheapest form of redress (see 
figures on p. 160).
Although the SEN dispute resolution system comprises formal and informal 
stages, it does not assure PDR. This is because no formal or informal 
mechanism attains all of the goals. Only a managed system incorporating 
mechanisms that attain all of the PDR goals can assure PDR. If each PDR goal 
is of equal value, a significant amount is traded-off in choosing formal 
adjudication. There is much to be gained in terms of procedural fairness by 
having an appeal considered by a tribunal of the calibre of the SENDIST or by 
the Administrative Court, but since this is at the cost of time, expense and all of 
the other disadvantages identified in this thesis, the question is whether 
anything is ‘lost’ in adopting the children’s services complaints model. If PDR 
is the blueprint for administrative justice, it would appear not.
The table below examines the ability of the CSCP to deal with Adler’s 
composite list of administrative grievances:
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ABILITY OF THE CSCP TO DEAL WITH ADLER’S COMPOSITE 
TYPOLOGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE GRIEVANCES
Composite Category CSCP
Cl Decision wrong or unreasonable Yes.
C2 Administrative errors Yes.
C3 Unacceptable treatment by staff Yes.
C4 Unacceptable delays Yes.
C5 Information and communication problems Yes.
C6 Benefit/service unavailable or deficient Yes.
C7 General objections to policy Yes.
C8 Other types of grievances Yes.
6.2.2.3. What people want from a complaints procedure
A survey was undertaken to determine what people wanted from complaints 
procedures (Department of Health 2008). This was what emerged200:
• complaints should be handled quickly and decisively;
• simpler complaints should be dealt with immediately to prevent 
unnecessary escalation;
• early acknowledgement of a complaint and the issues it raises are 
important;
• investigation of complaints must be rigorous and of high quality;
• procedures must be flexible to allow, where necessary, for alternative 
ways to be found for the problems to be resolved;
• there needs to be a single contact point for the people involved in a 
complaint;
• timely and effective communication throughout is important because it 
creates confidence in the process and helps everyone understand what is 
happening, why it is happening, and what the likely result will be;
• complaints arrangements must be seen as unbiased and impartial;
• the complaints process needs to be responsive to the needs of vulnerable 
people;
• there should be clear information about how to make a complaint. 
Information should be simple, clear, straightforward and jargon free;
• an open culture, which assists learning rather than apportioning blame, 
is more acceptable for complainants;
200 There were 376 written responses to the survey, and in excess of 1,000 people attended the 
road shows and national conferences at which Department of Health staff spoke (respondents 
comprised over 500 health, social care and advocacy professionals and over 500 patients, 
service users and their representatives).
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• easy access to specialist, independent advocacy and adequate support for 
mediation is necessary;
• special measures need to be put in place for more vulnerable groups of 
people -  for example, it may be necessary to work more proactively to 
engage with some groups that have tended to be ‘seldom heard’.
Successful techniques for complaints handling are:
• dealing with an ‘informal’ complaint on the spot to reduce the risk of 
escalation;
• clarifying the desired outcomes early in the process;
• an open, non-defensive attitude;
• recognition of the distress caused and recognition of the value of an 
apology;
• strong leadership by senior management within the organisation;
• senior management involvement in oversight of the complaints process;
• properly trained and experienced complaints staff;
• appropriate support in the form of advocacy and mediation;
• a shift from a process-driven system towards arrangements that are 
based on active resolution, involving the complainant. (Ibid. pps 8-15).
The organisation must monitor whether externally developed standards on 
complaint handling are met by ensuring there is in-house review of complaints 
handling and internal accountability of those staff dealing with complaints to 
senior managers. There should be rewards for dealing with complaints 
positively (or penalties for non-compliance), and external inspection of 
complaints handling with senior managers being held accountable for failure to 
meet standards.
Consultation preceding revisions to the model for children’s services complaints 
revealed a desire for similar requirements. In this context, the Children’s Rights 
Director sought views of children living away from home who were supported 
by social services201. These are set out in Chapter Seven, and indicate broad 
support for the model. Key features for children were accessibility, swift 
resolution and follow-up to ensure that changes were made. It would seem that 
the children’s services complaints model has the potential to offer what service 
users want. Whilst these were comments relating to ways in which the social 
services complaints model could be improved, nevertheless the extent to which 
the SEN appeals process lacks what is wanted is striking. It is characterised by
201 These were children in boarding schools, further education colleges, children’s homes, 
residential family centres, foster care and with adoptive families.
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the parents ‘fighting’ for their child202, and appears to exacerbate conflict. There 
is no assurance of service improvement.
6.2.2.4. How the model would address the problems identified in SEN 
disputes
Problems with the SEN appeals process identified in the thesis are set out 
below. It is then explained how the model addresses these problems.
• the system perpetuates inequality;
• initial decisions are made on a different basis to appeals;
• failure to give sufficient weight to collective goals at the appeal stage;
• inability to deal with all possible aspects of a dispute;
• excessive costs for parents in engaging expert witnesses to prepare 
reports and give evidence;
• access;
• too many appeals;
• conflict.
Because the children’s services complaints model envisages investigation and 
review, as opposed to a de novo appeal, all relevant factors, including both 
context and consequences, will form part of any reconsideration. Although there 
is emphasis on individuation, the focus is on ensuring decisions have been taken 
properly in line with the authority’s overall obligations. Thus there should be no 
instance of ‘perseverance bounties’ or queue-jumping and better assurance of 
overarching equality within the system as a whole. There is consideration of 
whether the initial decision was made properly and reasonably, as opposed to a 
different basis for decision-making. There is an equal balance of collective 
goals and individual interests. All aspects of a dispute are dealt with in one 
place. Because there is an investigation, it should be unnecessary for parents to 
commission expert evidence. Complainants are helped to access the system. It is 
local and designed to be easily accessible.
202 House of Commons Education and Skills Committee 2006; Hall 1999.
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It operates to diffuse conflict and to stop disputes from escalating. The child is 
the focus. Steps are taken to redress the risk of disadvantage arising from 
power-imbalance. The system is based on a culture of listening to complainants 
and seeking resolution, as opposed to conflict and winning battles. It is 
envisaged that most disputes will be resolved at the first stage. If a complaint 
progresses all the way to a Panel hearing, the period between lodging the 
complaint and the Panel hearing is 13 weeks, with a further 3 weeks for the 
authority to say how Panel recommendations will be implemented. This is 
quicker than the SENDIST appeal process, which takes 16-20 weeks to get to 
the hearing stage, and a further 10 working days for a decision.
6.2.2.5. How the model might operate in SEN disputes
Both Galligan and Adler have serious reservations about making assumptions 
that a model used in one context may be suitable in another. These are 
considered in the final Chapter. If it is accepted that the CSCP is a model that 
could resolve the problems identified with the SENDIST appeals process in this 
thesis, the next stage would be a feasibility study and cost-benefit analysis. 
Below are some initial suggestions about how the CSCP model might operate in 
SEN disputes. There are a number of issues requiring further consideration.
The system of de novo appeals to an independent tribunal would be replaced by 
a complaints process comprising conciliation, investigation and review by an 
independent Panel. Complaints could be about: all of the LEA decisions that 
may currently be appealed to the SENDIST, and any other unwelcome or 
disputed decision related to a child’s SEN; delay in the assessment process or in 
the making of provision; the management of the assessment and review 
processes; the quality or appropriateness of any provision made, or arranged, by 
the LEA; the attitude or behaviour of staff; eligibility criteria and their 
application; and the impact of policies on individual children. Available 
remedies would comprise: the LEA undertaking appropriate specified action to 
redress the complaint, to eliminate poor practice and to improve services; the 
making of apologies; and the payment of compensation. Questions arising are 
whether such a system would constitute a fair procedure and whether additional 
steps should be taken to ensure decisions are complied with. The CSCP
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envisages that Panels make recommendations, whereas SENDIST decisions are 
binding upon LEAs.
The effect of introducing an internal complaints procedure encompassing 
investigation of all aspects of SEN disputes would mean that the LGO would be 
involved in fewer cases. The LGO generally defer to local procedures unless 
there is some indication that these are not being operated properly. If the 
procedure operates as it should to secure swift resolution, applications to the 
Administrative Court for Mandamus in urgent cases should be rare, but would 
not be precluded.
There would be a need to appoint CMs and to assemble advice and advocacy 
services. The role of the PPS could be redefined within this context. PPOs 
might fulfil the role of CMs and IPSs the advocacy role. It appears some PPSs 
are under-resourced, whereas there may be under-use of regional mediation 
services that are paid fixed fees. These services might be used more cost- 
effectively if brought within a complaints/advocacy/informal resolution service 
operating at arms-length from the LEA.
Mediation may, or may not, feature at the informal stage, depending upon what 
emerges from the ongoing studies. If mediation is to feature, consideration 
should be given either to incorporating a rights-based model or imposing a 
requirement upon LEAs to provide advocates for parents. Rights-based 
conciliation is advocated as the more cost-effective option. As explained further 
in the next Chapter, it is considered that advocacy services should be available 
for children.
Under the CSCP, investigations are conducted by IOs, who are local authority 
officers, and adjudicated upon by senior managers who are independent of the 
service under investigation with oversight by IPs. The question is whether an 
investigation conducted in this way could provide a competent and rigorous 
review in the context of SEN disputes that involve determinations made within 
a complex legislative and case law framework.
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Competence is an important issue. On the one hand, there is no reason to 
suppose that local authority officers would not be competent to investigate SEN 
complaints since they are trusted to be initial decision-makers within this 
complex legal framework. Also, the legal framework relating to provision of 
care services for both children and adults is similar to the legal framework 
governing provision for SEN insofar as both are based upon discretion to 
provide services based upon needs assessments203. Arguably, if local authority 
officers are deemed competent investigators of children’s services complaints, 
they should be deemed competent investigators of SEN complaints.
On the other hand, the function of any review should be a higher level re­
consideration. This is ensured, to some extent, by the fact that the adjudication 
is conducted at senior manager level, but there also needs to be an assurance 
that the 10 will be capable of understanding the nature of children’s SEN and 
the LEA’s obligations towards them in order to present a report for 
adjudication. In relation to the assurance of SEN expertise, possibilities are that 
there could be a requirement for IOs to undertake training to enable them to 
develop relevant expertise. Alternatively, there might be a requirement that IOs 
be educational psychologists, or that investigations be conducted by the 
educational psychology service, as in the Gersch case study referred to in 
Chapter Five. The (former) House of Commons Education and Skills 
Committee have called for these services to operate at arms-length from local 
authorities. Parents might have more confidence about the fairness of 
investigations conducted by an arms-length service.
In relation to the assurance that the 10 and adjudicator have an understanding of 
the legal framework and relevant case law, investigations may involve 
consideration of issues such as whether it is reasonable for the initial decision­
maker to have preferred the evidence of one witness over another; whether 
provision is adequate to meet a child’s needs; whether speech therapy (and 
other types of therapy) should be in Part 3 of a statement; what constitutes an 
efficient use of resources or reasonable use of public expenditure; whether
203 See section 17 of the Children Act 1989 and section 47 of the NHS and Community Care Act 
1990.
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criteria for assessment and statementing are lawful and whether discretion has 
been exercised lawfully and rationally. Extracting principles from the case law 
relating to these issues and applying them to particular sets of facts may be a 
difficult exercise.
Although Gulland’s 2006 study found that few complainants viewed their 
complaints in ‘legalistic’ terms -  as a breach of entitlement to services, or of 
procedural rights -  and were not seeking ‘legalistic’ solutions, nevertheless 
solutions must be in accordance with the law, even if they are not expressed in 
‘legalistic’ terms. There are two possible methods of achieving this. The first is 
to acknowledge that it is essential for specialist legal advice to be made 
available to both the 10 and the adjudicator in relation to individual complaints, 
and to have procedures requiring that such advice is sought, and that reports are 
cleared with lawyers before they are finalised. The second possibility is that 
advocated by former SENDIST President, Trevor Aldridge, in the context of 
SEN and Mashaw in arguing the need for a superbureau -  that the principles 
must be established and set out clearly, obviating the need to rely upon case 
law.
The complexity of the legal framework strengthens the argument for having a 
qualified lawyer at the Panel stage. If the CSCP model were to be adopted for 
SEN disputes and the SENDIST replaced by local Panels comprised of 
volunteers (as per the model), there would be a loss of expertise. The SENDIST 
comprises legally qualified chairs and lay members with relevant experience. 
This is a tribunal that is highly regarded, and which has been suggested as an 
alternative to local Panels hearing exclusion appeals by both Harris and the 
Council on Tribunals204. What might be a possibility is the SENDIST 
undertaking the review stage. This could involve SENDIST members 
comprising independent Review Panels. Another possibility would be the 
SENDIST conducting a triage process to determine whether to conduct a further 
investigation or a review incorporating an oral hearing, depending upon the 
circumstances of the case and the complainant’s wishes.
204 Harris 2000 and Council on Tribunals 2003.
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A different possibility would be that the SENDIST lay members could 
undertake the role of IPs in second-stage investigations, with legally qualified 
chairs conducting the third-stage review. It appears currently that SENDIST 
members, through no fault of their own, are under-used. They undertake 
preparation for hearings that never take place because cases settle at the last 
moment, which is a waste of resources. A staged and managed system focused 
on resolution is less likely to have high numbers of last minute settlements. The 
time and expertise of SENDIST members could be put to better use within such 
a system.
If Panels were to be comprised of volunteers, as per the CSCP model, this is 
likely to prove unpopular with parents. The SENDIST replaced local Panels 
considering SEN appeals because they were not perceived as sufficiently 
independent. Although, at that time, Panels comprised elected members (and 
this would not be envisaged), a move back to local Panels might be seen as a 
retrograde step by parents. There are differing views about arms-length bodies 
that are supposed to be impartial but are convened by the body whose decision 
is being reconsidered. Although criticism of social services Review Panels has 
not been extensive , there have been significant criticisms of local Panels 
hearing admissions and exclusions appeals relating to competence and lack of 
independence .
A further question is whether, if the SENDIST (or SENDIST chairs) undertook 
the role of inquisitorial review, they could continue to operate as a tribunal 
within the Tribunal Service and, if this were possible, whether this should be the 
case. It would be a departure from the CSCP model. Local Review Panels under 
this model do not operate as tribunals under the supervision of the 
Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council, presumably because they do not
205 Williams and Ferris did not believe that the involvement of local authority staff (or 
councillors for that matter) in complaints compromised the independence of Panels. They 
concluded that local knowledge was valuable and perceived as such by complainants (Williams 
and Ferris 2005).
206 See Harris 2000, Leggatt 2001, Coldron 2002, Council on Tribunals 2003, House of 
Commons 2004, DfES 2005 and Coldron 2008. The case of R (T by his mother and Litigation  
Friend) v Independent Appeal Panel fo r  Devon County Council & the Governing Body o fX  
College [2007] EWHC 763 (Admin) presents a clear example of a failure by an exclusions 
panel to understand the reasoning process that must be undertaken in an appeal involving 
disability discrimination.
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operate adversarial procedures and because they do not make binding 
determinations. There is an example of a tribunal that conducts inquisitorial 
reviews under the supervision of the Council. This is the Schools Adjudicator. 
If there were concerns about non-compliance with Panel recommendations, 
consideration could be given to whether the Panel, comprising SENDIST 
members, could continue to operate within the framework of the Tribunals 
Service. This would mean no structural change to the operation of the 
SENDIST, merely a change in procedures. It would also mean there would be a 
right of appeal to a second-tier Tribunal when it comes into existence. This is 
considered further in the next section and in section 7.6.
The CSCP model might operate in the context of SEN disputes as follows:
THE CSCP MODEL ADAPTED FOR SEN DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Stage 1 -  Local Resolution
Complainant may complain about an LEA as described above.
The complaint may be made to any LEA officer or to the CO.
If made to an LEA officer, the CO must be notified that a complaint has been 
made within 24 hours.
The CO must record the complaint.
Where the complainant is a child, an advocate must be appointed.
The CO will liaise with the complainant and the advocate to determine the 
appropriate form of local resolution. It might be possible to resolve the 
complaint immediately by simply agreeing to provide what the complainant is 
seeking. Where agreement is reached in this way, the CO records the outcome. 
Where an immediate solution cannot be agreed, an appropriate form of local 
resolution will (if possible) be agreed with the complainant -  this might take 
the form of a meeting with the school or LEA officers or relevant professionals 
or ‘formal’ rights-based mediation.
The CM, the IP and advocate are present at the meeting or mediation.
This first stage must be completed within 10 working days unless the 
complainant agrees to an extension. If a solution is agreed, the CO records that 
the complaint has been resolved.
The complainant may by-pass this first stage and insist that the complaint be 
investigated. The CO might also be able to insist on an investigation.
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If not resolved
If not resolved
If not resolved
Referral to the Second-tier Tribunal or to Education and Children’s Services 
Ombudsman (see pps. 261-262)____________________________________
The complainant may request a review within 20 days of receipt of the 
investigation report, or at any time if the recommendations in the report are not 
complied with.
An independent Panel will consider the report of the investigation and will 
conduct a review of its adequacy and the adequacy of the recommendations.
Stage 3 -  Review Panel
The CM arranges an investigation that produces a report and an adjudication 
within 25 working days. The complainant may agree for the period to be 
extended, but the maximum period is 65 working days.
An IO conducts the investigation and presents a report to the IP and the child’s 
advocate for comment. A senior manager not linked to the case adjudicates.
If the complainant is content with the outcome of the investigation and any 
recommendations, the CM records that the complaint has been resolved.
Stage 2 -  Investigation
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6.3. A UNIFIED COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE
The table below sets out a list of possible complaints that could be made about 
education and children’s services provided by local authorities and maintained 
schools, and the mechanisms for dealing with them.
POSSIBLE COMPLAINTS ABOUT MAINTAINED SCHOOLS AND 
LOCAL AUTHORITY EDCATION AND CHILDREN’S SERVICES
Nature of Complaint Dispute Resolution 
Mechanism
Legislation
Complaint that LA or GB in 
breach of statutory duty or 
acting unreasonably in 
relation to exercise of 
education and children’s 
services functions (other 
than SEN functions 
specifically subject to 
SENDIST appeals)
Secretary of State 
LGO
Administrative Court
Sections 496 and 497 
EA 1996
Nature of Complaint Dispute Resolution 
Mechanism
Legislation
Complaint about school 
admission arrangements
Adjudicator Section 90 SSFA 1998
Appeal against decision not 
to admit a child to school of 
parents’ choice (where child 
not statemented).
AAP Section 94 SSFA 1998
Appeal against 
exclusion
GB
LAP
Section 52 EA 2002.
Complaint about the 
curriculum
School complaints 
procedure
Section 409 EA 1996
Complaint about the school 
or extended services
School complaints 
procedure
Section 29 EA 2002.
Complaint about the quality 
of provision in a school
Ofsted Section 11A EA 
2005207
Complaint about pattern of 
education in a LA area
LA Section 14A EA 
1996208
Complaint about 
home/school transport, 
including SEN transport
LA
LGO
Secretary of State Section 496/497 of the 
1996 Act
207 Inserted by section 160 of the Education and Inspections Act 2006.
208 Inserted by section 3 of the 2006 Act.
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Complaint of disability 
discrimination relating to 
provision of education
SENDIST
AAP (admissions)
LAP (exclusions)
LGO(maladministratio
n/process)
Administrative Court
(policies/urgent
applications)
Part 2 SENDA
Complaint about children’s 
services
CSCP Representations 
Procedure (England) 
Regulations 2006
SEN Schools complaints
procedure
Conciliation
Mediation
SENDIST
LGO
Administrative Court
Complaint about school’s 
refusal to admit child where 
school is named in 
statement
Secretary of State Section 497 EA 1996
‘LA’ means local authority; ‘GB’ means governing body; ‘EA 1996’ is the 
Education Act 1996; ‘SSFA 1998’ is the School Standards and Framework Act 
1998; ‘EA 2002’ is the Education Act 2002; ‘EA 2005’ is the Education Act 
2005; ‘AAP’ is an Admissions Appeals Panel; ‘LAP’ means an Independent 
Panel dealing with exclusion appeals. The table relates to schools maintained by 
LEAs. Academies have a different complaints framework, as do independent 
schools.
There are 13 different procedures all involving different bodies. The DCSF’s
Children’s Plan states:
Parents’ complaints will be managed in a straightforward and open way 
and as many issues as possible will be resolved quickly. Parents, 
particularly those who may not be so readily engaged, will understand 
the route to follow when they have a complaint. We will review what 
more can be done to streamline and strengthen these arrangements, 
(paragraph 3.25).
The Department is looking to facilitate a coherent complaints procedure and at 
arrangements for ensuring that advocacy for children is systematically
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available. What is envisaged may be ‘one-door’ access. In contrast to the 
position relating to education and children’s services complaints, there is a 
‘one-door’ access system in place for adults’ health and social care complaints, 
simplifying the process for complainants. A single complaint may relate to the 
actions of both private and public bodies providing services under different 
legislative regimes. Where complaints involve more than one body, the CM for 
the body receiving the complaint arranges for aspects of the complaint relating 
to their services to be investigated and sends details of other aspects to relevant 
bodies. The CM then drives the process forward to ensure compliance with 
timescales and coordinates production of a single response.
To illustrate how ‘one-door’ access might operate for education and children’s 
services complaints and to compare this with the current system, it is helpful to 
consider a hypothetical example. A 12-year-old boy with an autistic spectrum 
disorder and behavioural difficulties attends a high-achieving mainstream 
school. Staff at the school recognise that he has learning difficulties, and request 
a formal assessment. They are concerned about the extent to which his 
behaviour is disrupting the class. The LEA do not believe the boy’s needs are as 
severe as is suggested. Neither do they consider that the school have exhausted 
all of the strategies at their disposal for helping him. The request is refused. The 
boy is subsequently excluded. Despite an obligation upon governing bodies to 
provide education from the sixth day following an exclusion, no education is 
provided209. His parents struggle to cope with his behaviour at home. His social 
worker fails to provide respite care.
Under the current system, the boy cannot appeal to the SENDIST about refusal 
to assess or to an LAP against the exclusion. These are the rights of his parents. 
The boy or his parents could make a complaint to the Secretary of State under 
section 496 or 497 of the Education Act 1996 about the failure to provide him 
with education following the exclusion, or bring an application for Mandamus 
injudicial review proceedings. The boy, anybody acting on his behalf, his
209 See regulation 3(1) of the Education (Provision of Full-Time Education for Excluded Pupils) 
(England) Regulations 2007 (S.I. 2007/1870).
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parents, or both he and his parents can complain about the failure to provide 
respite care under the CSCP.
If there were ‘one-door’ access, the parents or the boy could complain to a CM 
who would direct different aspects of the complaint to the relevant mechanisms 
and coordinate a response. But there would still be a plethora of mechanisms. If 
the parents wished to appeal both the exclusion and the failure to assess, they 
would need to prepare case statements, commission expert reports, attend 
hearings, and engage witnesses for each relevant tribunal.
If there were to be a single education and children’s services complaints 
procedure based upon the CSCP model, the boy or any person on his behalf, his 
parents (or both) could make a complaint. The CM would assist the boy to find 
an advocate. The authority would then endeavour to resolve all aspects of the 
complaint informally. If this were not possible, the complainant(s) may request 
an investigation. It might be possible to agree arrangements for short-term 
educational provision and respite care pending the outcome of the investigation. 
But there would appear to be a need to introduce a fast-track procedure to 
determine issues needing to be resolved urgently where agreement cannot be 
reached.
An IO would identify and investigate each aspect of the complaint with 
oversight by an IP. The IO could seek views from educational psychologists and 
other relevant professionals, and would speak to the child, parents and staff at 
the school. If each aspect were upheld, the outcome might be recommendations 
that the boy be reinstated at the school pending the outcome of an assessment; 
that an assessment be conducted; that the school and the local authority 
apologise; and that compensation be awarded. Investigation of exclusions 
would be a significant departure from the current system, but it would bring 
exclusions in line with procedures for other complaints about schools.
This introduces a further argument for a single system based upon the CSCP. 
The guidance on schools’ complaints procedures (DfES 2003) recommends that 
they follow the three stage CSCP model, except that there is no suggestion that
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children can complain and no provision of advocates. This means that 
complaints about the actions of schools in relation to SEN are already being 
dealt with under a model with the same structural basis as the CSCP. Adopting 
this model for SEN complaints about LEAs would bring consistency. The third- 
stage of the school complaints procedure comprises a review Panel of 
governors, which would not be sufficiently independent, particularly for 
consideration of exclusion appeals. However, proposals are currently under 
consideration for an independent body to undertake the review stage of schools 
complaints, with either the local authority or the Government Office conducting 
investigations. This might be considered a sufficiently independent 
reconsideration and an improvement on the current system in place for 
exclusion appeals, provided compliance could be assured and investigations 
could be conducted quickly210.
If the boy or his parents are unhappy with the outcome of the investigation, they 
can request a review. The expectation would be that most complaints would be 
resolved at the first or second stages. The research on social services complaints 
shows this to be the case (Gulland 2006 and Ferris 2006). The review stage 
might comprise the CM asking the relevant body to conduct a review. Where 
there is a need for more than one body to be involved, the CM would send 
details of the relevant aspects of complaint to the bodies having jurisdiction and 
coordinate a single response.
If sending complaints to different review bodies proved problematic,
possibilities for their amalgamation to form a single review body might be
considered. The question of whether this should be a tribunal or an Ombudsman
would need careful consideration. As stated previously, it would be unusual for
a tribunal to adopt inquisitorial procedures, though there is a precedent for this
211and it might be an attractive route if there were concerns about enforcement .
210 It is acknowledged that the suggestion that admission and exclusion appeals should be 
subsumed into a unified system is not one that should be made as an aside in a thesis about 
SEN. Whether this would solve the problems identified with Admission and Exclusion Appeals 
Panels would need to be the subject of further detailed consideration.
211 Compliance with recommendations by local authorities is unlikely to be problematic -  see 
further section 7.6., but the issue of whether there might be a need to impose binding decisions 
upon schools needs further consideration.
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What would be more in keeping with the CSCP model would be an Education 
and Children’s Services Ombudsman. Such a body might be given the functions 
envisaged for Mashaw’s superbureau, namely the drafting of specialist 
legislation and the ability to provide guidance on training and managerial 
techniques in addition to the function of reviewing the findings of complaints 
investigations.
‘One-door’ access will not assure proportionate dispute resolution. There is a 
need for rationalisation and unity of procedures -  for a single model that attains 
all of the PDR goals; has a single access point; and is managed to ensure 
complaints are driven forward within a culture of listening to complainants. It is 
clear, however, that a considerable amount of further thinking is needed about 
how a single system would operate. The thesis presents a single system as the 
ultimate PDR goal, but recognises that there may be significant practical 
difficulties with its implementation.
An argument for amalgamating the SEN dispute resolution system with the 
CSCP is the need for a change to the culture within which SEN decision­
making and dispute resolution operate. It does not appear to be one of listening 
to children and parents. It has been characterised as a ‘battle ground’, with 
LEAs being more concerned about resources than children’s needs. Mashaw 
argues that ‘cultural engineering’ is necessary. Under an amalgamated system, 
children’s services managers could fulfil the adjudication role and the expertise 
of IPs and advocates could be used to ‘infuse’ the process with people 
accustomed to operating within the ‘children’s services culture’. This may assist 
cultural change in SEN decision-making.
A further argument for a single complaints system is the need for a single 
system of determining provision for children with both educational and social 
needs. The need for this has been argued by the Audit Commission. Their 2002 
report (Audit Commission 2002b) identified the damage caused by having 
separate SEN policies and sidelining children with SEN from other political 
agendas. In their contribution to the Select Committee’s 2007 Report (p. 11), 
they suggest that the holistic objectives of the Common Assessment Framework
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implemented under the ‘Every Child Matters’ agenda should apply to children 
with SEN, and they recommend that assessment and funding of SEN should be 
transferred to Children’s Trusts to allow shared budgets and joined-up planning. 
It is hoped that the Audit Commission and the Committee will continue to press 
for this. Whilst a single complaints system is needed regardless of whether there 
is a single framework of provision, it would be consistent with this much- 
needed wider reform.
In relation to the avenues of complaint identified in the table at the beginning of 
this section, the Secretary of State, LGO, Adjudicator, Ofsted and maintained 
schools all conduct inquisitorial procedures, whilst AAPs, LAPs and the 
SENDIST conduct de novo appeals. Yet in all instances what is being 
considered is whether a public body has failed to act reasonably. It is difficult to 
understand why the procedures should be different.
The creation of appeals procedures serves to create the appearance of conferring 
meaningful rights. However, for the reasons advanced by Adler and others and 
set out on pps.151-2 of the thesis, such procedures appear to create more 
problems than they solve -  defensiveness on the part of officials; those who 
gain do so at the expense of others; procedural rights confer the appearance of 
legality whilst undermining meaningful reform; detrimental effects are caused 
by the tyranny of small decisions. The fact that ensuring a reasonable balance 
between individuation and collective goals has been problematic in admission, 
exclusion and SEN appeals212 appeals suggests that, if there is to be a unified 
procedure, it should be an inquisitorial review - a procedure facilitating 
investigation of whether decisions are reasonable having regard to the 
implications for all children affected by them, and with the operational goals of 
resolving conflict and improving services.
In relation to the options for change identified in Chapter Four, it is now clear 
which of these is argued for and why. In relation to the other suggestions:
212 See Harlow and Rawlings 1997 p. 464 in relation to polycentric decisions in admissions 
appeals; Harris 2000 for the problems with exclusions appeals; and the Council on Tribunals 
2003 for criticisms of admission and exclusion appeals.
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• bureaucratic rationality plus the superbureau - an internal review 
without independent oversight would not constitute a fair procedure. 
Fair procedures are discussed in section 7.6.
• widening the remit of the SENDIST -  the thesis recommends that 
Panels will be comprised of SENDIST members. Their remit will be 
wider than the SENDIST’s current remit.
• the LGO dealing with all SEN disputes - although the LGO 
complaints process assures most of the PDR goals because it follows 
the inquisitorial model, arguably the CSCP model is a better one 
because it is specialist and managed locally.
• choice -  a choice of procedure might be envisaged if the body, or 
bodies, conducting the stage-three review were to operate in the manner 
envisaged for the CSCI in social services complaints213.
• independent assessment -  as stated previously, separation of the 
decision-making functions relating to provision and funding is 
problematic. If independent assessors make decisions, this risks budgets 
spiraling out of control and cuts in other services. If they make 
recommendations, implementation would be considered taking into 
account available resources and other obligations. The DCSF have said 
they are considering piloting the contracting-out of the assessment 
function. A number of LEAs have been directed by the Secretary of 
State to contract-out this function because they have failed to perform it 
adequately. The DCSF are not aware of any LEAs that have voluntarily 
contracted-out this function, although it would be open to them to do so. 
If the DCSF are able to instigate a pilot study, its outcome will be 
informative as to whether taking steps to assure independent assessment 
might be a worthwhile reform. But this proposal stems from the 
perception that LEAs are more concerned with resources than 
children’s needs. Arguably what necessary is for measures to be put in
213 The consultation document An Independent Voice -  New Social Services Complaints 
Procedure (Commission for Social Care Inspection 2004) proposed that the CSCI undertake 
third stage reviews of social services complaints and be afforded discretion to arrange an oral 
hearing by a Panel; conduct a further investigation; refer the complaint to the LGO; or take no 
further action.
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place to ensure proper weight is given to children’s needs and to foster 
confidence in the process.
• re-assessment by an independent professional appeal Panel -  this 
would be expensive for the State and intrusive. It would necessitate 
children having to repeat a barrage of tests. The Panel would need to 
have information about other children to whom the LEA owed 
obligations, available resources and local provision. The CSCP model 
of an investigation followed by independent review should ensure that 
LEAs are properly fulfilling their obligations, and would be less 
intrusive for the child.
There is a crucial element of PDR that has been neglected in the discussion.
This is that initial decision-making must be improved. Arguably, this is more 
important than consideration of complaints procedures since, however effective 
and accessible such procedures are, not everyone who is unhappy will 
complain. Therefore, the “Evans practices” (see p. 169) are crucial and reflect a 
culture similar to that imbued in the CSCP. These could be defined as standards, 
compliance with which could be examined on inspection. Also, the evidence of 
LEAs’ preoccupation with resources and battle-ground culture would suggest 
that Mashaw’s recommendations of training, QA and management techniques 
are needed to ensure cultural change. A cost-benefit and feasibility study could 
be carried out to assess whether parents and children should attend Panel 
meetings where decisions are made, forcing LEAs to recognise them as people, 
as opposed to names on a list.
The final Chapter is about rights, children, fair procedures and justice.
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Chapter Seven
Rights, Children, Fair Procedures and Justice
Our self-esteem and sense of worth are bound up with the right to 
determine what shall be done to and with our bodies and minds. 
(Dworkin, G. 1982 p.203).
PPO: “I saw this question [Do you elicit children’s views?] and I 
thought ‘Well actually we don’t,’ and I thought ‘Well why don’t we?’ 
and the reason is because we are empowering parents -  we very rarely 
actually meet the child...”
LEA Officer: “I mean it’s rare that as an LEA officer we meet
children, it’s always a slightly unreal position because you find yourself 
in a meeting where you’re the only person there who’s never met the 
child.”
LEA Officer: “We don’t really listen to children and young people.” 
(University of Exeter. A. 2004 pp.8-9.).
7.1, CHAPTER SUMMARY
The Previous Chapter suggested the CSCP model as a promising one for SEN 
disputes and for a unified children’s complaints procedure dealing with all 
complaints about LEA and maintained schools’ provision of education and 
related extended services, and children’s services. Although the thesis argues 
the need for a unified system, due to word limit constraints, it does not consider 
whether, and how, complaints about independent schools could be brought 
within this system nor deal with the practicalities of incorporating admission 
and exclusion appeals within such a system. This would need to be the subject 
of further work.
The CSCP enables children, of any age, to complain, and helps them to do so. 
Arguments in favour of enabling this are that giving children the status of 
complainant is the only way of enabling their true views to heard. However, 
there is evidence in various studies that, even where children are given party 
status and separate representation in court proceedings, they remain ‘out of 
hearing’ (Masson 1999), with the proceedings being dominated by the views of 
adults. Arguments against enabling children to complain are that this would 
overburden them; complaining that a school is not meeting a child’s needs
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might place the child in a difficult position vis-a-vis that school; that parents 
should complain on their children’s behalf because they are the guardians of 
their best interests in taking forward any complaint; that helping children to 
complain is an unwarranted interference with parents’ right to bring up their 
children, and may lead to conflict between children and their parents.
The argument of unwarranted interference might be stronger if it were 
envisaged that children should be the sole complainants. But as parents can 
complain, instead of, or in addition to, their children, allowing children to 
complain removes nothing from parents in terms of rights. Giving children a 
right to complain will not cause them to disagree with their parents, it will 
enable the child’s view to be given proper status in any consideration where 
such disagreement exists.
A basis is needed to decide between competing arguments. A model for 
children’s rights developed by Eekelaar appears to provide a reasonable 
benchmark. When assessing the current SEN decision-making and dispute 
resolution provisions with reference to this benchmark, it appears that it is 
reached in terms of what it envisaged in relation to the involvement of children 
in decision-making (though whether what is required in the Code of Practice is 
being implemented appears questionable), but it is not reached in terms of the 
provisions for children’s involvement in dispute resolution. Enabling children to 
complain, as envisaged by the CSCP model, comes closer to meeting this 
benchmark. But in view of the evidence that so few parents of children with 
SEN complain, arguably there is a need for more. Where schools or other 
agencies are concerned that children’s needs are not being met, they should be 
pro-active in referring cases to advocacy services to enable the matter to be 
pursued.
The Chapter discusses children’s rights; the right to education and enforcement 
of that right; participation; respect for private and family life and procedural 
justice. It considers Adler’s recommendations for achievement of PDR and 
explains why the recommendations in this thesis (which are different) provide a
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promising model in terms of SEN. It concludes with a return to the research 
question, and observations on access and justice
7.2. CHILDREN’S RIGHTS ■ A BENCHMARK
Rights are relationships; they are institutionally defined rules specifying 
what people can do in relation to one another. (Freeman 1992 p.28).
Leaving discussion of the child’s role in SEN decision-making and dispute 
resolution to the final Chapter is not reflective of failure to attach importance to 
this issue. Ensuring that children’s true views inform the SEN decision-making 
and dispute resolution systems is of paramount importance. The discussion is 
situated here to enable it to take place in the context of both the existing system 
for resolution of SEN disputes and the proposals for reform. Various rights are 
involved in this discussion - the right to education; to participation in decision­
making; to respect for private and family life; and procedural fairness. These are 
recognised by international instruments -  the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC)), the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
Rights under the ECHR are the rights of both parents and children, and are 
enforceable in the English courts. Policies must be drawn up with reference to 
these rights. The other significant instrument in this discussion is the UNCRC 
which, although binding on the UK, does not confer directly enforceable rights, 
and is written in terms that are too vague to be easily translatable into 
obligations in domestic law. It has been influential, however, in terms of policy­
making and court decisions relating to children.
Flekkoy and Kaufman (1997) say, as long as Robinson Crusoe was alone on his
desert island, he did not need rights. He had liberty and autonomy, but did not
need to exercise rules of social interaction:
The concept of human rights rests on a basic concern for the protection 
of dignity, integrity and equality of the individual as well as for society. 
When the strong elements in a population dominate the weaker, 
society’s need to control becomes a question of the degree to which
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control of the individual is necessary in order that society might 
function. (Ibid p.6).
The ethical, moral and psychological reasons for establishing rights are 
interpreted into legal rights through national law. In order to consider whether 
children have meaningful rights, it is necessary to consider, briefly, the 
fundamental question of what rights are.
Dworkin's thesis is that, if persons have moral rights, they must be accorded 
these rights even if a utilitarian calculation shows that the general good would 
be maximised by denying them (Dworkin. R.M. 1979). He invokes Rawls’ 'A 
Theory of Justice' (Rawls 1973) in support of this. Rawls proposes a 
methodology of reflective equilibrium whereby people choose the structure of 
the society in which they live by designing moral principles to fit moral 
judgments through the mechanism of a social contract model. Autonomy lies at 
the root of the Rawlsian contractarian conception. Rights comprise both 
equality and autonomy. In contrast to utilitarianism where individual life 
choices may be overridden if others are to be made better off, rights protect the 
integrity of persons leading their lives in the way they choose.
Dworkin identifies the existence of a moral right against the state in terms of 
saying for 'some reason’, the state would 'do wrong' to treat a person in a certain 
way even if it was in the general interest to do so. He sees Rawls' contractual 
mechanism as a moral metaphor and believes that all principles derive from a 
fundamental principle of equal concern and respect for each person. For 
Dworkin, equal respect is a fundamental political right. Governments have a 
moral duty to treat all citizens with equal concern and respect unless there is a 
good reason for treating them differently. But what constitutes a good reason is 
a particularly difficult question where children are concerned. As Freeman says, 
gender, colour and age are now universally accepted as indefensible 
distinctions, but age continues to ground legitimate discrimination in relation to 
children. (Freeman 1992).
Freeman describes children as the victims of the 'double standard which is 
deeply embedded in our social practices and well established in our laws, with
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one set of rights for adults (providing them with opportunities to exercise their 
powers) and another for children (providing them with protection and at the 
same time keeping them under adult control).' What is childhood (he says) other 
than a concept invented by adults? In any event, having rights will not improve 
conditions or people. Rights are about acting within relationships, and are only 
as useful as their implementation permits. (Freeman 1992 p.29)
Children’s rights have been the subject of much discussion. Fortin (2003) asks 
whether a body of literature may be used as a basis to apply legal rights to 
children in a way that promotes their moral and legal rights effectively. She 
observes that theorists have concentrated on finding an ideal theoretical model 
for the concept of children’s rights, and that, although their contributions remain 
at the level of intellectual conjecture, they nevertheless provide a theoretical 
rigour that the subject would otherwise lack. Problematic issues are 
competence, conflict of rights and the extent to which rights may be overridden 
by paternalistic interventions where children choose a path that may not be in 
their best interests. Children may have the right to have their decision-making 
powers respected, whilst also having the right to be protected.
Fortin divides the theoretical writers into 2 camps -  the ‘children’s 
liberationists’ whom she suggests over-emphasised the importance of children’s 
rights to enjoy adult freedoms, but nevertheless made an important contribution 
to the debate by generating interest in children’s ability to take greater 
responsibility for their lives, and the ‘children should be allowed to be children’ 
writers.
Holt (1974) and Farson (1978), the most well-known children’s liberationists, 
suggested that it was a form of oppressive and unwarranted discrimination to 
exclude children from the adult world, and considered children should have the 
same rights as adults. Writers, such as Campbell (1992), argued in response that 
there are dangers in ignoring the slow rate of children’s physical and mental 
development by giving them the same rights as adults; that children should be 
protected from being forced into adulthood before they are sufficiently mature;
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and that interfering in children’s relationships with their parents may result in 
potential damage to the family unit as a whole.
More recent children’s liberationists, such as Franklin (1995), have argued that
even young children are capable of making informed choices. Freeman (1992)
suggests that, whilst special treatment of children can be justified where they
lack capacity and maturity, the goal is to bring them to a capacity where they
are able to take responsibility for their lives. This involves allowing children to
make mistakes. The law’s treatment of children in determining their
competence with relation to arbitrary age limits is open to criticism. This is
reflected in the Gillick decision, where Lord Scarman said:
If the law should impose on the process of “growing up” fixed time 
limits where nature knows only a continuous process, the price would be 
artificiality and lack of realism in an area where the law must be 
sensitive to human development and social change.214
Fortin observes that this case translated the concept of a qualified form of 
teenage autonomy into new legal principles governing the boundaries between 
parents’ rights and children’s rights by suggesting that, in some circumstances, 
parents have no right to interfere in decisions taken by mature teenagers.
At the opposite extreme, John Stuart Mill considered that it was justifiable for 
adults to make choices on behalf of children because children are not capable of 
rational autonomy. The promotion of children’s rights conflicts with their 
welfare because they have not yet developed the cognitive capacity to make 
intelligent decisions in the light of relevant information and their judgment is 
prone to be ‘wild and variable under the instance of emotional inconstancy’ 
(Mill 1859 p.73).
Further arguments against giving rights to children are that parents are, for the 
most part, adults who know and love their children best, and are rightly cast by 
the state in a caring role, enabling them to exercise powers over their children. 
Purdy (1992) suggests that giving children more liberties renders the parental 
role unworkable and untenable. Goldstein, Freud and Solnit (1973) argue that
214 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority. [1986] AC 112 p i86.
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parents cannot carry out child-rearing responsibilities with any confidence if 
subject to constant scrutiny; families operate most successfully if allowed to 
develop their own values, therefore family autonomy is essential to a well- 
ordered society; the state has not the resources or sensitivity to do a good job of 
parenting instead of parents. This non-interventionist approach reflects Article 8 
of the ECHR -  the right to respect for private and family life - and is followed 
in the Children Act 1989. But it assumes that generally the interests of children 
and parents are the same, and overlooks the fact that children also have rights 
under Article 8.
MacCormick (1982) argues that it is possible to acknowledge that children have 
rights, but that it is also possible to justify overriding those rights in their 
interests because children regularly perceive rights that are important to their 
long-term well-being, such as safety and discipline, as being the reverse of 
rights and advantages, however there is a need to maintain this in balance.
Fortin argues that it might be possible to justify paternalistic coercion to ensure 
that children fulfil their potential, but this should not unduly restrict their 
capacities for decision-making. (Fortin 2003. p.23).
Flekkoy and Kaufman (1997 p.50) argue that abridgement of a child’s freedom 
on the basis of lack of competence must lead to a moral obligation to develop 
such competence to enable the child to exercise that freedom, rendering the 
limitation unnecessary. Children must be made aware of their rights and helped 
to develop the necessary skills to exercise them. The rights of the child must be 
seen as a
[...] complex, dynamic totality, where rights of self-expression and self- 
determination must be weighed with or against the rights for protection 
or development, with best interests as the guidelines for choice. This 
means that the child may not always be allowed to make the decisions, 
but it does not mean that he or she loses the right to voice an opinion (if 
he or she wants to and is able to do so) or the right to be informed about 
the reasons for a different decision. (Ibid. p.62).
If the basis of Convention rights is that every person is to be treated with respect 
for his dignity and integrity, this implies that adults, including parents, should 
respect children’s views. Dependency (they say) is not a reason to deny children
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rights because negotiation of participation based on respect can very well be 
carried out in relation to dependent persons (Ibid. p.65). They refer to ‘The trap 
[...] of considering children as one homogenous group, regardless of age, and 
without asking them, presuming that adults have all the answers.’ (Ibid. p.67).
Eekelar has advanced a model that deals with the issue of competence and 
achieves a balance between autonomy and protection for children. The model 
was developed in the context of considering whether children should be able to 
make decisions with significant consequences where parents considered the 
child’s chosen course of action was contrary to their best interests. This is 
different to the context of considering whether children should be allowed to 
complain. But, as the arguments against allowing children to complain might be 
that it would not be in their interests to ‘overburden’ them by giving them this 
right, or that it might conflict with their parents’ rights to decide what is best for 
them, the model presents a logical basis for resolving the dilemma of whether 
children should be given this right and the delineation between different 
interests.
The model has, as its goal, ‘to bring a child to the threshold of adulthood with 
the maximum opportunities to form and pursue life-goals that reflect as closely 
as possible an autonomous choice.’ (Eekelaar 1986 p. 169). However, mindful 
of the conflict arising between the interests of children and those of their 
parents, Eekelaar suggests that children’s interests be conceived only in terms 
of ‘those benefits which the subject might plausibly claim for himself. It is 
necessary to employ an adult’s ‘imaginative leap’, and guess what an adult 
might have wanted once he reaches the position of maturity (Ibid. p. 170).
This ‘leap’ suggests dividing children’s interests into three groups: basic (care 
and well-being); developmental (equal opportunity to maximise potential); and 
autonomy (freedom to choose lifestyle)215. If autonomy interests conflict with 
basic or developmental interests, the latter will always prevail. Eekelar justifies 
this by suggesting that few adults would retrospectively approve of the exercise
215 Other writers have defined similar categories of rights -  Freeman 1983a, Campbell 1992, 
Bevan 1989. Bevan has two broad categories - protective and self-assertive.
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of autonomy being allowed to prejudice life-chances. He considers that 
perceiving the relationship between children and their parents as ‘welfarist’ is 
inconsistent with the concept of children’s rights -  that if A has a right, that 
must be promoted by B in accordance with what B determines to be A’s 
welfare, then A has no rights at all. He argues that such a model fails to give 
proper respect to the human worth of the child, and that no assessment of how 
best to advance a child’s interests should take place without allowing the child 
to exercise choices. What is needed is a clear set of principles that respect 
choice whilst retaining the possibility to override it as a last resort.
Eekelaar developed a further version of the model based upon ‘objectivization’ 
and ‘dynamic self-determinism’ (Eekelaar 1994a). Its object is to enable acting 
with the object of furthering best interests to be reconciled with treating 
children as possessors of rights. The model does not rule out paternalism -  it is 
not a delegation of decision-making - but it assures that the child’s wishes are a 
significant factor in the adult’s decision. Determining what children want 
should be should be facilitated in a structured environment in which 
competence and personality can be assessed. The function of the model is to 
establish the most propitious environment for children to develop their 
personality. It envisages integration of children in decision-making and into the 
legal culture as an important constituent part of society.
Freeman describes the model as one of the best attempts at an answer to the 
question as to when limits should be imposed on rights in the name of best 
interests (Freeman 2007 p.7). Morrow describes it as ‘enabling children to make 
decisions in controlled conditions, the overall intention being to enhance their
916capacities for mature well-founded choices.’ (Morrow 1999 ). Fortin suggests
thatEekelaar’s model allows ‘respectable jurisprudential arguments for 
maintaining that a commitment to the concept of children’s rights does not 
prevent interventions to stop children making dangerous short-term choices, 
thereby protecting their potential for long-term autonomy.’ (Fortin 2004 p.72).
216 Cited in Freeman 2007 p.7.
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Eekelaar’s model of ‘dynamic self-determinism’ would seem a reasonable 
benchmark against which to evaluate children’s participation in SEN decision­
making and dispute resolution. The questions are:
• whether children should be able to enforce their education rights -  i.e. 
whether they should be the complainant in any disputes resolution 
process, or a participant;
• if they are participants, what the extent of their participation should be; 
and
• how their ongoing participation in SEN decision-making might be 
facilitated.
The first step in this analysis is to consider the nature of the substantive right to 
education.
7.3. EDUCATION 
7.3.1. Rights
Harris observes that there are two fundamental principles enshrined in 
international treaty obligations relating to the right to education -  ‘universality’ 
(that education, or at least primary education, must be provided free of charge to 
all) and ‘equal access’ (Harris 2007 p.37). Article 13 of the ICESCR envisages 
education as generally available and accessible to all; Article 23 of the UNCRC 
provides that ‘handicapped’ children have the right to special care, education 
and training to help them achieve the greatest possible self-reliance and to lead 
a full and active life in society; Article 28 recognises the right of the child to 
education with a view to achieving this right progressively and on the basis of 
equal opportunity217, but Articles 23 and 28 are limited by Article 4 which 
provides that States parties must take measures relating to economic, social and 
cultural rights but only to the maximum extent of available resources. Rights 
under Article 15 and 17 of the European Social Charter relating to education for
217 This includes provision of free primary education; encouragement of the development of 
different forms of secondary education, including general and vocational education; an 
obligation to make these forms of education available and accessible to every child, and to take 
appropriate measures such as the introduction of free education and the offering of financial 
assistance in case of need; and envisages measures to encourage regular attendance at school.
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persons with disabilities and provision of adequate facilities and services are 
also limited by resources218.
The right to education in Article 2 Protocol 1 of the ECHR (‘A2P1’) is a right
of the child against the state:
No person shall be denied the right to education. In exercise of any 
functions which it assumes in relation to education and teaching, the 
State must respect the right of parents to ensure such education and 
teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical 
convictions.
The second sentence is subject to a reservation by the UK to the effect that it is 
accepted only insofar as is compatible with the ‘provision of efficient 
instruction and training and the avoidance of unreasonable public expenditure’. 
The meaning of ‘education’, and the scope of what constitutes a minimum level 
of provision are open to interpretation. In the Simpson case219 it was said that 
the right under A2P1 is not an absolute right that requires Contracting Parties to 
subsidise private education of a particular type or level, and that there must be a 
wide measure of discretion left to appropriate authorities as to how to make best 
use of the resources available to them in the interests of disabled children 
generally. In principle, A2P1 guarantees access to educational facilities that 
have been created at a given time and the possibility of drawing benefit from 
the education received.
This right ‘by its very nature calls for regulation by the state, which may vary in 
time and place according to the needs and resources of the community of 
individuals’, as long as the substance of the right to education is preserved220. 
The Belgian Linguistics and Simpson cases have affirmed the overriding power 
of the state to decide how best to provide education within the resources 
available for all pupils. It appears the right to education, in relation to 
individuals, simply guarantees equal access to existing facilities221, which
218 See Autism Europe v France Complaint No 13/2002 European Committee of Social Rights.
219 (1989) 64 DR 188.
220 Belgian Linguistics (no 2) (1979-80) 1 EHRR 252 para 3.
221 See I Hare ‘Social Rights as Fundamental Rights’ in B Hepple (eds.) Social and Labour 
Rights in a G lobal Context (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2002) 153 at 167 referred 
to in Harris 2007 p. 71.
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means ‘efficient and properly equipped schools of sufficient type and number 
available to meet the needs of the LEA’s population222.
A2P1 requires the state to respect the right of parents to ensure such education 
and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical 
convictions. Although education is the right of the child, relevant religious and 
philosophical convictions are those of the parents. Harris helpfully explains the 
relationship between parents, children and the state by categorising the state as 
agent of the parents in fulfilling their moral and legal duty to educate their 
children. Parental preference is not recognised as a philosophical conviction for 
the purposes of Article 9 of the ECHR. In the case of Graeme223 the 
Commission said that, even where a dispute concerns philosophical convictions, 
the child’s right to education under A2P1 was the dominant part of the 
obligation. This implied that the most important consideration is whether the 
child is suitably educated. In determining this, the state is under a duty to ensure 
conformity with the parent’s philosophical beliefs and convictions insofar as is 
possible, but this does not require the state to provide special facilities to 
accommodate particular convictions.
224In T v Special Educational Needs Tribunal and Wiltshire County Council it 
was held that parents’ preference for a particular form of special educational 
provision (in this case inclusion) did not amount to a religious or political 
conviction. However, this case was decided with reference to R (Williamson) v
225 • •Secretary o f State for Education and Employment and Others m which it had 
been held that belief in the use of corporal punishment could not amount to a 
philosophical conviction or belief. This was overturned by the House of Lords 
subsequently, so the position is uncertain. The Strasbourg jurisprudence 
indicates that ‘conviction’ denotes views that have reached a certain level of
0 0  f\cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance . It is clear from the UK’s 
reservation to A2P1 that policy favours collective goals over individual rights,
222 Hughes v First Secretary o f  State and South Bedfordshire D istrict Council [2007] EWCA 
838 CA.
223 Graeme v UK  [1990] 64 DR 158.
224 [2002] ELR 704 (QBD).
225 [2005] 2 AC 246.
226 Cam pbell and Cosans v UK (No.2) [1982] 4 EHRR 293 para 36.
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even in circumstances where the parent’s choice of educational provision is in 
line with other state policy (inclusion). By neglecting to interfere, the courts 
have upheld this as a reasonable position to adopt.
Harris argues that the rights under the various Conventions coalesce into a basic 
human right to education which fits into the welfare/interests theory of rights. 
The right protects an interest (in being educated) the importance of which has 
warranted the imposition of duties for the benefit of the interest holder (the 
child). However, even substantive education rights are tenuous because the 
nature of the obligation is often imprecise (Harris 2007). As observed in 
Chapter Three, an obligation to assess needs and make provision where 
necessary allows considerable discretion227. Education is an empowerment 
right, described as ‘necessary for people to participate in the democratic process
and for such process to function’ (Fabre 2000), and ‘a pre-requisite to the more
228reasoned exercise of political and civil liberties’ (Hodgson 1998) .
Because the right is limited by resources, scarcity of resources places children 
in a competitive position. This limits the potential of the right to ensure social 
inclusion on the basis of equality because some parents are better able to derive 
benefits for their children due to their own privileged educational backgrounds 
(Stychin 2000). Such parents are also more able to enforce their choice and 
influence provision generally due to their participation skills (Harris 2007 p.43). 
Equality of opportunity does not result in equal outcomes.
SEN and admissions legislation introducing parental preference were enacted in 
line with the rhetoric of empowerment of parents in the 1980s. A combination 
of weak rights limited by collective goals and resources, and unequal 
enforcement, has resulted in substantial inequality, as illustrated in the SEN 
context by the Select Committee’s 2006 Report. There is evidence of wide 
variations in the extent to which LEAs statement children (Audit Commission
227 Further, the cases of R v Secretary o f  State ex parte Lashford [1988] 1FLR 72; R v Isle o f  
Wight Council ex parte AS [1993] 1FLR 634; H  v Kent County Council and the Special 
Educational Needs Tribunal [2000] ELR 660 confirm that LEAs may determine whether 
schools have sufficient funding and skills to provide for a child’s needs, obviating the necessity 
for LEA involvement.
228 Cited in Harris 2007 at p.40
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2002 pp. 26-30); that mainstream schools are unwilling to take children with 
SEN for fear of them ‘dragging down’ their position in the league tables of 
school performance (Ibid. paras 42-46); and that children with SEN are more 
likely to be permanently excluded229. There are also concerns about segregation 
of children with SEN in mainstream schools because they are being taught by 
untrained learning assistants (Ainscow 1999 p.3).
In the context of admissions, a recent study refers to covert selection and 
‘selection by mortgage’. (Coldron 2008). The higher the socio-economic intake 
of a school, the greater the likelihood it will be perceived as ‘good’ and popular 
with parents. Both parents and staff at the school will resist the intake of 
children likely to be disruptive. The market creates a hierarchy and those at the 
bottom of the hierarchy suffer perpetually by its creation. The study cites 
examples of polarisation and wholesale vilification and denigration of less 
advantaged families and communities, suggesting that this is a means by which 
material advantage and power are maintained and the imposition of symbolic 
and cultural inferiority made to appear acceptable. Given the ability of 
education to influence significantly the lives of children of differing levels of 
ability, ethnic background and social class, it appears, as Harris says, that ‘the 
level of state intervention and redistribution required is clearly greater than that 
being achieved under the current market/consumer-based system.’ (Harris 2007 
p.46). This thesis argues that the same is true of the enforcement mechanisms 
currently in place.
The right to education is not an unqualified right. The next question to consider 
is the role of the child in enforcement.
7.3.3. Enforcement
Children cannot appeal LEA decisions about SEN or access schools’ complaints 
procedures. They may attend a SENDIST appeal hearing, give evidence and
229 SEN pupils with and without statements made up 67% of the total number of permanent 
exclusions in 2001/2; 65% in 2002/3; 64% in 2003/4; 58% in 2004/5; and 68% in 2005/6. 
Figures are from the DCSF First Release series (www.dfes.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/SR). A study 
by Harris identified links between exclusion and ethnicity and social deprivation, and found that 
children with SEN were seven time more likely to be permanently excluded (Harris 2000).
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address the tribunal. The SENDIST guidance for parents states that they can 
bring their child to the hearing. There is also guidance for children about what 
to expect. This suggests that they may attend at the beginning of the hearing to 
give their views, but the expectation is that they will then leave. Harris’s 
research indicated that children rarely attended hearings (Harris 1997 pp 146- 
151). Children may be excluded if likely to disrupt the proceedings, or where 
their presence would make it more difficult for any person to adduce evidence
230or make representations necessary for the proper conduct of the appeal .
When the issue of children’s involvement in SEN appeals was considered by 
the House of Commons Education Select Committee (1995-6 Q58), arguments 
against attendance were the absence of creche facilities, and concerns that 
children might hear something about themselves that would be psychologically 
damaging; that they might appear more intellectually capable or well behaved 
than the evidence would suggest, as a result of which the tribunal would not 
obtain an accurate view of their needs; and that they might become bored and 
restless.
9^1The parents’ statement of case may include the child’s views . Where an LEA 
opposes an appeal, they must include the child’s views or reasons why these 
have not been obtained232. The Exeter study (Exeter University 2004a) indicated 
that children’s views were rarely sought before the tribunal stage of the dispute 
resolution process. Originally the purpose of this study was to examine the 
process of eliciting children’s views. However data compiled indicated that 
there was such paucity of examples of children’s views being sought that the 
researchers were forced to change the remit of the study to eliciting the views of 
professionals about the practicalities and appropriateness of eliciting children’s 
views. Conclusions were that it could not be said that children’s views played a 
significant role in preventing and resolving disputes.
230 Regulation 30 of the Special Educational Needs Tribunal Regulations 2001 (S.I. 2001/600, 
as amended by S.I. 2002/2787).
231 Ibid. Regulation 9.
232 Ibid. Regulation 13.
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Many mediators who were interviewed stated that, as non-specialists, they were 
not keen to undertake eliciting children’s views as a general practice. Some 
made practical suggestions as to how this could be done, others questioned the 
wisdom and practicality of attempting to elicit views of children with severe 
difficulties. PPOs did not elicit children’s views because they viewed their role 
to be that of empowering parents. Most LEA officers never met children who 
were the subjects of disputes.
There was a diversity of views in response to the question of who should seek 
the child’s view. Those suggested were educational psychologists, parents, 
independent advocates, the mediator, or the child’s teacher. It was 
acknowledged that access might be a problem. Parents might be uneasy about 
professionals eliciting their child’s views. Confidentiality was also considered 
problematic. The child may not wish his views to be made known to his parents 
or his school.
There were practical issues to be thought through: an appropriate place; 
eliminating pressure for the child; establishing a rapport; specialist help that 
might be needed where the child has difficulties in communication; ensuring the 
‘authentic voice’ of the child is heard; the competence of children in giving a 
view and the competence of professionals to establish children’s views 
accurately; the weight and value that should be afforded; placing too much 
responsibility on children; and not raising children’s hopes.
In compliance with the requirement to make children’s views known to the 
SENDIST, LEAs used pro-formas. These were almost never completed by the 
child on his own. Children were rarely consulted properly about disputes. But 
some interviewees considered that listening to children was crucial; that what 
needed to happen was for structures to be put in place to help children to 
express their views; that there needed to be a receptive audience willing not just 
to listen, but to negotiate and explain the ‘reality’. Their view was that any 
provision will be more effective with the child ‘on board’: the perceived 
wisdom of children and parents being ‘done unto’ should be a thing of the past 
(Ibid. p.25).
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The report concluded that there was much to be done in the field of eliciting 
children’s views in dispute resolution. The value in doing this is that it promotes 
children’s participation. But there is the risk of a negative effect where views 
are not taken seriously. Numerous recommendations were made: parents should 
be encouraged to allow their child’s views to be heard; listening to children 
should be started early and become a normal part of their school lives; children 
with severe difficulties should be given appropriate specialist help in making 
their views known; instigation of effective specialist training in eliciting 
children’s views; and the introduction of national guidelines to promote 
consistency of approach compiled by an independent body.
If the CSCP were to replace SENDIST appeals and other complaints procedures 
to bring a single system into operation, there would need to be consideration of 
what part children should play, and whether it should be the same for all 
children. Approached in this way, arguably the consideration would be whether 
there is a basis for not giving children with SEN a right to complain within a 
system where other children have this right -  whether there is a reasonable basis 
for treating them differently. One difference is that children with SEN may be 
more likely to have parents who will complain for them.
Giving children the right to complain, and helping them to do so, in the 
children’s services context, arose from the legacy of abuse scandals that 
highlighted failures to take seriously the opinions of children (Kirkwood 1992; 
Utting 1992, 1997; Waterhouse 2002). Children are looked-after by local 
authorities because they do not have parents, or because their parents are 
incapable of or unwilling to care for them. The same may not be true for 
children with SEN, although some children with SEN are looked-after by the 
local authority. Their position has been highlighted by the Education and Skills 
Committee in their 2006 Report as needing to be reviewed urgently because 
they are dependent upon the local authority, as their corporate parent, to bring 
an appeal against itself. In Care Matters (DfES 2006) the DfES announced that 
they would issue guidance about helping carers and persons with parental 
responsibility for looked after children with SEN to appeal.
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The snapshot of the SEN appeals process portrayed by the various studies 
referred to in Chapter Two is one of middle-class, well-educated parents 
fighting for their children. In the absence of any evidence of conflict between 
parents and children, arguably parents should simply be left to be the guardians 
of their children’s interests. Taking the step of empowering children to 
complain might be regarded as an unwarranted interference in family life. There 
is an obligation upon LEAs to make children’s views known, albeit a qualified 
one. If the obligation is not being complied with, perhaps the only further action 
needed (if any) is to take steps to ensure the obligation is operating as it should.
But the snapshot is misleading because what is also known is that 99% of 
parents of children with SEN do not appeal despite the fact that help is available 
for them in the form of advice from the PPS and the SENDIST. The limited role 
children currently play in the SEN dispute resolution process is based upon an 
assumption that their parents are competent and willing to enforce state 
obligations towards them. The 99% figure calls into question the basis upon 
which this assumption has been made.
There is another aspect of the system that is inconsistent with the assumption. 
Provision enabling schools to request assessments for children implies a 
recognition that some parents may not seek remedial help for their children 
where this is necessary. There is also a recognition that some parents may be 
uncooperative with pro-active measures being taken in their child’s interests. 
LEAs have a power under paragraph 4 of Schedule 26 to the Education Act 
1996 to serve a notice on the parent of the child concerned requiring the child’s 
attendance for the purposes of an assessment. Any parent who fails without 
reasonable excuse to comply with any requirements of a notice commits a 
criminal offence.
Where a school have requested an assessment, they do not have right of appeal 
against refusal. It is not suggested that schools should have such a right because 
this risks exacerbating conflict between schools and LEAs. It appears, though, 
that if the limited role of the child in the dispute resolution process is based
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upon an underlying assumption that his parents can, and will, enforce his rights, 
this may not be a safe assumption to make. Eekelaar says that, if the ‘empirical’ 
assessment of children’s interests is wrong, this contributes to their oppression. 
Children have a practical disability in vindicating their rights because they are 
dependent upon adults for this (Eekelaar 1986 p. 168). As Sawyer says, ‘Parents 
may as easily be cruel or inadequate as they may be kind and enlightened.’ 
(Sawyer 2006 p.8).
Essentially there might be four models:
1. the SEN model;
2. the CSCP model allowing children to complain and helping them to do 
so;
3. a limited right to complain for children who wish to do so, but whose 
parents are unable or unwilling to complain on their behalf;
4. a system of ensuring that somebody will complain on behalf of a child 
where necessary to ensure enforcement of the child’s rights.
Model 4 could be combined with 1, 2 or 3. Models 1 and 4 fall within the 
interests theory of rights; model 2 within the choice theory; and model 3 
arguably combines both. However, choice and interests are not mutually 
exclusive. It may be in children’s interests to enable them to choose to appeal. 
Analysis of the SEN appeals system with reference to Eekelaar’s model would 
suggest that failure to allow children a right of appeal, leaving enforcement to 
be undertaken by parents in line with their own assessment of what is in the 
child’s interests means that children with SEN cannot be said to have rights.
The system denies their autonomy interest, and fails to provide any assurance 
that their wishes are elicited in an environment in which personality and 
competence can be assessed233. It cannot be said to operate in a context of 
establishing the most propitious environment for bringing children to adulthood 
with maximum opportunities. Fortin states that legislation fully acknowledging 
that children are the focus in SEN proceedings is long overdue, and that they
233 Whilst attendance at the beginning of a tribunal hearing might facilitate this, if children 
rarely attend tribunal hearings, such instances must be rare.
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should have party status. She considers that this is unlikely to be rectified by 
human rights law unless the courts ‘can be persuaded to interpret Article 6 of 
the ECHR vigorously’ (Fortin 2003 p.377). This appears unlikely, however, as 
it was stated in Simpson that Article 6 is not engaged -  that education rights 
under domestic law and under A2P1 do not confer obligations of a civil nature 
but fall squarely within the public law domain, having no private law analogy 
and no repercussions on private rights or obligations.
The CSCP is a model that allows children to take steps to enforce a local 
authority’s obligations towards them, and to complain in relation to process and 
procedures. They can either do this themselves, or ask somebody to complain 
on their behalf. If a child wishes to complain, help is provided in the form of an 
advocate. The child’s parents, and anybody with an interest in his welfare, may 
also complain. In this context, complaining does not involve preparing a case 
statement, compiling evidence and commissioning expert witnesses. It may not 
even involve attending a hearing if the complaint can be resolved before this 
stage.
Applying Eekelaar’s model to the CSCP, the question would be whether this 
regime establishes the most propitious environment for children’s personal 
development. Arguably it does. It would appear to advance children’s 
developmental and autonomy interests; it ensures that the child’s wishes play a 
significant part in any decision; and provides an environment in which the 
child’s competence and personality can be assessed. The risk in complaining is 
that there may be adverse repercussions for a child who complains. But 
enabling children to complain, in this context, was prompted by the severe 
repercussions of not enabling children to complain.
There might be a need to do more for some children, however, in order to 
facilitate the environment envisaged by Eekelaar. Boylan and Braye (2006) 
argue that the advocacy provisions in the CSCP do not go far enough in 
empowering children to participate in decision-making. Provision is based upon 
a consumerist model operating on a case-based post-hoc problem-solving basis. 
Children (they say) should be pro-actively included in decision-making. This
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may necessitate, for some children, enduring relationships with advocates who 
are independent of the local authority. The CSCP model enables looked-after 
children, young children, and children whose capacity to complain may be 
impaired to complain. Realistically they may be unlikely, or unable, to do so. 
This suggests that possibilities for a combination of models 2 and 4 should be 
explored - that schools and other agencies should be enabled (or required) to be 
pro-active in referring their cases to independent advocacy services.
Although Fortin is right that giving children party status in SEN appeals is long 
overdue, lodging an appeal within the context of an adversarial process is likely 
to be a more difficult and daunting process for a child than making a complaint 
within the CSCP where the evidence is obtained by the investigator and the 
process is managed. If children are to have a meaningful role in determining 
provision for their needs, a procedure that makes it easier for them to complain 
is more likely to enable this, which strengthens the arguments for the model.
During the consultation undertaken by the office of the Children’s Rights 
Director on the proposals to amend the CSCP, the response of one younger 
person was “What are you asking us about complaining for? We all know how 
to do that.’’(Commission for Social Care Inspection 2005 p.7). But many of the 
group said they found it difficult to complain, and that the new procedures 
would not really change that. It was difficult to complain about a foster carer 
because afterwards you would still be living with that family. This has 
resonance in the SEN context. A child who says he does not wish to attend the 
school he is attending may nevertheless have to remain at that school, and a 
child who expresses the view publicly that he wishes to attend a school other 
than the one his parents think he should attend may have to face the 
consequences of possible discord at home.
The children and young people asked about the CSCP considered it was a 
reasonable procedure, the difficulty was that adults were not trusted to listen 
seriously and fairly to what children had to say. One group suggested a three- 
way meeting comprising the complainant, somebody to speak for them and the
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person complained about. Complaints were important. Things did not get sorted 
out unless a complaint was made.
There was support for the idea of making suggestions, as opposed to 
complaints. It would seem more reasonable to make a suggestion and then 
complain if nothing was done, but it should be compulsory for social services to 
respond. One group suggested that children should be asked what they thought 
about decisions before they were made. Young people should be told how to 
make a complaint or a suggestion via a website, information leaflets or by 
someone explaining this to them. Children thought the best person to make a 
complaint to was their social worker. Another possibility was a suggestions 
helpline or a Children’s Rights Officer.
Getting complaints sorted quickly was important and whoever looked into a 
complaint should check up on what changed afterwards. One group worried 
about improving the process because if this led to more children complaining, 
there might be too many complaints to cope with and each complaint would 
take even longer to sort out (Ibid. p.9). There should not be a time limit of one 
year to make a complaint as some people do not feel confident enough to make 
a complaint about something until much later. Children should be told the result 
of their complaint or suggestion and the reasons for the decision.
In relation to the issue of the involvement of an independent person, most of the 
consultees agreed that independent oversight should continue; some thought 
that this was not as important as getting things sorted out quickly; others 
thought the independent person should conduct the investigation, rather than 
just watching over it. One idea was that the independent person should check 
that action was taken following the complaint and that there were no 
repercussions for the child who had complained -  that it should be explained to 
the person complained about that children are allowed to complain and that 
complaints can be positive.
Many found the distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ stages confusing -  
‘formal’ was more to do with how serious the complaint was, rather than a stage 
that followed if something wasn’t sorted out. There were three key messages -
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‘listen and take action’; ‘quick and easy’, and ‘sort it out’ (Ibid. p. 16). This 
provides a clear picture of what children who have a complaints procedure want 
from it.
Enabling children to instigate complaints may make a significant difference to 
the extent to which they are listened to. A study by Masson found evidence that, 
in child protection cases, although children have party status and are 
represented by Cafcass guardians, they were out of hearing of the legal process 
(Masson 1999). They wanted arrangements for their care to be sorted out and to 
maintain important relationships, but their concerns frequently remained 
unaddressed. One reason for this was the court’s limited power over local 
authority decisions, another was the desire of professionals to protect children. 
Although the children in the study were capable of understanding what was 
going on, they were not given information. The system appeared to exist for 
adults, not for them. Fortin, in discussing child protection cases, argues that the 
process is dominated by adult litigants and that it is ‘only where applications are 
made on behalf of children themselves that their rights are considered in any 
depth.’ (Fortin 2006 p.302).
In Mabon v Mabon234 three teenage boys applied to the Court of Appeal to be
represented separately from the services of the Cafcass guardian. Their
application was successful. Thorpe LJ concluded that it was ‘. . .simply
unthinkable to exclude young men from knowledge and participation in legal
proceedings that affected them so fundamentally, given that they were educated,
articulate and reasonably mature:
Unless we... are to fall out of step with similar societies in the 
safeguarding of Article 12 rights, we must, in the case of articulate 
teenagers, accept that the rights to freedom of expression and 
participation outweigh the paternalistic judgment of welfare235.
A study on advocacy services for looked after children (Oliver 2006) revealed 
that advocates were described by children as more accessible than social 
workers. They responded more quickly, and were perceived as having more
234 [2005] EWCA Civ 634.
235 Ibid p.637.
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time and willingness to listen. In relation to disabled children, most social care 
professionals agreed with advocates that views and wishes should be listened to. 
But some thought that advocates risked undermining parents and social workers 
in decision-making. A further group thought that advocates needed to be more 
assertive in expressing children’s views. Separating the child’s wishes from 
those of the parents was identified as a particular challenge for advocates.
Both advocates and social care professionals tended to agree that effective 
advocacy involved maintaining a balance between assertiveness and tactfulness, 
and that care should be taken not to disrupt children’s networks of support.
Most parents and carers of children with disabilities expressed positive support 
for advocacy and did not report feeling that their own needs were overlooked. 
Most children and young people expressed appreciation for the role of 
advocates in allowing their views to be heard, and in helping them to negotiate 
tensions in cases where their wishes were not in accordance with their parents’ 
views. The study identified a range of perceived practical and psychological 
benefits for children as a result of advocacy. These included enhanced self­
esteem, improved care packages and the reversal of decisions perceived as 
contrary to young people’s wishes or welfare.
It was widely believed that advocacy empowered children and young people, 
even if they did not always get what they wanted. The majority of young people 
reported a high level of satisfaction with their experience of advocacy: on a 
scale of 1-10, 86% (N=31) of those who responded (65% of the whole sample) 
gave advocacy between 8-10 points. Most young people were able to identify 
important emotional and practical outcomes of advocacy, such as feeling more 
confident and less stressed, and considered their views were taken more 
seriously. 38% (N=18) of young people reported that their requests had been 
fully met and that practical outcomes were important and far-reaching (Ibid. 
p .ll) .
In 2004, the North West SEN Regional Partnership piloted an advocacy service 
for children with SEN that was successful and has been extended (SEN regional
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Partnerships 2004). The South West Regional Partnership have developed 
Regional standards for the participation of children and young people with 
additional/special needs and their parents in the planning and review of 
services. It is hoped that, in fulfilment of their commitment in the Children’s 
Plan to listening to children, the DCSF will make advocacy services generally 
available for children who need them.
During the passage of the Children and Young Person’s Bill, an Opposition 
amendment was laid at the House of Lords Committee stage, the effect of which 
would have been to give looked-after children a right of appeal to the 
SENDIST . Lord Adonis, in resisting the amendment on behalf of the 
Government, suggested that the HMCI review of the assessment, statementing 
and appeals process due to report in 2009/2010 might consider the issue of 
whether children should be given rights of appeal to the SENDIST. He also 
stated that research is ongoing, commissioned by the Welsh Assembly, which 
will consider whether children in Wales should be given a right of appeal to the 
SEN Tribunal for Wales. The argument in this thesis is that further 
consideration should be given enabling children to appeal under the current 
system, but that a model for SEN complaints based upon the CSCP would 
facilitate an environment in which children would find it easier to complain.
7.4. PARTICIPATION
The SEN Code of Practice 2001237 devotes an entire chapter to the inclusion of 
children in the decision-making process. However, children are not to be 
‘overburdened’:
Children and young people with special educational needs have a unique 
knowledge of their own needs and circumstances and their own views 
about what sort of help they would like to help them make the most of 
their education. They should, where possible, participate in all the 
decision-making processes that occur in education including the setting 
of learning targets and contributing to IEPs, discussions about choice of 
schools, contributing to the assessment of their needs and to the annual 
review and transition processes. They should feel confident that they 
will be listened to and that their views are valued. However there is a 
fine balance between giving the child a voice and encouraging them to 
make informed decisions, and overburdening them with
236 73/101. www.publications.parliament.uk.
237 Chapter 3.
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decision-making procedures where they have insufficient experience and 
knowledge to make appropriate judgments without additional support.
Ascertaining the child’s views may not always be easy. Very young 
children and those with severe communication difficulties, for example, 
may present a significant challenge for education, health and other 
professionals. But the principle of seeking and taking account of the 
ascertainable views of the child or young person is an important one. 
Their perceptions and experiences can be invaluable to professionals in 
reaching decisions. LEAs, schools and early education settings should 
make arrangements to enable this to happen (Ibid. para 3.4.).
The Code acknowledges that parents may need support in seeing their children 
as partners in education; that they may be reluctant to involve children in 
decision-making, considering them ill-equipped to grasp all relevant factors. 
Schools should show children sensitivity, honesty and mutual respect, 
encouraging them to see themselves as equal partners. Children should be 
involved in decisions from the start of their education, and ways in which they 
are encouraged to participate should reflect their evolving maturity (Ibid paras 
3.5 - 3.6).
In stressing children’s involvement in the decision-making process, the Code 
refers to Articles 12 and 13 of the UNCRC. Neither the Code nor the 
Convention provide clear, enforceable participation rights. Whilst Article 12 
provides that children capable of forming their own views must be allowed to 
express them freely in all matters affecting them, this is limited in an important 
way by the overriding requirement in Article 3 that all actions concerning 
children should take full account of their best interests. Obvious difficulties 
with this phrase are that it may be open to different interpretations, and who 
should determine best interests. There is also a reference to ‘protection and care 
as is necessary for [the child’s] well-being’.
Article 5 provides that the state has a duty to respect the rights and 
responsibilities of parents and the wider family to provide guidance appropriate 
to the child’s evolving capacities. There is a tension between Articles 3 and 5 
and Article 12 that reflects the ambivalence over the need to promote children’s 
capacity for self-determination, whilst at the same time maintaining the 
traditional rights of parents to provide direction, support and discipline.
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Article 12 also states that the weight given to children’s views is to be 
determined in accordance with their age and maturity, and that children must be 
given the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings 
affecting them, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate 
body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law. 
Researchers at the University of Exeter conducted a follow-up study to the one 
referred to in the previous section to establish the extent to which children’s 
views were being sought as part of the ongoing process of providing for their 
needs based upon data from those working in schools and information from 
LEAs on relevant policies and practices (Exeter University 2004b).
What emerged was that some schools embraced an ethos of pupil participation. 
They saw it as applying to all children, there being no distinction for children 
with SEN, and had developed their own policies and practices. Key distinctions 
were made between formally and informally eliciting children’s views.
‘Formal’ meant assigning specific persons to undertake the task for specific 
purposes -  sometimes through talking to the child on a one-to-one basis or 
contriving a small group situation outside the whole class. ‘Informal’ meant 
listening to pupils as part of ongoing daily interactions.
There were considerable variations in the extent to which children were 
involved in the statutory process. Some were not involved at all, with 
practitioners considering it was inappropriate for them to hear what was said 
about them. Schools cited lack of time and lack of guidelines as to how to how 
to interact with children to elicit their views as reasons for not involving them. 
But there were also examples of practitioners going to considerable lengths to 
establish the child’s authentic view: allowing the child to write his own views; 
scribing the child’s view; allowing the child to relax by doing a craft-related 
activity while talking; taking care not to ask leading questions; and using 
opportunities away from school to talk and listen.
Of the LEAs participating in the study, only 20% rated their approach to 
eliciting the views of children with statements as ‘satisfactory’; 60% reported 
that pupils’ views were recorded in all their statements and said that they had
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explained the requirement to seek children’s views to their parents; but only 
30% collected children’s views over time, and only 10% had a written policy on 
seeking children’s views (Ibid. p.8). There were examples of the expression of 
views leading to positive outcomes. The report recommended a model of full 
ongoing pupil participation which has been taken forward.
This study suggests that, despite what is stated in Chapter 3 of the Code, 
participation of children in decision-making was not universal practice. 
Although steps have been taken to rectify this in the area of the South West 
Regional Partnership, arguably there is a need to do more at a national level in 
terms of taking further measures to ensure compliance with the Code. Perhaps 
the participation model developed by the South West Regional Partnership 
could be developed to form a national framework of standards, compliance with 
which can be monitored on inspection. Also, there appears to be a need to 
develop a culture embracing children’s participation.
7.5. RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE
How should the rights and interests of parents feature in determining the role 
children should have in SEN decision-making and dispute resolution? As 
previously mentioned, Article 5 of the UNCRC provides that States Parties 
must respect the rights of parents and guardians to provide appropriate direction 
and guidance to their children. Article 18 provides that both parents have 
responsibility for bringing up children, and that the state should support them in 
this task. Article 16 provides that no child shall be subjected to arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with his privacy, home or family life.
Article 8 of the ECHR provides:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety 
or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others.
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Both parents and children have rights under this Article, though, as Fortin 
observes, Article 8 was not drafted with children’s rights in mind. It appears to 
emphasise the privacy of adults, and is ‘ill-equipped to help the courts in 
finding a balance between parents’ powers and children’s rights’ (Fortin 2003 
p.55)238. If conferring a right of complaint upon children in SEN disputes were 
to be considered interference with the rights of parents to make decisions about 
their children’s upbringing, such interference would need to be necessary, as 
opposed to desirable, in order to comply with Article 8.
Firstly, what the thesis proposes is that both children and their parents may 
complain. It is arguable that enabling children to complain in addition to their 
parents is not an infringement of parents’ Article 8 rights. Secondly, if there 
were any infringement, Eekelaar’s model is helpful in arguing justification. If 
the objective is to bring a child to the threshold of adulthood with the maximum 
opportunities to form and pursue life-goals that reflect as closely as possible an 
autonomous choice; and if autonomy is an essential interest, then interference 
with parents’ rights is necessary in the interests of a democratic society in 
developing responsible citizens. And if children cannot be said to have rights 
unless they can enforce them, then any interference with parents’ rights that 
enabled children to enforce their rights is necessary for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of children.
In 2006 the DCA commissioned research on whether children should be 
separately represented in private family law proceedings (Douglas 2006). The 
DCA concluded, on the basis of this research (interviews with 15 children and 
23 parents), that there was no evidence to support facilitation of separate 
representation for all cases, and put out to consultation a proposal that children 
should only have separate representation in cases where there are legal issues to 
be resolved. Reasons cited for this were that it would not be in children’s best 
interests to encourage separate representation. Bringing children into the
238 For example, the case of Nielsen v Denmark (1988) 11 EHRR the court refused to allow an 
application that a child’s Article 5 rights had been infringed on the basis that to do so would 
undermine his parents’ rights under Article 8. In this case, the child, who had a ‘nervous 
disorder’ was placed in a closed psychiatric ward for 5 months. Article 8 has also been used by 
parents to challenge local authority decisions to take children into public care. For analysis and 
summary of the case law, see Fortin 2003 at pps 55-61 and Fortin 2006 at pps 306-312.
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proceedings could be stressful and impose too much responsibility, particularly 
where children believed that the judge would make a decision based entirely on 
their view. Children could be confused and manipulated by their parents.
The conclusion was reached in spite of the fact that the children interviewed 
liked the idea of someone being appointed by the court to help them to have 
their say; were clear about what they wanted from a ‘good’ guardian; and 
considered courts should be ‘child-friendly’ and judges approachable, so that 
children could put their views directly (Ibid. pps.7-9). Because the court is 
obliged to have regard to children’s ascertainable wishes and feelings, these will 
continue to be obtained in a range of different ways and conveyed to the court 
by adults on behalf of children.
Because parents manipulate their children and use them to achieve their own 
ends in disputes, the response is to deprive children of separate status. This 
appears both unattractively paternalistic and punitive. Literature on access to 
justice239 indicates that ignorance of rights or procedures, cost, complexity of 
process, lack of assistance and physical barriers prevent many people from 
accessing formal dispute resolution mechanisms. In this context, it appears that 
being a child is a more significant barrier than any of these. The evidence 
emerging from this study, and the consultation on the CSCP, highlights the 
difficulties experienced by children in complaining. Arguably there are 
alternative responses to that of ‘downgrading’ children’s views to lessen their 
feeling of responsibility. The outcome of this consultation cannot reasonably be 
used to suggest that it would be inappropriate to enable children to complain in 
the context of education and children’s services.
If the CSCP model were to be adopted as the model for a unified education and 
children’s services complaints procedure, this would envisage that children are 
enabled to participate at the formal and informal stages. If the ongoing studies 
reveal that mediation is valuable in SEN disputes, it might form part of the 
informal stage. Writings on family mediation suggest that the mediatory role 
becomes more complicated where the child is interviewed separately. The
239 Adler and Gulland 2003 provide a summary.
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mediator voices the child’s views in the same way as he does for the parties to 
the dispute. But the child is the subject of the dispute, so there will be ethical 
pressures upon the mediator to become his advocate. Where the child’s views 
coincide with the views of either party, this must compromise the independence 
of the mediator. Also, the mediator may be placed in an impossible position 
regarding confidentiality of information revealed by the child. He may find 
himself in the position of being aware of information, but not being able to use 
it.
The model of rights-based conciliation and provision of advocates for children 
would appear to overcome these difficulties by allowing mediation to be seen as 
overtly advancing children’s interests. The SEN Toolkit precludes children’s 
involvement in mediation. It is not known whether the ongoing mediation 
studies will consider children’s involvement. The DCSF research brief makes 
no reference to this.
7.6. FAIR PROCEDURES
7.6.1. Review Panels
The SEN dispute resolution system currently envisages an appeal to an 
independent tribunal, with further appeal to a court240, complaint to the LGO 
and mediation. All of these bodies and the mediator are independent of the 
LEA. The question is whether a change to the CSCP model would compromise 
the rules of procedural fairness. The informal and investigation stages of the 
CSCP model are not independent, though there is independent oversight and 
involvement of independent advocates for children. Whether there is sufficient 
independence at the Panel stage will depend upon what this stage comprises.
It is not suggested that the Panel stage comprise anything other than review by 
persons who are independent of the local authority. As stated previously, the 
possibility of the review stage being conducted by Panels comprising members 
recruited locally, as in the CSCP model, is not favoured. The possibilities 
suggested were Review Panels comprising SENDIST members or the
240 Though this is to be replaced by an appeal to a second-tier tribunal, this will be a court of 
record.
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SENDIST conducting a triage process to determine whether they should 
conduct a further investigation or a Review Panel hearing. If the SENDIST 
were to operate as Panels convened under the CSCP model currently operate, 
they would make recommendations, as opposed to binding determinations. This 
exposes a flaw in the CSCP model’s assurance of PDR because PDR envisages 
that people should be able to choose between binding decisions and agreed 
solutions.
The question is whether this renders the CSCP model unsuitable. The Gulland 
and Ferris research (Gulland 2006 and Ferris 2006) on the social services 
complaints procedure reveals that non-compliance with Panel recommendations 
is not a problem. The LGO Annual Reports also indicate this. This thesis argues 
that the model is not weakened by the fact that non-compliance is a possibility. 
Non-compliance with tribunal orders and court judgments is also possible. If 
there were concerns about non-compliance, the model could be adapted to 
introduce enforcement powers. The significant change recommended by the 
thesis is the change from a de novo consideration under adversarial procedures 
to inquisitorial review.
Nevertheless, careful thought is needed before removing a right of appeal to an 
adjudicative body. Judicial review is available, but in limited circumstances and 
as a last resort. It was decided in Simpson that Article 6 of the ECHR is not 
engaged in SEN disputes. But, if the proposals for reform in this thesis would 
breach the requirements of Article 6, to recommend them would be to advocate 
a lower standard of procedural fairness for SEN disputes. There is no desire to 
do this, therefore the Article 6 case law can be used a benchmark.
Article 6 requires that, in the determination of civil rights and obligations, 
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Under the CSCP, Panels 
do not make independent determinations, only recommendations. The body 
making the determination is the local authority. The question is whether the lack 
of independence can be cured by availability of judicial review. This will 
depend upon whether the original decision-making process was subject to
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sufficient safeguards and how wide the reviewing court’s powers are241. Also 
relevant is whether review lies to a body with full jurisdiction to deal with the
'JA'Jcase as it requires . A combination of the further fact-finding process at the 
investigation and review stages and the independence of the Panel would appear 
to provide sufficient safeguards and to enable the Administrative Court to deal 
with cases as required.
The Article 6 compatibility of local authority complaints procedures has been 
considered by the courts in two cases with different outcomes. In both cases, 
Panels were not comprised entirely of persons independent of the authorities. 
The social services complaints procedure was considered in Bee sort143.
Although the Court of Appeal said that the Panel that had reviewed the 
complaint lacked the impartiality required by Article 6, they considered that this 
did not automatically render the decision nugatory. In this particular case, there 
was no evidence that the Panel had not arrived at a fair and reasonable 
recommendation. Therefore, if there was no reason in substance to question the 
objective integrity of the first instance process, whatever might be said about its 
appearance, the added safeguard of the availability of judicial review would 
very likely satisfy the Article 6 standard unless there was some special feature 
of the case to show the contrary. The body responsible for conducting the 
independent fact-finding does not have to be independent. It merely has to be 
capable of acting independently.
But, in Tsfayo v United Kingdom244the European Court of Human Rights 
distinguished the Alconbury and Runa Begum line of cases which suggested that 
availability of judicial review cures lack of independence at the internal review 
stage where that review constitutes a reconsideration of the facts. Tsfayo 
concerned an appeal by an Ethiopian asylum seeker to a Housing Benefit and 
Council Tax Benefit Review Board (HBRB) comprising five elected members 
of the authority that had rejected her application. In response to an argument
241 R ( Q ) v  Home Secretary [2003] EWCA Civ 364. Judicial review was insufficient in asylum 
cases because the fact-finding procedures at first instance were inadequate.
242 See Alconbury [2001] UKHL 23; Runa Begum  v Tower Hamlets LBC  [2003] UKHL 5.
243 Beeson, R on the application o f  D orset County Council [2001] EWHC Admin 986. 30th 
November 2001.
244 [2007] LGR 1.
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that the HBRB did not constitute an impartial and independent tribunal under 
Article 6(1), the Government argued that although the councillors were not 
themselves independent, the availability of judicial review ensured that the 
proceedings as a whole complied with Article 6(1).
In rejecting this argument, the court said that the HBRB had decided a question 
of fact, namely whether there was good cause for the delay in making the claim. 
Determination of this depended upon assessment of the applicant as a credible 
witness. The Administrative Court was not in a position to reach a view on this. 
The HBRB was not merely not independent, but directly connected to one of 
the parties to the dispute. For these reasons, there was held to be a violation of 
Article 6(1). Tsfayo may be seen as a shift towards more exacting standards in 
relation to Article 6(1).
It would appear that what is proposed in this thesis terms of reform would 
comply with the judgments in Beeson and Tsfayo because Panel members 
would be independent. SEN decision-making by LEAs comprises consideration 
of individuation and general policy, and should turn on the merits of both. The 
SEN Code of Practice sets out the principles in accordance within which 
decisions must be taken. The implications of local policy considerations are 
settled in LEA criteria. These leave room for various degrees of discretion 
depending upon how prescriptive they are. The decision-maker must balance 
individual and collective goals. Evidence must be collected and a judgment 
made. The right of the individual is not to any particular outcome, but to a fair 
procedure.
If the SENDIST were to assume the role of a Review Panel under the CSCP 
model, it is argued that this would be a fair procedure that would operate fairly. 
If it were considered necessary, enforcement powers could be introduced, or the 
SENDIST might remain within the Tribunal Service as an inquisitorial tribunal 
making binding determinations.
In terms of procedural values, such as the right of both parents and children to 
be heard, fair treatment, equal access, a level playing field, the right to be given
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reasons for a decision may be said to relate to a concept of justice that
supersedes in importance the assurance of an accurate decision in individual
cases. As Galligan says:
The common good includes not only the effective application of the 
laws but also the fair treatment of persons. To neglect one in favour of 
the other, or to portray them as locked in conflict, would be to distort the 
relationship between them. (Galligan 1996b p.33).
He refers to the line between the social good in having accurate decisions and 
the social good in protecting certain values. These are the values enshrined and 
protected by the courts injudicial review - rights to have one’s circumstances 
taken into account and genuinely considered; a process conducted in good faith; 
reasonable decisions taken on rational grounds having taken into account all 
relevant (and no irrelevant) factors. In terms of procedures, Galligan suggests 
that their normative function is ‘to ensure that decisions are made accurately in 
accordance with the objective of the legislation; give effect to other identified 
standards relevant to their context; operate effectively and cost-effectively; and 
to ensure and appropriate safeguards.’ (Ibid. p.43). The proposed reforms 
ensure this.
7.6.2. Mediation and Conciliation
The function of mediation and conciliation in SEN disputes is to achieve 
compromise. The parties agree a course of action which is different to that 
which has resulted from LEA exercise of discretion. Settlement may be a 
rational and justifiable course to take. The risk is that the need to compromise 
will be influenced by unequal bargaining power so that parents feel there is no 
alternative other than to settle, or that continuing with the dispute is so 
unappealing that compromise is the lesser evil. The PEACH study (Williams, M 
2005) provides some evidence of the latter, but it is a small study. The early 
reports from regional mediation providers collated by the DfES, on the other 
hand, show satisfaction with the mediation process.
The advantages of informal processes are set out in Chapter Five. It is not 
proposed to repeat them here. The danger is that, where there is inequality 
between the parties, conciliation and mediation become a means of coercion
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and injustice. It is for this reason that mediation is not an ideal forum for all 
disputes. The solution, however, is not to abandon informal mechanisms where 
such mechanisms show the potential to bring benefits, but to improve them. 
Galligan asks what are the boundaries within which compromise through 
agreement can be fair and legitimate. He suggests that it is artificial to contrast 
authoritative adjudication and compromise as opposite ends of the spectrum, 
and that ‘most decisions are negotiated and contain elements of compromise.’ 
(Galligan 1996b p.278)..
Galligan argues that conciliation and mediation are not appropriate in disputes 
where there are reasons of public policy for insisting on proper adjudication of 
the issue, and that there is a need to determine suitability. As Fuller says, ‘not 
everything is negotiable; some signposts and boundary markers of what is 
tolerable should be preserved.’ (Fuller 1970 p.305.). Galligan also argues that, 
where compromise is involved it must be informed compromise.
In terms of procedures, Galligan envisages a process enshrining principles for 
deciding whether to allocate a case to mediation; for reaching agreement; and 
for maintaining values relevant to the process. The SEN dispute resolution 
process currently has no procedure for this. The legitimacy of negotiation 
depends upon the process being fair which, Galligan says, is premised on three 
criteria: the parties must be able to participate effectively; they must be properly 
protected (have knowledge of the consequences of outcomes); and agreement 
must be uncoerced. He considers that the predicted outcome of adjudication 
should be made known and, because the process envisages an active bargaining 
process, the main object of procedures should be to secure a framework of 
involvement that guarantees a free and genuine process of negotiation and 
agreement. Ensuring that the predicted outcome is made known in SEN disputes 
is problematic. A possible methodology would be to conduct an Early Neutral 
Evaluation prior to mediation, but this would be cumbersome and likely to 
cause delay if it were to precede mediation, which might then precede access to 
formal mechanisms if unsuccessful.
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Galligan states that the mediator must be competent and impartial; the 
bargaining process must be recorded, and outcomes made available for scrutiny. 
He perceives the legal basis of negotiation and compromise as problematic, and 
observes that issues of procedural fairness, in the context of informal 
mechanisms, rarely come before the courts. There is no requirement that the 
outcomes of SEN conciliated and mediated settlements be recorded or available 
for scrutiny. This is a requirement of the CSCP.
In terms of exercising discretion, doctrines against fettering a power or 
contracting it away are based upon the idea that the decision-maker must 
consider all relevant facts and act reasonably. In mediation a decision-maker 
may agree to provide more than he reasonably judges to be the legal 
entitlement, but Galligan considers this does not necessarily follow. The 
guiding principle, he argues, must be that any agreement is real and entered into 
voluntarily. The task of procedures, therefore, is to ensure this knowledge, 
willingness and genuineness.
This thesis argues that there are two methods of achieving this. The first is to 
establish procedural safeguards; the second is to create an administrative culture 
of fairness that will pervade any conciliation and mediation arrangements. It 
may be necessary to adopt the first approach pending a move towards the 
second. In the context of SEN, mediation and conciliation have been introduced 
without either. The adoption of a unified children’s complaints process under 
the auspices of a specialist body with responsibility for designing the rules and 
oversight of operation might engineer development of such a culture to enable 
informal mechanisms to be used to their best advantage.
The introduction of case management; the provision of advice for parents and 
advocates for children; and the adoption of the principles of rights-based 
conciliation would ensure procedural fairness in the manner Galligan suggests 
is necessary. The involvement of a specialist body with the function of 
‘engineering’ culture, and designing rules and procedures might obviate the 
need for the courts to undertake the function of laying down principles. This
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would reduce concerns about the courts only being able to do this in a 
piecemeal fashion, and the length of time taken to develop a body of case law.
7.6.3. De Novo Appeals (adversarial/enabling) or Investigation 
(inquisitorial)?
A report by the National Audit Office observes that traditionally, complaints
have been perceived to relate to processes and how issues have been handled,
and as part of the internal business arrangements of departments and agencies
(National Audit Office 2005). The report states that complaints are often
thought about primarily in terms of customer responsiveness and business
effectiveness. Appeals systems and tribunals, on the other hand, concern the
accuracy or correctness of substantive departmental or agency decisions, and
conventionally form part of the administrative justice sphere. They are often
considered primarily in terms of citizens’ legal rights, natural justice and a
range of related quasi-judicial criteria. The report observes:
This bifurcated approach may have some advantages, but it is very 
distinctive to the public sector and has no counterpart in private sector 
firms. Rigidly separating complaints from appeals also means that many 
public service organizations are essentially providing two different basic 
systems of redress, which are set up and organized on different lines. 
And citizens also have to grapple with two very different concepts of 
redress, instead of a more integrated concept of ‘getting things put 
right.’(Ibid. p.7).
In the context of SEN, where the decision-making procedure enshrines adequate 
provision for establishing relevant facts and enabling participation, it is difficult 
to see why this process should be repeated by a different body on appeal. If the 
decision-making process does not operate in this way, steps should be taken to 
rectify this. Where it is suggested, in an individual case, that the process has not 
been conducted properly, a reasonable course of action would be to investigate 
what has happened and review the decision. The rationale for de novo appeals 
stems from a consumerist approach to education that appears misconceived in 
the context of providing for children’s needs and entirely at odds with the 
holistic approach needed to operate an inclusive system. A locally based 
inquisitorial review is a fairer procedure for SEN disputes because such a 
system removes the onus of preparing and presenting the case from the
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complainant and so better facilitates access and equality; enables systemic 
abuse to be identified and redressed; and should drive service improvement.
There is evidence in the Evans study of systemic abuse in the form of dragging- 
out decisions and pre-occupation with resources. Operation of blanket policies 
prompted the DfES letter of December 2005. Although there is a mechanism for 
dealing with such abuse -  the LGO -  it is rarely accessed. This is unsurprising 
because the LGO cannot grant the substantive relief parents want for their child 
in terms of ordering the LEA to make a statement or pay for the child to go to a 
private school. If parents are exhausted from battling with an LEA through a 
tribunal process, it appears unlikely that they would further complain to the 
LGO.
7.7. PROCEDURAL TRANSPLANTS AND PDR
Having adopted Adler as its guru and the foundation of its theoretical basis, 
ironically this thesis is to conclude by disagreeing with him in some respects. 
Adler identifies a flaw with the PDR model, which is that it envisages that the 
dispute resolution mechanism should be determined by what people want. He 
says:
[...] it will still be necessary to make decisions in individual cases and it 
is by no means clear that it will always be in the public interest for 
individual preferences to prevail. Individuals who just want an apology 
may have a strong legal case while those who seek a legal remedy may 
have a very weak case or no case at all. Although pressure should not be 
brought to bear on those who do not wish to appeal (or complain), there 
is an argument for encouraging them to do so when it is clearly in the 
public interest that their cases should be considered by a tribunal (or by 
a court or an ombudsman). There is likewise an argument for 
discouraging those with weak cases or no cases at all from pursuing 
expensive and time-consuming appeals and complaints procedures. The 
problem, in both cases, is that of ascertaining, in advance, of a hearing 
or an investigation, the strength of the individual's case. (Adler 2006a 
p.970).
304
He proposes seven policy options245, all of which, he argues, hold out the 
prospect of enhancing administrative justice, either by reducing the incidence of 
disputes or by handling them more effectively. These are:
• priority should be given to improving first-instance decision-making 
and reducing error rates
‘Transforming Public Services’ envisages that the establishment of a unitary 
Tribunals Service will lead to improvements in this area. It proposes that the 
Tribunal Service should ‘enter into agreements with the various decision­
making departments that feed into it, setting out how together they intend to 
improve the whole, end-to-end process. Adler questions whether this will be 
sufficient to raise the standards of first-instance decision making to 
acceptable levels. He refers to the limitations on tribunals’ effectiveness as a 
check on administrative decision-making identified by Genn (Genn 1994 
p.266) and Baldwin, Wikeley and Young (Baldwin 1992 pps.84-85).
Adler is hopeful that the improved standing of the Tribunal Service might 
make tribunal decisions more appropriate, but argues that this is insufficient. 
He endorses Mashaw’s recommendation of QA determined by standards 
developed by a superbureau. These are suggestions made in the previous 
Chapter in relation to SEN decision-making.
• a ‘one-door’ approach
Adler highlights the difficulty alluded to in this thesis, that the relationship 
between procedural fairness (which might be dealt with by internal 
procedures or Ombudsman complaints) and substantive justice (which is 
dealt with by courts and tribunals) is a complex one. Grievances that appear 
only to involve procedural fairness may also involve substantive justice 
while grievances that appear only to be concerned with a denial of 
substantive justice may also raise issues of procedural fairness. Expecting 
people to analyse what sort of redress they want and then to choose the
245 The seventh option is that publicly-funded representation should be available for appeals to 
the second-tier tribunal. This is a reasonable and well-argued suggestion, but is not discussed 
because it is not immediately relevant to the recommendations for change in this thesis.
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appropriate redress mechanism ‘is bound to result in errors because people
may misunderstand what is at issue and choose an inappropriate redress
mechanism’. He states:
The existing arrangements assume that individuals know what kind 
of problem they have and how to access the appropriate redress 
procedure. However, the considerable number of cases that cannot 
be dealt with because they fall outwith the jurisdiction of the redress 
procedure that is selected suggests that many individuals lack this 
understanding. In order to deal with this problem, the NAO 
Report246 recommends that government departments and public 
bodies should investigate whether a closer alignment of procedures 
and a common handling of complaints and appeals would be more 
cost effective. It should clearly be more cost effective because the 
introduction of a ‘one-door’ approach, in which everyone who is 
dissatisfied with a decision or the way in which it is reached, puts 
their concerns to an official who decides what kind of problem they 
have and directs them to the appropriate dispute resolution 
procedure, would reduce the number of errors that individuals make 
when they select redress procedures for themselves. (Ibid. p.975).
This thesis recommends ‘one-door’ access and consideration of possibilities 
for implementation of a single system.
• when an individual makes a complaint or submits an appeal, the 
initial decision should always be reviewed
The proposals in this thesis endorse investigation and review following 
attempts to achieve informal resolution.
• ‘early-neutral evaluation9
Adler argues that a neutral review could result in the identification (for both 
sides) of ‘weak’ cases and, in such instances, appellants and government 
departments or public bodies could be advised to ‘think again’. In other 
instances, both parties could be advised about what they need to do in order 
to stand a reasonable chance of succeeding at a tribunal. Together with 
departmental review (he says), Early Neutral Evaluation could result in the 
‘filtering out’ of a substantial proportion of the weak cases that constitute a
246 National Audit Office 2005.
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significant proportion of tribunal hearings. He suggests that this be carried 
out by the Tribunal Service.
As this thesis recommends the CSCP as a model for SEN disputes, this 
option would not be a practicable one. A possible weakness of the CSCP 
model is that it does not provide a satisfactory filter. Complaints with wide 
and important repercussions might be settled with one phonecall, whereas 
the ‘vexatious litigant’ complaints with no substance may go all the way to a 
Review Panel hearing. This problem could be ameliorated by the operation 
of proportionate case management. It should be possible for a CM to advise 
complainants, in appropriately defined circumstances, that a complaint will 
not be pursued, but also to ensure that a matter is further investigated even 
though the parties have resolved their particular disagreement. In these 
cases, the CM would take forward an investigation, with the original 
complainant simply being a source of information.
• conciliation or mediation before the tribunal hearing
As stated in the previous Chapter, Adler does not consider mediation and 
conciliation suitable in citizen vs state disputes. The argument in this thesis 
is that informal mechanisms can be ‘customised’ to enable the benefits 
claimed to be realised without the risk of disadvantaging the weaker party.
• pro-active ombudsman procedures should be used to investigate 
cases in order, if possible, to settle without a hearing
Adler does not advocate this. He states that Ombudsmen were established to 
deal with grievances where no remedy was available from courts or 
tribunals because no legal right had been infringed, and that their remit is to 
provide remedies for maladministration rather than to determine the legality 
or merits of administrative decisions. He observes that Ombudsmen use 
informal and flexible methods to investigate complaints about the ways in 
which administrative decisions are made, rather than adjudicatory hearings 
to determine the legality or merits of these decisions. He argues that they 
provide additional remedies and should not be seen as alternatives to courts
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and tribunals. He acknowledges, however, that Seneviratne’s work 
(Seneviratne 2002) illustrates that the dividing line between courts (and, by 
extension, tribunals) on the one hand and Ombudsmen on the other, which 
was once thought to be clear and unambiguous, is now becoming more 
contentious.
He notes the impressive achievements of the Financial Services
Ombudsman247, but concludes:
In spite of [the] achievements [of the FSO], it is neither clear that the 
substitution of one mode of dispute resolution for another could be 
achieved in a smooth and orderly way nor that any costs savings 
would result from doing so. Thus, the case for tribunals adopting the 
pro-active procedures that Ombudsmen use to investigate cases is 
not really made out. However, Lord (Geoffrey) Filkin, who was the 
junior minister in charge of tribunal reform in the LCD when the 
White Paper was being drafted in 2003-2004, was known to be very 
impressed by the FSO's achievements, and some of the policy 
options discussed above, in particular, the ‘one-door’ approach and 
early-neutral evaluation, both of which involve pro-active advice 
giving, and the adoption of a more proactive approach by tribunal 
chairs and members, which is referred to below, do represent 
tentative attempts to incorporate features of the Ombudsman's 
approach into tribunal decision making. This is probably as far as the 
incorporation of ombudsman techniques into tribunal decision 
making is likely to go. (Ibid p.979).
If the SENDIST were to undertake the review stage for SEN complaints under 
an adapted version of the CSCP model, this would be an example of a tribunal 
adopting Ombudsman techniques. Adler’s first argument against this is that 
tribunals and Ombudsmen have different functions. Whilst this is correct, it 
does not mean that only courts or tribunals can deal with disputes about legality 
or merits. Gulland’s thesis considered this issue and concluded against 
recommending that is necessary to have a tribunal to determine disputes about 
legality or merits in the context of social services complaints (Gulland 2006 -  
see pps. 241-2 of the thesis).
247The figures he cites are that the FSO investigated almost 100,000 cases in 2003-2004; 
resolved 42 per cent of cases by mediation and conciliation, 50 per cent after investigation by an 
adjudicator and the remaining 8 per cent by decision of an Ombudsman. Less than 20 cases 
required an oral hearing. The average unit cost per case (£473) was almost exactly the same as 
for tribunal cases (£455) (National Audit Office 2005).
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Placing the argument in the SEN context, it might be helpful to consider an 
example. If an LEA, in conducting a statutory assessment, fails to obtain an 
educational psychologist’s report and, as a result, mis-diagnoses a child’s needs 
and sets out unsuitable provision in a proposed statement, that LEA has acted 
unlawfully in breach of a statutory obligation and arrived at an irrational 
decision. The solution is to ensure that the LEA obtains the relevant report 
quickly, and reconsiders the decision. A complaints system could achieve this 
more quickly than an appeal to the SENDIST and more cheaply than an 
application for judicial review. Adversarial adjudication is not a pre-requisite 
for disputes about legality or merits.
The second argument is that ‘procedural transplants’ must be dealt with 
cautiously. If a mechanism operates successfully in one context, it does not 
necessarily follow that the same will happen in a different context. This is a 
reasonable conjecture. Indeed Galligan makes the same point (Galligan 1996b 
p.358) but, if taken to its logical conclusion, the argument that change should 
not be considered because there is no evidence that the change would work 
might mean that nothing would ever be changed. Where there is evidence that 
change is needed, the next step is to consider what the possibilities for such 
change might be and how feasible it would be to facilitate them.
A criticism of this thesis might be that it argues for change without producing 
any new empirical work to justify the argument -  that it ‘puts the cart before the 
horse’. The answer to this is that the thesis identifies that evidence for change 
exists, as does the justification for the nature of the changes suggested. It is 
necessary to set this evidence out persuasively as a first stage in order for the 
argument to be accepted. The empirical work is then about the practicalities of 
how change may be implemented. As Galligan says, in the quotation at the 
beginning of this thesis, matters of theoretical interest lie behind practical 
decision-making. It is hoped that the discussion in this thesis will not only be of 
interest in its own right as a theoretical analysis, but will be of practical use in 
identifying problems and proposed solutions not identified in existing work. It 
is from this twin basis that the theoretical analysis makes its claims of worth.
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Whilst Adler’s caution in relation to public expenditure is entirely proper, his 
observations do not stem from the premise of attempting to find solutions to 
problems identified with the operation of the adversarial adjudicative model in a 
specific context. Despite Adler’s observations, the argument embodied in this 
thesis is that the CSCP model, incorporating rights-based conciliation, advice 
for parents, and with children having the status of complainants and being 
provided with advocates, is one that better assures PDR than the current SEN 
dispute resolution system. Its recommendation is that a feasibility study be 
undertaken. The long term aim would be to adopt the CSCP as a single model 
for education and children’s services complaints. At the very least, possibilities 
for setting up local case management to ensure parents and children are aware 
of relevant complaints mechanisms and the complaints they deal with should be 
considered.
7.8. JUSTICE
Although the analysis is based upon PDR, which is a model of substantive
justice, the rationale for change is based in Adler’s interests theory/authority-
wide approach model of rights. This distributive justice model is central to the
arguments for reform. As Coldron says:
The concern of distributive justice is the fair allocation of social goods 
or resources. In a meritocratic, and therefore socially mobile, society our 
level of education would be a major means by which we are allocated to 
our occupations and consequently to different levels of prestige and 
financial reward. On this basis education is a major resource that would 
in a just society be allocated fairly.
This does not imply equally. For, quite apart from the impossibility that 
every individual can attain the highest competence in all fields, if 
educational attainment is to serve as the criterion for allocation, it 
requires that outcomes differ. Some people need to do better than others. 
When, inevitably, some people get greater social and financial rewards 
than others we are persuaded to accept this inequality if we think their 
rewards are the result of greater ability or hard work -  the meritocratic 
principle.
If however some individuals or social groups are unfairly handicapped 
and others unfairly advantaged in the competition for educational 
success then the fairness of the system is brought into question.
(Coldron 2008 p. 6).
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Rawls advanced a theory referred to as the Difference Principle (Rawls 1993, 
pps. 5-6). He proposed that each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate 
scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which is the same scheme for all; in 
this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be 
guaranteed their fair value. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two 
conditions: they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and they are to be to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged members of society.
The moral motivation for the Difference Principle is equal respect for persons. 
Where strict equality would result in particular groups being disadvantaged, 
there is a need for them to be treated differently in order to bring them to a truly 
equal position. Rawls' principle provides guidance on what type of arguments 
will count as justifications for inequality. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy summarises Rawls’ arguments as follows:
Rawls is not opposed to the principle of strict equality per se, his 
concern is about the absolute position of the least advantaged group 
rather than their relative position. If a system of strict equality 
maximizes the absolute position of the least advantaged in society, then 
the Difference Principle advocates strict equality. If it is possible to raise 
the absolute position of the least advantaged further by having some 
inequalities of income and wealth, then the Difference Principle 
prescribes inequality up to that point where the absolute position of the 
least advantaged can no longer be raised248.
The former Prime Minister, Tony Blair recognised
[...] a long tail of under-achievement and failure, concentrated in our 
poorest communities, weakening our socierty and economy and 
undermining the life-chances of millions of young people [...] those 
students who are disadvantaged socially and economically [...] continue 
to suffer the greatest educational disadvantage. Morover, it is precisely 
these students who are disproportionately represented in the SEN 
population.249
The aim of the proposed reforms is to bring those who are disadvantaged - 
because they are poor, less well-educated, have learning difficulties, are from 
ethnic minority backgrounds, or because they are children - to the starting gate
248 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-distributive/
249 Speech to headteachers in Cardiff, 3 May 2004.
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on equal terms. The hope is that this will better ensure that children with SEN 
get the help they need; that help is provided quickly; that children, and their 
parents, are listened to and treated with respect; and that the system allocates 
limited resources fairly. Although access is only one element of PDR, true 
equality of access is an important factor. The proposed model for reform 
addresses the barriers to access identified in the body of work relating to access 
to justice by ensuring that: advice is available to parents and children about 
rights and procedures; the system is cost-effective for complainants; complexity 
is reduced; there is a single access point; complaints are resolved swiftly; the 
process is informal; and representation is provided for children. The evidence 
from the consultation with children and adults referred to in the last two 
Chapters also indicates that, following implementation of reforms that were 
much-needed, it is a system that users would want.
The conclusion of this thesis is that the introduction of mediation and 
conciliation into SEN dispute resolution does not assure proportionate dispute 
resolution. Justice does not come cheap. PDR embraces multi-factorial goals, 
some of which are attained through adopting aspects of conciliation and 
mediation. Because this thesis is located in the arena of provision for children 
with SEN where disputes may be fraught and solutions needed urgently, the 
PDR goals of swift resolution and reduction of conflict, which mediation and 
conciliation can ensure attainment of, are important ones. But introduction of 
these mechanisms, which may be cheaper for parents and for the state, simply 
allows different choices. Each choice involves different trade-offs; and each 
trade-off is a ‘loss’, in terms of goals. This thesis argues there is a need for more 
to be done.
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